

REARTICULATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
ITS IMPACTS ON NATIONAL/STATE IDENTITY AND STATE SOCIETY
RELATIONS IN TURKEY:
THE CYPRUS CASE

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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ABSTRACT

REARTICULATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY ITS IMPACTS ON NATIONAL/STATE IDENTITY AND STATE SOCIETY RELATIONS IN TURKEY: THE CYPRUS CASE

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The central problematic of this dissertation is how, in what ways and to what extent ‘foreign’ political discourses and representations are instrumentalized by the state apparatus in the constitution and maintenance of domestic political order and state identity in a given polity. In that respect, this study assuming a dialogical interplay between internal and international political processes and structures aims to re-examine and problematize the Turkish official discourse on the Cyprus question. Doing this, it is intended for critically questioning the role and impact of those discourses in the reproduction of the state identity and the state society relations in Turkey.

Despite an increasing body of contemporary literature on the question, there still exists an urgent need for a brand new approach critically examining Turkey’s official Cyprus discourse from the viewpoint of power/domination relations in Turkey. This dissertation considering the restrictions and weaknesses of the mainstream scholarship proposes a new conceptual/analytical framework and research agenda facilitating the re-assessment of Cyprus question and its implications in restructuring and/or securing the domestic politics in Turkey.

In this context, the main argument of this thesis work is that the modes in which the Cyprus question is discursively framed and/or represented by the Turkish state elite within domestic politics are inherent to the reconstruction of state society relations and state identity in Turkey. Drawing on the post-structuralist and constructivist IR theories, I do propose that the official and mainstream understandings coding and fixing the Cyprus dispute primarily as an issue of state’s security and ‘a national cause’ around which the unity and cohesion of Turkish society should necessarily be guaranteed has a two-fold function: First, they ensure the continual reorganization of Turkish political life in full conformity with the priorities and policy objectives articulated by the state elite. This grants them the power and capacity of inscribing the boundaries of the political space and disciplining the political imagination. Second, they ensure the maintenance of the state society relations in its conventional and hierarchical terms in such a way as to reproduce the former’s supremacy over and independence from the latter.

Keywords: Cyprus, Turkish foreign policy, state identity, state society relations, securitization, national cause.

ÖZET

TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASININ YENİDEN TELAFFUZU TÜRKİYE’DE ULUSAL/DEVLET KİMLİĞİ VE DEVLET TOPLUM İLİŞKİLERİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİLERİ: KIBRIS ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu çalışmanın ana sorunsalı, verili bir siyasada dış siyasal söylem ve temsiliyetlerin iç siyasal düzenin kurulması ve idamesinde devlet aygıtı tarafından nasıl, hangi biçimlerde ve ne ölçüde araçsallaştırıldığı şeklinde formüle edilebilir. İç ve dış siyasal süreçler ve yapılar arasında diyalojik bir ilişkisellik olduğunu varsayan bu çalışma, Türkiye’de Kıbrıs konusundaki resmi söylemi yeniden irdelemeyi ve sorunsallaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bunu yaparken amaçlanan, Türkiye’de devlet kimliğinin ve devlet toplum ilişkilerinin yeniden üretilmesi süreçlerinde Kıbrıs sorununa ilişkin olarak benimsenen bu söylemin rol ve etkilerini eleştirel biçimde sorgulamak ve ortaya koymaktır.

Kıbrıs meselesine ilişkin literatürün gittikçe genişlemesine karşın Türkiye’nin resmi Kıbrıs söylemini, Türkiye’deki iktidar/tahakküm ilişkileri açısından eleştirel bir incelemeye tabi tutacak yeni bir yaklaşıma hâlâ şiddetle ihtiyaç vardır. Ana akım akademik çalışmaların kısıtlarını ve zayıflıklarını dikkate alan bu tez, Kıbrıs sorununu Türkiye’deki iç siyasetin yeniden yapılanması ya da bu biçimiyle sürdürülmesi üzerindeki etkileriyle yeniden değerlendirmeyi olanaklı kılan yeni bir kavramsal/analitik çerçeve ve araştırma gündemi önermektedir.

Bu bağlamda bu tez çalışmasının temel argümanı, Kıbrıs meselesinin Türk devlet seçkinleri tarafından iç siyasal alanda söylemsel olarak kurgulanış ve temsil ediliş biçimlerinin, Türkiye’de devlet kimliğinin ve devlet toplum ilişkilerinin yeniden inşa süreçlerine içkin olduğudur. Yapısalcılık-sonrası ve inşacı uluslararası ilişkiler kuramlarına dayanarak şunu öneriyorum ki Kıbrıs meselesini, etrafında milli birliğin ve bütünlüğün mutlaka tesis edilmesi gereken bir ‘milli dava’ ve devletin güvenlik sorunu olarak kodlayan ve sabitleyen resmi ve ana akım anlayışların iki önemli işlevi bulunmaktadır. Bu yaklaşımlar ilk olarak Türkiye’de siyasal hayatın devlet seçkinleri tarafından dile getirilen öncelikler ve siyasal amaçlarla tamamen uyumlu bir şekilde sürekli yeniden düzenlenmesini güvence altına alır. Bu da onlara siyasal alanın sınırlarını çizme ve siyasal tahayyülü disipline etme güç ve kapasitesini tanır. İkinci olarak bu anlayışlar, Türkiye’de devlet toplum ilişkilerinin geleneksel ve hiyerarşik yapısının, ilkinin ikincisi karşısındaki üstünlüğünü ve bağımsızlığını yeniden üretecek biçimde korunarak idamesini mümkün kılar.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kıbrıs, Türk dış politikası, devlet kimliği, devlet toplum ilişkileri, güvenlikleştirme, milli dava.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For many in Turkey the landing of Turkish troops on Cyprus in July and August 1974 amounts to the last episode of the play staged on this little and charming Mediterranean island of Cyprus. Those who deem the existence of two independent and sovereign states in the island as a *sine qua non* of any viable settlement for the Cyprus dispute “would accept Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s frequent statement that the issue was resolved in 1974.”¹ Nevertheless as opposed to this ahistorical discourse that overlooks the historicity and complexity of the question, the connotations and the implications of the Cyprus issue are far more complicated in contemporary Turkish regional and global politics than it used to be in the previous decades. The myth built around its salience and uniqueness in terms of geo-strategy and geopolitics has rendered Cyprus one of the most stern and precarious fields of superpower rivalry during the years of bi-polarity. The increase of regional scale politics and actors in tandem with new supranational agents, i.e the European Union, soon after the collapse of the global East-West rivalry made the settlement of the Cyprus dispute much more problematic and significant. In the wake of the application of the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic to the European Union for full membership in June 1990, the European Union began to be involved in the question as has never been in the past. This has rendered the issue far more important for the European continent to which Cyprus is politically, though not geographically, linked.²

¹ Bahçeli, Tözün, “Turkey’s Cyprus Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974”, in *Greek-Turkish Relations In the Era of Globalization*, Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), (Massachusetts: Fidelity Press, 2001), p. 213.

² Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, in *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict Postmodern Union*, Thomas Diez (ed.), (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 57.

Finding a viable solution to the Cyprus dispute has turned out to be more and more decisive in the reconfiguration of the internal sociopolitical balances and power relations in Turkey, which is one of the major problematics of this thesis work. This is not only due to the link established among the resolution of the Cyprus problem, Turkey's full membership to the European Union, and the amelioration of Turco-Greek relations in such a way as to ensure security and stability in Eastern Mediterranean. Yet more importantly, it stems from the strong impacts and implications of the reviving debates since the end of 1990s as regards the Cyprus question on restructuring the relations between 'the ruling' (the state) and 'the ruled' (the society) in Turkey.

It is fair to propose that for Turkish citizens, the beginning of the 21st century is marked with the institutionalization of a gradual change of the rationale on which the state society relations in the country are founded. More interestingly, this paradigmatic change has been experienced not owing to the debates on domestic issues but rather due to the debates on issues traditionally thought to be pertaining to the sphere of foreign policy. The two fundamental subjects of those debates, in which divergent sectors of Turkish society were actively involved, were Turkey's reviving accession process to the EU and the resumption of the negotiations regarding the Cyprus dispute under the auspices of the United Nations. Particularly the new UN proposals presented under the rubric of the 'Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem' on 10 November 2002 set the Cyprus question high on the political agenda of the Turkish public opinion. These debates where conventional official and mainstream approaches were criticized ever extensively than before was a relatively recent but historically significant political experience from the viewpoint of democratization of state society relations in Turkey. It could easily be claimed at this juncture that the debates surrounding Turkey's full membership in the EU and the Cyprus question have served to politicize the public sphere by paving the way to the articulation of civil

societal demands differentiated from state-centered policy objectives, priorities, and interest calculations. It is mainly owing to those debates that ‘the political’ has been reinvented and Turkish socio-political order has been repoliticized.

It is fair to propose that how the Cyprus question is discursively framed and/or represented by the Turkish state elite within domestic politics should necessarily be included in the analyses on the processes through which the state identity and state society relations are (re)constructed in Turkey. For any social scientist searching for whether there exists any relationality between the reproduction of state identity and domestic political order and the modes in which foreign political issues are articulated and represented by the state elite, studying the Cyprus question yields ample insightful data. In this sense, a thorough analysis of the official discursive economy pertaining to the issue premised on the constant assertion of such concepts as ‘national interests’, ‘national security’, ‘national cause’, ‘national unity and cohesion’, ‘geo-strategic importance’ is a source of great merit for the scholars questioning how and in what ways internal and international processes are intertwinedly operational in the shaping of state action and state identity. For it allows analysts to trace the implications of relationality between the national formation of the state and the international dimension of its behaviors.

1.1. Major Problematic of the Dissertation

The central problematic of this dissertation can be formulated as how, in what ways and to what extent ‘foreign’ policy discourses and representations are instrumentalized by the state apparatus in the constitution and maintenance of domestic political order and state identity in a given polity. In this context, the study assuming a dialogical interplay between internal and international political processes aims to re-examine and problematize the Turkish official discourse adopted on the Cyprus

question. In undertaking this, it is intended for critically questioning and unveiling the role and impact of those discourses in the reproduction of the state identity and the state society relations in Turkey in the manner that the power holders desire. Thus the dissertation incorporates foreign policy initiatives and discourses of the Turkish state into the dynamics forming and reforming the domestic political life and order. As such it seeks to search for to which extent the Cyprus question has a bearing on the sustenance of the state-centric structure of Turkish political modernity. In doing this, the dissertation urges the reader to reconsider the Cyprus question from the perspective of internal power relations by concentrating on its implications in restructuring and/or securing the domestic politics in Turkey.

The dissertation treats state society relations as the fundamental area constantly reconfigured in accordance with the core characteristics of the domestic order and also as a discursive space through which these qualifications assigned to the regime are reproduced through multiple mechanisms. Thus the discursive and performative processes through which the core assumptions of the state identity are redefined are integral to and contingent upon the dynamics and practices framing and reframing state society relations within a given socio-political context. As regards foreign policy, the study refutes, from the inception, the conventional, statist and essentialist conceptualizations presuming it as an aggregate of bureaucratic activities and diplomatic procedures rationally conducted by the state to pursue pre-determined national objectives and to ensure 'national security' within necessarily anarchical international politics. The study, on the contrary, conceives foreign policy as inherent to state identity construction, functioning through disciplinary, exclusionary and securitizing discourses and performances of the state and through 'othering' strategies. Therefore, in this analytical framework foreign policy refers to a vital space through which the domestic society is persistently warned against internal and external enemies

and informed about the indispensable characteristics of the state. The constant assertion of threats, dangers, insecurities, ‘inimical others’ through foreign policy across the public sphere serves to the securitization of those issues and leads to accumulation of more power in the hands of state apparatus. Thereby this dissertation attaches utmost importance to the problematization and full exploration of the security language that the Turkish state elite has used as to the Cyprus question.

1.2. State Identity As A Discursive Artifact: Foreign Policy As A Disciplinary Practice and “One of Its Constitutive Elements”³

As the final and most perfect form of political institutionalization, the nation state is accorded inevitability and naturalness by the teleological episteme of the realist International Relations (IR) paradigms. The nation state is taken for granted as an autonomous actor, sovereign presence, ontologically pregiven entity having, once settled, completed and coherent identity. However as the critical IR scholarship clearly indicated, states are entities in permanent need of reproducing themselves and the core assumptions of their identity. To this view refusing to take states as *a priori* given and/or the only natural and objective form of political community, “states are (and have to be) always in process of becoming”⁴.

The concept of identity has begun to be widely used by both critical and mainstream IR scholarship from the 1990s on parallel to the strengthening of the post-positivist approaches within the discipline. These critical studies were aiming at deciphering and deconstructing ontological and epistemological presumptions, ideological formations behind cultural representations and discursive structures in international political theory. As such, beyond the psychological analysis the concept of

³ Bach, Jonathan P.G., *Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and National Identity After 1989*, (Munster, Germany: Lit Verlag; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 56.

⁴ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 12.

identity has increasingly attracted IR scholars as an area of study “treated as a soft concept during the Cold War years.”⁵

As for the state identity, it has both an internal dimension (“it is what binds the group together”) and an external dimension (situating the state with respect to others)⁶. Thereby state identity includes (1) the aggregate of images, set norms, narratives and the core characteristics of the state that are expected to be shared by the large majority of the society; and (2) “the self placement of the polity within specific international context. Those contexts consist mainly of the constellation of states, international institutions and historical experiences within which a state is embedded.”⁷ As Banchoff stated, evidences concerning the identity of any state can be gleamed from a wide range of sources such as “the legal norms that govern foreign policy (...), the dominant images preferred in its media, the standardized text books”⁸, the oral and written declarations of official figures across the political spectrum, the explanations of party leaders in press conferences and in other settings, and the parliamentary debates. These are all the discursive and representative instruments through which the state identity is constantly reproduced that should necessarily be assessed together with the concrete actions of the state in internal and external political realms.

In realist IR theory, foreign policy is conceptualized as the conduct of series of diplomatic practices by the state elite to pursue pre-determined national objectives and interests and to ensure ‘national security’. In the conventional discourse, the sphere of foreign policy refers to the external orientations and rational choices of self-interested states towards others within an anarchic interstate system. By the same token, foreign policy is portrayed as a vital battlefield where the domestic society namely citizens are

⁵ Yılmaz, Eylem, *The Role of Foreign Policy Discourse in the Construction of Turkey's Western Identity During the Cold War*, unpublished Master's thesis, (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2002), p. 11.

⁶ Banchoff, Thomas, “German Identity and European Integration”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 5/3 1999.

⁷ Ibid., p. 68.

⁸ Ibid., p. 68-9.

safeguarded against violence, anarchy and uncertainty necessarily proceeding from international politics and where national defence and security are maintained vis-à-vis external enemies.

On the other hand, within the last two decades various critical studies positioning themselves away from the essentialist and reductionist nature of conventional IR theory engendered novel opportunities for the discipline to transcend its long-standing inertia. These studies, some of which critically interrogate the state-centricism of the discipline, dedicated themselves to posit a more comprehensive and adequate conceptualization of state, 'foreign' policy and international politics. These critiques, be they positivist or non-positivist, shifted the focus of the theory onto the processes where internal and international political structures reciprocally framed each other. As opposed to the realist school, in which "the domestic is clearly demarcated from the international sphere"⁹ the intertwinedness of these two realms has constituted, to a large extent, the core and content of the new critical research agenda.

This new research avenue intends to question how and to what extent the ways in which 'foreign' policy issues are articulated are functional in building a fixed and coherent national/domestic identity. Therefore within the dissident literature 'foreign' policy is theorized not as "the external view and rationalist orientation of a pre-established state, the identity of which is secure before it enters into relations with others"¹⁰. But rather it is conceptualized as exclusionary practices "in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of "danger" with threats identified and located on the "outside""¹¹. In this analysis 'foreign' policy refers to a series of political practices through which external and internal 'others',

9 Diez, Thomas, "The Imposition of Governance: Transforming Foreign Policy Through EU Enlargement", COPRI 2000, IIS Working Papers, accessible at <http://www.copri.dk/publications/workingpapers.htm>, p. 6.

¹⁰ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 51.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 68.

endangering the pre-supposed identicalness between the state and the society, are specified and declared by the state apparatus. Thus, the specific rhetoric used by the state elite to define the threats and dangers with which the domestic society is faced is integral part of foreign policy articulations as a constitutive element in state identity construction. Conceptualized in this way, ‘foreign’ policy constitutes one part of governance “as a structure that governs the behaviors of those embedded in it in the socio-political realm”¹². Thereby ‘foreign’ political initiatives of the state apparatus and the modes in which they are represented in domestic politics are inherent to the reproduction of both state identity and domestic order.

State society relations constitute the fundamental sphere in which the unique characteristics of the domestic political life and order are shaped and reshaped through interactions between the state and the national ‘social formation’ in which it is embedded. In this sense, critical IR scholarship draws our attention to the functionalization of foreign political issues in regulating and reinscribing this vital space in the manner that power holders desire in a given polity. The classical paradigms conceptualize those relations as relations between a completed agent (the state) and its social/national formation¹³ occurring within a definitely bounded political space. Whereas in the post-structuralist IR theory state society relations correspond to a structure continually transforming and discursively and performatively reconfigured through disciplinary mechanisms.

This analytical framework gains profound importance in critically assessing Turkey’s Cyprus policy and the discourse, which conceives the dispute as a source of imminent/existential threat and as ‘the national cause’ of Turkishhood. The analytical tools and insights presented by the dissident post-structuralist literature provide this

¹² Diez, Thomas, “The Imposition of Governance”, p. 6.

¹³ Alford, Robert R., “Paradigms of Relations Between State and Society”, in *The State Critical Concepts Volume I*, John A. Hall (ed.), (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 63-76.

dissertation with the prospect of re-examining the official discourse concerning the Cyprus issue. A re-examination by placing special emphasis on the implications and manifestations of this discursive totality in the maintenance of state identity and state society relations in Turkish political landscape.

1.3. The Aimed Contributions and Originality of the Dissertation

The conventional Turkish foreign policy writing, the state and security-centricist essence of which is indubitable, analyzes foreign policy with respect to the rational choices and external initiatives of the Turkish state towards others in international politics. In this literature the analyses on Turkey's foreign policy issues are generally limited with a mere chronological account and description of events.¹⁴ Among other weaknesses of the mainstream scholarship on Turkish foreign policy is its failure to conceptualize the intertwined nature of internal and external political processes, discourses and representations and the significance of this intertwinedness in system reproduction. In this sense, the conventional literature on the Cyprus question has never seemed to be enthusiastic enough to pose the critical question of 'what could be the role and functions of the Cyprus issue in the reproduction of the inner political balances in Turkish political landscape?' The literature, in turn, has not deemed it necessary to problematize the fundamental premises of the official and mainstream discourses on Cyprus by contextualizing them in internal power relations.

Instead of critically assessing the modes in which the Cyprus issue is articulated and represented by the political and bureaucratic establishment, it adopts the official state line particularly if such a 'national cause' is at stake. It is prone to accept the

¹⁴ These characteristics of conventional IR scholarship in Turkey can easily be observed in the edited volumes aiming to include all the crucial issues of Turkish foreign policy. For instance see: Bal, İdris, *Yirminci Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2001), Gönlübol, Mehmet, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), Oran, Baskın, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Volume 1-2*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), Sönmezoglu, Faruk, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994).

official Cyprus discourse, in *a priori* fashion, as reflecting objective and unquestionable realities. The author of this thesis work is of the opinion that the mainstream scholarship on Cyprus has not only replicated the basic tenets of the official discourse in ‘academic’ sense but also has substantially contributed to its reproduction as the hegemonic Cyprus discourse in Turkish domestic politics.

Therefore despite an increasing body of contemporary literature on the question, there still exists an urgent need for a brand new approach critically examining Turkey’s official Cyprus discourse from the viewpoint of power/domination relations in Turkey. That ‘foreign’ policy is deemed not only as external initiatives of the state towards others but as a socio-political practice and part of governmental structure will open up a new prospect for a much more comprehensive and inclusive analysis on our issue of Cyprus. This dissertation taking into account all the restrictions and weaknesses of the mainstream scholarship mentioned below proposes a new conceptual/analytical framework and research agenda facilitating the reexamination of official and popular Cyprus discourses in Turkey. This reexamination assuming a dialogical interplay between internal and external political processes is bound to focus on the impacts and implications of the Cyprus question on the relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ in the country.

In this context, I do propose that the official and mainstream understandings coding and fixing the Cyprus dispute primarily as an issue of state’s security and ‘a national cause’ around which the unity and cohesion of Turkish society should necessarily be guaranteed has a two-fold function: first, they ensure the continual reorganization of Turkish political life in full conformity with the priorities and policy objectives articulated by the state elite. This grants them the power and capacity of inscribing the boundaries of the political space and disciplining the political imagination. Second, they ensure the maintenance of the state society relations in its

conventional and hierarchical terms in such a way as to reproduce the former's supremacy over and independence from the latter. This dissertation which aims at introducing a power perspective to the problematic, perceives the Cyprus issue not solely as a foreign policy problem but a domestic issue through which internal political balances are reconstructed. It is in here that its contribution to the studying of both the state society relations and the state identity in Turkey lies. This is where the uniqueness and originality of the study can be found.

This study is not an attempt to simply renarrate the relatively recent history of the Cyprus dispute as has been the general tendency among Turkish and Greek scholars through specifying such benchmarks as the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottoman, the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, the 1974 interventions, and the involvement of the EU in the conflict. Thus, this dissertation is not problem-driven but rather interested in exploring the Cyprus issue from a number of theoretical angles by particularly drawing on discourse analysis. The general tendency in the literature is to inscribe the criteria of a viable solution to this prolonged conflict by proposing conditionalities prioritizing the objectives and considerations of the Turkish 'side'. However, this study is not inspired by such a problem-solving approach. Yet it is intended for presenting a discursive map of the official and mainstream academic narratives on Cyprus drawn up within a process of more than last five decades.

The study further seeks to draw attention to the role and significance of external dynamics in the sustenance of Turkish political modernity as a state-oriented process. Of the basic hypotheses put forward in this dissertation is that the conventional and mainstream IR scholarship in Turkey replicates and diversifies the basic tenets of the statist outlook in 'academic' sense as regards Turkey's foreign policy issues. On the other side, the literature on Turkish modernization lacks attention to the foreign political sources and dynamics of Turkish economic and political modernity emerging and

developing as a state-sponsored and state-based project. In the same vein, it is also inclined to exclude the outer dynamics from its analyses on the nature of the relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ in Turkey, the evolution of which is deeply embedded in that of Turkish modernity. The paradigms belonging to this literature, therefore, do not attach due importance to the role and impact of Turkish state’s foreign policy initiatives and discourses in the reproduction of the state-centric character of Turkish politics and modernization. This dissertation associating Turkey’s official Cyprus discourse with the maintenance of the monolithic and statist structure of Turkish modernization is of great merit and significance in this sense.

1.4. Methodology

Should we restate Sanjoy Banerjee’s argument, even though it is not possible to associate every discourse with “a corresponding practice, every practice has a corresponding discourse.”¹⁵ This study, benefiting from the method of discourse analysis, intends to decode the main tracks of the discursive map of the official and mainstream approaches to the Cyprus question surviving since the beginning of 1950s up to the present time. In attaining this goal, the study will particularly focus on specific historical stints where the Turkish public opinion was mostly preoccupied with the Cyprus problem such as the second half of 1950s as the years when the Cyprus issue was declared as a ‘national cause’, the mid-1970s, namely the years of Turkey’s military intervention and international/intercommunal attempts toward solution and the early years of the new millennium in which foreign policy has appeared as the main dynamic underlying the reconstruction of socio-political structure in Turkey particularly through the Cyprus question and Turkey’s full membership in the European Union.

¹⁵ Banerjee, Sanjoy, “The Cultural Logic of National Identity Formation Contending Discourses in Late Colonial India” in *Culture & Foreign Policy*, Valerie Hudson (ed.), (Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 31. Cited in Eylem Yılmaz, *The Role of Foreign Policy Discourse in the Construction of Turkey's Western Identity During the Cold War*, p. 5.

The dissertation does not limit discourse analysis solely with official declarations and other written and oral statements of political figures and party leaders. A wide range of resources such as academic and non-academic books and materials, journals and magazines, memoirs, leaflets, brochures published by various associations and student unions, posters and internet web sites have been scanned and utilized throughout the dissertation¹⁶. Various oral and written statements of Rauf Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), throughout the long history of the Cyprus dispute have also been included in the analytical scope of the study. For, his approach and rhetoric as regards the Cyprus question, which are constantly disseminated by Turkish media in a way as to deeply influence the public debate, is in full conformity with those of the Turkish bureaucratic and foreign policy establishment. “The policy that I have been pursuing is designated together with Turkey, found its expression in joint declarations signed by the Presidents of the two states and is approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the National Security Council.”¹⁷ What is more, some specific themes broadly articulated by Turkish civilian and military state elite within the context of the question such as Turkey’s geopolitical rights over Cyprus, its security concerns and vital interests in the Eastern Mediterranean have always occupied a central position in Denktaş’s speeches and formal declarations.

1.5. A Brief Outline of the Dissertation

This study is divided into eight chapters. The introductory chapter is allocated to concisely explain the major problematic, the aimed contributions, originalities, the methodology and the content of this dissertation.

¹⁶ It should immediately be stated that unless the name of the translator is mentioned, the translations made from Turkish sources are mine.

¹⁷ Denktaş, Rauf R., “Türkiye’nin Hakları Önde”, *Radikal* 8 November 2003 (the translation belongs to Esra Kaliber).

The central task of the second chapter is to discuss and problematize how state identity, foreign policy and state society relations are theorized within the neo-realist paradigm of International Relations and in neo-Weberian historical sociology as its critique. With regard to neo-realism, the chapter suggests that this mainstream discourse of IR discipline, due to its state-centricist and monolithic essence, fails to conceive and theorize both the precise nature, historicities, and specificities of the nation state and its complex relations with other states, international organizations and the domestic society in the age of global politics. As for the neo-Weberian historical sociology, the chapter reaches the conclusion that notwithstanding its success in incorporating into the analytical enterprise internal specificities, historicities and unique characteristics of the state and implications of those in its international behaviors, the neo-Weberian attempt disregards the role and significance of ideological forms, discursive and representative practices of the nation state in the constitution and maintenance of the domestic order and its identity.

The third chapter deals with the poststructuralist account of IR theory trying to develop a new politics of epistemology which is neither essentialist nor foundationalist. This dissident literature aiming to decode the vital relationality between material existence of objects and their discursive and representative construction radically differentiates itself from the critical or mainstream modern approaches in its theoretical inquiry. I do propose in this chapter that the attempt of poststructuralism to reconceptualize state and foreign policy could create novel opportunities in examining foreign policy articulations of the state and its impact on the constitution and maintenance of the domestic regime within a given polity. In the chapter I will also try to remind the securitization/desecuritization debate with the prospect that reexamining Turkey's official Cyprus policy and the corresponding discourse with the insights

provided by this debate will yield new opportunities to reflect on its implications on the state society relations in Turkey.

The burden of the fourth chapter will be to scrutinize three main paradigms problematizing Turkish modernity- namely, sociological, bureaucratic and state centric and political economy based understandings. These paradigms, which have made substantial contributions in understanding and explaining Turkish modernity, will be delineated by giving primacy to their analyses as regards Turkish state identity and its relations with the domestic society. This chapter mainly suggests that even though all these paradigms employ different conceptual tools and analytical frameworks, they have a tendency of explaining the development of Turkish modernity and the evolution of relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ by recognizing an unconditional primacy and supremacy to internal dynamics. By assuming domestic and foreign policies as entirely distinct structures they do not adequately address the foreign political initiatives, discourses and representations of the state while analyzing the core characteristics of Turkish modernization and politics.

The objective of the fifth chapter can be said to shed some light on the historical background within which the Cyprus issue has turned out to be a multi-partite international question. However, it does not offer a mere historical account of this prolonged conflict. It intends to explicate how specific events and phenomena are historicized and narrativized by the authors favoring Turkish official and mainstream argumentation on Cyprus. Even if limited, this chapter aims at contributing to the analytical agenda of the dissertation by laying special emphasis on the continuities within this discursive positioning.

The sixth chapter is dedicated to examining the Turkish official discursive economy approaching the Cyprus issue from a state-centric security perspective. In this respect I will first reveal various ways of securitizing the issue at stake within its official

representation by drawing on formal and informal statements and/or other sources extracted from different historical epochs of the Cyprus dispute. With reference to Neo-Weberian historical sociology the chapter will also assess the centrality assigned to the geopolitical and geo-strategic position of the island of Cyprus within security-based official and mainstream approaches.

The seventh chapter intends to explore the ways in which the Cyprus issue was functionalized in the reproduction of the domestic/national identity, national cohesion and unity by the bureaucratic and political establishment in Turkey. The chapter will primarily try to illuminate the historical context in which the Cyprus question has been adopted as ‘the cause of Turkish nation’ around which maintenance of the national unity is necessarily required. It will secondly deal with the problematic of ‘the other’ with respect to the official and mainstream rhetoric relating to the Cyprus dispute. In this sense, the study aims at revealing how and in what ways these rhetorics have been instrumental in specifying and declaring communism, communists, Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey as the ‘inimical other’ of the Turkish nation. In this context, the declaration of the Cyprus issue as a ‘national cause’, anti-Greek riots of 6-7 September 1955, the expulsion of Greek minority in the years of 1964-65, and the anti-communist struggle of the 1950s and 1960s will be put under scrutiny.

In the concluding chapter it will first be concisely addressed what kinds of roles and functions were ascribed to the sphere of ‘foreign’ policy in order to reinscribe the boundaries of ‘the political’ in Turkish post-1980 security regime. In this part of the dissertation, it will also be proposed that the Turkish mainstream scholarship on the Cyprus question has more often than not contented itself with replicating the official state line rather than problematizing it. However the chapter arrives at the conclusion that in the new millennium the debates on ‘foreign’ policy matters have a potential to reintegrate the Turkish society into the political sphere as a real political subject. Hence

any attempt to desecuritize the Cyprus issue in such a way as to integrate it into the political processes will substantially contribute to the democratic transformation of the state society relations in Turkey.

CHAPTER II

THEORIZING THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND ITS CRITIQUES

2.1. Introduction

The debates revolving around the state and its conceptualizations have occupied a substantial place within the discipline of International Relations (IR) particularly since the 1970s. In fact, as Migdal stated “over the course of twentieth century” various social scientists “from Weber (1964) and Gramsci (1971) to Almond and Verba (1963) and Skocpol (1979)”¹ have concentrated on interrogation of both the formation of the state and its position relative to non-state actors within internal and international politics. Nettl’s article entitled ‘State As A Conceptual Variable’² published in 1968 has also made remarkable contributions to the revitalization of theoretical interest in these debates. This article taking for granted the state as a foundational category of meaning was aiming to develop a state-based approach in social sciences in an attempt to analyze social facts and realities. On the other side, numerous historical sociologists such as Theda Skocpol, Anthony Giddens, and Michael Mann have initiated another theoretical enterprise with the aim of recalling the state back to the analytical plane. Their primary concern was to reconstruct the central status of the state vis-à-vis the neo-realist paradigm restricting its international agential capacity with the structural conditions of the ‘anarchic’ inter-state system.

The emergence and development of the recent critical discourses, (i.e. feminism, poststructuralism, and post-colonialism) have stirred up debates regarding the state

¹ Migdal, Joel S., “Studying The State”, in Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, (eds.), *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

² Nettl, J. P., “State As A Conceptual Variable”, *World Politics*, 20,4 (1968), pp. 559-92.

within the IR discipline. The growth of the critical literature has led to the problematization of the state, its nature, its source of legitimacy, its ontological and epistemological status, the stability of its identity, and so forth. As such, the way in which the state has been conceptualized has appeared as a litmus test distinguishing conventional and critical understandings within the international political theory. It could be claimed that examining the state conceptualizations of these theoretical positions by considering the differentiations among them would elucidate their general analytical and methodological attitudes. For, such an attempt would make possible raising of three crucially important questions on the nature of those theories. These are: (1) whether they are essentialist, privileging one category of meaning in analyzing the social relations and their reproduction³; (2) whether they are foundationalist, assigning an ontological and epistemological priority and validity to certain pregiven facts without making them the objects of theoretical enquiry, (3) whether they are reductionist attributing one variable or a group of variables an absolute determinacy capacity over and independence from the others. It should be added that a thorough conceptualization and comprehension of international relations and foreign policy processes necessitate an adequate theoretical and historical account of the state.⁴ Such a necessity would naturally encourage one to search for more closely how and to what extent the state is incorporated into the International Relations theory.

In this context, the main purpose of this chapter could be described as to examine how the state, its core characteristics and agential capacities in both internal and external political domains are approached and theorized within the neo-realist paradigm of International Relations and in neo-Weberian historical sociology as its critique. This theoretical chapter shall delineate these positivist mainstream and critical

³ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997).

⁴ Ibid., p. 55.

IR discourses in three different analytical planes: These could be cited as (1) ontological and epistemological level, (2) degree of international agential capacity assigned to the state and the conceptualization of foreign policy, and (3) degree of international autonomy attributed to the state in domestic politics and its relations with the society.

In this respect, the first part of this chapter will be dedicated to how the state, foreign policy, and the sphere of state society relations are conceptualized in the neo-realist school of International Relations. This section begins by drawing attention to the very paradox that even though neo-realist paradigm essentially treats the state as the central and primary category of meaning, the fundamental unit of analysis and as the key actor of international politics, it does not need to raise theoretical questions about the precise nature and basic characteristics of the state. This conventional approach conceives foreign policy as purely state-centric and security-focused phenomenon and naturalizes the configuration of state society relations in accordance with the state's institutional priorities, objectives and security understanding. This section reaches the conclusion that the state-centricist and hence essentialist and monolithic nature of neo-realism suffices to conceive and theorize neither historicities, and specificities of the nation state nor its complex relations both with other states, international organizations and the domestic society in the age of global politics.

The second part of the chapter will be allocated to the neo-Weberian historical sociology the main task of which is to reintroduce the category of agency with the purpose of 'bringing the state back in' the analytical domain. The first and second wave historical sociology and their reflections on IR theory will be discussed and problematized without overlooking their strengths and limitations. This section arrives at the conclusion that the neo-Weberian attempt is successful in incorporating in the analytical enterprise internal specificities, historicities and unique characteristics of the state and the role and implications of those in its international behaviors. Yet it can still

be spoken of a substantial theoretical hole; that is the role and significance of ideological forms, discursive and representative practices of the nation state in the constitution and maintenance of the domestic order and its identity.

2.2. Conceptualization of the State in the Realist Paradigm

2.2.1. Ontological and Epistemological Level

A myriad of critical studies set out their analyses on the conceptualization of the state within the realist and the neo-realist paradigms by always pointing out to this very paradox: even though within the traditional international political theory, the state is assigned a centrality and primacy as a category of meaning, it has a tendency toward denying and rejecting the possibility of theorizing the state. Although the state is accepted as the fundamental unit of analysis by the realist discourses, its historicity and specificities are not taken into account. It will be possible to speak of some other manifestations of this paradoxical attitude whilst explicating the realist conceptualization of the state in a more detailed manner in the ensuing pages. It will be observed that this paradox, in fact, does not conflict with the reductionist and essentialist nature of the realist tradition. On the contrary, it is the cause and product of this tradition.

Epistemologically and methodologically speaking, the state represents the point of departure in the analyses of the realist paradigm on international politics. Thus the state, of which the pregiven nature is not questioned, occupies the status of being the basic unit of analysis. This analytical posture of realism that was more evident throughout the Cold War years spontaneously renders the state “as the key to comprehending the operation of the international system, its structure and its

fundamental characteristics.”⁵ If Waltzian neo-realism is left aside, to a certain extent, it would be more apparent that we face with a theoretical context where all the other units of analysis are downgraded and subjugated vis-à-vis the state. So, the endeavor of understanding, and the act of producing knowledge on the sub-national, national, and international facts and phenomena, from the very outset, begin and remain under the shadow of a reductionist and exclusionary methodology. As Richard Ashley argued, in realist paradigm “the state is viewed as the ‘essential actor’ whose interests, power, decisions, practices, interactions with other states define and exhaust the scope and content of international politics as an autonomous sphere... There is no political life absent of state, prior to state or independent from state.”⁶ In this theoretical construct, the existence and maintenance of international politics are assumed as totally dependent on the presence of nation states since the content and boundaries of the international politics are conditioned and sustained by the interactions among them. In this respect, the primary concern of the international political theory is fixed as the analysis of behaviors of states toward others struggling for national interests (maximization of national power) within an anarchic environment. In this epistemology, such issues as national interests, security concerns, and institutional priorities of the states are also treated as pregiven facts and objective conditions imposed by international anarchy. Such givenness, and thereby unquestionability serve to consolidate and normalize the idea that internal and international political processes are shaped and reshaped by states’ own interests, needs and priorities.

The ramifications of the realist epistemology are also bound to be observed in understanding and explaining internal politics. The production and reproduction of the domestic political structure is conceptualized in accordance with the pregiven institutional identity of the state. To sum up, in the realist epistemology, the nation state

⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

⁶ Ashley, Richard K., “Three Modes of Economism”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 27 (1983), p. 470.

is accorded a status of givenness and being the only privileged unit of analysis. At the ontological level, the privileged status of the state as the unitary rational actor within political history is reproduced by the realist paradigm within a linear interpretation of history where the nation state refers to the highest degree of political institutionalization. What is more, the natural evolution and progress of humankind and politics have inevitably necessitated the emergence and development of the nation state and the inter-state system constituted and determined by interactions among these absolutely sovereign subjects. This inevitability and naturalness assigned to the nation state as the final and perfect stage of a given evolutionary process, from the very outset, precludes it from being rendered object of any theoretical enquiry. As Rob Walker reminds us “although the state has long been the central category of international political theory, its precise nature remained rather enigmatic.”⁷ For this reason, one might witness a representative and discursive essentialism, where the theorization of the nature of the nation state and the sources of its autonomy from the domestic society are rejected in *a priori* manner.

It is rather conceptualized as an ontologically pre-given entity and an uninterrogated totality. As Keyman clearly puts it “in this context, the state does not need to be theorized, because it speaks for itself – just as the facts do in positivism. Thus, the state is taken for granted, no theoretical question is raised about its precise nature, as well as about the basic characteristics of the social formation in which it is embedded.”⁸ In such an ontological attitude the states, of which interests, and objectives are pre-determined and defined, are conceptualized as rational actors taking the most appropriate decisions. They are also viewed as unitary subjects having acquired the necessary consensus for implementing those decisions. In that theoretical fiction, states

⁷ Walker, R.J.B., “The Territorial State and The Theme of Gulliver”, *International Journal*, 39 (1986), pp. 531-532.

⁸ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 57.

that have similar interests and objectives are conceptualized as homogenous units “operating within a determinist mechanical system”⁹ like the billiard-balls or black-box. Therefore in realist discourse, like the nation states themselves their specificities, unique differences, and historicities are not made object of any theoretical and critical enquiry. The significance of these specificities and differences in evaluating internal and international political processes are denied and/or glossed over by the conventional systemic and non-systemic IR theory. This, in turn, results in attributing a coherent, frozen, and pre-given identity to the state. As Keyman correctly argued in this formula the state remains as a decision-making subject, “an external object, untheorized fact and ahistorical entity.”¹⁰ Therefore what we come across is a theoretical framework claiming its state-centeredness, where the state itself is excluded from the analytical plane.

From the ontological point of view, it can be argued with some degree of accuracy that like other positivism-rooted theories of social sciences, the realist tradition is prone to universalize the nation state, which is, in effect, unique to the historical development of Western societies and the political institutionalization inherent to Western modernity. Following this logic, the nation state is taken for granted as the sole natural and objective form of the political institutionalization, which is, beyond all doubt, prevalent for all societies. This claim to objectivity grounded on the given characteristics, in itself, represents an analytical enterprise based on a subjective and exclusionary ontology which legitimizes and privileges certain ways of understanding and explaining at the expense of others.

⁹ Walker, R.J.B., “The Territorial State, The Theme of Gulliver”, p. 531-32.

¹⁰ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 57.

2.2.2. Conduct of Foreign Policy and the International Agential Capacity of the State

To begin with, it would be elucidating to our purpose to remind a well-known fact. The spheres of internal and international politics (as the spheres of hierarchy and anarchy respectively) are totally isolated and differentiated from one another within the realist paradigm by using simplification as a method of clarification. For instance, “Waltz insists that the empirical complexity or reality must be simplified and reduced down to one key factor.”¹¹ Conceptualization of domestic and international politics as spaces having absolute boundaries makes operational a reductionist discourse premised on given binary oppositions. This is the point where McKinley and Little’s contributions appear to be more relevant. “The analytical tools of domestic politics are deemed by realists to be neither appropriate nor desirable for international phenomena.”¹² As it could be apparently seen the essential difference and uncompromising separation constructed between domestic and international political structures begin in tandem with the process where the analytical investigations and the efforts of producing knowledge regarding those domains are initiated. As Hoffman puts it, the absolute division between internal and international politics is regarded as “the starting point of any valid theory of international relations.”¹³

The state of nature among men is a monstrous impossibility ... governments establish the conditions for peace (and are) at the same time the precondition of society. The state of nature that continues to prevail among states often produces monstrous behavior but so far has not made life itself impossible.¹⁴

However, the theorization of domestic and foreign politics within the framework of binary oppositions could not only be expounded with the reductionist and

¹¹ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.17.

¹² McKinlay, Robert B., Richard Little, *Global Problems and World Order*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), p.71.

¹³ Hoffman, Stanley, *The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations*, (New York: Praegen, 1965), p. 13.

¹⁴ Waltz, Kenneth N., *Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1959), pp. 227-28.

simplificationist tendencies of the conventional international political theory. For, the primary function of this conceptualization is to mask the given status ascribed to the state as the only autonomous subject within internal and the sole decision maker in the external political processes. The realist paradigm, in turn, ventures to conceal reciprocal relationality between the hierarchic domestic and anarchic international politics, which ensures their reproduction. As much as the reproduction of ‘the domestic’ and ‘the international’ continues, such division will also reproduce itself.

So long as humanity has not achieved unification into a universal state, an essential difference will exist between internal politics and foreign politics. The former tends to reserve the monopoly of violence to those wielding legitimate authority, the latter accepts the plurality of centers of armed force.¹⁵

Following this argumentation, the state as a sovereign and autonomous actor within the internal politics is the only power that could reconcile the conflicting groups or parties and could put an end to the state of nature within the domestic society. Drawing on Bartelson “internal sovereignty is legitimized with reference to what is externalized at the moment of birth, without ever being abolished wholesale.”¹⁶ To presume that the only way of dealing with the external state of nature in which “the struggle for power is universal in time and space”¹⁷ is to acknowledge absolute sovereignty of state authority within a given territory: “In any case, whether departing from man’s sinful nature or the corruption of the social bond, the logic of sublimation moves in the same direction and creates the same difference and ethical hierarchy between the domestic and the international.”¹⁸

In respect of this theoretical approach, foreign policy is conceptualized as external behaviors of the nation state toward others within the anarchic inter-state system. It is presupposed that the state’s survival within the state of nature inherent to

¹⁵ Aron, Raymond, *War and Peace: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. R. Howart & A. Baker Fox, (London: Weidenfelt and Nicolson, 1966), p. 6.

¹⁶ Bartelson, Jens, *A Geneology of Sovereignty*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.25.

¹⁷ Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics Among Nations*, (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp. 328-29.

¹⁸ Bartelson, Jens, *A Geneology of Sovereignty*, p. 25.

the nature of international politics is totally contingent on its power and authority to exhaust the state of nature in domestic politics. Therefore, the state's claim both to full sovereignty within domestic politics and to be the sole decision-making subject within international politics are more or less guaranteed within an essentialist theoretical construct. "It can be argued in this respect that the equation of the state with the decision-making process constitutes the essence of the realist view of the state,"¹⁹ which is imbued with potential autonomy and independence from domestic society.

Foreign policy initiatives of nation states as rational and unitary actors are conceptualized with reference to both the international agential capacity accorded to them and the structural conditions of the inter-state system. The degree of international agential capacity ascribed to the state by different theoretical positions conditions their ability to "determine policy or shape the international system free of international structural constraints."²⁰ Hobson, at the very beginning of his analysis, emphasizes the necessity of making distinction between Waltzian neo-realist conception of the state and that of the classical realists'. To him, there exist "two clearly differentiated realisms and two distinct theories of the state."²¹ This difference does not emanate from their different epistemological and methodological stances but rather from the discrepant degree of international agential power that they attach to the state. At this point, Hobson criticizes the neo-realist theoretical posture for being parsimonious. Although it assigns the state high domestic agency (institutional autonomy from the society), neo-realism has the inclination of confining it within the constraints of international politics, since, in reality, the state is imbued with no international agency. To Hobson, "for neo-realism, states are in effect 'passive bearers' (Träger) of the international political

¹⁹ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 57.

²⁰ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 17.

²¹ Ibid, p. 17.

structure”²² whereas in classical realism, nation states as the political formations possessing varying domestic agential capacity, through different historical epochs all have “at all times (albeit to varying degrees) sufficient levels of international agential power to shape the inter-state system.”²³ A similar difference and even contrast are brought into agenda by Richard Ashley between the ‘emancipatory realism’ and ‘technical neo-realism’. Ashley argues that in latter theoretical position, states imbued with no international agential capacity have no choice other than technically adapting to the requirements of the international anarchic system.²⁴

2.2.2.1. Waltzian Neo-Realism and ‘Passive-Adaptive State’

Waltz strives to conceptualize the state and its international agential capacity by constructing dualities demarcating the internal and international political domains from each other. In this theoretical construct, hierarchy as the ordering principle of domestic politics is produced and reproduced through authority exercises of the state deplete with full authority and sovereignty within a given territory. It is this hierarchy that makes likely cooperation, harmony, and thereby solidarity in between the units (i.e. the individuals). Division of labor, based on the specialization of the individual units so as to increase interdependency and reciprocal trust between the members of domestic society, could only be established and maintained, should the state of nature be overcome and the security problem be totally sorted out by the state authority. As opposed to this, anarchy as the ordering principle of inter-state system does not allow for the foundation and the sustenance of such cooperation and division of labor which would necessitate the specialization, functional differentiation, and thereby interdependence among the units (i.e. the nation states). For this reason, states are taken

²² Ibid, p. 17.

²³ Ibid, p. 17.

²⁴ Ashley, Richard K., “Political Realism and Human Interests”, *International Studies Quarterly* 25: 1981, 204-36.

for granted as homogenous and more importantly ‘like units’ responsible for the fulfillment of similar national objectives and interests.

Thus while they differ greatly in terms of capability, functionally they are all alike – that is, they are all sovereign, having a centralised political system with a legitimate monopoly of violence and rule-making, and are not subject to a higher political authority either domestically or internationally.²⁵

As a consequence, their histories and specificities are not deemed worth theorizing by the realist and neo-realist approaches. In the absence of any higher coercive authority that could eliminate the state of nature, states are assumed as entities in the permanent need of ensuring their security and as residing in a competitive anarchic environment. It is this competitiveness and anarchy that lead the state forcibly to adapt to the “self-help” which is defined by Waltz as a system where “those who do not help themselves (i.e. adapt), or who do so less effectively than others will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer.”²⁶

It can be deduced from all these clarifications that within the realistic discursive totality, the state of nature, “associated with occurrences of violence”²⁷ by Waltz among the units of inter-state system, is frozen within an ahistoric theorization and is contemplated as a process persistently reproducing itself. It is presumed in *a priori* fashion that in the absence of a world state, similar to that of Hobbes’ Leviathan, “there is nothing to prevent the inter-state conflict from recurring”²⁸. In this state of nature, taken for granted as a fact that already existed, there could not be any long-run interdependency and even cooperation among the states, which would inevitably make them vulnerable.

At this juncture in order to explicable the nature of the state of nature, another analogy is coined by Waltz.

²⁵ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 22.

²⁶ Waltz, Kenneth, N., *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979) p.102.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 118.

²⁸ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 21.

Just as the market emerges as a result of the spontaneous actions of individuals and firms (who do not seek order but only self-interested personal gain), so the international political structure emerges out of the spontaneous actions of self-interested states pursuing their own selfish national interests. But, once formed, the international system constraints the actors (i.e. the states).²⁹

Following the footsteps of Bartelson, “within this logic, order grows out of disorder, harmony out of conflict.”³⁰ Should we quote from Waltz, “order may prevail without an orderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator.”³¹

Although, at first glance, the state of nature, in which insecurity and anarchy are institutionalized, seems to be to the detriment of states, from theoretical point of view, it serves to the consolidation of their status of being the only legitimate decision-making subject in foreign policy matters. This theoretical fiction, named by Bartelson as “logic of sublimation”³² delegitimizes the active involvement of other non-state actors (i.e. different social groups) within the decision-making processes regarding foreign policy issues. The socializing effect of the individual anarchy forces states to be homogenous and ‘like units’ that have similar objectives and interests. If we return to our analogy, just as the structure of the market system, the structure of inter-state system is shaped and reshaped through the competition of selfish units (nation states) and with the ‘invisible hand’ of anarchy. Therefore, such an anarchy, which is reproduced through the spontaneous actions of the competing states, once formed just as in the market system³³, begins to determine and constrain the behaviors of the actors, namely the nation states. Hence, a theoretical enterprise comes into sight where anarchy is recognized as the primary independent variable in the analysis of foreign policy initiatives of the states. In effect, in such a theoretical framework, international agency

²⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

³⁰ Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 24.

³¹ Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, p. 77.

³² Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 24.

³³ Smith, Adam, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 2 vols., ed. Edwin Cannan, (New York: The Modern Library, 1776/1937), p. 423.

of the state is confined to the requirements of conditions imposed by the anarchic inter-state system, although they have high domestic agential capacity.

[So] for Waltz the international political structure selects out states according to whether their behavior conforms to anarchy (i.e. the requirement of military survival), rewarding those who conform with survival or even great power, and those who do not with decline, defeat or extinction.³⁴

It would not be wrong to claim that in Waltzian anarchy-centric reductionism, states are imbued with no international agential power that could contribute to the formation and reformation of international politics and/or to mitigate the constraining logic of anarchy. In such an argumentation, states' success in pursuing their national goals of maximizing their power is assumed as totally dependent upon their adaptability to the circumstances imposed by international politics. Within the realist discourse, the states' success is also associated with its ability to emulate the hegemonic power. That the state is not viewed as an independent variable and agent which has a saying in the structuring and restructuring of the international political system is, in fact, another tenet underlying Waltzian argument that we do not actually need a theory of the state. If we are to speak of the international in which all the relations that constitute and reconstitute it are given, and if we are to speak of the nation state, of which interests, objectives, characteristics, and identity are also pre-determined, Waltzian rejection of any possibility and necessity of a theory of the state turns out to be easy to comprehend. According to neo-realism, another factor determining and constraining the foreign policy initiatives of nation states is the necessity to emulate the successful practices of the system's leaders. In this respect, Waltz argues that "[a]s in economics, competitive systems are regulated by the 'rationality' of the more successful competitors... Either their competitors emulate them or they fall by the wayside."³⁵ Accordingly, the states who do not imitate the leading or hegemonic states in order to minimize the relative power gap stemming from the

³⁴ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 22. A detailed elaboration of this issue could be found in Kenneth N. Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).

³⁵ Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 76-7.

anarchical power differentiations are condemned to weaken and even perish eventually. Various IR scholars such as Ashley, Walker and Griffiths and as well as Hobson affirm that a distinction be made between the classical realism and its neo-realist version as to their conceptualization of the state. While the neo-realists, particularly Waltz, accuse the classical realist approach of being reductionist in the sense that it ventures to explicate the whole system through its parts, according to these authors the agential quality of the state is more clearly recognized within the classical realist statism.³⁶ In the classical approach, the state is situated as an independent agential variable domestic changes of which have a more deterministic impact on the structuring and restructuring of international politics. Thus, in sharp contrast to neo-realism, it is accepted that changes in the natures of the units (i.e. a possible reduction of the state's domestic agential power) directly lead to fundamental changes in the structure of international politics. More so, a strong corollary is established between the domestic and international agential capacity of the state, according to which a possible decline in the former would forcibly result in a decrease in the latter. Although this relationality, which would be addressed later in a more detailed manner, attributes more capacity and effectiveness to the state in order to resolute inter-state conflicts and to mitigate the logic of anarchy, anarchy still constitutes the basic character of international politics, by which the actions of the individual state are regulated.

2.2.3. Domestic Agential Power of the State and Its Relations with the Society

States are endowed with absolute domestic agential power and unproblematic institutional autonomy vis-à-vis non-state actors by almost all scholars pertaining to the realist school within the discipline of the IR. In this respect, state society relations are

³⁶ Ashley, Richard K., "Political Realism and Human Interests", *International Studies Quarterly*, 25: 1981, pp. 204-34; Walker, R.B.J., "Realism, Change and International Political Theory", *International Studies Quarterly*, 31: 1987, 65-86; Griffiths, Martin, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics*, (London: Routledge, 1992).

comprehended as a sort of space where institutional priorities, needs, and objectives of the state are satisfactorily met and its autonomy from the rest of the society is constituted and maintained in such a way as to ensure its homogenous and unitary 'nature' within the structure of inter-state system. Therefore, the way in which state society relations are analyzed serves to institutionalize the independence of the state as the only legitimate decision-making subject, within a potentially autonomous "political sphere characterized by the state action and state power"³⁷, from the social formations to which it belongs. Many realists claim a direct relationality between the maintenance of the absolute internal sovereignty and the sustenance of the state's international agential capacity. Within this logic, the absolute institutional autonomy provides states with high international agency, both to deal with the inter-state conflicts and to minimize the relative gaps stemming from the anarchic structure of international relations. To illustrate, to Morgenthau, the construction of balance of power that could overcome international anarchy "could best be achieved where state's domestic agential power was high."³⁸ For him, the establishment of fundamental social norms which constitutes and maintains such balance of power operating across the international society is also closely related to the degree of domestic agential capacity of the states. These social norms could be materialized only through high domestic agential power ensured by the well insulation of the state apparatus from the rest of the society. For Gilpin, in turn, states that have low or moderate domestic institutional autonomy vis-à-vis other social actors would inevitably face with difficulties or limitations in maintaining its interests and objectives in the international realm. "Thus, high domestic agency enables the state to better conform to inter-state competition under anarchy, and hence grow stronger; low domestic agency undermines the ability of the state to develop

³⁷ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 57.

³⁸ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 51.

its power base, leading to great power decline.”³⁹ The consolidation of the state’s institutional autonomy and domestic agency are also of utmost significance for it to surpass a set of internal and external fetters that could jeopardize its relative positioning within the inter-state system. Following this logic,

under conditions of low domestic agency, these non-political fetters undermine the state’s position in the system; under conditions of high domestic agency such fetters can be overcome, enabling the state to expand its power base. These fetters comprise technological diffusion, internal social fetters and high international military costs.⁴⁰

It should immediately be emphasized that the conventional international political theory needs to problematize neither domestic nor international capacities of the state by taking for granted the legitimacy of its sovereignty rights within a given territory and social context. For the realist analytical enterprises the givenness of sovereignty considered as a defining property of the state by many, prevents, from the outset, rendering state society relations object of theoretical enquiry. As such, those relations are operationalized as the processes of constructing and reconstructing the subjugation of the society to the state apparatus.

In the realist discourse, another mechanism ensuring the absolute domestic agency of the state as a unitary actor both in the internal and external realms is to highlight the indivisibility of state sovereignty. According to this understanding, “two or more entities – persons, groups of persons or agencies – cannot be sovereign within the same time and space.”⁴¹ This necessary indivisibility of sovereignty is conceived as a legitimate instrument through which the unitary nature of state agency is reproduced within both internal and international politics.

[I]n any state, democratic or otherwise, there must be a man or a group of men ultimately responsible for the exercise of political authority. Since in a democracy that responsibility lies dormant in normal times, barely visible

³⁹ Ibid., p. 32. Hobson draws on these notions in Gilpin’s book *War and Charge in World Politics* especially between the pages 96-105.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 33.

⁴¹ Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 342.

through the network of constitutional arrangements and legal rules, it is widely believed that it does not exist, and that supreme lawgiving and law-enforcing authority, which was formerly the responsibility of one man, the monarch, is now distributed among the different co-ordinate agencies of the government, and that, in consequence no one of them is supreme. Or else that authority is supposed to be rested in the people as a whole, who, of course, as such cannot act.⁴²

The indivisibility and unquestionability of the state's sovereignty are achieved by transforming it to the collective will of the political community which is produced and reproduced through the society's "organic unity by virtue of social cohesion and national loyalty."⁴³ At this juncture, the modern nation state's sovereignty rights and interests are absolutely insulated from the interests and actions of the personalized sovereign.⁴⁴ Due to this collectification/depersonalization of the state's sovereignty "we are entitled to conceive of state as a 'collective personality' being capable of 'thought and choice' "⁴⁵ on behalf of the whole society.

2.3. Neo-Weberian Approach: Historical Sociology of The State

It is a gainsaying that 1980s could be cited as interrogation years for the neo-realist paradigm and its primacy status within the discipline of IR. During those years, numerous critical studies aiming at unearthing limitations, inadequacies and weaknesses of the neo-realist paradigm in analyzing both the national and international political structures and processes began to be published successively. Those criticisms coming from both the inside and outside of the international political theory successfully revealed the reductionist and essentialist ontology and epistemology of the realist tradition by deciphering and/or deconstructing its empiricist, positivist and ahistoric nature. Secondly, these dissident works have also achieved to pave the way for the incorporation of many critical theories of different social science disciplines into the IR

⁴² Ibid., p. 344.

⁴³ Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 27.

⁴⁴ Waltz, Kenneth, *The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, p. 73.

⁴⁵ Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 27.

theory. In this regard, the critical works of scholars of comparative politics, political economists and historical sociologists have made substantial contributions to the overcoming of the theoretical lackings and impasses of the conventional understandings and discourses.

The theoretical attempt coming from Neo-Weberian historical sociology, which strove to develop a state-centric model and to “elevate the concept of the state to the center of contemporary political discourse,”⁴⁶ have a very distinctive place among them. The scholars such as Theda Skocpol, Micheal Mann, Anthony Giddens by indicating the undertheorized nature of the state within the neo-realist paradigm and also the reductionism of the society-centric approaches, i.e. Marxism, liberalism, have initiated a novel theoretical enterprise. Their central objective could be defined as to reintroduce “the category of ‘agency’, by which the state as an institutional agency is theorized through a historical analysis of interactions between structures and agencies.”⁴⁷ More so, vis-à-vis the structural functionalism, and instrumentalism of the conventional approaches, the prior task of these historical sociologists was determined as ‘bringing the state back in.’ This neo-Weberian attempt, which Hobson divides into two as ‘the first’ and ‘second wave’ will be addressed below both in terms of its similarities and distinctions with the conventional international political theory.

2.3.1. Ontological and Epistemological Level

As emphasized by many scholars, (i.e. Ferguson and Mansbach, Halliday) the realist IR theory has reached an impasse regarding the theorizing of the state⁴⁸ due to its ontological and epistemological limitations. Among these limitations that led to the

⁴⁶ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 59.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 59.

⁴⁸ Ferguson, Yale H., and Richard W. Mansbach, *The Elusive Quest*, (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South California Press, 1988) and Halliday, Fred, “State and Society In International Relations: A Second Agenda”, *Millennium*, 16 (2) 1987: 215-29.

increase of the critical studies aiming to present an adequate account of the state are:

a lack of a theory of the state and an exaggeration of ‘structure’ to the detriment of ‘agency’; an inability to theorize the integrated nature of global politics; given the assumption that there is fundamental separation or dichotomy between the international and national realms; a lack of a theory of international change; and a static, ahistorical approach.⁴⁹

By taking into account all these inadequacies and restrictions, the neo-Weberian historical sociology has striven to develop analytical means of a new theoretical framework incorporating the specificities and historicities of the state into the spheres of analytical inquiry. In this respect, such issues as origins of the state power, sources of its legitimate institutional autonomy, international dimension of state behaviors have been perceived as indispensable elements of theoretical investigations.

In ontological and epistemological terms, the neo-Weberian historical sociology sets out its analysis by emphasizing institutional autonomy and agential capacity of the state having its own life and history which cannot be reduced to any other factor. For instance Giddens insistently highlights the fact that

both capitalism and industrialism have decisively influenced the rise of nation states, but the nation state system cannot be reductively explained in terms of their existence. The modern world has been shaped through the intersection of capitalism, industrialism and the nation state system.⁵⁰

Such an approach does not deny the interactions between the rise of capitalism and nation state; however it denies the presumption that nation states are the products of capitalist development. Accordingly, Skocpol proposes that “[j]ust as the capitalist development has spurred transformation of states and the international state system, so have these ‘acted back’ upon the course of capital accumulation within nations and upon a world scale.”⁵¹ As evident from this quotation the neo-Weberian attempt places emphasis on the need to examine the emergence and rise of different entities, structures

⁴⁹ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 174.

⁵⁰ Giddens, Anthony, *The Nation State and Violence: Volume Two Of A Contemporary Critique Of Historical Materialism*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), p. 4-5.

⁵¹ Skocpol, Theda, *States and Revolutions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 110.

or processes within the historical contexts unique to them. Besides, such an approach does not invite an epistemology in which these institutions and structures are made the object of theoretical inquiry as formations totally isolated and independent from one another. The reciprocal interrelatedness between the emergence and rise of those i.e. capitalism, industrialism, and modern nation state constitutes a very fertile research avenue for the epistemology which is that of historical sociology.

This conception of history also calls for an epistemological stance which is not founded on uni-linear and reductionist inferences foregrounding one single factor but rather should be premised on the discontinuities and intertwinedness among different processes and other variables. This non-evolutionary interpretation of history rescues Giddens from the realist reductionism, where the rise of modern state is conceived as inevitable and natural end result of the progressing human civilization and urges him search for the sources upon which modern state bases its legitimate power. This fashion of conceptualizing history also allows Giddens to evaluate discontinuities, divergences and ruptures within modernization process.⁵² As it was stated before, the rejection of foregrounding one single factor in explicating socio-political changes is another feature of the historical sociology. “There are four institutional clusterings associated with modernity: heightened surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrial production and the consolidation of centralized control of the means of violence. None is wholly reducible to any of the others.”⁵³

In epistemological terms, another contribution of the neo-Weberian approach is to reintroduce the category of agency overlooked within the structuralist account of social theory as well as of the conventional IR theory (particularly in Waltzian neo-realist systemic understanding). This epistemological posture aims at giving primacy to

⁵² For a detailed analysis of Giddens’ notion of historical discontinuities, see Giddens, Anthony, *Consequences of Modernity*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 3-17.

⁵³ Giddens, Anthony, *The Nation State and Violence: Volume Two Of A Contemporary Critique Of Historical Materialism*, p. 5.

the agency over the structure in analyzing the socio-political relations and change. It is this rediscovery of the state that provides the base for the neo-Weberian analysis to radically alter the structural deterministic theoretical positions. This it does by making the state an epistemological object that has to be studied in its own right. In this respect the basic questions with which the state-centric model deals could be stated as (1) under which historical circumstances the nation states emerged and gained their institutional autonomy so as to act independently as an agent both in domestic and international politics and (2) what the specificities of nation states are that make them influential in shaping and reshaping of history.

In this sense, the state-centric model can be said to constitute an agency problematic, which aims to rescue social theory from its subordination to the structuralist and functionalist orthodoxies that have constituted the epistemological basis of the society-centric theories of the state.⁵⁴

This emphasis on the category of agency rescues, in turn, the IR theory from the neo-realist reductionism premised on the system reproduction and the functionalist account of the state.

However, the neo-Weberian state-centricism (particularly the first wave Weberian movement by Hobson's terminology) involves a set of risks which pave the way for new reductionist and essentialist inclinations. First, the state-centric model aiming at recalling the concept of the state to the analytical plane has a privileged and inadequately problematized status in the analysis of the emergence and rise of the modern politics and society. Moreover, the possibility of reification of the state's institutional capacities at the expense of other factors could be noted as a highly serious danger before the historical sociological theory. In line with Keyman's argument it could be proposed that "the model and the agency problematic it develops, while escaping functionalism and arguing for the necessity to recognize the specificity of the

⁵⁴ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 60.

state, eventually constructs an institutionally essentialist theory of the state.”⁵⁵ The historical sociological epistemology assigning causality and determinacy to the roles and functions of the state runs the risk of reproducing the reductionist inferences of the systemic understandings or society-centric theories of the state in another way. For instance,

in the state-centric model, although it is suggested that changes in civil society cannot be explained without due reference to the state, changes in the state are accounted for without taking into account civil society. At the level of representation, this means that civil society is ‘represented by’ the state, but not vice versa.⁵⁶

However, the constitution and reproduction of any social system could not be reductively expressed only due to the institutional agential capacities of the state but rather by virtue of its relations with the social formation in which it is embedded. As Jessop correctly argued against the state-centric model,

if modern society is not unitary nor a functional totality, then there can be no single center from which its reproduction is secured. Instead the very possibility of reproduction arises from the configuration or the condensation of political forces in a given time, and in that sense it is without guarantees and a priori determinants.⁵⁷

This theoretical presumption of the state-centric model giving primacy to the state in analyzing the reproduction of the modern society takes it for granted as a coherent self at the ontological level whereas it does not need to problematize, as is the case in the realist IR theory, the process in which the state identity was constituted and maintained through various discursive, representational and performative mechanisms. The neo-Weberian historical sociology is also inclined to reduce political power only to the state power in such a way as to consolidate its privileged ontological status to the detriment of civil society. By doing this, it reproduces the conventional understanding of politics and civil society where the political struggle for power within domestic society was

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.60.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.83.

⁵⁷ Jessop, Bob, *State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in Their Place*, (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), pp. 48-70.

reductively theorized only with reference to the political and economic phenomena. “However politics contains struggles over structures of meaning, as well as, over the process of construction of collective identities, both class and nonclass.”⁵⁸ But the ideological and discursive aspects of these struggles and its impact on the state society relations are omitted by the state-centric model. It should be stated that this institutional autonomy and a coherent self accorded to the state in a priori fashion could be cited as the most important commonalities between the realist and the neo-Weberian school. Furthermore, the neo-Weberian interpretation of history, where the state is generally assumed as the principle point of reference, prevents it from constituting a radical challenge and critic to the realist paradigm adopting the similar modes of analysis in IR theory.

Secondly, the question of the production and reproduction of state identity within the national social context to which the state belongs are not attached due importance by the scholars of historical sociology. As indispensable and even the very foundation of the statehood, the analysis of state identity and its discursive, representative and performative reproduction, and its significance within power relations are not also accepted as the object of an any critical examination and remained unproblematic. While the state-centric model recognizing the state absolute domestic agent capacity vis-à-vis other social groups it does not need to theorize the reciprocal relationality between the constitution and maintenance of state identity and state society relations. As a result, the model reproduces the reductionist and essentialist stance of the society-centric theories of the state. With respect to IR theory as numerous scholars have correctly argued the state-centric attempt could not fully achieve to go beyond the empiricist and positivist nature of the realist tradition and to exceed its limitations and

⁵⁸ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 80.

inadequacies.⁵⁹

The main proposition central to the neo-Weberian state-centric model and its incorporation into the IR theory is the idea that any theoretical inquiry must begin with the recognition of state's specificities within a historical context.

A significant alteration in the conditions of human social existence comes about with the invention of 'history'. From then on the circumstances of social reproduction are themselves reflexively monitored in an effort to influence the form institutions assume. I take this to be the main feature that separates *organizations* from other types of collectivity.⁶⁰

This persistent emphasis on the specificity and historicity of the state as an institutional agent aims to distinguish its historical evolution from that of other social and/or global structures, and processes such as industrialism and capitalism. According to Keyman, Skocpol, for instance, conceives the state "as an institution, a social actor, and a set of bureaucratic apparatuses. State policy and structure should not be derived from social structures, but should be considered in their internal specificity, which stems from their historical and spatial dimensions."⁶¹ The emphasis on the spatiality of the state representing its territorial basis within Skocpol's theory is of merit due to two reasons: first Weber's famous definition of the state as an organization claiming to have a legitimate monopoly of power and coercion in a given territory is incorporated within her theoretical enterprise. Accordingly, Giddens determines the three elements of the state inscribed in Weber's definition as below: "(1) the existence of a regularized administrative staff able (2) to sustain the claim to the legitimate monopoly of control of

⁵⁹ Some of the authors and their studies regarding the neo-Weberian historical sociology as politically reductionist could be cited as Jessop, Bob, *State Theory*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Scholte, Jan Aart, *International Relations of Social Change*, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1993); Halperin, Sandra, "Shadowboxing: Weberian Historical Sociology vs State Centric International Relations Theory", *Review of International Political Economy*, 5 (2): 1998, pp. 327-39.

⁶⁰ Giddens, Anthony, *The Nation State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, p. 12.

⁶¹ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 61.

the means of violence and (3) to uphold that monopoly within a given territorial area.”⁶² However it should be stated that Giddens criticizes Weber as he attributed specific characteristics of the modern state to the all forms of state in such a way as to minimize the differences between the traditional and modern states⁶³ at the ontological level. Secondly, the adoption of Weberian view, which conceives the state as a territorially bounded organization functioning within legally defined boundaries, provides for the historical sociological attempt the possibility of developing an analytical interest to the international dimension of state action. This analytical interest both establishes a strongest linkage between the historical sociology and the IR theory and also converges it with the realist paradigm. For, to propose that the geopolitical framework of the state which antedated the emergence and spread of capitalism provides the state with the opportunity of acting as an independent agent is to explicitly accept, like realists, that states should be regarded as actors having both internal and external sovereignty.

2.3.2. Conduct of Foreign Policy and the International Agential Power of the State

Such scholars as Fred Halliday, Jarvis, Hobson, Hall, Hobden, Seabrooke venture to integrate the state theory of the Weberian historical sociology (WHS) into the IR theory in order to get a more adequate account of the state, and thereby international politics. Of the central aims of this theoretical enterprise is to problematize the absolute distinction prescribed in between the internal and international realms within the realist discourse by indicating the intimate relations between these two. In this regard, it is worth noting Skocpol’s analytical inferences seeking to trace the implications of the intertwinedness between the national social formations of the state and international dimensions of its actions.

⁶² Giddens, Anthony, *The Nation State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, p.18.

⁶³ Ibid., p.18.

In Skocpol's conceptualization the state is represented as a fully sovereign administrative apparatus having a legitimate monopoly of power and coercion within a given territorial totality. By drawing on Max Weber, Skocpol claims that states function in relation to both their own territories and the boundaries with other states. For this reason, an adequate account of the state recognizing its specificities necessitates in-tandem analysis of the internal and global conditions that state actions shape and are simultaneously shaped by them. To Skocpol,

the state is fundamentally Janus-faced, with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class-divided socio-economic structures and an international system of states... the international system as a transnational structure of military competition was not originally created by capitalism. Throughout modern world history, it represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality-interdependent in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it.⁶⁴

In effect for Skocpol, the significance of the geopolitical circumstances (namely restrictions and/or opportunities) is not only limited to indicate the Janus-faced nature of the state. It is also functional in the definition of internal and international dimensions of the state agency. In line with Keyman it could be argued that for the neo-Weberian historical sociology

the geopolitical framework of state action preexisted capitalism, and allowed the state to act as an independent actor. It is the territoriality of state action that makes the state operate outside and above civil society, that makes it clear that it preceded capitalist development, and that gives the state its own history.⁶⁵

Mann, in turn, emphasizes the unique place of geopolitics in theorizing state action by maintaining that

[g]eopolitical organization is very different from the other power organizations mentioned so far. It is indeed normally ignored by sociological theory. But it is an essential part of social life and it is not reducible to the 'internal' power configurations of its component states.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Skocpol, Theda, *States and Revolutions*, p. 32.

⁶⁵ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, pp. 61-2.

⁶⁶ Mann, Michael, *The Sources Of Social Power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 2.

This persistent incorporation of geopolitics into the state theory is strategically important for historical sociology to reveal that the state is a nation state, which the society-centric models (i.e. liberalism and Marxism) have failed to comprehend. Another point overlooked by these society-centric approaches is the internality of the international relations “to the process of the very constitution of the modern state as nation state.”⁶⁷ For this reason, the analysis of international dimension of the state action is treated as a kind of prerequisite for an adequate account of the structure of the state and its territoriality within the neo-Weberian approach. This is the point where the significance of Hintze’s analysis lies. According to him, there exist two crucially important factors determining “the real organization of the state. These are, first, the structure of social classes, and second, the external ordering of the states- their position relative to each other, and their over-all position in the world.”⁶⁸

However, Hobson adamantly criticizes Skocpol with reproducing the systemic reductionism of the neo-realist discourse as she privileges the logic of anarchy to the detriment of the state’s international agential capacity. With respect to this reductionism, he states that “as with Waltz and Gilpin Skocpol reduces the state to the international political system such that the state is discounted (albeit unwittingly) as analytical independent variable.”⁶⁹ Furthermore for Hobson “like Gilpin and Waltz, Skocpol subscribes to a ‘passive-adaptive’ theory of the state, in which the state’s principle task is to adapt, or conform to the logic of the international political system and international military conflict between states.”⁷⁰ Accordingly, military exigencies of international politics, which is conceptualized as anarchic as in the case of the realist tradition, constitute the global context where the state’s international agency is

⁶⁷ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 81.

⁶⁸ Hintze, Otto, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. Felix Gilbert, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 183, cited in Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 30-1, and 22, 29.

⁶⁹ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 176.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.176.

constrained. By considering the very foundational place of the international anarchy, in Skocpol's approach, Hobson even accuses her of "throwing or 'kicking the state back out', thereby stripping the state of international agential power"⁷¹ The preponderant position of international anarchy as an autonomous analytical category within Skocpolian theoretical territory could also be deduced from her statements below:

[t]he international state system as a transnational structure of military competition was not originally created by capitalism. Throughout modern world history, it represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality-interdependent in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it.⁷²

Another conspicuous similarity between the systemic approach of neo-realism and Skocpol's theoretical enterprise is observable with regard to the conceptualization of the domestic agency of the state as an intervening variable which enables or hinders their adaptability to the conditions of international politics. Within this theoretical construct, in which the international anarchy is presumed as the basic causal variable, the state's adaptability and conformity to the military requirements of the inter-state system have been changing mainly owing to its varying domestic agential capacity. In this sense, high domestic agential power that could be defined as the ability of overcoming the domestic socio-economic fetters would result in high adaptability and conformity to the military exigencies of international politics. On the other hand, the insufficient institutional autonomy from the society would naturally bring maladaptability, and thereby failure to conform to the logic of anarchy. To Skocpol, maladaptive states are not just punished through defeat in war but also social revolution in the internal politics.⁷³ It could be argued that the international agency accorded to the state, in other words the conduct of foreign policy initiatives independently as an autonomous actor, in Skocpol's approach is discussed due to its ability to conform to

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 176.

⁷² Skocpol, Theda, *States and Revolutions*, p. 32.

⁷³ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 178.

anarchy. Thus, it is highly difficult to claim that she has succeeded to reintroduce the category of agency to the analytical domain but she has rather reproduced the structuralist account of the neo-realist paradigm “In essence, for neo-realists and particularly for first-wave WHS scholars, the state turns out to be little more than a transmission belt through which geopolitics reshapes and reconfigures state structures and state-society relations.”⁷⁴ For this reason, exclusively the first-wave WHS leaving up its promise to go beyond the impasses of the conventional IR theories with respect to the conceptualization of the state represents for many a pathway back into neo-realist cul-de-sac.⁷⁵

To overcome these impasses, a new theoretical enterprise is initiated within historical sociology to go beyond the neo-realist conception of state. The major objective of this second-wave WHS is to fulfill the incomplete project in which the state is “genuinely ‘brought back in’ as a power source that cannot be reduced to any singular exogenous logic.”⁷⁶ In this context, the simplificationist logic of the neo-realist paradigm, which singles out one key factor (namely the international anarchy) in explaining the state’s international agency is replaced by the second-wave WHS with ‘multicausality’ considering the intertwindeedness among multiple variables as interdependent power sources. In the same vein, the third principle of the second-wave WHS cited as ‘multispatiality’ is dedicated to dissolve the primacy of the anarchic inter-state system in analyzing the state’s foreign policy initiatives. Therefore, it is asserted that “the various spatial levels- sub-national, national, international, and global- all affect and structure each other, such that none are self-constituting but are embedded in each other.”⁷⁷

Thus the agent and the structure (the state and international politics) both of

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 193.

⁷⁵ Scholte, Jan Aart, *International Relations of Social Change*, p. 23.

⁷⁶ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 193.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 195.

which have partial autonomy, reciprocally shape and reshape each other. In such a theoretical construct, of which the primary goal is to resolve the agent structure dichotomy, all power actors are deemed interdependent and necessary for the existence of the other. States are conceptualized as the “agents which not only constitute other power actors and domestic and international structures, but are simultaneously constituted by them.”⁷⁸ In this regard, Hobson proposes the replacement of “the state duality of ‘international anarchy’ and ‘sovereignty’” with “a ‘dynamic duo’”⁷⁹ between these two.

It is also contended that there exists a symbiotic relationship between the domestic and international agential capacities of nation states. Within this formula, the deeper the state’s embeddedness within the social formation to which it belongs, the higher governing capacity (domestic agency) it gains; the higher domestic agency the state has, the more its international agential capacity becomes. For instance Hobson, while developing his theoretical enterprise named as the ‘structurationist synthesis of the agent and structure’ emphasizes the importance of the state’s domestic specificities in explicating its foreign policy initiatives and the structural circumstances of the international political economy.⁸⁰ Despite all these efforts embracing the internal specificities of the state and the global economic and political relations in analyzing the state’s foreign policy, there still exists a missing point referring to a substantial theoretical lacuna. This is the role and significance of the ideological forms and discursive practices of the nation states in the constitution and reproduction of the political order. It also fails to deal with the question of how foreign policy functions in the constitution of the state identity. For example, Skocpol, while defining geopolitics

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 212.

⁷⁹ For a detailed analysis of his notion of ‘dynamic duo’, see John M. Hobson, *The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology International Economic and Political Change*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 272-5.

⁸⁰ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, pp. 207-12.

as a sphere where the institutional autonomy of the state from domestic society is reproduced, she does not need to theorize the discursive and performative constitution of this autonomy. However one should not deny the success of this theoretical attempt in bringing to the analytical plane “the reciprocity between the nation state as the state of a modern-capitalist society and the constitution of international relations”⁸¹ which refers to a set of geopolitical, economic and social processes. The emphasis on the international dimension of state behavior also allows the neo-Weberian approach to incorporate the historicities and specificities of the state to the domain of critical inquiry and also to indicate the discontinuities, ruptures and divergences within this unique historical context. As a consequence, WHS “can be said to provide a reading of IR debates on the concept of the nation state as an institutional socio-spatial organization.”

The state-centric model, on the other hand, should not overlook the fact that the international politics could not be reduced to inter-state relations as in the case of the realist paradigm. While the state is called back as the unit of analysis, it should not be reified and exaggerated at the expense of other agencies (international organizations) or structures (global socio-economic relations).

2.3.3. Domestic Agential Power of the State and Its Relation with the Society

It would not be an exaggeration to claim that for many neo-Weberian sociologists such as Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann, the ways in which the state society relations are framed and reframed and the sources of state power and its institutional autonomy constitute the most fertile research avenue. Even though the sources of state power are conceptualized in divergent ways, state society relations are often understood as a sphere where the institutionally differentiated nature of the modern state and its absolute insulation from the domestic society are constructed and

⁸¹ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 82.

maintained. “It is this institutional separation from society which is thought by most Weberians to be the source of autonomous state power.”⁸² For Halliday the consideration of the conceptual differentiation between the state and society is required to save the state from being a ‘troublesome abstraction’. It is assumed that such an approach could also pave the way for new research avenues in which the vital relationality between the international dimension of state action and the process of configuration and reconfiguration of state’s institutional autonomy in domestic politics. By problematizing this vital relationality, Halliday questions

why and how participation in the international realm strengthens or weakens states, why and under what circumstances it permits states to gain autonomy and act independently vis-à-vis the social formations they govern, and under what conditions states become less or more responsive to, and representative of their social formations precisely because of their international role.⁸³

Halliday introduces three crucially important conceptual distinctions to make the IR theory develop in such a way as to conceive and theorize the state structure and actions in a more accurate manner. The first distinction is drawn between the state representing an ensemble of coercive, administrative apparatuses and the society composed of various different political groups with varying political power, wealth and skills who wish to access to this administrative body. The second distinction could be observable in between the state and government and aims to deconstruct the conventional approaches in the IR theory treating them as identical entities. In this context, Halliday’s problematic strives to

separate the ‘ensemble of administrative apparatuses’ from ‘the executive personnel formally in position of supreme control’ in order to refute the assumption that the state represents society as a whole, and also to show that in certain circumstances elements within the state may resist or actively oppose the policies of government.⁸⁴

⁸² Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 201.

⁸³ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 64.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.65. For a more comprehensive account of the issue, see Fred Halliday, “States and Society in International Relations”, *Millennium* 16 (1987): 215-36.

By the third distinction, which is in between the state and nation, Halliday ventures to erode the so-called unproblematic unity assumed by the traditional international political discourse between these two. The fundamental questions which Halliday deals with are to what extent the national states could represent the nation and could constitute a national territorial totality. These questions are posed for the problematization of presupposed ethnic homogeneity and political representivity accorded to the state-society complexity by the conventional approaches. By drawing on Charles Tilly's text on the emergence of nation state in Europe⁸⁵, Halliday asserts that the origin of the modern state could be found in coercion and extraction "both against the populations subjected to states and against rivals."⁸⁶ He also attaches importance to the interrogation of ideological and organizational function of the state for the consolidation of its autonomy from the society. State's strategies aiming at constituting national consciousness, national ideologies and national economics should also be investigated in an attempt to explicate "how states govern and administer their own populations and territories, impose control on societal relations, and produce effects in the constitution of those relations."⁸⁷

As Keyman argues although the problematique and research avenue developed by Halliday provide useful insights to theorize the structure of the state and its relations with civil society, the two substantially important questions remain unanswered within his theoretical enterprise. First, Halliday's problematic does not deal with the analysis of the relations of state and power which is integral to the formation of the state as an institutional administrative apparatus. The central characteristics of the process in which the modern society and modern politics were constituted could be cited as the second

⁸⁵ Tilly, Charles, *The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

⁸⁶ Halliday, Fred, "Theorizing The International", *Economy and Society* 18 (1989): 347-59.

⁸⁷ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 66.

matter which is not involved within Haliday's state-centric model. The concept of power which is so central in theorizing domestic and international agential capacities of the state as a Janus-faced entity should absolutely be object of any critical inquiry. Thus, it could be claimed with some degree of accuracy that Michael Mann's theoretical attempt including historical, spatial analysis of the concept of power yields proper means of problematizing the sources of state's institutional autonomy by focusing on the concept of power. Mann's understanding of power, which is not reductionist, not only provides him the opportunity of analyzing the state's distinct identity but also rescues him from conceptualizing society as unitary and as an organic totality. For him,

societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power as institutional means of attaining human goals. These networks are defined as ideological, economic, military, and political power relations that constitute sociospatial and organizational means of social control of people, materials, and territories.⁸⁸

Mann, with the aim of problematizing the specific power of the state, begins his analysis by making distinction between its despotic and infrastructural powers. The former upon which the conventional state theories have focused refers to "the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups."⁸⁹ However, it would not be wrong to state that the latter which is often omitted within these standard models is attributed more significance by the scholar to analyze the complexity of state society relations. The notion of the infrastructural power of the state allows Mann to evaluate the states embeddedness within the social context since it reveals "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."⁹⁰ Contrary to the conventional understandings giving primacy to the state's despotic power, and handling state society relations through binary

⁸⁸ Mann, Michael, *The Sources of Social Power*, pp. 2-3.

⁸⁹ Mann, Micheal, *States, War and Capitalism*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 5.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

oppositions and viewing them as entities within a zero-sum contest Mann establishes a corollary between the governing capacity of the state and its ability to be able to reach into society. In this formula the more infrastructural reach into society, the more effective and direct governmental capacity. In the same vein, in Mann's state-centric model the state's domestic agency is closely related with its embeddedness within its social formation.

The author, on the other hand, indicates three important factors by which the state gains autonomy. These could be cited as the "necessity of the state", "multiplicity" of its functions, and its "territorial centrality."⁹¹ He argues that throughout history the constitution and maintenance of the complex and civilized societies are necessarily dependent on the existence of a central, binding and rule-making authority. The need for building an order and social cohesion in which the protection of life and property are insured requires the foundation and the sustenance of monopolistic organization. Due to this notion, Mann accepts the 'necessity' as the mother of the state power. Secondly, the 'multiplicity' of the state's functions consolidates its institutional autonomy as a both domestic and international actor. It is this 'multiplicity' which impels the state to get involved in an multiplicity of relations with the other collective actors (i.e. the domestic social groups, international organizations, other nation states). Mainly owing to this involvement the state obtains a maneuvering ability which, in turn, constitutes "the birthplace of state power." Precisely due to two reasons Mann places emphasis on the significance of the territoriality of the state.

On the one hand, it provides a theoretical basis for Mann to criticize the society-centric understanding of the relative autonomy of the state vis-à-vis social classes and groups. On the other hand, it allows Mann to conceptualize state autonomy and state power within the context of geopolitics.⁹²

⁹¹ Mann, Micheal, "Autonomous Power of The State", *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 25 (1984), pp. 195-201.

⁹² Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 69.

To sum up, by making use of all these factors mentioned so far the state is enabled to act independently from the civil society as an autonomous actor.

Anthony Giddens is another neo-Weberian sociologist, whose theory of the state is grounded on the concepts of power and domination. Along with agency and structure, power as an elementary concept refers to a prerequisite the existence of which is sine qua non of being an agent.

To be a human being is to be an agent – although not all agents are human beings – and to be an agent is to have power. ‘Power’ in this highly generalized sense means ‘transformative capacity’, the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them.⁹³

In Giddens’ terminology, the nation state as an “institutional clustering” and organization derives its power from its ability to monitor and affect the circumstances of social reproduction and even to alter them.⁹⁴ It is this ability of the organizations that distinctively separates them from the other types of collectivity.

An organization is a collectivity in which knowledge about the conditions of system reproduction is reflexively used to influence, shape or modify that system reproduction. All forms of state administrative bodies are organizations in this sense ... in modern nation states, however, the reflexive monitoring of system reproduction is much more highly accentuated than in any preexisting form of state and, in addition, ‘organization’ characterizes many other aspects of social life.⁹⁵

According to Giddens, for the reproduction of the modern society the nation state appropriates its power from two different resources – the allocative and the authoritative. The first of these could be defined as “dominion over material facilities, including material goods and the natural forces that may be harnessed in their production. The second concerns the means of dominion over the activities of human beings themselves.”⁹⁶ Contrary to conventional liberal and Marxist understandings, Giddens stresses the significance of the authoritative power that makes the nation state

⁹³ Giddens, Anthony, *The Nation State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, p. 7.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 12.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

more capable in establishing a direct and close ruling over the population than its predecessors. However, instead of overestimating the authoritative resources, he rather prefers to draw our attention to the varying relations between these two forms of sources in the constitution of social system and dynamics of social change.

The modern nation state as a “power container” agent employs a combination of these resources for the maintenance of the social system, in other words, the modes of domination in which the relations of autonomy and dependency between actors or collectivities of actors were reproduced in favor of the state. For Giddens one of the distinctive characteristics of the modern state is the high surveillance technologies that it owns. Due to this high surveillance, the modern state gains the capacity of regulating and manipulating all kinds of activities (including the conduct of daily life) of its subjected population “across wide spans of time and space.”⁹⁷ It could be distinguished two types of surveillance as the accumulation of coded information and the establishment of supervision mechanism by the central authority. The first kind of surveillance is initiated by the state “to administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered. It is not just the collection of information, but its storage that is important here.”⁹⁸ The recording technologies of modern times (i.e. cameras, tapes, discs) along with the conventional recording methods (i.e. writing, oral) are all functioned as a storage device by the state. The second type of surveillance is that of direct observation and control imposed by the superordinates on the subjected population, which is exclusively enhanced within clearly bounded settings in public sphere.

In order to better understand how Giddens conceives the modern state and its dynamic relations with the domestic social formation, it could be elucidating to apply Bob Jessop’s schema concisely analyzing his views on the issue:

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 13.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 14.

For Giddens the rise of the modern state is associated with (a) a centralist legal order, (b) centralised administration, (c) a centrally organized taxation system, articulated with a rational monetary system, (d) major innovations in military organization reflected in the international state system and the separation of external military force from internal policing, (e) the development of the modern nation in conjunction with the nation state, (f) the development of communication, information, and surveillance possibilities, (g) internal pacification through the disciplinary society, and (h) the development of democracy in the sense of a pluralistic polyarchy and citizenship rights – as the reciprocal of the enhanced surveillance and ideology of the general interest involved in the modern state.⁹⁹

However, Giddens' approach to the modern state and society has a reductionist nature mainly owing to his account of the reproduction of the social system. First, he singles out one key factor – namely nation state in reproduction of modern society by either excluding the determinacy of other factors (i.e. cultural processes, socioeconomic relations) or subjugating them to a secondary position. If modern society is not unitary and an unproblematic totality with a coherent self, how its reproduction could be secured or administered from one single center? In order to eschew this reductionism, a new analytical perspective has to be developed in which the interconnectedness between numerous factors are asserted in analyzing the system reproduction. By doing so, the state-society distinction appearing as another analytical within Giddens' theory could also be exceeded. The significance of the specific articulations of the states, economy, society, and also the ideologically and discursively constructed nature of the state society relations should also be embraced within this novel effort. This is where the post-structuralist account of state and state identity has provided useful insight both for the critique of the modern accounts of the state and society and to radically alter them.

⁹⁹ Jessop, Bob, "Review of The Nation State and Violence", *Capital and Class* 29 (1989): p. 216.

CHAPTER III

POSTSTRUCTURALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

3.1. Introduction

*As discourse is about limits and dangers, about the presumed boundaries of political possibility in the space and time of the modern state, theories of international relations express and affirm the necessary horizons of the modern political imagination (...)*¹

*(...) It is the crucial task of both breaking with these presumed boundaries and extending the horizon of the modern political imagination that critical theory undertakes.*²

The last three decades of the twentieth century have increasingly witnessed a vastly ardent and fertile debate within almost all social science disciplines. In tandem with the claims of modern social disciplines to objectivity and universality, the modernity itself was problematized and opened to perpetual discussion. The critical interrogation of the modernist and positivist ontological and epistemological postures also provided a proper base by which the modes of understanding, explicating and representing of the present and past were subjected to critical inquiry. Particularly the endeavors to analyze the nature of the contemporary times have divided the social scientists roughly into two camps. For some analysts the present was signifying the end of the constitutive features of modernity and its pretentious promises. They tacitly declared “the end of history”, “the end of the social”, “the end of the grand meta-narratives” such as liberalism and Marxism, and “the end of mode of production.”³ However, others strove to develop a post-Enlightenment defense of modernity against these ‘endist’ discourses by stating that we are still experiencing the modern times and

¹ Walker, R. J. B., *Inside/Outside: International Relations As Political Theory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 6.

² Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 11.

³ For details, see Barry Smart, *Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies*, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-6.

conditions in which the organizing principles of modern society and politics in tandem with the nation state did not undergo any deep-rooted alteration.

The field of IR theory has also been drastically influenced from this modernity versus postmodernity debate. For many scholars the publication of Ashley's article entitled 'The Poverty of Neo-Realism' has constituted a vantage point both for the entrance of postmodern approaches to IR theory and also for the creation of the "postlate-modern discourse of world politics."⁴ The poststructuralist, feminist, and post-colonialist critique have all presented novel, exciting opportunities to deconstruct and even alter the conventional international political discourses having inadequacies and inaccuracies in assessing these recent socio-political and global developments. Such scholars as David Campbell, James Der Derian, Rob Walker, Michael Dillon and Cynthia Weber have all ventured to expatiate the inclusion/exclusion and disciplinary practices, and the foundationalist and essentialist nature and logic of the positivist rationalist theories (such as liberal realists and Marxist account of IR).⁵

This chapter will focus on the post-structuralist theory of International Relations trying to develop a new politics of epistemology and interdisciplinary research avenue for the full comprehension of state, foreign policy and international politics. The poststructuralist attempt on which this dissertation bases its hypotheses aims to draw our attention to the role and significance of specific articulations, subjective, interpretative processes, modes of representations in analyzing state identity, its foreign policy discourse and state society relations. Within the dissident literature 'foreign' policy is conceived not as the external and rational initiatives of the state "the identity of

⁴ Ashley, Richard, "The Poverty of Neo-Realism", *International Organization* 38 (1984): pp. 225-86.

⁵ See Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, Der Derian, James, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, Walker, R. B. J., *Inside/Outside*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Dillon, Michael, *Politics of Security: Towards A Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1996).

which is secure before it enters into relations with others”⁶. But rather it is conceptualized as exclusionary, disciplinary, and securitizing practices of the state integral to the reconstruction of its identity and the domestic political order. I do propose in this chapter that this reconceptualization of state and foreign policy could create novel opportunities in examining foreign policy articulations of the state and its impact on the constitution and maintenance of the domestic regime within a given polity.

After expatiating the poststructuralist account of foreign policy and state identity, the chapter will deal with the concept of security as a “speech act” and as never-ending project of the modern state. This section will be dedicated to discuss and reveal the specific role that foreign policy representations have played within securitizing discourses and practices of the state. In this respect, it is suggested that in creating a world of ‘others’ through constant articulation of threat and danger state functionalizes foreign policy as an instrument of securitization in an attempt to secure the domestic political regime. Thereby in the concluding part of the chapter I shall remind the securitization/desecuritization debate introducing a wider agenda to understand and explain the complex issue of security. I am convinced that this new agenda raising critical questions about the very nature of security and securitization will make substantial contributions to our main task of reexamining Turkish official and mainstream discourses on Cyprus.

3.2. Toward A New Politics of Epistemology

Drawing on Keyman the central objectives of this poststructuralist theoretical enterprise could be listed in the following manner: (1) to introduce and to decipher the inclusion/exclusion practice of the conventional international political theory

⁶ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 51.

functioning through strategies of ‘othering’ and also punishing the internal and external ‘others’; (2) to review the ‘logocentric’ characteristics of IR theory “in the sense of privileging modern white male Cartesian identity as its *modus operandi*”⁷; (3) to reject, from the very outset, all hierarchical explanations and regulations; (4) to encourage difference over identity, fragmentation over totality, heterogeneity over homogeneity and ambiguity over certainty; (5) to expose and to deconstruct the binary oppositions and dichotomies with which modern positivist theories operate; (6) against the claims of the rationalist schools to objectivity and universality, to unmask their subjectively and ideologically established epistemological stances by referring to the power-knowledge relations; (7) to refuse and alter the reductionist tendencies of the realist paradigm confining the scope of politics within the domain of modern state and also perceiving the IR merely by making reference to the power politics shaped and re-shaped through the interactions among these nation states; (8) to develop an anti-foundationalist strategy in which no “ontological, epistemological or ethical absolutes” are accepted in order to emancipate both the social relations and their analysis “through radical democratization” by “the recognition of difference.”⁸

3.2.1. Theory As Political Intervention

An interesting, distinctive characteristic of the poststructuralist analysis that could also be named as ‘the dissident thought’ is its adoption of the theory, in itself, as a ‘praxis’. How things are conceptualized as objects of theoretical inquiry are integral to their historical, linguistic, social and political constitution. Hence the theory and/or scientific discourse as “part of the social formation”⁹ which it attempts to delineate

⁷ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 124.

⁸ Ibid., p. 124.

⁹ Shapiro, Michael J., *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis*, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 7.

amounts to a political involved in the remolding of this very social formation. The post-positivist IR scholarship reveals the political nature of the act of theorizing by rejecting “the dominant assumption that theory “corresponds” to the external reality which it represents”¹⁰. The positivist paradigms of International Relations, i.e. liberalism, neo-functionalism, classical Marxism, claims objectivity by distancing themselves from the phenomena, realities and instances under analysis. Whereas the poststructuralist approach incorporates the analytical discourse and the act of theorizing in the discursive, historical reproduction of things and phenomena. For instance, the articulation of any dispute political in nature as vitally important or an existential threat to the national survival, namely its securitization, in the analytical discourse is integral to the process through which the dispute is securitized.

In the same vein, the conventional IR theories taking for granted the international as an objective reality having a pre-given ontological status and hence independent realm of existence reproduce, in analytical sense, the modern conception of history: the conception where the nation state appears as the only fully sovereign and even transcendental subject. Thus the critical IR literature treats epistemology also as a discursive framework “by which truth claims are made about reality”¹¹ and as a political deed by which any subjective conception and mode of understanding and explaining is elevated to the status of objective reality. As Keyman concisely put it

epistemologies operate: (i) with their own discursive practices, (ii) their own “truth” claims (whether scientific or power oriented), and (iii) their own mode of representation of “reality” (whether historically constructed or ontological), and, therefore have necessary political consequences¹².

Therefore, for the emancipation of social relations, the democratization of social theory is necessarily required in such a way as to refute the recognition of a primary and

¹⁰ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 5.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹² Ibid., p. 6.

privileged status to any single identity ontologically and epistemologically. Thus, the dissident thought enthusiastically ventured to develop a new ‘politics of epistemology’, which is neither foundationalist nor essentialist. While trying “to increase our understanding of world politics” the dissident IR discourse has not contented itself with problematizing presumptions, epistemic absolutes and given ontological categories on which the classical and neo-realist paradigms based their analyses. Thus the critical literature has deemed it necessary “focusing on the ontological and epistemological issues of what constitute important or legitimate questions and answers for IR scholarship, rather than on the structure and dynamics of international system *per se*.”¹³

By this new epistemology, the dissident literature aims to draw our attention to the role and significance of the specific articulations, the subjective interpretative processes and the modes of representations both in elevating any single concept to the center of the political discourse and in transposing the subjective conditions to the level of objective reality. This epistemological strategy cannot be disregarded and is innovative precisely because of two reasons: “first, it enables one to resist the imposed boundaries and the disciplining knowledgeable practices of power, both which constitute an order of “truth” in international relations theory.”¹⁴ Second, it focuses on the discursive practices within IR theory constraining our imagination of contemporary politics within definitely bounded settings (i.e. power politics, national interest and the state’s security priorities.).

By promoting difference over identity, and replacing the subject/object duality with intersubjectivity, the postmodern literature paves the way to conceptualize varying relations within multiple actors having “no ontological status apart from the various acts

¹³ Wendt, Alexander, quoted in Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 1.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 124.

which constitute”¹⁵ their reality. For instance, against the neo-realists and Weberian sociologists privileging international anarchy or the state agency in the reproduction of modern politics, the dissident thought probe into the sources of this reproduction in almost all fields in which individuals and all kinds of institutions, political or normative take place. As it could be remembered, in contrast to the realist paradigm’s deterministic and structuralist account of the state, the neo-Weberian approach has reintroduced the category of agency by making the state an epistemological object that has to be analyzed within its peculiar historical context. However, in analyzing the system reproduction, the state is unproblematically assigned a primary and autonomous role at the expense of others in such a way as to reproduce the realist kind of reductionist inclinations.

In doing so, it takes as its unit of analysis a national social formation, deals with it in a nonstructuralist manner, and concentrates its attention on the structure, capacities, power, and policies of the state in that formation. Thus, it offers an account of international relations by defining them as an inter-nation state system. However, the structure of international relations is so complex that it cannot be reduced to inter-state relations.¹⁶

As it could be deduced also from this quotation, state-centricism of the historical sociology has a tendency to constrain the scope of the political by the agency of the state as an “epistemologically autonomous and rationally acting subject”¹⁷ with a stable identity. Whereas, the poststructuralist discourse totally rejects to attribute the state a pre-given and pre-discursive identity and a coherent self, but rather it problematizes the discursive and ideological constitution of the state sovereignty as uncontested and natural phenomenon by decentering it. As a form of resistance to the essentialist ways of understanding and explaining, this epistemological stance includes to imagine

- (1) new political spaces, particularly those formerly relegated to ‘civil society’;
- (2) novel political practices, especially those that resist fetishizing the capture of the

¹⁵ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 9.

¹⁶ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 82.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 126.

state power; (3) new ways of knowing and being, especially those that resist a metaphysics of inclusion and exclusion; (4) new forms of political community, especially those that resist spatial reification; and (5) new ways of acting across borders, so as to make connections between the claims of humanity as such and the claims of particular people.¹⁸

For this reason, the dissident literature takes as a primary task to unfold the hidden essence of the modern international political discourses in which the state is imbued with full sovereignty and uninterrogated legitimacy. It radically differentiates itself from the critical or mainstream modern theories in its critical inquiry aiming to decode the vital relationality between material existence of objects and their discursive and representative construction within a given cultural, lingual, historical context. For example, while the modern social theory assigns the state a self-evident quality (the ability to speak for itself), an independent realm of existence, the dissident epistemology refutes the givenness of state sovereignty outside of and prior to discourse. Against the materially reductionist modernist epistemology, presuming the present conditions as the objective conditions of being, poststructuralism takes into account the relationality between the material existence of things and the modes in which they are represented within specific historical epochs.

David Campbell, while introducing his interpretative approach, lays particular emphasis on the indispensability of the interpretation in the articulation of things¹⁹ such as danger, threat, security, and national interests. The objective of such emphasis is to eliminate the materialistic reductionism of the rationalists' theoretical positions attaching objects an existence "independent of ideas or beliefs about them"²⁰ and reducing events and phenomena only to material causes. By problematizing intersubjective interpretations, specific articulations, and representations the critical

¹⁸ Walker, R. B., "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on The Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice", in *Contending Sovereignties*, eds. R. J. B. Walker and Saul Mendlovitz, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1991), pp.176-77.

¹⁹ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 4.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 4.

epistemology aims at drawing our attention to the very relation between power and knowledge. At the center of this new “politics of epistemology”²¹ lies the notion that things cannot be comprehended by attributing them a value-free essence that can be abstracted or excluded from the relations of representation and discursive space. The dissident literature assuming “the existence of a “causal” relation between the representing and represented” claims that how things are articulated, interpreted is inherent to the reproduction of power relations. Thus it concentrates on the way

in which *the discursive effect of the representation* occurs within the realm whereby human agents are in a position to convey a meaning to the represented. At stake is the investigation of the role “discourse” plays in the process of production of knowledge about the reality under representation²².

However, it should immediately be stated that the poststructuralist analysis does not implement a methodology in which the category of discursive is reified and exaggerated to the detriment of nondiscursive although they are often criticized as giving primacy to the former over the latter. Whereas the dissident epistemology refuses, from the outset, the existence of such distinction in between the discursive and nondiscursive realms, it searches for the unfolding of how the concepts are functionalized within any discursive and representative context, which is not free from specific historical conditions. “What is denied is not that ... objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive conditions of emergence.”²³

At the ontological level, the post-positivist critical scholarship refutes to recognize the nation state as a pre-given entity and transhistorical subject the legitimacy and sovereignty of which cannot be questioned. Thereby the dissident IR literature insists on the need for de-ontologizing the concept of the nation state and on the

²¹ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 5.

²² Ibid., p. 5. Italicized expressions are original.

²³ Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards A Radical Democratic Politics*, trans. Winston Moore and Paul Cammack, (London: Verso, 1985), p. 108.

necessity of deconstructing the ontological status conferred on it by the realist school. De-ontologizing the nation state means to situate it within history by addressing and problematizing the discursive and performative context whereby its characteristics, identity and legitimate sovereignty are constituted and sustained. To de-ontologize the nation state also means to reject any given/objective characteristics and naturalness/inevitability assigned to it and to problematize its identity “as either a textual or a discursive construction”²⁴.

For post-positivist IR scholars the space where such discursive construction and reconstruction is achieved through disciplinary and exclusionary practices is the modernity itself. Thereby they constantly argue the idea that international relations as a discipline has to transcend its modernist episteme.

International Relations is a discipline concerned with observing how the political project of leaving out the modern emerged and how it continues to operate globally. I am concerned with how we might outlive the modern politically. I think of outliving here as surpassing the modern political imagination not merely surviving its darellection²⁵.

Unless the modernist epistemological and ontological posture of the conventional international political theory is purged, its monolithic, exclusionary essence universalizing and naturalizing the Euro-centric conception of the human subject, the political, the state, the international (the modern self) will continue to outlive. As such it would not be possible to critically scrutinize the core assumptions about the modern nation state and international relations taken for granted as ontological categories.

In the light of these theoretical clarifications, it could be claimed that the poststructuralist research avenue is dedicated to unfold and problematize the discursively, performatively, representatively constructed nature of the state with a pre-given and coherent identity. Therefore, instead of taking the state as a finished entity

²⁴ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 8.

²⁵ Dillon, Michael, *Politics of Security: Towards A Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 1.

with a coherent self as in the case of realism and partially historical sociology, it focuses on the discursive and performative processes where the state identity, and thereby its legitimate sovereignty and institutional autonomy are produced and reproduced through disciplinary mechanisms. Such epistemological posture also offers substantial opportunities to the dissident thought to reconceptualize the foreign political initiatives of the state, which is integral to the constitution and maintenance of state identity. It is this internality of foreign policy to the process of building and rebuilding the state as a sovereign presence and even as a transcendental subject which would be the burden of the subsequent part of the chapter.

3.3. Reconceptualizing Foreign Policy and State Identity

In the neo-realist IR theory, foreign policy is conceptualized as external orientations of nation states towards others, which is also shaped and reshaped by the requirements imposed by the anarchic international politics. Furthermore, foreign policy is represented as a bridge linking these sovereign actors in such a way as to secure the givenness and stability of their identities. In this paradigmatic framework, internal and international political processes and the ways in which they are analyzed are deemed as antonymous to each other. Foreign political initiatives of the state are analyzed in such a way as to emphasize and reproduce its “autonomy from and the externality to domestic politics.”²⁶ Accordingly, international relations are assumed as relations between atomized and completed states with fixed and already established identities.

This ontologically privileged status accorded to the state which is constituted and reproduced through the specific articulations of foreign policy (i.e. diplomacy, international politics and so on) is subjected to an influential critical analysis by various

²⁶ Keyman, Fuat E., *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, p. 57.

dissident scholars with the aid of genealogical method²⁷. Thus, poststructuralists begin by deconstructing the conventional understandings of the rationalist IR theories attributing the state an unproblematic, self-evident, tautological presence. Whereas, critical scholars advocate to reorient “analysis from the concern with intentional acts of pre-given subjects to the problematic of subjectivity”²⁸ and reject the presence of prediscursive, primary and coherent state identity.

States are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox inherent to their being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in process of becoming. For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death.²⁹

Hence the discourse of primary and stable state identity aiming at consolidating the status of the state as a sovereign presence within international politics should be problematized by revealing its constructed nature through renewed processes. In the dissident literature, the state identity like all other collective or individual identities is conceptualized as “tenuously constituted in time ... through a stylized repetition of acts” and realized “not through a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition.”³⁰

By the same token, constructivist scholar Thomas Banchoff highlights the fact that state identity has both an internal dimension (“it is what binds the group together”) and an external dimension (situating the state with respect to others)³¹. Thereby state identity includes (1) the aggregate of images, set norms, narratives and the core

²⁷ Some bright examples of this genealogical method in IR and social theory could be listed as Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, revised edition, (London: Verso, 1991); David Campbell, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*; James Der Derian, *Anti-Diplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992); Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*; Michael Dillon, *Politics of Security*.

²⁸ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 8.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

³⁰ Butler, Judith, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity*, (New York: 1990), pp. 140-41, 145.

³¹ Banchoff, Thomas, “German Identity and European Integration”, *European Journal of International Relations* 5/3 September 1999.

characteristics of the state that are expected to be shared by the large majority of the society; and (2) “the self placement of the polity within specific international context. Those contexts consist mainly of the constellation of states, international institutions and historical experiences within which a state is embedded.”³² Thereby state identity, which is articulated by the political figures and official representatives of the state before both national and international audiences does not have a fixated essence and monolithic structure, can embrace multiple and even contrasting discourses in the course of different historical stints. Depending on global politics and/or on internal power relations certain motives of state identity (modern, western, secular, powerful, unitary and so forth) can be more accentuate when compared with other attributes.

In the same vein, “any national foreign policy discourse include some contrasting and normative historical perspectives. For a given state identity to be of analytical use, however, it must be *shared* within and across the parties aspiring for state power.”³³ Therefore the task of pinpointing the content of state identity primarily necessitates exploring major themes, views and ideas frequently articulated across the public sphere within a given polity. There can be cited a large variety of sources from which evidences illuminating the content of state identity can be extracted: “the legal norms that govern foreign policy”³⁴, the articles of the constitution, images and news fabricated in visual, printed and electronic media, the standardized school books, the oral and written statements of official figures across the political spectrum, the explanations of party leaders in press conferences and in other settings, formal declarations by the official and military institutions of the state and the parliamentary debates. These are all discursive and representative instruments through which the state identity is constantly reproduced that should necessarily be assessed together with the

³² Ibid., p. 268.

³³ Ibid., p. 269.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 268-69.

concrete actions of the state in internal and external political realms.

David Campbell in his book *Writing Security United States' Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* tries to explicate the inherence of foreign policy initiatives of the state to the constitution and maintenance of state identity, thereby “the very self and domestic order” by presenting a genealogical analysis of the concepts of foreign and security. By doing so, he deciphers the conventional approach to foreign policy, which conceives it as a “state-centric phenomenon in which there is an internally mediated response to the externally induced situation of ideological, military, and economic threats.”³⁵ However, this new research avenue is rather interested in questioning how and to what extent the ways in which foreign policy issues are articulated is functional in building a fixed and coherent domestic/national identity. Therefore within the dissident literature foreign policy is theorized not as a result of state’s actions but rather as one of fundamental determinants of the “renewed process of normative statecraft”³⁶ with the concern of fixing the domestic political community. Nonetheless the functions of the foreign political performances and discourses of state authority are not limited to that of imposing the fixed meanings of sovereignty, identity and so on. As Campbell has correctly argued “the boundaries of a state’s identity are secured by the representation of danger integral to foreign policy.”³⁷

Whereas the articulation of danger and calculation of threat are not based on objective conditions but rather dependent on subjective interpretative processes in compliance with the security discourses generated by the state.

While dependent on specific historical contexts, we can say that for the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the “inside” are linked through a discourse of “danger” with threats identified and located on the “outside”. The outcome of this is that boundaries are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged, and alternatives

³⁵ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 36.

³⁶ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 160.

³⁷ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 3.

marginalized.³⁸

Thus it is impossible to think foreign policy neither as external to the constitution of state identity nor as a bridge between the pre-established nation states. But instead it is an exclusionary process operating through the imposition of boundaries demarcating “inside and outside, us and them, domestic and foreign, and the sphere of citizen entitlements and that of strategic responses.”³⁹ Therefore, foreign policy as a specific type of boundary drawing practice between ‘the self’ and ‘the foreign other’ is so central to the constitution of state as a sovereign actor both in internal and international politics. In this sense, foreign policy necessitating the existence of a large scale organized and rational bureaucracy is a means unique to modern politics leading to the concentration of social power in the nation state. Thus it is also integral to the creation of a particular understanding of history so as to increase the national ‘consciousness’ and loyalty within a given social formation.

In order to better analyze how the foreign political actions and discourses of the state are functional within its exclusionary and disciplinary practices, Campbell proposes to make a careful distinction between two understandings of foreign policy:

The first is one in which “foreign policy” can be understood as referring to all practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly figured as relationships of otherness) that constitute their objects as “foreign” in the process of dealing with them. In this sense, “foreign policy” is divorced from the state as a particular resolution of the categories of identity and difference and applies to confrontations that appear to take place between ‘a self’ and ‘an other’ located in different sites of ethnicity, race, class, gender, or geography. These are the forms of “foreign policy” that have operated in terms of the paradigm of sovereignty and constituted an identity through time and across space. Operating at all levels of social organization, from the level of personal relationships through to global orders, “foreign policy” in this sense has established conventional dispositions in which a particular set of representational practices serves as the resource from which are drawn the modes of interpretation employed to handle new instances of ambiguity or contingency... In other words, the first understanding (“foreign policy”) has provided the discursive economy or conventional matrix of

³⁸ Ibid., p. 68.

³⁹ Connolly, William E., *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 201.

interpretations in which the second understanding (Foreign Policy) operates. The second understanding- Foreign Policy as state-based and conventionally understood within the discipline- is thus not equally implicated in the *constitution* of identity as the first understanding. Rather, Foreign Policy serves to *reproduce* the constitution of identity made possible by “foreign policy” and to *contain* challenges to the identity that results.⁴⁰

As it would be clearly seen from this lengthy quotation both “foreign policy” and Foreign Policy rather than being the external orientations of the pre-given states as finished entities are intertwinedly operationalized as a social practice in the (re)production of the subjugation of the society to the state through subjective articulations of danger, foreign, and security. It is this discourse of security by which the autonomy of the state is secured, which is of great merit for the purposes of this thesis in analyzing the role and impact of foreign political discourses and performances of the state on the relations of the ruling and the ruled in Turkey.⁴¹ Thus the poststructuralist re-theorization of foreign policy makes also possible the reconceptualization of state society relations as a sphere where the legitimacy of state sovereignty and supremacy are tenuously constructed and reconstructed performatively, discursively, and representatively. This reconceptualization of state society relations within the dissident literature will be the issue of the successive part of the chapter.

3.4. Reexamining State Society Relations As A Continual Security Project of The State

Identity is an inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it. Inescapable as it is, identity- whether personal or collective- is not fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference. But neither is difference fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. Difference is constituted in

⁴⁰ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 68-9.

⁴¹ However, as regards the issue of security Bill McSweeney criticizes Campbell for overstating the cognitive dimension of state identity and thus omitting the “essential material feature of all questions of security and identity-formation. This concerns the place of interests in the perception of security and in the management and transformation of collective identity.” See McSweeney, Bill, *Security, Identity and Interests A Sociology of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 126.

*relation to identity.*⁴²

Identity/difference problematic introduced into the IR discipline by the dissident literature places its particular emphasis on the state's activities to fix and stabilize the domestic society within strictly constructed boundaries as an organic totality. It is assumed that such confinement of society to a pre-established political identity stems from the fact that the state is in a permanent need of finding a proper ground upon which to base its legitimacy and monopoly of power. What is suggested here is that the state could not be viewed unproblematically as representative of the domestic society or 'nation' as in the case of modern international political theories. On the contrary, in order to terminate this tension states have to create an illusion based on unproblematic identification of the state with the society. As a product of, in constructivists' terms, "successful normative statecraft" or with Cynthia Weber's terms, the process of "writing the state"⁴³ this illusion is predicated on in position of a unified, harmonious, homogenous domestic political community which is "imagined"⁴⁴.

In the conventional approaches to state and nation, it is presupposedly argued that nation has a prior, prediscursive essence on which the state was founded with an indubitable and full sovereignty. A presupposition of this essence which implies the existence of an unproblematic and unitary collective identity legitimizes the state and its subsequent internal and external actions. Various recent critical studies have manifestly indicated that "the state more often than not precedes the nation: that nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy."⁴⁵ Thus, the constitution of the domestic political community as a unified and completed collectivity, and a coherent self serves to the representation of the state as the natural signifier of this imagined

⁴² Ibid., p.9.

⁴³ Weber, Cynthia, *Simulating Sovereignty*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁴⁴ Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1983).

⁴⁵ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 11.

unity. As in the case of state identity, the constitution of domestic political identity is not achieved once and for all, instead through a renewed process of normative statecraft. As various dissident scholars have asserted, in order to stabilize the political identity within internal society, states arbitrarily create artificial distinctions or draw absolute boundaries between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’⁴⁶. In such a distinction while ‘inside’ refers to the realm of peace, order, security and harmony, which are realized through the absolute state authority; ‘outside’ corresponds to the realm of necessity, violence, insecurity and anarchy. This illusive division is operationalized via the discourse of security and specific articulation of danger inherent to foreign policy. This is the exact point where the vital paradox of the nation state could be said to lie, which is lucidly explained by David Campbell as follows:

Should the state project of security be successful in terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exist. Security as the absence of movement would result in death via stasis. Ironically, then, the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state’s continued success as an impelling identity. The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.⁴⁷

As underlined in this quotation, nation states are in permanent need of recreating an illusion constituting a world full of dangers, threats, insecurity for the state and its citizens. In this conception ‘the outside’, which is presupposedly imagined as a realm consisting of rival and hostile states, is represented as a source of insecurity and existential threats precisely due to its very nature. Thus international politics refers to the realm of consistent violence necessitating the readiness of the state in military terms.

The building of such a world image through which the dangerous, the menacing

⁴⁶ A thorough analysis of this notion can be found in Richard Ashley, “Living In Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism and War”, in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations*, (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 300-13; Walker R. B. J., *Inside/Outside*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapter 8; Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Weber, Cynthia, *Simulating Sovereignty*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chapter 1.

⁴⁷ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, pp. 12-3.

and the anarchic are externalized or presumably accepted as the characteristics of ‘the outside’ is possible only via the strategies involving “an evangelism of fear.” In this respect Campbell’s argument that “the discourses of danger that were pivotal to the church- where the fear of death disciplined lives via the promise of salvation”⁴⁸ were reproduced by the state in its modern version is quite striking. The modern state apparatus desiring to secure the maintenance of internal power relations disciplines the domestic society via ‘modern’ dangers emanating from the chaotic interstate relations and via the fear of returning to the state of nature. In this imagining the state “as the immortal God” refers to the only power that may challenge these dangers and fears and that may realize security for its society. Hence the church’s ‘*pre-modern*’ promise of salvation is replaced by the state’s ‘*modern*’ promise of security. However, as indicated above materializing this promise totally exposes the state with the danger of losing the ground legitimizing its sovereign presence. Thereby states in effect do need a securitizing foreign policy discourse in which all foreign political issues are “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”⁴⁹ As it will be discussed more comprehensively in the ensuing pages the operation of securitization necessitates the use of a specific rhetoric by the official and political elite vis-à-vis the domestic society. Owing to state-based functioning of modern politics the sphere of foreign policy is bound to be quite open to this rhetoric through which socio-political problems are elevated to the status of existential/imminent threats.

Conceptualized in this way ‘foreign’ policy is integral part of the processes framing ‘man’ (and the domestic society) “in the spatial and temporal organization of

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 61.

⁴⁹ Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security A New Framework For Analysis*, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), pp. 23-4.

the inside and outside, self and other: i.e., in the “state.””⁵⁰ In this analysis ‘foreign’ policy refers to a series of political practices through which external and internal ‘others’, endangering the pre-supposed identicalness between the state and the society, are specified and declared by the state apparatus. The very operation of these practices “frames the domestic society in whose name they claim to be operating through their claim to know the source of threats to domestic society and “man.””⁵¹ Thus foreign policy constitutes one part of governance “as a structure that governs the behaviours of those embedded in it in the socio-political realm”⁵².

3.4.1. Negation of Difference

In order to stabilize domestic political order states implement various disciplinary practices premised on the construction of a world of ‘others’ appearing as threatening the security of both the state itself and the society which is thought as identical to it. The security of this permanent insecurity by which the fixed meaning of state sovereignty and political identity is produced and reproduced is totally dependent on the existence of both internal and external others. “States tend to create the appearance of a *threatening* ‘other’, against which the ‘self’ is defined negatively. In constructing an ‘other’ that appears threatening, the state is able to confer the appearance of unity upon the ‘self’ – i.e. a domestic population.”⁵³

The construction of self and other as antonymous categories to each other within this logic of representation functioning via binary oppositions signifies the passage from difference to identity. For the insurance of a coherent and unified political identity- namely the self - the different is determined and negated through othering processes. In

⁵⁰ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 62

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 62.

⁵² Diez, Thomas, “The Imposition of Governance: Transforming Foreign Policy Through EU Enlargement”, COPRI, IIS Working Papers 2000, p. 6 accessible at <http://www.copri.dk/publications/workingpapers.htm>.

⁵³ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 159.

the last analysis, the negation of difference in favor of a given identity is for the sake of eliminating the other, which is “alien, foreign, and perceived as a threat to a secure state.”⁵⁴ At this point it should immediately be noted that the act of negation includes also drawing boundaries within domestic society where the internal others are silenced, marginalized, punished, and are declared as ‘deviant’. In this context, post-structuralists have a tendency of analyzing state society relations by foregrounding the repressive mechanisms and othering strategies employed by the state apparatus.

3.5. Securitization/Desecuritization Debate

Securitization/desecuritization debate introduced in the literature by Ole Wæver and his colleagues in late 1980s not only provided innovative insights to transcend the uni-dimensionality of traditional security studies but also facilitated raising of new questions regarding the nature of state-society relations for social scientists. What’s aimed by this new approach is “to set out a comprehensive new framework for security studies” through which the precise nature of security can be rendered the object of analytical inquiry. While traditional state-centered security studies equate security with the issues of *high politics* (the issues concerning the military sector, use of force, war and strategic calculations) this new approach questions “the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security.”⁵⁵ They sought to implement a new research agenda within the discipline of International Relations both to offer more satisfactory answers to old questions (“what is and what is not a security issue?”) and also to raise new questions about the nature of the issue of security (“how issues become securitized?” and how can “the relevant security dynamics of the different types of security on levels ranging from local through regional to global”⁵⁶ be located?). Within

⁵⁴ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 36.

⁵⁵ Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security A New Framework For Analysis*, p. 1.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 1.

the scope of this thesis work, without addressing the criticisms directed by this new approach at the classical and neo-realist conceptualization of security I will rather deal with the nature of securitization as a discursive technique/mechanism of governance applied by the state elite. In this context, it would be our main purpose to explore the ways in which the Cyprus issue has been heavily securitized by the Turkish bureaucratic and political elite. It could be proposed with some degree of accuracy that problematizing Turkey's official Cyprus policy within the context of securitization/desecuritization debate will yield new prospects to ponder upon the implications of the Cyprus issue in Turkish domestic politics and particularly the state identity and the state-society relations in Turkey.

Wæver and his colleagues by introducing “a new agenda of security and politics”⁵⁷ through which “the processes of securitization and desecuritization”⁵⁸ are problematized, in effect, repoliticize the term ‘security’ itself, which the conventional approaches and their classical critiques have failed to do so. For an adequate problematization of these processes they formulated the questions of the new research avenue as

when, why and how elites label issues and developments as “security” problems; when, why and how they succeed and fail in such endeavors; what attempts are made by other groups to put securitization on the agenda; and whether we can point to efforts to keep issues *off* the security agenda, or even to de-securitize issues that have become securitized?⁵⁹

In Wæver's reconceptualization security refers to a “speech act”⁶⁰ through which an issue is represented or discursively framed “either as a special kind of politics or as above politics”⁶¹. It follows from the above analysis that security is a self-referential practice precisely because “it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue- not

⁵⁷ Wæver, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in *On Security*, Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), accessible at <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html>.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 36.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 36.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 34.

⁶¹ Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security A New Framework For Analysis*, p. 23.

necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.”⁶²

In this sense securitization can be defined as a disciplinary practice and/or mechanism whereby issues are “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”⁶³ Thereby securitization necessitates the use of specific “rhetoric of existential threat” through which issues are dramatized as the issues of “supreme priority”⁶⁴ by the securitizing actor, which is all too often the nation state. Thus the use of this specific rhetorical structure/tool “raising a specific challenge to a principled level” implies that

all necessary means would be used to block that challenge. And, because such a threat would be defined as existential and a challenge to sovereignty, the state would not be limited in what it could or might do. Under these circumstances, a problem would become a *security* issue whenever so defined by the power holders.⁶⁵

The lesson that these explanations convey reminds us two crucially important facets regarding the nature of security: first, securitization as an “intersubjective process”⁶⁶ does not necessarily imply the existence of a real threat to sovereignty or survival of the state; but rather it is realized through subjective threat perceptions and calculations articulated by the securitizer. However, as Wæver and his colleagues put forward, the word ‘subjective’ cannot be adequate to define the process of securitization on the grounds that “whether an issue is a security issue is not something individuals (read securitizer) decide alone.”⁶⁷ Success of any attempt to securitize an issue is totally contingent upon the existence of an audience accepting and tolerating all the acts of the securitizer that are not otherwise legitimate.

⁶² Ibid., p. 24.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 23-4.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 24 and 26 respectively.

⁶⁵ Wæver, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization”.

⁶⁶ Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security A New Framework For Analysis*, p. 30.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 31.

Nevertheless, as a critique I should state that these scholars have left a substantial hole in their account and do not unequivocally explain whether a loud articulation of an approval by an audience is necessary to assume that the conditions of such an acceptance have fully occurred. Even though they concede that securitizing move is realized through either coercion or consent and is achieved through negotiations between the securitizer (read political elite) and the audience/society, they are not clear regarding the nature of these negotiation processes through which approval for securitization is acquired. For instance, they do not adequately problematize the share and place of imposition and manipulation in obtaining such an acceptance by the securitizing agent. At this juncture it can be proposed that as in the case of Cyprus question the issues are successfully securitized through various legal and political mechanisms ensuring the silence of the obedient. Thereby approval is not necessarily preceded by a process of free discussion but rather is identified with the absence of an explicit opposition to the securitizing move.

The second quality of securitization foregrounded in Wæver's conceptualization (is more important from the viewpoint of our purposes and) relates rather to the identity of the securitizer. To Wæver, "security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites."⁶⁸ This means that securitization as a speech act and/or a discursive and performative process is utilized as a technique of governance since by *"naming a certain development a security problem, the "state" can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites."*⁶⁹ At this juncture, Wæver argues that the political issues are securitized by "power holders" for their "specific, self-serving purposes." Therefore, securitization as a means of maintaining control and hegemony is inherent to the power/domination relations within a given polity; thereby it cannot be thought outside of the processes whereby state society

⁶⁸ Wæver, Ole, "Securitization and Desecuritization".

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 34.

relations are reconfigured in its conventional and hierarchical terms. When the functioning of foreign policy in Turkey is deemed as a disciplinary practice drawing the legitimate boundaries of ‘the political’, this aspect of securitization gains more and more relevance in analyzing Turkish politics and in particular state society relations in Turkey.

Should we define securitization as a means of de-politicization whereby the issues are coded as existential and urgent threats and excluded from “the normal bounds of political procedure”, desecuritization refers to “the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere.”⁷⁰ When in a given polity state elite securitizes an issue, it takes it out of the political sphere by attributing it urgency and vitality. This means that the issue born into the spheres of ‘the existential’ “should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues.”⁷¹ In sharp contrast to this, desecuritization can only be achieved only if the issues are re-politicized in such a way as to “move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere.”⁷² Hence a symbiotic relationship can be presumed between desecuritization and democratizing processes the consolidation of which can be ensured through both widening of the political sphere and also an increased level of political participation within a given socio-political context. In this sense, our subsequent task will be to address Turkey’s Cyprus discourse, which displays securitizing traits. However, before examining how the Cyprus issue is articulated and securitized in the official representation, it will be useful to briefly focus on foreign policy as a securitizing practice.⁷³

⁷⁰ Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security A New Framework For Analysis*, p. 4.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 29.

⁷² Ibid., p. 29.

⁷³ As Assist. Prof. Pınar Bilgin (a member of examining committee for this dissertation) reminded me Ole Wæver mostly uses the concept of securitization in his analyses as regards the articulation of domestic political issues such as environmental and societal issues. However, I am of the opinion that this open-ended concept can be benefited from while analyzing the foreign policy initiatives and discourses of the state. At this juncture, it is also worth noting Wæver’s discussions on the possible outcomes of

3.6. Conclusion: Foreign Policy As A Securitizing Practice

*Between man and man we live in the condition of the civil state subjected to laws; between people and people, we enjoy natural liberty... Living at the same time in the social order and in the state of nature, we suffer from the inconveniences of both without finding security in either of them*⁷⁴.

*[M]odern man is stuck within a système mixte, subjected to tyranny on the inside, and aggravated by the security dilemmas coming from the outside*⁷⁵.

As it was revealed in a detailed manner in this chapter of this dissertation, the post-structuralist IR theory treats foreign policy as one of the main disciplinary and exclusionary discourses of the state premised on the creation of a world of ‘others’: a world consisting of external and internal enemies threatening the security of the state and the national social formation to which it belongs. Foreign policy as a discursive and representative totality whereby those enemies, menaces and dangers are specified and constantly announced to the domestic society has generally been the sphere where securitizing practices of the state apparatus have most frequently been observed.

Traditionally foreign policy is deemed as “state-centric phenomenon” and an area of bureaucratic competence requiring technical know-how to challenge the external “ideological, economic and military threats.” This conventional account marginalizing the domestic society from debates and decision-making mechanisms on foreign policy issues paves the way for the successful securitization of those by the state elite as the securitizing actor. The post-structuralist scholars are converging on the idea that questions political in nature are dramatized as existential and imminent threat, namely securitized, with the aim of inscribing and restricting the political imagination and at the

“internationalization or Europeanization” on the “national identifications” and/or domestic cultural identities. Wæver, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization”.

⁷⁴ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, *L’État de Guerre*, in C.E. Vaughan, (ed.), *Political Writings*, vol. 1, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1915), p. 304 cited in Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 194.

⁷⁵ Bartelson, Jens, *Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 194.

final instance ‘the political’ itself.⁷⁶ To them, foreign policy issues are securitized by the political establishment to secure the domestic order, internal power relations and the reproduction of core characteristics ascribed to the state. By drawing on Wæver it may be suggested that the act of securitization and hence depoliticization has a bearing on the constitution and maintenance of state society relations as the relations of subjugation and dominance. For it is geared towards preventing the society from being a real political subject vis-à-vis the state apparatus.

Securitization which is not implying the existence of a real threat or danger but rather premised on subjective perceptions, specific modes of articulations and representations is a process continually repeated vis-à-vis the domestic society. Thus securitizing discourses and practices, threat perceptions and calculations of the state apparatus never expires especially if foreign policy is at stake. As David Campbell correctly argued the existence of vital and fatal threats against national sovereignty and survival are “guarantor of the state’s continued success as an impelling identity.”⁷⁷ States need grand-narratives to figure at all times on the agenda prioritizing their security needs, concerns and objectives which would never satisfactorily be met. Thus the persistent articulation of dangers, risks and threats with which the state is faced in the international ‘arena’ does not constitute a threat to its survival in real sense; on the contrary “it is its condition of possibility.”⁷⁸

The author of this study is of the opinion that anyone trying to comprehend the complex relationality between the domestic politics, security regime, and foreign policy discourses of any given nation state should not skip over the relevant analysis of Carl

⁷⁶ For a more exhaustive account see Dillon, Michael, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1966), Chapter 1, Shapiro, Michael J., *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis*, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin press, 1988), Chapter 1, Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, pp. 12-13, Chapter 4.

⁷⁷ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, pp. 12-13.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

Schmitt, who is a relatively old but a very modern thinker⁷⁹. Unlike his post-structuralist successors, to Schmitt securitization of foreign policy matters and even ‘the political’ itself by the state is a necessity emanating from the very nature of modern politics. He is inclined to conceptualize politics as a space, which is fundamentally based on and shaped through the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and ‘friend’ and ‘foe’. In Schmittian analysis this main distinction as “the operational codes of” the contemporary interstate system and of “the sovereign states of Western and Central Europe”⁸⁰ is accepted as ontologically given, an unchanging fact as far as state’s foreign policy is concerned.

To Schmitt each political collectivity and/or state should “be permanently prepared by strong foreign security and defence strategies to be able to face the constant threats”⁸¹ emanating from the “inimical others.” “Therefore the ultimate function of the political in Schmitt conceptualization is to set and maintain the boundary distinction between the societies and to protect the common identity, security and existence of a certain society against the threats coming from outside the geographical possessions of the state.”⁸²

Taking into account all these theoretical debates the burden of the subsequent part will be to discuss and problematize Turkey’s official security discourse concerning the Cyprus question. In this sense, the modes in which the issue is heavily securitized by the Turkish state and political elite via the use of a specific rhetoric will be delineated in a comprehensive manner.

⁷⁹ For an excellent review of Schmitt’s ideas on such issues as ‘the political’, liberalism, sovereignty, the friend-foe distinction and the state see Cem Deveci, “Faşizmin Yorumlanması yada Carl Schmitt’in Saf Siyaset Kuramı”, in *Liberalizm, Devlet, Hegemonya*, E. Fuat Keyman (ed.), (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2002), pp. 32-88.

⁸⁰ Poggi, Gianfranco, *The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 10-11.

⁸¹ Karatekelioğlu, Petek, *The Impact of the European Union on the Modern Nation-State*, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2000), p. 12.

⁸² Ibid., p. 12.

CHAPTER IV

MAIN PARADIGMS PROBLEMATIZING TURKISH MODERNITY AND THEIR CRITIQUES

4.1. Introduction

The Turkish modernization, the first implications of which could be traced back to the end of the eighteenth century, is a process including deviancies and contradictions that render a linear and ahistoric reading inadequate and meaningless. Even if it is generally identified with Westernization, modernization was, at the very beginning, conceived as a requirement of a defense strategy and a means of survival against the West for the Ottoman state. Not surprisingly, serious and systematic modernization was initially institutionalized within the field of military and education as in the case of other Middle Eastern countries since the only impetus behind those reforms was ‘saving the state’ as an institutional structure. The prior applications of Western methods in these two fields made substantial impacts on the emergence of a powerful military and civil bureaucracy and intelligentsia,¹ who would lead the modernizing efforts both in the Ottoman polity after Tanzimat and also in the early years of the Republican era.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the struggle between the traditional and modern institutions, values and ideas spilt over every field of domestic public sphere. In tandem with 1923, modernization as the founding paradigm of the Republicanist discourses and performances gave rise to drastic changes in the process through which

¹ For a detailed reading on the emergence and historical evolution of this bureaucratic intelligentsia (*Kalemiye*) and the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Âli*), see Findley, V. Carter, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). The book provides an alternative reading of the late Ottoman era (where the political modernization and dismantling co-existed) by focusing on the Sublime Porte as the core institution of the Ottoman bureaucracy. For a brief summary of the mentality of this bureaucratic intelligentsia in Tanzimat period, see also Çetinsaya, Gökhan, “Kalemiye’den Mülkiye’ye Tanzimat Zihniyeti”, in *Cumhuriyete Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyetin Birikimi*, Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 54-72.

the state identity and state society relations in Turkey were constructed. Concomitantly, Turkish political modernization was evolving from the strategy of the Ottoman state for survival against the West to the founding ideology of the Turkish Republican state foreseeing contemporarization by taking part within the Western society. At this point, I shall propose that in both cases the exclusion and ‘protection’ of the ‘domestic’, the ‘inside’ from the ‘foreign’ and the ‘outside’ constituted the very basis of the governmentality in Turkey. Furthermore, in the latter period the inscription of the domestic society including the formation of new ‘man’ described by David Campbell as not only “individuals or national types but also the form of the domestic order, the social relations of production, the various subjectivities to which they give rise, the groups (such as women) who are marginalized in the process, and the boundaries of legitimate social and political action”² were also embedded in these exclusionary policies. Thereby, drawing on Campbellian terminology, modernizing policies and discourses of the Turkish Republican state aiming at the transformation and restructuring of the society have continued to function as a ‘double exclusionary practice’.

The main task of this chapter is to discuss the main arguments of the three basic paradigms that have made substantial contributions in understanding and explaining Turkish modernity. These approaches that could be cited as the sociological, bureaucratic and state centric, and political economy based understandings will be elaborated on by notably reflecting on their analyses regarding the state identity and state society relations throughout Turkish modernization process. Secondly, the commonalities among these paradigms assuming the domestic and foreign politics as distinct structures from each other will be emphasized since it is of great significance in clarifying the central aim and contribution of this dissertation. At this juncture, the

² Campbell, David, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 63.

chapter foregrounds the notion that the literature on Turkish modernization lacks attention to the role and impact of external factors while analyzing the emergence and development of Turkish economic and political modernity. In the same vein, literature on Turkish modernization lacks attention to the foreign political sources and dynamics of Turkish economic and political modernity emerging and developing as a state-sponsored and state-based project. The literature is prone to exclude the outer dynamics from its analyses on the nature of the relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ in Turkey the evolution of which is deeply embedded in that of Turkish modernity. For instance the literature does not attach due importance to the significance of the state’s foreign political initiatives and discourses in reproducing the state-centricist character of Turkish politics and modernization. In this context, the chapter finally proposes that a multifaceted assessment of Turkish political modernity and the state identity necessitates:

1. making reference to all internal and external political processes, while explaining the state-centricist and state-oriented structure of Turkish modernization, in this respect
2. searching for the role and impact of the Turkish state’s foreign political initiatives, discourses and representations in the reproduction of its core characteristics and the domestic order; and thus
3. evaluating the intertwined character of domestic and foreign political processes and their interactions instead of demarcating them in absolute boundaries.

Turkish modernization process, in which historical changes within the political, economic, and cultural life of the society are embedded, has been a very efficient area of study for a long time for various social scientists coming from divergent schools and disciplines. The continuities and discontinuities in the state structure and the ruling

tradition shaping the state society relations, which can be read directly parallel to the development of such process, have also occupied a prominent position in these works. In this perspective, the three basic paradigms engaged in the analysis of Turkish political modernity will constitute the focal point of this chapter.

4.2. The Sociological Based Approach

The sociological based understanding adopted by such scholars as Şerif Mardin, Niyazi Berkes, and Tarık Zafer Tunaya gives priority to the sociological and socio-political tools in analyzing Turkish modernization and its impact on the restructuring of the state identity and state society relations. The protagonists of this paradigm generally propose that those who want to probe into the issue at stake should primarily expatiate the distinctive features of Turkish politics. For instance, while presenting relations between the center and the periphery (the state and the society) as a key to explain Turkish polity, Şerif Mardin assigns strategic importance to making a comparison between the Turkish and Western European experiences in the centralization of the state authority³ within social structure since this discrepancy in the centralization of the state power eventuated in the constitution of state society relations in different manners. According to this approach, in the West the centralization process that has given rise to the modern nation state entailed a series of confrontations (that is conflict and consensus) between the peripheral and central powers whereas in the Turkish politics (both in Ottoman and Republican era) we can rather speak of a uni-dimensional confrontation which has merely appeared as a struggle between these two. This struggle surviving even after the modernization process of more than a century is defined by Mardin as the foremost social rupture constituting the very basis of Turkish polity.⁴

³ Mardin, Şerif, "Center Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?", *Daedalus*, 102 (1973), p. 169.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.170.

According to Keyman, Mardin, as the first social scientist to problematize the Turkish modernization with respect to modernity⁵, adopts a multi-faceted analytical and epistemological methodology allowing for the conceptualization of the historically and discursively constructed nature of modernization. Beyond the essentialist, functionalist and reductionist inferences of classical modernization paradigms, he yields a comprehensive analysis of Turkish political modernity without disregarding the very dynamic and controversial relationality among its social, economic and cultural dimensions⁶. Classical modernization discourses propound an evolutionary transitional process furthering stage by stage within a linear period of time where all traditional institutions of the social entity would be marginalized and thrown out of history. In line with argumentation, foundation of the nation state and national economy, sustenance of economic development, increase in industrialization and urbanization would naturally trigger the replacement of traditional establishments and values with the modern ones. Such reductionist theorization could conceptualize adequately neither the differentiated modes of modernity experienced in different historical and socio-political contexts nor the complicated and multidimensional relationality between ‘the traditional’ and ‘the modern’ having remarkable manifestations in both symbolic terms and everyday life of the society. The impasses and illusions of this paradigmatic positioning are surpassed in Mardin’s theoretical investigations feeding on diverse resources. Considering the purpose and content of this thesis work, I shall content myself with discussing his views on three crucial analytical planes. These are the foundation of the Turkish nation state, the center periphery relations and finally the opposition in Turkey.

⁵ Keyman, E. Fuat, “Şerif Mardin, Toplumsal Kuram ve Türk Modernitesini Anlamak”, *Doğu Batı*, 16 (2001), p. 16.

⁶ Ibid., p. 15.

4.2.1. Foundation of the Turkish Nation State

Whilst discussing the role and status of the Turkish nation state in Mardin's analysis of Turkish political modernity, we again face with a multidimensional perspective analyzing the dynamics of governmentality in Turkey through which privileged positioning of the state within social structure and its relations with other social groups are designated. For Mardin, since the history of modernization is neither the history of absolute ruptures nor the history of continuities, the Republican era conceptualized with the foundation of the Turkish Republic as a literal nation state and the Westernizing Kemalist will and discourse behind it should also be historicized with its conflicts and compromises with the *Régime Ancien*. As Fuat Keyman states such way of theorizing the Republican era could rescue us from the unidimensionality of the classical modernization paradigms foreseeing an evolutionary and linear transitional process from the traditional to the modern and not allowing to conceptualize ruptures, deviancies, and inconveniences within it. This approach could also indicate that in the eyes of the founders of the new nation state the Turkish Westernization refers to an adamant project of political modernity in which the traditional hierarchy between governmental institutions and social groups was maintained in the new form of state.

In light of these introductory remarks, it could be proposed that in Mardin's approach to Turkish modernity, the foundation of the Turkish nation state represents a 'dual act of drawing boundaries' through which the legitimate ground of the Kemalist modernizing reforms is established. This dual initiation has also served as one of the main pillars of the new ideology according to which the norms, principles, and moral values of the modernizing reforms were also installed by the Republican staff. In this respect, the boundaries demarcating the Republican era and its nation state from the Ottoman Empire and its polity on one hand, and the political, social, economic, cultural, and ethical limits and boundaries of Turkish Westernization as a project of political

modernity and nation building on the other were drawn by the new state elite. This initiation which has a dual capacity of determining the conditions of both the old and the present rendered the state the only legitimate and sovereign subject of the modernization process. This privileged status vis-à-vis the society has facilitated the maintenance of the traditional hierarchy between governmental institutions and other social groups in which the existence of an autonomous public sphere from the state is disallowed. Thus, the Ottoman ruling tradition in which peripheral forces were excluded from decision-making mechanisms has been sustained this time by making the whole society the object of the ideals and actions of the central elite since the members of the society were not conceived as conscious and voluntary participants of the modernization and Westernization efforts but rather as a mass to be manipulated for the ideals of the Republic.

In contrast to the Ottoman era the Republican state has not striven to preserve the status quo with its all institutions but it aimed at constructing a brand new order in which there was no place for rival political figures. In this respect, the ideals of the Republicanist staff such as the modern nation, “national identity”, and “general will to Westernization”, which in fact did not exist, were accepted in *a priori* manner as already present and part of the social and political reality⁸³. The Kemalists who assigned the state the mission and right of modernizing the society formulated and implemented their policies and discourses on the basis of such presuppositions, which has been reflecting, for Mardin, its utopian characteristic as dominant figures in the restructuring of the state. This utopianism also helped the creation of a proper ground on which ideological expectations of the new elite of the center were legitimized through the replacement of the traditional institutions, norms and values with modern establishments.

⁸³ Mardin, Şerif, *Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), p. 65.

In Mardin's analysis the Republicanist period with its aforementioned specificities represents an absolute separation from the Ottoman polity. Besides, endeavors to materialize the objectives of transforming and modernizing the society have paradoxically induced the reproduction of the traditional hierarchy between the state and society. Due to this reproduction of tradition in a new form of state, Republican period also implies a radical reorganization of Ottoman heritage for the author.

To sum up, Mardin interprets the foundation of the Turkish nation state and the modernizing Kemalist ideology and the will of contemporarization behind it as a "project of modernity". He strives to expatiate the complex relations of this project with the Ottoman era within a certain understanding of history⁸⁴ allowing the conceptualization of continuities and ruptures which co-existed in the transition from the Ottoman to the Republican polity. Such way of defining the Republican era where contrasts and contradictions are intertwined is of great merit to explicate the specific aspects of Turkish modernization both as a project of political modernity and as a practice of ruling. Concomitantly, while the objective of socializing the citizens of the new Republic in accordance with the norms and principles of political and cultural modernity was determined as the mission and basis of the state of the Turkish Republic, the endeavors to realize this objective have paradoxically induced the reproduction of the traditional hierarchy between the state and the society.

4.2.2. The Center and Periphery

Şerif Mardin in his article "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?" first published in 1973 provides very useful insights in analyzing the conditions of structuring and restructuring of Turkish politics in which the roles and

⁸⁴ Keyman, Fuat E., "Şerif Mardin, Toplumsal Kuram ve Türk Modernitesini Anlamak", p. 16.

status assigned to the central and peripheral forces (governmental institutions and social groups) are designated in accordance with a definite ruling tradition. This ruling tradition institutionalizing the duality of the center and the periphery has survived as a dominant figure both in the Ottoman and the Republican polities throughout the history of Turkish modernization. Even though, at first glance, the analysis of Turkish political system and thereby the modernization process within the context of this duality could seem inadequate and limited, this kind of conceptualization helps significantly to gain a fuller perspective ‘about the Turkish governmentality.’ This approach is also relevant in exploring how the center periphery relations have been constructed throughout the history of Turkish modernization. The article also searches for how and to what extent the reciprocal impact of the evolution of the Turkish modernity and the construction of the state society relations could be employed as an analytical tool in addressing the restructuring of Turkish politics.

In this article, Mardin begins with indicating the historical and structural differences even oppositions of the Ottoman and Western experiences as to the constitution of the center and its relations with the periphery, which deeply affected the evolution of modernity in those societies. For him, to establish a fuller perspective as regards the Turkish political system and thereby the modernization process, it is needed to make a comparison with the Ottoman and Western institutions that present structural contrasts to each other⁸⁵. In Mardin’s terminology

the forces that shape the state in the West seem to vary significantly from those that shape the Ottoman state before modernization set in. Because of its feudal antecedents, the process of centralization that create the modern state included a series of confrontations leading to compromises with what may be called the forces of the periphery: the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later, industrial labor.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Mardin, Şerif, “Center Periphery Relations”, p. 169.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 170.

Both in late Ottoman and the Turkish Republican polity the traditional distance between the center and the periphery fed on the way in which the modernizing reforms were conducted by the central authority. As the author puts it, while in the West modernization was achieved through a series of confrontations where each time the integration of the periphery forces to the center of the political system was obtained, in the Turkish case those confrontations always occurred as a unidimensional and a major conflict between the state elite and social groups that created “the most important social cleavages underlying Turkish politics during the more than a century of modernization.”⁸⁷

In the same vein İlkay Sunar in his book of *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development* begins his analysis on the evolution of Turkish economic and political modernization by comparing and contrasting “Western feudalism and the Ottoman patrimonial rule”.⁸⁸ He argues that the Medieval European politics was characterized by tensions and conflicts among the feudal lords who “try to expand their immunities and to establish themselves as rulers in their own rights” and the secular kings who “attempted to limit the political power of social estates through enforced subordination.”⁸⁹ Thus the Medieval European political landscape was shaped and reshaped by the constant struggles between “the efforts of kings to offset the drive of social estates towards local autonomy on the one hand, and the typical response of these feudal estates that sought to enlarge their existing guarantees and privileges on the other.”⁹⁰ Whereas the “patrimonial system” of the Ottoman Empire has never witnessed a constant struggle of that kind between the central authority and the peripheral forces

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 170.

⁸⁸ Sunar, İlkay, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development*, (Ankara: Ankara University Faculty of Political Science Publication, 1974), pp. 3-11.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

in such a way as to completely determine the speed and nature of the Ottoman/Turkish modernization.

Another distinction foregrounded in the sociological based paradigm between the classical Ottoman order and West European feudalism is related to the degree of autonomy that society has acquired vis-à-vis the state authority. According to this analysis while in the pre-modern European politics autonomy of social groups was secured through various civil guarantees recognized to the peripheral forces against the royal authority⁹¹ these “rights and the immunities enjoyed by local communities ... were absent in the Ottoman Empire”⁹². As Mardin clearly indicates mainly owing to the absence of such kind of rights and guarantees allowing the development of autonomous social groups, the Ottoman polity was characterized by the lack of Western type civil society institutions⁹³. However it would be an exaggeration to claim that the subjects (*reaya*) remained totally undefended vis-à-vis exercises of the state apparatus precisely because the power and authority of the Sultanate was limited with the “*millet system*”, the divine law (*shariah*) and the necessity of being just and equitable towards its subjects. It was the obligation of the Sultan (*Padishah*) as “God’s trustee” “to dispense justice (*adalet*) and to administer welfare (*hisba*)”⁹⁴ and to take all the measures for the sustenance of the conventional socio-political order and its institutions. What is more, as it would be more clear in the course of this chapter the Ottoman bureaucracy both in the pre-modern and in the transitional periods never avoided to establish multi-faceted patronage relations with different socio-economic groups and the relevant institutional structures guaranteeing the maintenance of these relations in the manner that the power-holders desired. While securing the reproduction of these patronage relations “a main

⁹¹ Bendix, Reinhard, “Social Stratification and the Political Community”, in *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), p. 213.

⁹² Sunar, İlkay, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development*, p. 4.

⁹³ Mardin, Şerif, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 11/3, (June 1969), p. 264.

⁹⁴ Sunar, İlkay, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development*, p. 6.

concern of the state was to ensure that each individual remained in his own class; this was regarded as the basic requisite for politico-social order and harmony.”⁹⁵

The *millet* system situating the Ottoman palace at an equal distance from almost all ethnic and religious communities granted those groups a relative degree of autonomy⁹⁶ particularly as regards their internal affairs. While examining the differences between the Ottoman paradigm of order and the European feudalism as pre-modern political systems İlkey Sunar concisely summarizes how the state society relations and the status of different socio-economic groups vis-à-vis the state were reconfigured within the Ottoman politics:

Nevertheless it is true that what made the Ottoman Empire different from Medieval Europe was a model of society in which social relationships and institutions were sustained by the direction imparted by the state. It was political authority which held together and defined the limits of society as a whole. Political authority penetrated the social sphere of life in such a way that society was subsumed under the state, and economic life was closely supervised by the ruler. No irrevocable immunities existed for the *reaya* (subjects). In short there were no privileged or immune estates which could act independently of the political center based on property rights, corporate personality, or the autonomy of towns.⁹⁷

Mardin and his various colleagues draw our attention to the intertwinedness and parallelisms between the constitutive dynamics of modernizing programs and those of state society relations. The recognition of the autonomous status of the peripheral forces in the West during “those confrontations” whether leading to “compromise” or conflict or even to the “victory of one side over the other”⁹⁸ paved the way for their involvement in the political system. On the contrary, exclusion of peripheral forces from the center has always caused the growth of the mutual suspicion between the state and society in Turkey. Throughout the modernization process this mutual suspicion, which is one of

⁹⁵ İnalcık, Halil, “The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey”, in R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow (eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 97.

⁹⁶ Gibb, H.A.R., and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), Volume I, Part II, Chapter XIV.

⁹⁷ Sunar, İlkey, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development*, p. 5.

⁹⁸ Mardin, Şerif, “Center Periphery Relations”, p. 170.

the central reasons of the estrangement of the center and the periphery from each other⁹⁹, has survived and constituted the limits and the conditions of participation of the peripheral forces in the policy making mechanisms.

According to Mardin, the whole responsibility of the estrangement and cleavages between the center and the periphery belongs to the state itself as it does not recognize the legitimacy of the peripheral forces' identities and their symbolic and cultural differences. "The state's claim to political and economic control was bolstered by its title to cultural preeminence. Relative to the heterogeneity of the periphery, the ruling class was singularly compact; this was, above all, a cultural phenomenon."¹⁰⁰ This cultural heterogeneity of the periphery was perceived particularly by the Republicanist staff as a danger to its unity and sovereignty. It was also an obstacle for the building of an organic and homogenous nation that would be identified with the ideal of the modern nation state. The peripheral forces were always seen as a mass that should be modernized and rationalized by the ruling elite in accordance with its pretentious modernization project predicated on the construction of a 'modern' self: a modern self leaving aside the traditional institutions, values and way of life and internalizing a new *Weltanschauung* in full conformity with the state's modernizing reforms. Thereby, the cultural dimension of the traditional conflict between the center and the periphery is not less important and non-negligible than the political aspect.

Should we quote from the article

on the one hand, the entire mechanism of the state was permeated by the myth of the majesty of the Sultan (later in the first years of Republic this was replaced by the majesty of Atatürk); on the other hand, there were restrictions placed on the common mortal's access to the symbols of official culture. For much of the population, nomad or settled, rural or urban, this cultural separation was the most striking feature of its existence on the periphery.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 183 and ff.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 173.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 173.

According to the author, the center-periphery polarity as “an extremely important structural component of Turkish politics perpetuated during the history of modernization in Turkey”. In this polarity defining the core characteristics of Turkish polity the periphery was represented “as a two-faceted entity”:

the periphery as made up of primordial groups, and as the periphery as the center of a counter-official culture. Both were *bêtes noires* of the Young Turks and of the Kemalists. But the policies of the modernizers, as well as fortuitous developments, worked to highlight the second facet of peripheral identity.¹⁰²

4.2.3. The Opposition in Turkey

It is non-deniable fact that the governmental rationality and the ruling tradition in Turkey the evolution of which is interrelated with that of modernity, opposition has been more often than not perceived by the power-holders as the ‘threatening other’ against which the fundamental characteristics of the domestic regime and the society is defined negatively. Thus the processes through which the state identity and the state society relations have been reconstructed in Turkey embrace also the reconstruction of the opposition. Furthering the analysis one step more, one should argue, in conformity with Şerif Mardin, that the boundaries within which the opposing groups have been forced to remain constitute also the boundaries of the political in Turkey. Within the regime the role assigned to the opposition is not to surpass those demarcating ‘the legitimate’ from ‘the illegitimate’, ‘the legal’ from ‘the illegal’. For this reason finding out how the opposition is perceived and represented would make significant contribution to the analysis of peculiar inner dynamics of Turkish politics. In this context, it is also strategically important to decipher the functioning of the political mechanisms controlling and neutralizing the opponent both as a means and consequence of the practice of ruling through which the state identity is stabilized.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 187.

Mardin in his article ‘Opposition and Control in Turkey’ delineates the modes of construction of the relationship between the governmental elite and the opposing groups throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. He is interested not only in theorizing the issue in political terms but also in searching for the social origins of intolerance against the different and the opponent in the country¹⁰³. As such, the major objective of the author is to explore the variables of the common attitude towards the opposition mirrored both by the representatives of the central and the peripheral groups. The article is also of significance in the sense that it indicates the reciprocal relationality between the evolution of political modernity and the exclusion and elimination of opposing movements from the political system.

If the opposition is defined as a mechanism having the ability of both limiting the absolute authority of the political power and of proposing and producing alternative policies, it could be claimed that there never existed such an opposition within the Ottoman polity.¹⁰⁴ However this Western type of conceptualization of the opposition could preclude attaining a full perspective regarding the special status of some mediatory institutions situated on the borderline in between the center and the periphery. For instance, the ideas of *ulema*, who was under the safeguard of the religion could not be easily eliminated when they were in conflict with the central authority. Again as Mardin puts it, extremities of absolutism could have been restrained through an arduous balance institutionalized between the Sultan, the *janissaries*, the *ulema*, and the *Kalemiye* (the bureaucratic class).¹⁰⁵ Besides, it should be noted that intolerance against the opposition groups articulating their criticisms and alternative opinions against the central authority could be remarked throughout the whole Turkish modernization history beginning with the late Ottoman era. For instance, when the

¹⁰³ Mardin, Şerif, “Türkiye’de Muhalefet ve Kontrol” in *Türk Modernleşmesi Makaleler 4*, Mümtazer Türköne and Tuncay Önder (eds.), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), pp. 190-93.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 179.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 179.

attitude and actions of *Kalemiye*, strengthening throughout the nineteenth century as the nucleus of the bureaucratic class, which would conduct the modernizing reforms are analyzed vis-à-vis the opposing and peripheral forces, the same scene is bound to be faced with. Like the Sultans and Young Turks of the early twentieth century, the members of this modernizing bureaucratic class always identified the opposing groups and their criticisms on the government's specific policies with betrayal to the state. This identification was intended for rendering the legitimacy and legality of the opposition debatable and interrogated¹⁰⁶. As a method of ruling this identification was also functionalized by the state elite of the new Republic to establish a political hegemony and to exclude the opposing and peripheral forces from the governmental institutions.

For Mardin, all the opposing currents in the political history of modern Turkey were always accused in the same way as they posed a threat to the national unity and even to the territorial integrity and hindered the conduct of the modernizing reforms¹⁰⁷. Such kind of accusation on the one hand eased the removal of the opponent groups from the political sphere and on the other paved the way for the government to maximize its objectives. More interestingly, Mardin's sociological analysis regarding the everyday life indicates that although there has not been a satisfactory body of reliable studies, the widespread and close control is one of the endemic characteristics of the Turkish nation.¹⁰⁸ The author also maintains that the intolerance towards the different can be witnessed in almost all social strata. Besides, the intolerance against the deviancies feeds on a perpetual fear of disintegration kept alive at national level. There has been a functional relationship in between this fear and the widespread control serving as a practice of ruling both at local and national level. The intolerance and estrangement,

¹⁰⁶ To Mardin, the history of modern Turkish politics is laden with instances where the opposing currents have confronted with similar accusations. See Ibid., pp. 181-182.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 181-82.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 188. For Mardin's detailed account of opposition in Turkey in English see Mardin, Şerif, "Opposition and Control in Turkey", *Government and Opposition*, 1 (3), April 1966, pp. 375-387.

which are noticeable as a fundamental feature of center/periphery polarity in Turkish politics, have a “more deep-rooted and diffused social basis than assumed”¹⁰⁹.

4.3. The Bureaucratic and State Centric Approach

The second paradigm foregrounding a state-centric analysis ventures to address and problematize the Turkish political modernity and the “legitimacy formula” through which the core characteristics of Turkish politics are defined. By capturing the attention to the extremely “strong state tradition” in Turkey, Metin Heper searches for the unfolding of the historical roots of the privileged and primary status allocated to the bureaucracy vis-à-vis other political figures and, in institutional terms, the state vis-à-vis the society. For him contrary to the Western European experience, the intolerance of the state elite toward the emergence of any politically influential and autonomous social groups both within the Ottoman and Republican polities together with some other factors such as the proliferation of praetorianist tendencies rendered the bureaucracy the dominant agent in Turkish modernization. The protagonists of this paradigm generally imply that the performances and discourses of these elites including the civilian and military bureaucratic establishment are geared toward consolidating their status within the regime as the only class having the transformative capacity to restructure the socio-political order.

The state-centric approaches ascribing the state an autonomous and independent status vis-à-vis other institutions within the sociopolitical structure have proved their durabilities in the literatures of various disciplines ranging from international relations to political science. In those studies, the state, as the most important unit of analysis, has been attached an ontologically given and epistemologically primary status. Presumed as a unitary and rational actor and sometimes even a transcendental subject, the state has

¹⁰⁹ Mardin, Şerif, “Türkiye’de Muhalefet ve Kontrol”, p. 191.

the ability and capacity to determine and manipulate the conditions through which politics is reproduced. Here lies the main source of autonomy and supremacy assigned to the state vis-à-vis other agents. According to Nettl, who is among the prominent figures of the state-centered theoretical enterprises, the autonomy implies the qualities that render the state a distinct sector enjoying independence in fulfilling its structural functions. Sovereignty refers to its capacity to determine and realize the common goods and objectives both for and on behalf of the society. Furthermore, the state is theorized as an institution determining the common interest independent from the society rather than as a societal and/or economic formation.¹¹⁰

As far as the Turkish political history is concerned, those state-centric analyses can be substantiated through Metin Heper's studies focusing on the bureaucratic class as the champion of the modernizing reforms and the "strong state tradition" in Turkey. It is fair to propose that the bureaucratic intelligentsia has a central focus in Heper's reading of the Turkish political history as its alliances and political struggles with other groups have a capacity to determine the conditions of Turkish political structure, and thereby the development of democracy and state society relations in Turkey. In this section of the chapter, I shall particularly focus on his theoretical investigations on the status of the bureaucracy and its constant desire to occupy and even constitute the locus of stateness. In this context, examining the linkage established by Heper between the consolidation of the bureaucracy's central and autonomous position within the system and of the transcendental nature of Turkish state will be of great merit when the aimed contributions and objectives of this chapter are considered.

According to Özman and Coşar¹¹¹ the fundamental issue problematized in Heper's studies is how the dynamics of Turkish politics are conditioned by a definite

¹¹⁰ Nettl, J. P., "The State As A Conceptual Variable", *World Politics*, 21 (1968), pp. 559-92.

¹¹¹ Özman, Aylin, and Coşar, Simten, "Siyasal Tahayyülde Devletin Belirleyiciliği Metin Heper Çalışmaları Üzerine Bir İnceleme", p. 82.

form and mentality of the state. Thus, he aims at elucidating the main characteristics of the ‘strong state tradition’ in Turkey and its legitimacy formula through which the state society relations are constructed. For instance, the distinction he makes between the two different articulations of the state “as a generalizing idea embodying rationally-formulated norms and values” can be said to gain great significance in this perspective:

first the state as an integrating idea seeking to unify the disparate elements of society around the norms and values in question; and second the state as an legitimizing idea- only that political power which is exercised according to the said norms and values is legitimate.¹¹²

With respect to this distinction it should also be noted that the center periphery polarity used by Mardin as a key to Turkish polity is replaced in Heper’s studies by the polarity in between the state elite and the political elite.

4.3.1. The Locus of Stateness

For Heper, the structural and historical conditions that produce this polarity in different contexts are of central importance to explore the dynamics of Turkish political system. This re-evaluation of Mardin’s center periphery distinction in the perspective of state centric theorization provides him the means of transition from the social cultural dimension to the political cultural dimension.¹¹³ In Heper’s terminology, the center (locus) of stateness refers not only to the political sphere surrounded by the civil and military bureaucratic elite and intelligentsia but also to the sphere in which basic norms and principles of politics are established and implemented.¹¹⁴ To Heper, the elite of the center in an attempt to construct and consolidate their primary status within the Turkish polity have always striven to keep the political life under their control so much so that alternative political figures (especially if they claim to represent the periphery) have

¹¹² Heper, Metin, “The ‘Strong State’ and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective” in *Democracy in Modernity*, S.N. Eisenstadt (ed.), (Leiden: E. J Brill, 1987), pp. 143-144.

¹¹³ Özman, Aylin and Coşar, Simten, “Siyasal Tahayyülde Devletin Belirleyiciliği Metin Heper Çalışmaları Üzerine Bir İnceleme”, p. 82.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 87.

been perceived as a threat to the modernizing reforms. In this regard, the political struggle between the state elite representing the state's modernization project and the political elite asserting the traditional values and the impact of this struggle on the structure of the state in Turkey have constituted the main trail of Heper's analysis on the historical development of Turkish politics. Heper drastically mentions that after the death of Mustafa Kemal, for the maintenance and consolidation of its position within the system, the state elite has induced a transformation in formulating the norms and principles of Atatürkist thought. In this sense, throughout Atatürk's lifetime these were defined as the techniques of discovering the truth, afterwards its bureaucratized version was put into force by the civil servant based on the strict ideological phrases legitimizing and securing its central position in Turkish polity. Reconstruction of Kemalist principles in such dogmatic way also helped the state to keep the political sphere under its absolute control and to act as both the ethical and political subject of Turkish modernization. In Heper's terminology, the center, in which the sovereignty of the state is institutionalized and the legitimate and legal boundaries of 'the political' are drawn, corresponds to the concept of 'the locus of stateness'. Heper points to the parallelism in between the political forces who occupy the locus of stateness and the structural conditions of Turkish political system, which impinge upon one another reciprocally. It may be surmised that the close examination of the impact of this interaction on the state society relations in Turkey throughout the Republican history could also provide us a new analytical plane regarding the issue since the characteristics of the political forces who constituted the center have deeply influenced those relations.

Heper strives to analyze the history of Turkish political modernity through a periodization based on the changes of the political forces dominating the political center. In accordance with this periodization, in the Ottoman polity the locus of stateness oscillated between the Sultanate and the bureaucracy particularly in the late

Ottoman era, where modernizing reforms were accelerated. Throughout this period, the bureaucratic class followed a consistent policy to exclude the Sultanate from the locus of stateness with the purpose of weakening the Palace within the Ottoman polity. During the War of Independence the Grand National Assembly, defined by Mustafa Kemal as the only genuine representative and a concrete symbol of the national will, functioned as the locus of stateness. In the period of 1923-38 (beginning with the foundation of Turkish Republic and ending with the death of Mustafa Kemal) the Presidency constituted the locus of stateness. In the subsequent period of 1938-50, the locus was fulfilled by the civil servant involving the Republican People's Party political bureaucracy. With the 1950 parliamentary elections in which the Democrat Party acquired the overwhelming majority, the political struggles to occupy and control the center gained a determinacy capacity in structuring and restructuring of the Turkish political system. It can be claimed with some degree of accuracy that in the period of 1950-60 the duality in between the state and the political elite pointed to by the author in various cases sharpened but did not lead to a change in the perception and exercise of the political power as in the case of state centric governing mentality. Subsequently, the 1960 military coup symbolizes the institutionalization of the military's determinacy position in Turkish political life. While the political restructuring in Turkey after 1960s which was performed unilaterally by the state elite placed the civil bureaucratic elite and later the presidency (directly) and the military (indirectly) at the core of the state, in several European countries the re-equilibration efforts were carried out by the elected representatives of the social groups, attenuating the role of the state apparatus.¹¹⁵ In consequence, within the transitional period of 1960-72 the military and the civil bureaucracy co-existed in the center of Turkish politics. Nevertheless, from 1972 onwards the military's weight and influence within the state have gradually increased.

¹¹⁵ Heper, Metin, "The 'Strong State' and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective", p. 145.

In the subsequent period, the 1980 military coup and the 1982 Constitution institutionalized the occupation of the locus of stateness by the military and the presidency the first implications of which could be traced back to the 1961 Constitution and constitutional amendments in the following ten years. In accordance with this kind of periodization, the fundamental duality determining the structural conditions of Turkish polity could also be read as a polarity in between the political forces constituting the locus of stateness and the ones remaining outside and/or excluded from it. When the political groups remaining outside the center (read the periphery) could not reach it or when they could not internalize the social and political norms and values established by the state elite (read the center), this polarity and the conflicts embedded in it have grown increasingly.

4.3.2. The Modernizing Kemalist Reforms

Heper sets out his analysis on the modernizing Kemalist reforms by establishing a linkage between the French Revolution of 1789, which was conducted by the bureaucratic elite, and the Turkish case. In replacing *l'état c'est moi* with *national moi* (a sovereign general will)¹¹⁶ however; in Atatürk's mind the creation of new man in accordance with the national *moi* is not directly the duty and the responsibility of the Turkish people "who have lost their capacity of taking the initiative because of the long centuries of the Sultan's personal rule". Thus, activating the potential of Turkish people and elevating them to the level of contemporary civilization was institutionalized as the basic mission of the Republican state.¹¹⁷ Until ordinary Turkish people attained a certain level of consciousness within the process of Westernization, "it was an obligation on the part of all the members of the Grand National Assembly, and all other elites- to

¹¹⁶ Heper, Metin, *The State Tradition In Turkey*, (The University of Hull: The Eothen Press, 1985), p. 49.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 50.

enlighten the people and help them make progress.”¹¹⁸ Under these circumstances, the locus of stateness was designated as the Turkish Grand National Assembly, holding all administrating powers in its hands, but not civil bureaucracy towards whom Mustafa Kemal had deep distrust and suspicion during the years of the War of Independence. Heper maintains that even after the war was over, and Ankara government was established, the civil bureaucracy displayed a dual characteristic. On one hand, there were many young and pro-nationalist bureaucrats coming from the Sublime Porte loyal to the traditional values of the Old Regime.¹¹⁹ The pro-nationalist and modernist wing of the civil bureaucracy has always perceived the latter both as a danger to the modernizing reforms and in opposition to themselves.¹²⁰ Henceforth, once the Ankara government was established, more effective and permanent measures were taken to eliminate the Sublime Porte wing of the civil servants, who were blamed by Mustafa Kemal for undermining the national effort during the initial stages of the War of Independence.¹²¹

During the early years of the Republican era, the role and status assigned by Mustafa Kemal to the civil bureaucracy within the new state structure is concisely summarized by the author as follows:

Atatürk opted for a Hegelian state- one that would safeguard the general interest without overwhelming civil society. However, he rejected, in the Turkish case, one integral element of the Hegelian state- ‘the absolute class’, or civil bureaucracy – as the guardian of the general interest. For the civil bureaucracy he revived an Ottoman tradition by adopting the idea of the machine model. For Atatürk the civil bureaucracy was a lesser part of the governmental machine- a mere instrument (*kâbil-i istimal bir cihaz*).¹²²

Parallel to the efforts of the government to reorganize and keep the civil servant under its tight control, the political party bureaucracy of the Republican People’s Party

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 51.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 55.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 56.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 56.

¹²² Ibid., p. 56.

gradually strengthened and began to act as if part of the apparatus of the Republican government.¹²³

In the 1927 (The Republican People's) Party convention it was decided that the officials administering social, political, economic, and cultural agencies, as well as the village headmen, could be appointed only with the approval of the party's inspectors. And the party set up a far-reaching organization alongside the civil bureaucracy, which could both control the bureaucracy and deprive it of some of its potential functions.¹²⁴

According to Heper, Mustafa Kemal faced with a crucial dilemma regarding the civil bureaucracy. On one hand, he tried to organize it functioning as a machine like institution, on the other he wanted them to be champions of the modernizing reforms and of "a substantively value system namely Atatürkist thought."¹²⁵ For this reason, the locus of stateness remained under the shadow of Presidency along those years. However, with İnönü's presidency (1938-50) the bureaucratic intelligentsia began to gain a larger place¹²⁶ and a more influential status within Turkish polity. According to Aydemir, the factor leading to such a situation can be seen as İnönü's determination to concentrate all powers in government rather than in the political party.¹²⁷

Heper finds out a parallelism between the rise of civil bureaucracy within two decades following the 1920s and the transformation of the 'Atatürkist *Weltanschauung*' *par excellence* into an ideological totality. Concomitantly, as stated elsewhere, while in the early years of the Republic the Kemalist modernizing reforms were defined as the techniques of finding out the truth guiding the society to a higher level of civilization, they were loaded with "substantive meanings"¹²⁸ with the fulfillment of the locus of stateness by the bureaucratic intelligentsia. The objective of this bureaucratized version of Atatürkist thought, as a political manifesto is to legitimize and consolidate its central

¹²³ Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence Of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 382-83.

¹²⁴ Heper, Metin, *The State Tradition In Turkey*, pp. 56-57.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 67.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 69

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 69.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 71.

role and position within Turkish polity. As they did not have Atatürk's charisma, they needed such a well-organized and strictly defined political formulae and to "take upon themselves the responsibility of carrying it out."¹²⁹

Heper additionally claims that there has been a strong proclivity among the members of the bureaucratic intelligentsia, who attributed themselves the mission of Westernizing Turkey, to hold the modernistic attitude for their own sake. The reconstruction of Atatürkist outlook in a bureaucratized form based on strictly modernizing and quasi-chauvinistic discourses could also be evaluated in this context. He also highlights the significance and even necessity of making a distinction between the state traditions that may be traced back to Mustafa Kemal's lifetime and be attributed to the bureaucratic intelligentsia. This differentiation sourced from the bureaucratic deviancy becomes evident particularly in the perception of transcendental nature of the state. In the former case, it is imagined that the mission, assigned to the state elite and intelligentsia- that of leading Turkish society in the course of Westernization and modernization, continues until the people could gain the capacity of conducting the process on their own. Therefore, elitism and transcendentalism were conceived just as transient means of reaching and surpassing the contemporary civilization whereas they were perceived by the civil servant as an end in itself. Karpas notes that the political orientation of the bureaucratic intelligentsia was based on "the idea that the intellectual should be the guide of the masses instead of opening avenues for their development."¹³⁰ Heper maintains that the civil servant who wanted to secure its central status preferred to promote transcendentalism and to structure the state system on a bureaucratic version of Kemalist principles functioning also as an exclusionary practice vis-à-vis the political elite claiming to represent the peripheral

¹²⁹ Heper, Metin, "A Weltanschauung-Turned-Partial Ideology and Normative Ethics: Atatürkism in Turkey", *Orient*, 1 (1984) pp. 88-89.

¹³⁰ Karpas, Kemal H., *Turkey's Politics: The Transition To Multi-Party Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 129.

groups. This bureaucratic *élan* perpetuating the transcendental nature of the state provides them the proper ground on which they could constitute the locus of stateness as the sole power at least for a definite period of 1938-1950.

Concomitant with the increase of transcendentalism and centralization of the state power some structural changes occurred within Turkish politics concisely summarized in the statement below cited by Heper from Lewis: “After the death of Atatürk there was deterioration. In the hands of lesser men than himself, his authoritarian and paternalistic mode of government degenerated into something nearer to dictatorship as the word is commonly understood.”¹³¹ This statement implies a period characterized by the ‘transient transcendental’ nature of the state where the legitimate and legal boundaries of all sorts of activities were inscribed by the bureaucratic intelligentsia. The subordinate status of the economics vis-à-vis the politics; and also of the economic activities vis-à-vis the high interests of the state articulated by those elites constitute another particularistic aspect of this period. In this context, the constitution and perpetuation of the state society relations in accordance with the statist paradigm and discourses outlined above were assumed as a principal and immediate task by the bureaucratic establishment. On the other hand, Heper’s emphasis on the cooperation and co-optation between the members of the academic and bureaucratic intelligentsia particularly in the period of 1945-1960 and during the elaboration of 1961 Constitution vis-à-vis the political figures claiming to represent the expectations of the people is eminently striking. The most profound distinction among this alliance and the political elite could be substantiated through their perception and notion of democracy. At this point it will be relevant and elucidating to have a glance at Heper’s writings on the issue.

¹³¹ Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 304.

4.3.3. Democracy In Turkey

The author conceptualizes the difficulties of democracy in Turkey by making reference to the ‘strong state tradition’ and the duality between the political and state elite that is embedded in this tradition¹³² since the conflicting situation among these two parties deriving from their different perceptions and expectations related to the democracy have a transformative capacity in restructuring the socio-political system in Turkey. To summarize roughly, the state elite conceives democracy as ‘rationalist democracy’ achieved through negotiations targeting to find out the common good for the society. In rationalist democracy the political elite is expected to be well-educated and knowledgeable politicians preoccupied with the long-term interests and coming generations instead of forthcoming elections.¹³³ Thus the democratic regime is maintained through the rational decisions and actions of those well-educated political actors implementing the best polities for the country. Therefore rationality and responsibility are conceptualized as the *sine qua non* of the smooth functioning of the democratic processes.

On the contrary, the political elite foregrounds the priority of the national will vis-à-vis the necessities of the *raison d'état* articulated through the state centric interest calculations, thus rendering the autonomy and independence of the state apparatus debatable within the social order. In such perception of democracy the term ‘responsibility’ is replaced with the term ‘responsiveness’ that could be defined as sensitivity towards the demands and expectations of the people. Özman and Coşar state that the horizontal and vertical dimensions defined by Giovanni Sartori as the two legs of the democratic system are explanatory concepts in Heper’s writings on democracy. In his conceptualization the vertical and horizontal dimensions refer to responsibility and

¹³² Özman and Coşar, “Siyasal Tahayyülde Devletin Belirleyiciliği Metin Heper Çalışmaları Üzerine Bir İnceleme”, p. 88.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 91.

responsiveness respectively.¹³⁴ To Heper, should the balance between these two dimensions be established, a viable democracy could exist and consolidate. In other words, the viability of a democratic regime is contingent on the compromise between the state elite, determining the public interest and conscience beyond and above the public and taking democracy as an end in itself, and the political actors, targeting to come to power to realize the interests of the social groups they claim to represent.¹³⁵ The author declares the political elite responsible for the absence of such balance and compromise on the grounds that they cannot deduce the necessary lessons from the past. Therefore, the full establishment of democracy in Turkey can be achieved only when the political elite has internalized democracy understanding and the responsibility consciousness of the state elite.

4.4. The Political Economy Based Approach

The scholars of the third paradigm such as Çağlar Keyder, Korkut Boratav, Gülten Kazgan, and İlkay Sunar, generally coming from the Marxist tradition draw on the world system and dependency theories to develop their analyses on the Turkish modernity within the perspective of the political economy. They search for how and to what extent the economic means and implications (such as the distribution of means of production and income among the social classes and their power and ability to influence the decision-makers) have had a bearing on structuring and restructuring the Turkish political system and the state itself. Çağlar Keyder in his book *State and Class in Turkey* after evaluating the distinctive functioning and characteristics of the traditional Ottoman land system which differs from European feudalism, tries to find out the parallelisms between the dismantling of this system and changes in the relations of the central

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 89.

¹³⁵ Heper, Metin and Keyman, E. Fuat, "Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and The Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 4, (34), 1998; Heper, "Consolidating Turkish Democracy", *Journal of Democracy*, 2 (3), 1992.

authority with the periphery in the late Ottoman era, which would also have its imprint on the polity in the early Republican period. In this regard, he also focuses on the economic policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (*Ittihat ve Terakki*) aiming at eliminating the possible rival classes vis-à-vis the bureaucratic elite by nationalizing the bourgeoisie and changing the owners of the means of production. This theoretical position problematizing the Turkish modernization history and the economic and ideological conditions restructuring the political order throughout this process benefits from the analytical means of political economy. Doing this it ventures to unfold the relationality between the economic mode of production and the reproduction of the social origins of politics.

For the economics-based scholars of this paradigm the World System Theory¹³⁶ provides a fertile ground in which the emergence and spread of world capitalism is presumed as the primary and independent variable in analyzing Turkish political modernity. They prefer to read Turkish modernization history in two different contexts: first the peripheralization of Turkish social formation due to the integration with world capitalism and second the efforts of the bureaucratic class to reestablish its control and hegemony over the production and redistribution processes of the economic surplus. In this context, determination of the nature of class structures and struggles inherent in the mode of production and the role of those in restructuring of the political regime due to conjunctures of world capitalism could be indicated as the central subject matters in this paradigm.

¹³⁶ The world system theory has been introduced and used mostly by Immanuel Wallerstein to explain the emergence and development of world capitalism as a globalized system throughout the period between the 16th and 17th centuries. See Wallerstein, Immanuel, *The Capitalist World-Economy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). For the studies of the author on the incorporation of the Ottoman economy into the world capitalism see Wallerstein, Immanuel, *The Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the World-Economy*, (New York, State University of New York, 1979), Wallerstein, Immanuel and Reşat Kasaba, *Incorporation into the World-Economy: Change in the Structure of the Ottoman Empire, 1750-1839*, (New York: Fernand Braudel Center, 1980).

It is generally accepted that in Western Europe the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production was accompanied by the replacement of the pre-modern social and political institutions with the modern ones from the sixteenth century onwards. The world system theory even implies that the nature and institutionalization of modernism as a form of social development unique to the West are integral to the development and spread of capitalism. Concomitantly, the political formations of the European feudalism with limited sovereignty and authority over the community that were inadequately institutionalized and centralized transformed into centralized and crystallized modern nation states as an outcome of world capitalism stretching into the sixteenth century.¹³⁷

However, in societies where the transition to the capitalist mode of production occurred in a totally different context, the transformation of social relations and constitution of modern politics introduced, one might say, a more complicated and distinctive progress in conjunction with their specificities. The World System Theory and the literature on peripheral development address the political modernity experienced in those societies with respect to their incorporation in world capitalism and finds out an intertwinedness between economic peripheralization and political modernization. As such, the relationality between the mode of production and of surplus extraction and the ideological reproduction of the political system that are not independent from the conjuncture of global capitalism constitutes the main analytical domain for the protagonists of this paradigm, where the unique and distinctive features of Turkish political modernity and economic system could be problematized. For this reason, they generally prefer to set out their analyses by focusing upon the peculiarities of the

¹³⁷ Wallerstein, Immanuel, *The Capitalist World-Economy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 293 and “The State in the Institutional Vortex of the Capitalist World-Economy” in *International Social Science Journal*, 32 (4), (1980), pp. 743-751.

Ottoman economic and land system differentiating it from the European pre-capitalist order.

In this regard Keyder, in his book *State and Class In Turkey*, foregrounds the two historical facts determining the socioeconomic origins of Ottoman/Turkish political modernity. The first one is the absence of large-scale land ownership that could challenge the central position of the bureaucratic class within the state structure as the sole power expropriating the economic surplus and the second is the expulsion of the ethnically differentiated Ottoman bourgeoisie, which left the bureaucratic elite unrivalled in “directing and controlling the state centered socioeconomic transformation.”¹³⁸ These, in effect, indicate that the social division of labor within the Ottoman setting, and to a certain extent in the Republican period, was being organized not mainly due to the economic criteria or market relations but rather to the perpetuation of the traditional political balances in such a way as to ensure the dominance of the state over all social groups.

The Ottoman economic order, in which slavery or serfdom identified with European feudalism did not exist, hinged upon the protection of small and independent peasantry from which the necessary surplus was extracted. The existence of an agricultural and land tenure system never tolerating the autonomous and large-scale land ownership was deemed necessary by the state for the maintenance of the power relations specific to Ottoman polity. In the Ottoman economic order all arable land was assumed as the property (*mülk*) of the Sultan yet the right of usufruct was granted to the subjects (*reaya*) under certain circumstances.

In practice, the state, as the regulator of the economy, apportioned the control of the land to military gentry (*sipahi*) who had shown extraordinary feats of courage under circumstances of war. The function of this gentry was to collect taxes from the peasantry and, in return, provide the state with armed troops (*cebeli*) in times of war. As military gentry they were members of the

¹³⁸ Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class In Turkey*, (London: Verso, 1987), p. 2.

ruling center; however, as benefice (*timar*) holders, they performed social and economic roles. Benefices were not hereditary; since they were granted they could also be appropriated. Although a part of the benefice was allocated for the *sipahi*'s use, his main task was the collection of taxes, fees and the provision of armed troops. The *sipahi* could not encroach upon the *reaya*'s right to usufruct, but neither was the *reaya* free to utilize the land as he wished. As in all spheres of production, producers were subordinate to the needs and the political coordination of the Empire. Production, in this sense, was for *use*, and not for exchange on a formally free market. In agriculture, the *sipahi* was the agent of this system of overall coordination.

In trade and commerce the subordination of the merchants to the political coordination of the Empire was also a fact¹³⁹.

As it can be deduced from this lengthy quotation from Sunar, the relations of production and redistribution in the Ottoman order were organized by the central authority such that it enabled the state's active involvement and intervention in the socioeconomic life. For the ruling elite the only way to preserve its privileged position within the sociopolitical structure was the sustenance of the state's close control and oversight over all economic and commercial activities. As it would be more apparent in the pages to come the will and strong enthusiasm of the bureaucratic establishment to keep the economic sphere under its control is a phenomenon observable in the whole phases of the Ottoman/Turkish modernization process. Furthermore in such periods as the early years of the Republican era the control and manipulation of all economic activities and actors by the state apparatus was assumed as indispensable for rebuilding the state's autonomy and supremacy vis-à-vis the society. To sum up the authors of this paradigm often converge on the idea that the absence of an independent or semi-independent economic life from the central authority and of groups "which crystallized around economic interests and which were ultimately shaped by the market situation as *classes*"¹⁴⁰ within the Ottoman paradigm of order can be explained due to two reasons: the instrumentalization of the economic sphere first in the maintenance of state society relations as the relations of subjugation and dominance and second in the reproduction

¹³⁹ Sunar, İlkay, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development*, p. 20.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

of domestic power relations in order to secure both the economic interests and politically dominant position of bureaucracy within the system.

Should the control and domination of the state functionaries over the production and redistribution processes as well as the nature of social classes be closely examined, it could be deduced that “the Ottoman order was constructed upon the Byzantine and Eastern Roman precedent.”¹⁴¹ In the classical Ottoman order the social stratification and division of labor were based on the presence of the two main classes absolutely differentiated and even alienated from one another mainly owing to their rule and status.

In this system the basic relation of surplus extraction was that which obtained between the peasant producers and the bureaucratic class. The peasants’ surplus was extracted in the form of taxes, and redistributed within the bureaucracy. Certainly a small part of the surplus thus extracted was spent on establishing the conditions for economic reproduction: maintenance of a road network, hydraulic projects, and the like. The larger part of the surplus, however, went towards the state functionaries’ consumption and luxury expenditure.¹⁴²

As long as the Ottoman state expropriated the adequate proportion of the surplus and kept all the commercial activities under its control, the survival of the classical economic system securing the independent status of the small peasant vis-à-vis the local potentate (*ayan*) could be achieved. Hence any ideological and economic challenges to the traditional balances of Ottoman polity were perceived by the central bureaucracy as a menace to their political status and economic revenues.

Throughout the Ottoman modernization history, these challenges afflicting the political structure emanated from both internal and external dynamics that became increasingly apparent within the processes of incorporation with world capitalism. İslamoğlu and Keyder propose that this process the implications of which could be traced back to the seventeenth and even to the late sixteenth century was experienced in

¹⁴¹ Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class In Turkey*, p. 7.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 25.

different parts of Ottoman land within different spells of time.¹⁴³ Kazancıgil also argues that the transformation process of the historical Empire to the modern nation state is closely related to the peripheralization of the autonomous Ottoman social formation with the impact of capitalist world economy.¹⁴⁴ However, he further asserts that conceptualization of Turkish modernization leading to the foundation of Turkish nation state only due to the external dynamics and disregarding the specificities of Ottoman social formation would fail to provide an adequate analytical basis.¹⁴⁵

Declining of the Ottoman rule due to various reasons such as strengthening of the peripheral notables in such a way as to jeopardize both independent peasantry and the unchallenged position of the bureaucracy extracting the economic surplus, decrease in the non-agrarian based incomes of the center due to the shift in trade routes in Europe, cease of territorial expansion, replacement of traditional fief system with tax-farming system accelerated in tandem with the integration with world capitalism. Throughout the process the development of market-oriented production of commodities threatened the absolute dominance of the Palace over the production and distribution processes. The lengthy quotation below from Keyder concisely summarizes the new balances between the central authority and the centrifugal tendencies before the modernizing reforms were put into force by the bureaucratic elite to recentralize the state power:

in the eighteenth century, in fact, Ottoman lands did come under the increasing domination of local notables who controlled the tax-farming hierarchy. These local notables lived in the provincial centers, content to extract the agricultural surplus from the independent peasantry. Under the collective name of ayans they extended their influence beyond the countryside as they attempted to regulate the urban economy as well. During the latter half of the eighteenth century ayan councils in provincial capitals began to function as urban patriciates, deciding

¹⁴³ Kazancıgil, Ali, "Türkiye'de Modern Devletin Oluşumu ve Kemalizm", in *Türk Siyasal Hayatının Gelişimi*, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (eds.), (İstanbul: Beta Yayınları, 1986).

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 174.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 174.

not only an internal trade and guild permits regulating the economy, but also on urban revenues and expenditures.¹⁴⁶

In the meantime the growing market-oriented agricultural production through the penetration of world capitalism into the Ottoman economic structure nurtured the peripheral endeavors seeking for the political influence both by forging alliances with the local officials of the central authority and by upholding some secessionist desires.

By the early 19th century “the power of local magnates (*ayan*) had so grown that the state was forced to sign a contract with them”. With this agreement (*Sened-i İttifak*) “what the local *ayan* secured was the recognition of their local autonomy at the expense of the sultan’s authority.”¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless the signing of such a bill motivated particularly the pro-Western and secular wing of the civil bureaucracy to accelerate its modernizing and centralizing program under the name of ‘saving the state’. With these reforms encouraged and, in some cases, even imposed by the Western powers, the bureaucratic establishment intended both to reestablish and consolidate the authority of the center over the provinces and also to reconstruct the traditional surplus extraction system through which its privileged relations with the producers was protected. At this point it will be elucidating to look through Sunar’s analysis to better comprehend the 19th century Ottoman politics witnessing continuous struggles between the centralizing bureaucracy and the local forces. Sunar takes the signing of 1808 *Sened-i İttifak* as the “beginning of a peculiar dialectic between centralization and localization.”¹⁴⁸ To him, the peculiarity of this dialectic stemming from the fact that “each centralizing response to local autonomy” conducted under the name of “reform and progress”¹⁴⁹ as a move toward modernization was contributing to the erosion of power and authority of the ruling elite. “The reforms were essentially a conditioned response to the challenge of

¹⁴⁶ Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, p. 15.

¹⁴⁷ Sunar, İlkay, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s Development*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

the West and the decline of the Empire. But policies that were drawn with the explicit purpose of unifying the Empire had a way of contributing to the breakdown of the political center and hence the breakdown of the patrimonial system itself.”¹⁵⁰

It should also be noted that parallel to the Ottoman integration into the European capitalism and penetration of market relations into the Ottoman society, this paradox of the ruling elite manifested itself as has never been the case in the previous periods. For instance the revolt of Muhammed Ali (the former ayan of Rumelia and the governor of Egypt), who was defeated with the British support in return for crucial economic concessions, ostensibly exemplifies this paradox. This event on the one hand constituted a new stage from the viewpoint of modernizing and centralizing efforts of the bureaucracy and on the other accelerated the peripheralization of Ottoman economy within world capitalism eventually leading to the strengthening of the peripheral forces. The Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Commerce of 1838¹⁵¹ through which various concessions were granted to Britain is defined by Keyder as “the first important step in institutionalizing the Empire’s integration into the political-economic logic of European capitalism.”¹⁵² The Treaty

removed all monopolies, allowed British merchants to purchase goods anywhere in the Empire and imposed duties of 5 per cent on imports, 12 per cent on exports, and 3 per cent on transit. It was to apply to all parts of the Empire, and specifically to Egypt, where Muhammed Ali had to set up an elaborate system of monopolies. Other European powers soon acceded to the Convention¹⁵³.

This Treaty that paved the way for some other European countries in gaining similar commercial privileges rendered the Ottoman territory a kind of a free trade area open to the extraterritorial interventions of the Great Powers, which, in turned contributed to the strengthening of non-Muslim traders. The European powers aiming at liberalizing the

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁵¹ For the complete text of the Treaty see Charles Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of the Middle East: 1800-1914*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966), pp. 38-40.

¹⁵² Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, p. 28.

¹⁵³ Issawi, Charles, *The Economic History of the Middle East*, p. 38.

Ottoman economic order “were interested in the free flow of European manufactured goods into the Ottoman markets, as well as the free flow of Ottoman primary products into the European markets”¹⁵⁴. In order to secure this flow of goods and raw materials Europeans forced the Ottoman state to enact laws and other relevant regulations including Tanzimat reforms and the 1858 new Land Code, leading to irrevocable transformations in the Ottoman socioeconomic structure. The capitulatory extraterritorial trade grants which were to be used by the Palace bureaucracy to diversify the state’s revenues paradoxically helped to accelerate the dismemberment of the Empire and also its peripheralization within the European order. The frequent use of capitulations inevitably led to the “creation of a counter source of power, economic in nature, against the power and the authority of the Ottoman regime itself.”¹⁵⁵

This early, gradual and orderly insertion into the European state system, through which a new ‘modern’ faction within the bureaucracy defined and legitimated itself against a previously dominant one, might provide a clue to explaining the generally more accommodating behavior of Ottoman civil servants when compared with, for example, Chinese antagonism, or Japanese revanchism towards Western penetration. In the Ottoman Empire the secular bureaucracy accepted and justified their adhesion to European models and principles in the name of progressive reformism. They welcomed the institutionalization of economic integration into Western capitalism as a victory over the retrograde tenets of old Ottoman statecraft.¹⁵⁶

Keyder implies that both the secular faction of the civil bureaucracy in the late nineteenth century and their successor, the Young Turks identified their reformism with “the European paradigm of social progress.”¹⁵⁷ They were the champions of freedom and progress against the absolutist and arbitrary rule of the Sultan. The author reads the pro-European and pro-modern attitude of those with respect to the struggles with the Sultanate and the reestablishment, dominance and the autonomy of the state mechanism

¹⁵⁴ Sunar, İlkay, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s Development*, p. 8.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁵⁶ Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, p. 28.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 28.

perpetuating this privileged position of the civil bureaucracy as the principal intermediary of incorporation with world capitalism within the social structure.

4.4.1. Expulsion of the Ethnically Differentiated Bourgeoisie

Throughout the deepening of integration with European inter-state system and the world economy, the increase in volume of trade with Europeans especially from 1830s to the world depression of 1873 caused the proliferation of market relations and thereby the growth of market-oriented production. According to the political economy based paradigm, the penetration of market relations and the commercialization of agriculture exercised two transformative effects on the Ottoman/Turkish modernization. First, the Ottoman economy turned out to be “a subordinate and responsive part to the needs and demands of the “self-regulating” global market”, which induced its transformation “from a form of *political* (redistributive) economy to a *dependent market* economy, along with, of course, the institutional and social changes which accompanied such transformation.”¹⁵⁸ Second a new intermediary class forming “the principal links between European markets and local producers”¹⁵⁹ emerged the members of whom belonged to non-Muslim communities. European traders’ unwillingness to work with Muslim merchants because of various political and cultural reasons drove them out of the field and provided a privileged status to non-Muslims. By the dawn of the nineteenth century these ethnically differentiated merchants, who settled in such port cities as Istanbul, Izmir and Salonika, constituted the class of compradors achieving to expropriate a substantial proportion of the economic surplus. “Foreigners and Christian populations of the Empire created, advanced and seized these opportunities on account of their economic (lower taxes) and political (extraterritorial) status.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ Sunar, İlkay, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development* p. 15.

¹⁵⁹ Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, p. 22.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 34.

In the paradigm of political economy the drastic changes and differentiation of the ideological attitudes and economic mentality of the Committee of Union and Progress cadres are also evaluated with the emphasis on the conjuncture of European inter-state system and capitalist penetration. Although the Young Turks ascended to power within a position defending liberal thought and equal rights for the minorities and also tolerating the increasing involvement of Western powers in the Ottoman economy, particularly in tandem with the Balkan Wars in which secessionist tendencies of non-Muslim bourgeoisie and British backup behind it became apparent, they immediately began to pursue nationalist policies in economic, cultural and political realms in the absence of inter-state constraints on bureaucratic policy-making during the war years. The government took a series of measures to eliminate the autonomous bourgeois class having the potential of endangering both the hegemonic status of the bureaucracy and the geographical integrity of the state. The creation of a ‘national economy’ (*milli iktisat*) and a national bourgeoisie was also supported by the prominent Turkist authors such as Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, who were influential in the formulation of the CUP’s economic policies¹⁶¹. The then leader of the CUP, impressed by the German policies for nationalizing the economic sphere were converging on the idea that unless the foreign and the non-Turk (*gayri Türk*) elements were kicked out of the economic space the loss of new lands and even of Anatolia could not be prevented and the survival of “Turkish nation” could not be achieved¹⁶². As Kızılyürek correctly pointed out nationalization and Turkification of the economic sphere turned out to be an indispensable and indivisible part of the project aiming at transforming the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish nation state¹⁶³.

¹⁶¹ Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kısacasında Kıbrıs*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 160.

¹⁶² Avcıoğlu, Doğan, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi*, 3rd volume, (İstanbul, 1983), pp. 1113-1114.

¹⁶³ Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kısacasında Kıbrıs*, p. 162.

In this context, especially from 1913 onward the government attempted to build up a new class of Turkish Muslim entrepreneurs dependent totally on and loyal to the bureaucratic desires and the territorial integrity of the state. The policies of the Committee of Union and Progress such as the unilateral abrogation of the capitulatory privileges, the institutionalization of the new protectionist trade regime bringing the foreign firms under Ottoman judicial system and text legislation, the exclusion of the ethnically differentiated bourgeoisie from the economic scene in favor of Muslim traders could be assessed in this regard. Not unlike the subsequent Republican political elite, for the CUP leaders the creation of a surrogated bourgeoisie in need of their grace was of greatest significance from the perspective of the unchallenged dominance of the state elite over the productive processes in such a way as to perpetuate the supremacy of the state apparatus. Since the officials of the CUP government saw an interdependency between the neutralizing the minorities and 'saving the state', they began to implement a policy of ethnic destruction and exclusion which was effective from 1915 to 1923 and led to a substantial erosion in the heterogeneity of the population before the modern nation state was founded. In the period stretching from 1914 to 1924 due to various reasons such as ravages of the war (lasted for Turks until 1922), Greeks' voluntary and/or forceful immigration dramatically changed the demographical landscape that would constitute the territorial boundaries of the Turkish Republican state. According to the statistical data collected by Keyder from diverse resources¹⁶⁴, whilst prior to the World War I the minorities constituted approximately 18% of the population, in 1924 nearly just one out of every 40 persons was minority belonging.

¹⁶⁴ Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, p.79. Keyder explains the changes within the composition of the population in Turkey by referring to the following resources: Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914, Demographic and Social Characteristics*, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Empire and the End of the Empire*, (New York: New York University, 1983); Dmitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact Upon Greece*, (Paris: Mouton, 1962).

What this drastic development indicates is that during the war years Turkey lost most of its commercial class, such that when the Republic was formed, the bureaucracy found itself unchallenged. Whatever remained of the bourgeoisie was too weak to constitute a class with an autonomous stance against the bureaucracy.¹⁶⁵

Kazancıgil proposes that the basic contradiction constraining the transformation of Ottoman Empire into a modern nation state lies at the bureaucratic attitudes towards the peripheral powers. Although the patrimonial state bureaucracy extracted the necessary income to conduct a consumption-oriented life style from the centrifugal groups (such as *mültezims* (tax-farmers), *ayans*, merchants and manufacturers), it always precluded those from attaining political power, and this in turn retarded the institutionalized of the political modernity in Turkey.¹⁶⁶ Kazancıgil put forward that the Tanzimat can be interpreted in two different perspectives: first as the endeavor to accommodate the superstructure of the Ottoman social formation to the needs and circumstances of capitalist world economy and the interstate system; and second as the effort of increasing state's revenues through the consolidation of the central control over the periphery.¹⁶⁷ The state elite always desired to behave in accordance with the basic principle in the institutionalization of classical Ottoman order defined by Kazancıgil as the non-transformationality of the economic wealth to the political influence.

4.4.2. Foundation Of The Modern Turkish State

Following the footsteps of Kazancıgil, the transformation of the traditional Ottoman Empire into the modern nation state can be interpreted as the accommodation of the peripheralized Ottoman social formation to the conjunctures of capitalist world economy and inter-state system.¹⁶⁸ Such assessment establishing a linkage between the

¹⁶⁵ Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, p. 79.

¹⁶⁶ Kazancıgil, Ali, "Türkiye'de Modern Devletin Oluşumu ve Kemalizm", in *Türk Siyasal Hayatının Gelişimi*, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (eds.), (İstanbul: Beta Yayınları, 1986), p. 180.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 180.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 184.

peripheralization and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire also implies that the historical evolution of world capitalism gave rise to the foundation of Turkish nation state. For the author, Kemalist cadres were aware of the fact that the only way to maintain political independence within the conjuncture of world capitalism was the foundation of a modern state allowing the development of a strong civil society based on market economy so much so that the establishment of a Western type of modern bourgeois state was a matter of life and death for Turkey. Even though it may theoretically seem possible the constitution of the new state and social order in accordance with norms and principles other than the capitalist kind, in real terms this was quite far from being realized mainly owing to two reasons: first, the constitution of the state and political regime opposing to the Western model was contrary to the system of values of the political elite of the time and secondly, it was totally dependent on challenging the Turkish peripheral status within the framework of world capitalism, which was impossible throughout the period. İnsel propounds that the economic policies adapted by the Republican state elite were not reflecting only the economic preferences of the state but rather they were utilized as a means of intervention vis-à-vis the society which was to be modernized.¹⁶⁹ The author also implies that as far as the objectives and effects of those policies leading to the active involvement of the state in production and redistribution processes were concerned, it could be noted that they substantially contributed to the restructuring of social relations by the modernizing clique. Furthermore, the central aim of this active involvement of the state in economy during the early years of the Republic was to ensure the close control of the state over the society. As one of the prominent elements of the project of political modernity and nation building, the Republican state strove to create a national economic life the legitimate boundaries of which are drawn by the state itself in such a way as to serve

¹⁶⁹ İnsel, Ahmet, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, second ed. (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1995), p. 47.

solely to the *raison d'état*.¹⁷⁰ In this respect, The State Enterprises Adjudications, a Law For The Encouragement of Industry, and Customs Tariffs were used as the strategic means of realizing this objective. Insel conceptualizes control of the state over the economic structure in the following manner: Economics is perceived as a peril that could erode the state's central authority insofar as it had the potential of generating conflicts and feeding centrifugal proclivities. In this case, there is only one remedy for those who desired both to realize "national development" and to eliminate those "dangers": the economics ought to be formed by the state itself and also be regulated firmly by the state apparatus. Korkut Boratav, in his book 'Etatism in Turkey', exemplifies the state interventionism in economics in the early years of Turkish Republic by focusing on the monopoly rights of the state over iron and sugar production and the running of ports.¹⁷¹ What is more, regarding particularly the production of strategic goods for the state and public interest, the private and foreign entrepreneurs have always faced with extensive restrictions which were pertaining not only to the period of 1932-1938 identified with etatism.

İnsel also proposes that the national economics, which was firmly manipulated and totally kept under control by the state, could be interpreted as one of the techniques for the civil and military bureaucracy to perpetuate the patrimonial state tradition. The creation of a bourgeois class working totally dependent on and owing its existence to the state was the most important means of control over the economics from inside by the state.¹⁷² The formation of an economic life the actors of which were not in a conflicting position with the ideals and desires of the bureaucratic intelligentsia was of vital importance for the maintenance of the political stability through which the state's undebatable supremacy over other social groups was institutionalized. This is a

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁷¹ Boratav, Korkut, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1974), pp. 85-97.

¹⁷² Insel, Ahmet, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, p. 51.

corollary of the essential relationality established in between the maintenance of the state's central status in economics and its political permanency. According to İnel, Ş. S. Aydemir, who was one of the most vigorous defenders of the etatist economic policies, clearly explicated the dimensions embedded in etatism beyond economics in his following statement: "Etatism, for us, is the reappearance of the ex-regime of the militarized nation under the circumstances and necessities of modern times."¹⁷³

4.5. Conclusion: A Critique Of the Paradigms Problematizing Turkish Modernity

As stated in its introductory part, this chapter was allocated to probe into three main paradigms problematizing Turkish economic and political modernity- namely, sociological, bureaucratic and state centric and political economy based understandings. These paradigms were rendered the object of theoretical inquiry by especially focusing on their analyses and inferences concerning the relations between ruling and the ruled in Turkey throughout the modernization process. While expatiating the three main theoretical positions I limited myself with the writings of authors who are of Turkish origin such as Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper, Çağlar Keyder, and İlkey Sunar.

It is a non-deniable fact that all these theoretical investigations have made substantial contributions to the problematization of Turkish political and economic modernity. They all, by giving priority to different analytical tools and conceptual frameworks in dealing with the issue, have presented remarkable data for the exploration of the distinguished features and peculiarities of Turkish modernization. The multi-layered analytical enterprise of particularly the sociological approach has a bearing on the creation of a literature making possible the conceptualization of the controversies, deviancies, and tensions of modernization process in Turkey.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 52.

It is fair to propose that even though those three paradigms could be situated in different analytical frameworks, they share a common ontological and epistemological posture that can be qualified as more crucial than their differences. I attach profound importance to the full appreciation of those commonalities restricting and even, in some cases, fixing their theoretical interrogations. In this context, this critical concluding section is dedicated to;

- 1) address the common ontological and epistemological foundations on which those paradigms based their analyses by remaining loyal to the research agenda of this dissertation and
- 2) recontemple on the possibility of a brand new approach to Turkish modernity placing due emphasis on the external political dynamics and the foreign policy rhetoric of the state while conceptualizing the state centricist nature of the domestic regime and the modernizing reforms in Turkey.

The three main approaches problematizing Turkish modernity base their analyses on a definite logic of explanation. Even though they specify their research avenues by utilizing analytical insights of different social science disciplines such as sociology, comparative politics and political economy, they produce the same logic of explanation feeding on similar ontological and epistemological presuppositions. Those approaches treat the state, in ontological terms, as a pregiven entity and in epistemic level assign it the status of the only privileged and sovereign subject of Turkish modernization history. As an outcome of this approach, the state is essentially accepted both as the basic unit of analysis and as the fundamental point of reference. The political economy based understanding does not constitute an exception to this. Even though this paradigm ventures to explain modernization of Ottoman social formation with respect to its incorporation into the world capitalism, it delineates this process mostly within the context of Ottoman state's relations with the Western powers. In the

same vein, in Mardin's analysis the concept of the 'center' and in Heper's terminology the 'locus of stateness' are used generally interchangeably with the state and accepted as the vantage point in their analytical deductions on Turkish modernity.

In the scholarship on Turkish modernization the state is conceived as an empirically observable, institutionally pre-given and completed entity "the identity of which is secure before it enters into relations with others."¹⁷⁴ Thus in the literature where a coherent identity is attributed to the Turkish state, its precise nature, the sources of its autonomy and legitimacy are not rendered the object of theoretical inquiry. Even though these paradigms especially the first and the third ones (the sociological and economy-based understandings) critically approach practices and policies of the ruling elite and/or state apparatus vis-à-vis the society, they do not evaluate the discursive, performative and historical construction of the former's supremacy over and autonomy from the latter. In such conceptualization the state to which is accorded the role and status of being a unitary and rational actor is presumably accepted as the only sovereign subject of Turkish modernization history. Such analytical and methodological posture engenders a very important analytical limitation for the paradigms addressed in this study: the analysis of Turkish modern political history within a state-oriented perspective by giving primacy to the state's performances vis-à-vis other agents or social groups. It could be claimed with some degree of accuracy that in the sociological paradigm these drawbacks and limitations are surpassed, to a greater extent, through the detailed sociological observations and inferences of Şerif Mardin regarding both the every day life and the macro-politics in Turkey. For instance he presents a multifaceted analysis of how the relations between the ruling and the ruled in the country are constructed by focusing on different aspects (such as sociopolitical, cultural) of the center-periphery duality in Turkey.

¹⁷⁴ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, p. 51.

Whereas, in the second paradigm, in which the objectives, interests and the actions of the ruling elite are taken as the fundamental point of reference, a pure state-centric reading of Turkish modernization history is provided. The political struggle and strife between the bureaucratic establishment and the political elite and the manifestation of this struggle in the structuration of the state can be cited as the main trails of Heper's analysis as regards Turkish modern politics. The political economy based approach acknowledging the class struggle and the mode of production and redistribution of the economic surplus as independent variables adopts the same reductionist logic of explanation in which the state is conceived as the bearer subject of the Turkish modernization history. All these paradigmatic approaches by taking the state as ontologically pregiven totality and unproblematic unity posit that the state has a prediscursive and coherent identity and hence they fail to conceptualize the historical, performative and discursive construction of Turkish state as a modern nation state.

In line with this essentialism the scholarship on Turkish modernization has a tendency of analyzing the relations between the ruling and the ruled from the perspective of Turkish state's initiatives as the very agent of the political modernity. They do not need to create a new rhetoric where Turkish society can speak on behalf of itself as a real and historical subject instead of being only passive bearer of the state's performances. State society relations constitute the fundamental sphere in which the unique characteristics of the domestic political life and order are shaped and reshaped through interactions between the state and the national 'social formation' in which it is embedded. The paradigms of Turkish modernity conceptualize those relations as relations between a completed agent (the state) and its social/national formation occurring within a definitely bounded political space. Whereas states as unavoidably paradoxical and never finished entities always have to produce and reproduce that so-called stable identity through various mechanisms. This perpetual act of reproduction is

applied in accordance with its claims to territorial integrity, national unity and, in some cases, national homogeneity. Thus, problematizing the dynamics of state society relations the evolution of which is interrelated with that of modernization in Turkey necessitates;

- 1) the rejection of any ontological and epistemological status accorded to the state beyond the various acts determining its reality and conditions of existence and
- 2) the conceptualization of state identity by considering its performative, discursive and representative construction within a definite historical and spatial context.

These paradigms also strive to understand and explain the state centricist nature of Turkish modernity by giving primacy to the inner dynamics. This is due to the fact that the internal and international politics are deemed as distinguished structures separated from each other with absolute boundaries. Hence these political structures having their own specificities are assumed as the objects to be covered within different research avenues. Mainly owing to this analytical and methodological reductionism, they are inclined to marginalize the impacts of the outer dynamics in the Turkish modernization process and the state identity construction. The literature on Turkish modernization lacks attention to the foreign political sources and dynamics of Turkish economic and political modernity emerging and developing as a state-sponsored and state-based project. In the same vein, the literature is prone to exclude the outer dynamics from its analyses on the nature of the relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ in Turkey the evolution of which is deeply embedded in that of Turkish modernity. For instance the literature does not attach due importance to the significance of the state’s foreign political initiatives and discourses in reproducing the state-centricist character of Turkish politics and modernization. However, as previously indicated in this dissertation, foreign policy is not only an external relationship that the

state initiates towards others in international society yet more importantly it is part of the governmental structure “that governs the behaviors of those embedded in it in the socio-political realm.”¹⁷⁵ This conception of foreign policy urges us to reexamine the national foreign policy rhetoric of Turkish state as a social and disciplinary practice by which it rules the society. As David Campbell puts it, foreign political discourses and representations premised on the constant articulation of danger, threat, national interests and national security are both integral to state identity-making and functional in securing the standards of this identity. They are also operational in specifying the criteria of being allowed into the political center, of being marginalized and excluded from the political domain and public life. Especially in the contexts where securitizing and nationalistic dose of the state’s foreign policy rhetoric is high, foreign policy is functionalized by the state elite in neutralizing the opposition and/or certain sectors of the domestic society. Re-examining Turkish state’s foreign policy rhetoric from this perspective can present a new analytical plane for the full exploration of why Turkish political modernity displays state-centricist traits. If the state society relations are deemed as the fundamental sphere in which statist structure of Turkish political modernity is produced and reproduced, this new analysis taking into account foreign policy gains paramount importance.

To various analysts in the maintenance of the state society relations in its conventional and hierarchical structure the sphere of ‘foreign’ policy has at all times had a distinctive role to play in Turkey. Within the Republicanist tradition ‘foreign’ policy has been perceived as a *vital* sphere in pursuit of Turkey’s national interests and security goals, requiring technical know-how and expertise. In most cases ‘foreign’ political actions of the state have been portrayed as its endeavors to ward off external threats directed against its unity and integrity. Thus in the official discourse ‘foreign’

¹⁷⁵ Diez, Thomas, “The Imposition of Governance”, p. 6.

policy refers to a battlefield to be entrusted only to those cognizant of its peculiar rules and techniques. In the Republicanist tradition the only group having this special knowledge and skill is assumed as the Turkish bureaucratic establishment. Thereby this conventional account leaves the formulation and conduct of ‘foreign’ policy to the monopoly of a relatively small state elite and restricts as much as possible the intervention of the political figures in decision making processes on foreign policy issues. It is expected from the political figures (namely party leaders, MPs and other politicians) to behave in accordance with the pre-determined ‘state policies’ without criticizing their substance. This approach placing ‘foreign’ policy above politics, in turn, limits the participation of the society and its elected representatives in both the debates and decision-making processes on foreign policy matters.¹⁷⁶ As a matter of fact, moving foreign policy issues out of the political sphere at least until the recent years exerted a narrowing effect on Turkish politics and consolidated a definite understanding of political modernity in which the political is equated with and reduced to the state’s institutional objectives, interests and security concerns. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that the sphere of foreign policy has become operationalized in drawing the legitimate boundaries of Turkish politics. Thus a full exploration of the statist essence of Turkish modernization project necessitates the inclusion of the state’s foreign policy initiatives and discourses in the analytical agenda.

By considering all these analytical remarks, the chapter finally proposes that a multifaceted assessment of Turkish political modernity and the state identity which is neither reductionist nor essentialist necessitates:

¹⁷⁶ As another important factor preventing the occurrence of large scale social debates on foreign policy issues, the state based thinking of the Cold War years should be cited. Throughout the Cold War era the imagination of an existential communist threat stemming from Turkey’s ‘imminent’ neighbor the Soviet Union aborted the chances of assessing foreign policy beyond the state-based security concerns.

1. making reference to all internal and external political processes, while explaining the state-centricist and state-oriented structure of Turkish modernization, in this respect
2. searching for the role and impact of the Turkish state's foreign political initiatives, discourses and representations in the reproduction of its core characteristics and the domestic order; and thus
3. evaluating the intertwined character of domestic and foreign political processes and their interactions instead of demarcating them in absolute boundaries.

I hope that this dissertation problematizing the Cyprus dispute and particularly the modes in which it is articulated in Turkish politics from the perspective of state society relations in Turkey can be a source of inspiration for forthcoming studies meeting all these requirements toward a brand new and comprehensive analysis of Turkish modernization.

CHAPTER V

LONG-LASTING HISTORY OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE TURNING POINTS AND DISCURSIVE POSITIONS

5.1. Centrality of History in the Cyprus Question

Any scholar studying on the Cyprus issue shall soon notice the fact that history, or more precisely, the act of writing history is assigned centrality and unique importance by all the actors involved in the issue. The Cyprus dispute, where multiple identities conflict with and overlap each other, has all too often been among the fundamentals of the rhetorical structure devised by those parties. Even remembering and reminding the past as an inherent part of identity construction have turned out to be the fundamental determinants of the inter-identity strives and discourses.

The “image of communion” mobilized in nationalism is not fixed. It is continuously negotiated through the interweaving of the past with the present in a battle for control of a national popular memory, which is constructed reciprocally through the interaction of dominant and subordinate public representations of the past private memory. This site of combat between dominant, subordinate and private memories forms a terrain of struggle for the creation of shared meanings in the constitution of a national cultural identity¹.

The divergences among the right wing nationalist parties/Denktaş leadership and the left-leaning opposition parties as regards their visions of Turkish Cypriot community’s identity as a ‘purely Turkish’ or a ‘purely Cypriot’ one “has been most evident in the construction of folklore, literature and representations of the past.”²

Thereby the deed of writing history, which can be conceptualized as ‘the mode of historicizing’, inscribes simultaneously the limits and boundaries of the analyses as

¹ Killoran, Moira, “Nationalisms and Embodied Memory in Northern Cyprus”, in Vangelis Calotychos (ed.), *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community (1955-1997)*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 161.

² Ibid., p. 161. For a more elaborate analysis of the role of folkloric and linguistic elements in identity construction see Moira Killoran, “*Hallelujah There Is No God But Allah*”: *State Formation and Identity Contestation in North Cyprus*, Master’s Thesis, (The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Anthropology, 1989); Moira Killoran, *Pirate State, Poet Nation: The Poetic Struggle over ‘the Past’ in North Cyprus*, PhD Dissertation, (The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Anthropology, 1994) and Mehmet Yaşın, *Kıbrıs Türk Şiiri Antolojisi*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1994).

regards the present in the bulk of texts ranging from academic studies to official declarations. The inscription of the present through historiography makes a very historicist but, in fact, ahistoric discourse dominant in those texts through which the other party to the dispute is represented as ‘a historical enemy’ and an ‘existential threat’ to its survival.

Fear here is the keyword, as both sides in Cyprus perceive themselves as endangered minorities: the Turkish Cypriots as a minority on the island and the Greek Cypriots as the minority in the area, given Turkey’s proximity and the presence of Turkish troops in the north. Past experiences gives ample justification for such fears³.

For instance in official declarations by both Northern Cypriot leadership and the Turkish political and bureaucratic elite, the attacks and massacres of pro-Enosis Greek Cypriots and the encumbrances experienced by Turkish Cypriots, i.e. being forced to live in enclaves, are constantly imprinted on the public and private memories. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots “remember and point to the 1964 Turkish preparations and threats of invasion which the famous Johnson letter averted, the subsequent bombings of Greek Cypriots by Turkish planes, and the dislocation, missing and dead of the 1974 Turkish attack.”⁴

With regard to the Cyprus dispute the intense articulation of a specific and subjective interpretation of history particularly by the elites of the two sides has two critical functions in the process of national/political identity construction: glorification of its own nation and demonizing of the other. Through a very historical but ahistoric discourse “one’s own nation is conceptualized as a transhistorical essence of enduring-even eternal- national characteristics,”⁵ which are fixed and already completed. This approach either ignores the historically, performatively constructed nature of national

³ Papadakis, Yiannis, ‘Enosis and Turkish Expansionism: Real Myths or Mythical Realities’, in Vangelis Calotychos (ed.), *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community (1955-1997)*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 71-72.

⁴ Ibid., p. 72.

⁵ Ibid., p. 74.

identity in interaction with other identities or “anthropomorphizes nations and states as persons with set characters.”⁶ “Self-glorification and the demonisation of the enemy make some characters appear as the ‘goodies’ of the hi(story) while the others are, inexorably, the ‘baddies.’”⁷

Another reason which made remembering and reminding the past (the discourse of history) so central to the Cyprus problem is related to its inherence to the national historiography in the so-called Motherlands. The Cyprus conflict is represented both as part of a greater historical enmity between these two and as a proof of the expansionist intentions and inclinations of the other side. The lengthy quotation below provides a succinct illustration of Greek and Turkish accounts of history:

In the Greek case the story goes as follows: our glorious Byzantine Empire was destroyed by the invading barbaric Turkish tribes and, fallen from its previous grandeur, it has become the present small Greek state after the expulsion of the Greek population in 1922. The Turks lurk in search of more Greek lands, as their threats in the Aegean and Western Thrace show and as the 1974 invasion of northern Cyprus and the expulsion of its Greeks to the south proves. In the Turkish case the scenario is reversed: in the liberal *millet* system of the glorious Ottoman Empire it was the treacherous Greeks, who despite their privileged position, stabbed us in the back by first revolting against us, gradually capturing more and more territories, to attack even the heart of Anatolia in 1922 in the name of the *Megali Idea*, so inciting the ‘Rums’ of Cyprus for *enosis* which is what they tried to bring about with the 1974 coup⁸.

As such in the dominant nationalistic discourses of the Motherlands the Cyprus history refers to the magnitude and imminence of the threat ‘the other’ (the historical enemy) poses to the nation. Identification of the dispute with the defeats and grievances of the past paradoxically consolidates its current popularity and graveness in the contemporary politics of those countries. As a consequence, an ethno-centric and exceedingly historicist interpretation of Cyprus history overlooking the historical specificities of the dispute turns out to determine the scope and content of the discursive field and constitutes the epistemic conditions behind the mainstream analysis. The act of writing

⁶ Ibid., p. 73.

⁷ Ibid., p. 74.

⁸ Ibid., p. 70.

history as a process from which the Cyprus people themselves are excluded has always been inherent to the inscription of national history in Turkey and in Greece. To put it differently, the Cypriots who are expelled from the analysis as a historical subject are rendered passive bearers of a history inscribed by the others. Such authors as Mehmet Hasgüler, Mehmet Yaşın and Tanıl Bora converge on the idea that this mode of historicizing the Cyprus issue is very functional in imposing and securing the limits of the national/political identity in the 'Motherlands'. In such a discursive economy either Enosis or partition-oriented practices of understanding and explaining the Cyprus issue premised on certain ontological and epistemological presumptions are privileged. This either/or logic feeding on binary oppositions or intractable dualities gives constant emphasis to the ethnic differences rather than the identity of Cypriotness.

The declaration of the other side as a 'historical enemy' vis-à-vis the national unity and survival necessitates attributing "an unchanging evil intention" to the other party emanating from "the enemy's character"⁹ itself. More importantly, the narrative operating through demonizing of the other side to the dispute "is presented as a key imperative code of history, which denies contingency, and in effect, history itself."¹⁰

Thus it would not be an exaggeration to state that history as a constitutive element of "competing nationalistic rhetorics"¹¹ also conditions the epistemic boundaries of the visions of the parties on the nature and structure of the unified social body that they imagine for the whole Cyprus community. "This embodied remembrance of history is an appeal to a form of knowledge that is visceral and therefore "natural" and outside of intellectual challenge"¹².

⁹ Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 73.

¹¹ Killoran, Moira, "Nationalisms and Embodied Memory in Northern Cyprus", p. 160.

¹² Ibid., p. 160.

5.2. Historical Background

One of the reasons, perhaps the principal reason, for the Cyprus dispute is each side's intense historical memory and conviction that history has done it an injustice. It is not the record of history that is so important as the elements of it that each side accentuates to justify its own present position. Any relative newcomer to the study of the Cyprus conflict may well feel the need then for a broad view of the history of Cyprus and the Cyprus conflict.¹³

This chapter of the thesis not only aims at addressing the historical process through which Cyprus has turned out to be a multi-partite international question. As I have stated before, my intention is not to give a chronological account of the events but rather is to make the readers familiar with the historical context in which Cyprus issue has been shaped and reshaped through various factors. It should immediately be stated that while tracing the historical development of the Cyprus issue I shall foreground particularly the aspects of the issue closely related to the conditions by which the state society relations and the state identity in Turkey are reproduced. This chapter intends to reveal how the political developments as regards the Cyprus dispute both inside the island and at the international level were understood and articulated in Turkey's official and mainstream discourses. By placing particular emphasis on such turning points as the foundation of the 1960 Cyprus Republic, the famous Johnson letter, Turkey's military intervention of July-August 1974, and more recent developments i.e. Kofi Annan's plan and subsequent debates, the chapter is dedicated to highlight the continuities and ruptures in Turkey's official discourse, which is not by and large different from that of the Denktaş leadership. In this dissertation how the historical development of the Cyprus dispute was represented and articulated within Greek Cypriot and Greek nationalistic discourses is rarely touched upon since the study is mostly interested in the

¹³ Dodd, Clement H., "A Historical Overview", in *Cyprus The Need for New Perspectives*, Clement H. Dodd (ed.), (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1999), p. 1.

impacts and implications of the dispute on Turkish domestic politics¹⁴. This section of the thesis work is drawn up with the prospect that the Cyprus history will be re-written with a stance which is neither ethno-centric, essentialist nor reductionist.

5.2.1. The Pre-Modern Times

In various academic texts the history of Cyprus is traced back to the 13th century BC when the first settlers coming from the Aegean colonized the island. It is generally affirmed that in the course of long centuries the “nations who controlled Anatolia or the North African coast and wished to be dominant in the Mediterranean had all wanted to add Cyprus to their list of possessions.”¹⁵ It is accepted in *a priori* fashion that the island has always remained geographically and strategically important in all historical epochs. This kind of generalization indeed serves to consolidate the idea that the island has still been preserving its geo-strategic status in contemporary international politics.

During a remarkable part of its history, Cyprus remained under the rule of Roman and Byzantine Empires as a semi-independent province. Even though by the end of third century AD Christianity achieved dominance in tandem with Greek language and culture on the island, “the Cypriots successfully fought to maintain the independence of their church and thus became one of the oldest autocephalous churches of the Eastern Orthodox churches.”¹⁶ By the 16th century Cyprus was of greatest importance for Venetians both as a trading post and a military base against the

¹⁴ For a critical account of the dispute from the viewpoint of Greek history see Michael Attalides, *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979); Constantine Melakopides, *The Cyprus Problem in Greek Foreign Policy*, in *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution*, Norma Salem (ed.), (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 71-90; Yiannis Papadakis, “Enosis and Turkish Expansionism: Real Myths or Mythic Realities?”, in *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community (1955-1997)*, Vangelis Calotychos (ed.), (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 69-87. For an evaluation of the Cyprus issue from the perspective of the emergence and development of Greek nationalism see Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp. 29-143.

¹⁵ İsmail, Sabahattin, *20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences*, (İstanbul: Kastaş Ltd. Co. Publications, 1989), p. 12.

¹⁶ Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 2.

Ottomans. The conquest of the island by the Ottomans in 1571 led to drastic changes in the socio-political structure and the demographic composition of the island. Among these radical changes are the abolition of serfdom for indigenous people, weakening of linkages of the island with the West to a large extent, and settling of a great number of peasants and artisans transferred from Anatolian land to almost all regions of the island.¹⁷ That the Ottomans “treated the Greek Orthodox community as a largely self-governing religious group or *millet*”¹⁸ ensured the strengthening of Orthodox clergy within the extensively heterogeneous ethnic structure of the island. The year 1821, when the Greek uprising for independence against the Ottoman rule commenced, is generally coded in the texts, sympathetic to Turkish thesis, as the onset of serious frictions between the Turkish and Greek or the Muslim and Christian populations of the island.

5.2.2. The Cession of the Island to Britain and Subsequent Developments: The Modern Times

In Berlin Conference of 1878 the island was rented out to Britain by the Ottomans in return for signing a treaty of alliance vis-à-vis the Russian threat. Through this cession qualified by many as fraudulent¹⁹ the British seized the island conceived as ‘the key to Western Asia’ by them²⁰. Turkish historians and scholars generally converge on the idea that the cession of the island to Britain remarkably increased political mobilization among Greek Cypriots, who desired the unification with the independent ‘mainland’ Greece (*Enosis*). On 5 November 1914, soon after the Ottoman Empire was

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 2. For the details of mass population movements after the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottoman see Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publisher, 1991), pp. 27-28. However it should be noted that the book is more sympathetic to the established Greek views.

¹⁸ Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 2.

¹⁹ Uslu, Nasuh, “Kıbrıs Sorunu”, in *21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, İdris Bal (ed.), (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2001), p. 263.

²⁰ Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 214.

involved in the World War I in alliance with Germany, Britain announced the annexation of Cyprus²¹, which was later recognized by both Turkey and Greece in the Treaty of Lausanne signed on 24 July 1923. Turkey's formal acceptance of the permanent cession of the sovereignty of the island to Britain is explained by Turkish authors either in terms of the necessity of the international balances of power of the time or as a result of the peaceful foreign policy adopted by the founders of the Turkish Republic. Accordingly, the Turkish state elite giving primacy to the conduct of the modernizing reforms in domestic politics consented to relinquish the island to Britain in order to preclude emergence of new crises in foreign relations.²²

The 1920s marked, for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the rising of nationalistic inclinations in such a way as to compound the ethnic and religious division on the island. On the Greek side the mounting of nationalistic ambitions manifested themselves with the intense articulation of the demands for Enosis and of the antagonism towards the British colonial rule.²³ On the Turkish side a new intelligentsia opposing to the pro-British stance of the traditional and pious ruling elite²⁴ began to strengthen and make their voice heard. These young intellectuals inspired by the Kemalist regime of the newly founded Turkish Republic desired the implementation of the modernizing reforms on Cyprus as well.²⁵ In 1931 there occurred one of the most striking revolts in the history of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots "encouraged by the Greek-Orthodox Church, resorted to violence and revolted against" the British colonial rule "in

²¹ Ertekün, Necati M., *The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, (Nicosia: K. Rüstem & Brother Publisher, 1984), p. 1.

²² Uslu, Nasuh, "Kıbrıs Sorunu", p. 263.

²³ Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kısacasında Kıbrıs*, pp. 219-20.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 218.

²⁵ For the details of the impacts of the Kemalist reforms on the young Cypriot Turkish intellectuals see Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kısacasında Kıbrıs*, pp. 218-20. Furthermore, within Turkish Cypriot community the process of the replacement of the Ottoman-Islamic identity by Turkish ethnic identity can also be followed in the same book pp. 209-244.

the cause of Enosis”²⁶. After the oppression of this uprising the colonial rule considered taking measures necessary to curb the nationalist movements in both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.

The early years after the World War II witnessed the strengthening of the leftist movements, particularly the pro-Soviet communist AKEL in Greek Cypriot community. During this period besides the Orthodox Church, AKEL members were among the vehement protagonists of Enosis at least until the leftists were defeated in Greek civil war; whereas Turkish Cypriot intellectuals and leaders were in favor of maintaining the status quo since they conceived the continuation of the British rule as the only way of preventing Enosis.²⁷ “‘*Maintenance of the Status Quo*’ was how we baptized our cause. We did not even want to envisage that someday Britain would abandon the island. Unaware of changing state of affairs we cherished friendship blindfoldedly for the British.”²⁸ As a matter of fact, the colonial administration adopted the strategy of utilizing and manipulating the reactions of Turkish Cypriots to Enosis by encouraging their political mobilization and organization vis-à-vis the Greek majority.²⁹ According to Kızılyürek, Britain also contributed to the rise of nationalist campaigns concerning the Cyprus issue in Turkish domestic politics during late 1940s.³⁰

However until mid-1950s the existence of a Cyprus problem for Turkey was persistently rejected by the ruling parties and the state elite. Even until the foundation of the independent Cyprus Republic in 1960 the question was conceived as “an internal affair of Britain”. For these political and bureaucratic figures, who were “satisfied with

²⁶ Ertekün, Necati M., *The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, p. 2.

²⁷ Denктаş, Rauf R., *Rauf Denктаş’ın Hatıraları*, 10th volume, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 2000), pp. 64-65

²⁸ Ibid., p.227. (emphasis original) Translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.

²⁹ Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, p. 232.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 233.

the British presence on the island”³¹ the maintenance of the status quo was going to impede both the Greekification of the island and its takeover by the pro-Sovietic communists. On 13 October 1948 the then Foreign Minister in the Republican People’s Party (RPP) cabinet explicitly declared in the Turkish Grand National Assembly that “for Turkey there is not a Cyprus problem as such.”³² In the same vein, on 25 January 1950 the then Foreign Minister in the RPP government Necmettin Sadak in an interview published in *Kim* magazine stated that

there is not a Cyprus problem as such. I had clearly told it to journalists long time ago. For, Cyprus is today under the British sovereignty and rule and we are convinced that Britain is neither intended nor inclined to surrender Cyprus to any other state.³³

The Foreign Minister of the Democratic Party government, which came to power in 1950 general elections, Fuat Köprülü also took the stance in favor of the maintenance of the British rule in Cyprus by declaring on 20 August 1951 that “we do not see any reason for a change in the status quo in Cyprus; but if there would be a change our rights have to be respected.”³⁴

However, particularly with the plebiscite organized by the Orthodox Church in Cyprus and perceived by many Turks as a step toward achieving the ultimate aim of Enosis³⁵, the nationalist and Panturkist authors and political figures, associations and student unions became more directly involved within the issue. For them the official discourse denying the presence of the Cyprus question in Turkey’s political agenda was unacceptable. The keen interest and affinity of these circles in the Cyprus issue will expansively be explored in the sixth chapter of the thesis. It suffices at this juncture to specify that Cyprus was thought to set the proper ground for the rearticulation of Pan-

³¹ Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 29, No. 3, July 1993, p. 507.

³² Ibid., p. 508.

³³ Erim, Nihat, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık, no date), p. 115.

³⁴ Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, p. 507.

³⁵ İsmail, Sabahattin, *20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences*, p. 42-43.

Turkist aspirations as well as the calls for anti-communist struggles³⁶. What is more, the newly emerging situation in the island after this plebiscite of the Greek Church appeared as a timely opportunity for the nationalist and Panturkist circles to reorganize themselves politically, who were swept away from the political scene with the defeat of Germany in the World War II.

In 1949 the Greek Orthodox church with the initiatives of ‘Bishop of Kition, Makarios’ decided to organize an open plebiscite regarding the unification of the island with Greece in order to bring the demands for Enosis to the agenda of international community. The organization of such plebiscite aggravating the mutual lack of confidence among the two communities is analyzed by various Turkish authors within the context of the domestic political balances and power relations within Greek Cypriot population.

Makarios who had perceived that this plebiscite would give him an advantage in the elections for the Archbishopric, was leading this movement. There would be no obstacles between Makarios and the Archbishopric if he could prevent AKEL from monopolizing the Enosis efforts by conducting a successful plebiscite under the supervision of the church. Also the Greek Cypriot left would be prevented from acquiring a dominant position in the Greek Cypriot politics. In fact when faced with the Church’s reaction, AKEL would have to step backwards by canceling its plebiscite and telling the people to support the plebiscite organized by the Church.³⁷

In the plebiscite, which lasted one week, 95.73% of the Greek Cypriot population voted in favor of Enosis. The results, which arose fervent reactions among the nationalist circles in Turkey, were announced by Makarios sending delegations to various capitals in Europe and to the United States. “After the successful conduct of the plebiscite Makarios easily won the elections for the Archbishopric and thus became the religious and political leader of the Greek Cypriot people.”³⁸

³⁶ Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, p. 207.

³⁷ İsmail, Sabahattin, *20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences*, pp. 40-41.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 43.

5.2.3. The Internationalization of the Cyprus Dispute and Its Repercussions in Turkish Politics

In the wake of the Greek Civil War the newly founded right-wing government “became a firm and persistent advocate of self-determination for the island and for Enosis.”³⁹ In parallel with the endeavors of the Greek Cypriot leadership headed by Makarios to internationalize the question on 16 August 1954, Greece formally applied to the United Nations with the aim of having the issue incorporated in the agenda of the General Assembly. After the approval of a committee recommendation by the General Assembly the issue was open to discussion in the Committee by 14 December 1954. The draft resolution prepared by the Committee was adopted by the General Assembly as the resolution no 814(IX) after a series of arduous discussions.

The General Assembly,
Considering that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus,
Decides not to consider further the item entitled ‘Application under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the Island of Cyprus.’⁴⁰

During the debates on the Committee resolution in the General Assembly the British delegation, claiming the Cyprus issue to be its own internal affair, based its thesis on the incompetence of the UN to discuss such an issue. The delegation also emphasized the strategic necessity to maintain the British sovereignty over the island, which was recognized also both by Turkey and Greece with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Britain advocated the unacceptability of the application of the principle of self-determination for Cyprus on the grounds that it meant the transference of a part of British territory to another UN member.⁴¹

³⁹ Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 4.

⁴⁰ UN General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, 447th Plenary Meeting, p. 96.

⁴¹ For the full text of the British delegate Selwyn Lloyd’s speech see *ibid.*, pp. 52-55.

The Greek delegation, who approached the matter as one of freedom and human rights, foregrounded the colonial nature of British rule over the island under which the Cypriot people did not want to live. Thereby, for them the application of the internationally accepted principle of self-determination should have been considered in the context of the Cypriots' indispensable democratic rights and freedoms. The Turkish UN delegate Selim Sarper delivered speeches drawing attention to "the geographic, ethnic, historical and economic"⁴² factors justifying Turkey's interests on Cyprus throughout the discussions both in the Committee and before the General Assembly. He also expressed Turkish support to Britain as regards the incompetence of UN to discuss the subject pertaining to British domestic affairs. Throughout the debates Sarper articulated a common distrust shared by the government and the nationalist circles in Turkey by pointing out that "the Greek version of self-determination for Cyprus that is Enosis was vigorously opposed by 100.000 Turkish citizens of the island."⁴³ Even though the resolution no 814 of the General Assembly postponing the discussions on the application of self-determination to Cyprus provoked resentment and anger in Greek public opinion against the United States and the United Kingdom, the resolution was, in effect, appreciated by the Greek government in the sense that it amounted to the acknowledgement of the international character of the Cyprus question.

However, the Greek efforts to internationalize the matter by bringing it to the agenda of international forums confronted with unfavorable and vehement reactions particularly on the part of the nationalist and pan-Turkist circles in Turkey. In the meetings organized by the nationalist associations and student unions the Greek attempts were harshly condemned and Menderes government was called upon to pursue a more active and involved Cyprus policy. In many Turkish dailies such as *Hürriyet*,

⁴² Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, "The Cyprus Question and the United Nations, 1950-1986", in *Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments*, Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), (Madison: Wisconsin, 1996), p. 174.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 174.

Vatan, Zafer and Yeni Sabah numerous successive articles were published concentrating on the Greek threat targeting the presence of Turkishness on Cyprus. The intensive emphasis on Turkishness prepared the ground on which the Cyprus issue was declared as a “national cause (*milli dava*)”. Parallel to the condensation of a nationalistic atmosphere in the domestic politics, the reluctance of the Menderes government to pursue an aggressive and clearly defined Cyprus policy began to erode by the summer of 1954. The government, in contrast to its previous stance, devised a new foreign political discourse imbued with nationalistic motives and emotions. The radical change in government’s Cyprus policy encouraged by Britain as well, “who wanted to use Turkish opposition as a counterweight to *enosis*”⁴⁴ is generally narrativized by Turkish authors as a convergence between the official stance and the Turkish public opinion or as responses of the political leaders to the public demands and sentiments.

In asserting Turkey’s rights over Cyprus, however, Turkish leaders were also responding to public opinion. In Turkey, it could be taken for granted that the prospect of any change in the sovereignty of Cyprus, and especially developments concerning the status and security of the Turkish community, would be of considerable interest to the public at large. Governments felt the pressure of public opinion to act in protection of the national interest. Thus, beginning with anti-*enosis* demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara in 1950 to protest the Greek-Cypriot *enosis* plebiscite of the same year, it was Turkish public opinion that led the campaign of opposition to *enosis*. These, and similar manifestations of keen domestic interest in Cyprus in later years have had a substantial impact on the way governments have responded to developments on the island.⁴⁵

The national discourse produced and reproduced by the leaders of the nationalist associations and student unions and various prominent columnists, all of whom enjoyed organic ties with the political authority was instrumental for the state and political elite to ensure national unity and cohesion in Turkey. What is more, as Tözün Bahçeli conceded there existed some authors arguing that “the Menderes government exploited

⁴⁴ Bahçeli, Tözün, “Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey since 1955”, in *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution*, Norma Salem (ed.), (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 63.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 63.

the issue domestically by encouraging nationalist sentiment to support its tough stance over Cyprus.”⁴⁶ The significance of the Cyprus issue in the reproduction of the nationalist discourses legitimizing the government’s policies shall be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner in the ensuing pages.

Returning to our latest issue, before the London Conference convened in 29 August 1955 “Greece once more applied to the UN asking to have the matter included on the agenda for the tenth session of the General Assembly.” Whereas “this time the Committee recommended against the inclusion” and the General Assembly decided to refuse “to bring the question for discussion.”⁴⁷ Parallel to the increase of tension on the island in 1955, Britain intensified its diplomacy encouraging Turkey to partake in the Cyprus negotiations as a concerned party. As a concrete corollary of that diplomacy, Britain invited Turkey and Greece to London to negotiate the issue on the table in a tripartite conference. Meanwhile, it should be born in mind that during the UN negotiations in 1954 and the subsequent years the United States, in turn, bolstered the British policy of reaching a solution among the concerned parties of the question since it held the idea that adoption of any UN resolution on the issue could inflict Turco-Greek relations so detrimentally that it could destabilize NATO’s southeastern flank. As a matter of fact, 1959 settlement (namely the London/Zurich Treaties) can be considered as the outcome of the intra-NATO efforts to attain a solution on Cyprus within Western family.

As to the Turkish domestic politics, a few days after Greece had raised the issue at the United Nations “a national seminar” was organized in Istanbul by the European Youth Campaign and the Turkish National Student Federation (TNSF) (*Türk Milli*

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 64. Here Bahçeli presents as the example of this approach the work below: Paul B. Henze, “Turkey, the Alliance and the Middle East. Problems and Opportunities in Historical Perspective”, (presented at the Wilson Center on January 19, 1982).

⁴⁷ Sönmezoglu, Faruk, “The Cyprus Question and the United Nations, 1950-1986”, p. 174.

Talebe Federasyonu) to “discuss the concept of the European Union.”⁴⁸ However, in the course of the meeting where Turkey’s major newspaper editors and the TNSF leadership participated the debates on the Cyprus issue took the limelight mainly owing to the recent Greek application to the UN. “... [T]he participants deduced to form an association to advance the Turkish cause in Cyprus. They named the association The Cyprus is Turkish Committee.”⁴⁹ In October 1954 the Committee acquired a legal status with the name of the ‘Cyprus is Turkish Society’ (*Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti*), which would assume a very significant role to play in the reproduction of a Cyprus-oriented nationalist discourse in Turkey during the second half of 1950s.

Another factor which led the Cyprus-oriented political mobilization to gain prominence in Turkish politics can be cited as the launching of the EOKA (*Ethnike Organosis Kypriou Agoniston*, or the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) military campaign on 1 April 1955. The Greek authors insistently state that at least at the beginning the EOKA campaign only targeted the British colonial rule on Cyprus; but not the Turkish community at all. For them the central reason flaring up the bi-communal armed strife on the island is the support lent by Turkey to the British colonial administration. The main objective of EOKA led by general Grivas were formulized as “to force the British to grant Cyprus the right to self-determination which was bound to lead to *Enosis* or union with Greece.”⁵⁰ General George Grivas “adopted the *nom de guerre* “Digenis”, the name of a Byzantine hero who became legendary, and subsequently became known as George Grivas-Digenis.”⁵¹ It could be proposed that the intensification of EOKA military campaign waged with the accompany of an anti-

⁴⁸ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 77.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 77.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 50.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 50.

colonial discourse speeded up the British endeavors to utilize Turkey as a means of exerting pressure vis-à-vis Greece and the Greek Cypriots.

In this context, by the end of August 1955 Britain invited Turkey and Greece to London for a Tripartite conference “to attempt to solve the Cyprus problem – thus marking the beginning of Turkey’s active participation and reversing British policy of excluding Athens and Ankara from the politics of the island.”⁵² Even though it did not prove successful, Britain and Turkey appreciated it as a step forward for their respective theses. That is, for Britain the conference revealed vis-à-vis the world public opinion that it is not the only party that dragged the Cyprus conflict out. On the other hand, for Turkey the conference meant the official recognition of its status as a concerned party by the other two. In the analyses congruent with the pro-Greek thesis, Turco-British collaboration at the UN negotiations and in the London conference is generally noted as the beginning of the formation of *the Anglo-Turkish alliance* vis-à-vis Greece and the Greek Cypriot community.

Meanwhile in Turkey, before and during the London conference the Cyprus is Turkish Committee enthusiastically worked out to disseminate the rumor that on 28 August 1955 the Greek Cypriots would execute a massacre against Turkish Cypriot community. In those days when the news of massacre prompted a fervent reaction within Turkish public opinion, the nationalistic accent in the government’s discourse relating to the Cyprus policy has become more and more evident. For instance, the acting Prime Minister Adnan Menderes after convening with the executive board of the Cyprus is Turkish Committee explicitly declared, “Cyprus will never be the Greeks’.”⁵³ Various mass-circulated papers such as *Hürriyet*, *Istanbul Ekspres*, *Vatan* (Istanbul daily) and *Zafer* (the mouthpiece of ruling Democratic Party) initiated to wage a

⁵² Salem, Norma, “The Constitution of 1960 and Its Failure”, in *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution*, Norma Salem (ed.), (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 118.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 82.

vigorous campaign against both the Greek Cypriots and Makarios (particularly EOKA and the communists) and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul. It is worthy of noting especially *Hürriyet*'s campaign against the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Athenagoras⁵⁴ and *Istanbul Ekspres*' news about the bombing of Atatürk's house in Selonika. These news and campaigns which would be touched upon in a more detailed manner in the sixth chapter of the dissertation triggered an anti-Greek and anti-communist atmosphere in Turkey in such a way as to strengthen and re-legitimize the nationalist and pan-Turkist political movements in Turkey. As it would be delineated in the following pages the news on the bombing of Atatürk's house publicized by *Istanbul Ekspres* with a special edition served to prepare the ground for the 6-7 September 1955 riots against the Greek minority in Istanbul and Izmir. Across the Mediterranean Sea, on the island of Cyprus "in the fall of 1955, the British authorities formed the "Auxiliary Police Force" and the "Mobile Reserve Force", both manned exclusively by Turkish Cypriots. The objective of these two forces, totaling 3,000 policemen, was to fight along with the British against the EOKA movement."⁵⁵ The establishment of these supplementary police forces by the British administration is interpreted by both Turkish and Greek analysts as a manifest of the British 'divide and rule policy' "setting one community against the other."⁵⁶

In 1956 the Menderes government changed its initial policy of supporting the maintenance of the status quo in Cyprus namely the continuation of the British colonial rule and, if not possible, returning the island to Turkey. The government with the encouragement of the then international political circumstances began to articulate the partition of the island in between the conflicting parties as "the last concession that it

⁵⁴ For the role and keen interest of *Hürriyet* and its founder Sedat Simavi in the agitative campaigns concerning the developments in Cyprus see Necati Zincirkıran, *Hürriyet ve Simavi İmparatorluğu*, (İstanbul: Sabah Yazı Dizileri, 1994), pp. 23-27, 27-31, 43-47.

⁵⁵ Salem, Norma, "The Constitution of 1960 and Its Failure", p. 57.

⁵⁶ Dodd, Clement, "A Historical Overview", p. 7.

and the Turkish nation could make.” Whereas, for Greece and the most part of Greek Cypriots, who did not wish to be distanced from the ultimate goal of Enosis, partition was unacceptable as much as the continuation of the British administration on the island. Meanwhile, due to the escalation of the tension on the island, the British authority decided to send Archbishop Makarios to exile on Seychelles on 9 March 1956. A few days later Makarios had been sent to exile, Britain initiated a diplomatic undertaking to bring the matter to the agenda of the United Nations under the title of “Greek support for terrorism on Cyprus.”⁵⁷ As Faruk Sönmezoğlu stated “this was a sign that British policy had changed and she would no longer argue against internationalization of the problem.”⁵⁸

Another significant alteration regarding Britain’s Cyprus policy by 1956 occurred in her former attitude of totally rejecting the application of the principle of self-determination for the island. This policy change was overtly expressed by the British Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd during the discussions on the Radcliffe Plan in the Parliament as follows:

When the time comes for this review, that is when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, shall in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty’s Government recognizes that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.⁵⁹

On the other side, until the end of 1958 Greek diplomacy was preoccupied with posing the matter, in international forums and during the United Nations discussions, as that of in between Britain and the people of Cyprus. Doing this, Greece was aiming at eliminating “Turkey as a concerned party entitled to participate in the discussions of the

⁵⁷ Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, “The Cyprus Question and the United Nations 1950-1986”, p. 174.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 174.

⁵⁹ Parliamentary Debates, (*Hansard*), 19 December 1956, vol. 562, No. 32. Col 1272-1276.

issue.”⁶⁰ However it should be born in mind that from the second half of 1950s then on, the international power politics imposed by the “Cold War” have become more and more involved in the question.

5.2.4. The Involvement of NATO powers in the Issue and the Foundation of the Cyprus Republic

The major NATO powers were concerned with the increasing rapprochement between the Greek Cypriot leadership and the Warsaw Pact countries and with the non-aligned states. They intensified the pressure on Turkey and Greece for reaching an immediate settlement to the question, which would primarily satisfy NATO’s security needs and expectations. As a matter of fact, a ‘Gentlement Agreement’, which was to be unveiled later, had been reached between Turkey and Greece besides the founding treaties of the Republic of Cyprus. According to this agreement concealed at that time, both Turkey and Greece undertook to endorse the leaders of the two sides (namely the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities) against the communists and to encourage the Cyprus Republic to become member of the NATO.⁶¹

As a consequence of the pressures exerted by the major NATO powers, in December 1958 the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers began to negotiate the issue at the United Nations. At the end of these talks which continued throughout January 1959, the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers Menderes and Karamanlis achieved to draw out “the outlines of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus dispute.” The agreement reached by the Turkish and the Greek governments in an unexpectedly short period of time “was announced in a joint Graeco-Turkish communiqué issued on 11 February

⁶⁰ Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, “The Cyprus Question and the United Nations 1950-1986”, p. 174.

⁶¹ Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, pp. 265-66.

1959.”⁶² The British government was ready to accept any agreement signed between these two on the dispute on the condition that “it could maintain sovereign British bases and a military presence in the island. It was only then that Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders were fully brought into the picture.”⁶³ As it would be more apparent particularly Makarios was quite reluctant to sign the Zurich Accords, which was therefore defined as “essentially an imposed settlement”⁶⁴ excluding and “neutralizing ethno-political goals of Enosis and partition”⁶⁵ of the island. Throughout those negotiations they also framed the basic elements of the new Cyprus Republic’s constitution based on the equal partnership of the two communities in Cyprus. With the settlement “in the event of a breach of the provisions of” the Treaty of Guarantee “Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom” as the guarantors of the newborn Cyprus state undertook both “to ensure observance of those provisions” and “to take action” jointly or unilaterally “with the sole aim” of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.”⁶⁶ Although the Menderes government was criticized for having abandoned partition in Cyprus by the main opposition Republican People’s Party and some other political figures, public opinion makers (columnists, student union leaders and the nationalist associations) made successive declarations in support of the government’s new policy. “[I]n general there was considerable agreement with the government’s characterization of the Zurich-London Accords as a victory for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.”⁶⁷ First, Enosis was prevented and the Turkish Cypriots gained the right of veto over the administrative issues. “Furthermore, the Turkish community became a

⁶² Polyviou, Polyvios G., *Cyprus Conflict and Negotiation (1960-1980)*, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980), p. 13.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 13.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

⁶⁵ Joseph, Joseph S., *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*, (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 38.

⁶⁶ The article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee cited in Ertekün, Necati M., *The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, pp. 128-29.

⁶⁷ Bahçeli, Tözün, “Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey since 1955”, p. 64.

partner of the new Cypriot state with substantial legal safeguards to ensure the protection of its rights.”⁶⁸

Nevertheless, it should be stated in parentheses that scholars working on the Cyprus issue converge on the idea that the independence and sovereignty of the newly emergent Cyprus state assured by the “1960 Accords” and its constitution was quite restricted and fragile⁶⁹ on the grounds that the survival of the new Republic was contingent upon both the behaviors of and the relations among the external powers particularly Turkey and Greece. Moreover, rather than the identity of Cypriotness “ethnic considerations” dominated “not only the process through which the settlement was reached but also its content.”⁷⁰

5.2.5. The Crackling of The Republic of Cyprus and Subsequent Developments

Even though both Enosis and partition were banned with the Constitution of the Cyprus Republic proclaimed on 16 August 1960, the ‘motherlands’ have become more and more involved within sociopolitical and cultural life in the island. As Joseph S. Joseph pointed out “education, religion, culture, language, history and military ties”⁷¹ were operationalized in the constitution and maintenance of the “ethno-political gap” in between the two communities. “During the 3 years’ duration of the co-founder partnership state of the Cyprus Republic”⁷² the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leadership attached importance to the strengthening of their linkages with the nations of which they assumed to constitute an inalienable part.

The internal affairs of the two communities were regulated by provisions based on the premise of historical, linguistic, cultural, religious, and educational unity

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 64.

⁶⁹ For the detailed analysis of the “roots of the constitutional crisis” within the Republic of Cyprus see Salih, Halil Ibrahim, *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on A State*, (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1978), pp. 18-25.

⁷⁰ Joseph, Joseph S., *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*, p. 37.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 40.

⁷² Gazioglu, Ahmet C., “Was Cyprus Ever Really United”, *Perceptions*, June-August 2002, no 6. p. 64.

with Greece and Turkey. The two communities were distinguished vis-à-vis each other with references to their Greek and Turkish origin, language, culture, and religion.⁷³

For instance as to the field of education, “harmonization of the educational systems of the two Cypriot communities with those of their motherlands came into effect after the declaration of independence.”

Since education in Cyprus was segregated, the two communities maintained separate schools in which teachers and textbooks imported from the motherlands were used to socialize the young Cypriots into Greek and Turkish cultural patterns, religious beliefs, social values and ethnic ideals.⁷⁴

What is more, the Constitution of the Cyprus Republic comprised numerous provisions restricting the sovereignty rights of the new state from the outset and hampered “the smooth functioning of its government.”⁷⁵ To illustrate, it was accepted that the basic articles of the Constitution could not be amended. The first article of the Constitution stipulated “The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish communities...”⁷⁶ The Constitution recognized both to the President and the Vice-President the right of veto on the issues “concerning foreign affairs, defense and security.”⁷⁷

In consequence, both the Turkish and Greek sides began to increasingly articulate their misgivings and suspicions about the 1960 Accords. The Greek side believed that the Founding Treaties of the Cyprus state which were “colonial in nature” and imposed upon them by the great powers exerting intense pressure denied their right to rule the island as a majority. The preservation of the two military bases over which Britain had the sovereignty right as enshrined in the Treaties was harshly criticized by

⁷³ Joseph, Joseph S., *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*, p. 38.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 40.

⁷⁵ Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, p. 509.

⁷⁶ Blaustein, Albert P., and Gilbert H. Flanz, *Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Cyprus*, (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1972), p. 1.

⁷⁷ Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, p. 510.

the Greek anti-imperialist left. On the other hand, the Turkish side was bothered with the non-implementation of the Treaties' provisions fully or even their deliberate violation. As to the Turkish domestic politics, along with the ongoing debates as regards the Cyprus issue after the 1959 Settlement, the leader of the main opposition party (Republican People's Party) İsmet İnönü criticized the government with not achieving the partition of the island as an independent Cyprus state, which as a UN member could constrain Turkey's ability to maneuver in future crises.⁷⁸

Whilst searching for why the new Cyprus Republic called by Clerides as the "reluctant republic" could not survive as a legitimate body embracing the two communities in the island, his following remarks are worthy of noting:

... [I] wish to explain why I have referred to the Republic of Cyprus as the reluctant republic. It is because neither the Greek Cypriots, nor the Turkish Cypriots wanted or fought for the independence of their country. The Greek Cypriots wanted or fought to unite Cyprus with Greece and the Turkish Cypriots to unite it with Turkey, or at least to divide it between Greece and Turkey.⁷⁹

Besides, the first coalition government led by İnönü, who came to power after the military coup of 27 May 1960, continuously declared that it would remain loyal to the founding treaties of 1959. As Melek Fırat pointed out in this spell of time the least desirable deed for Turkey was the outbreak of a discord with Greece or any other ally indicative of a change in Turkish foreign policy.⁸⁰ "Turkey had no intentions over Cyprus other than seeing the co-partnership independent Cyprus Republic become a success, a peaceful country and a bridge of friendship between the two motherlands."⁸¹ The Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff, too, strongly bolstered the 1959 settlement up with the purpose of normalizing the Turco-Greek relations the significance of which transgressed the Cyprus question. Thereby, for

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 510.

⁷⁹ Clerides, Glafkos, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, vol I., (Nicosia: Alithia Publications, 1980), p. 21, quoted in Gazioğlu, Ahmet C., "Was Cyprus Ever Really United", *Perceptions*, June-August 2002, no 6. p. 64.

⁸⁰ Fırat, Melek M., *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1997), p. 75.

⁸¹ Gazioğlu, Ahmet C., "Was Cyprus Ever Really United", p. 65.

Kızılyürek and various authors it was clear that this was an anti-communist consensus aiming at preventing the involvement of the Soviets in the issue.⁸² However, it is quite difficult to claim that the 1959 settlement was adopted and internalized by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leadership with the same degree of enthusiasm. The following statement of Rauf Denktaş, who was still in favor of the partition of the island, to the first Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus Emin Dirvana is quite striking as it reveals his disbelief and distrust in independent Cyprus Republic: “When the day comes and Makarios annihilates the Agreements, we wish you to leave Cyprus as a governor to which you were appointed as an ambassador.”⁸³

Eventually there appeared a series of discords in Cyprus politics some of which could be distinguished as the ones

over Turkish Cypriot insistence on maintaining the separate municipalities in the five major towns (as provided for in the Constitution), over the guarantee of thirty per cent of civil service posts for the Turkish Cypriots, over the exclusion of the Turkish vice-President from foreign affairs, and over separate, or mixed army units.⁸⁴

When Makarios presented a proposal to revise various provisions of the constitution on 30 November 1963 the crises over the taxation and administration issues deepened and widened in such a way as to endanger the independent Republic of Cyprus. These amendments “that virtually have left the Turkish Cypriots with no more than minority rights”⁸⁵ were categorically rejected by both the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey. The revisions articulated by Makarios included the abrogation of the Vice-President’s veto power, “a virtual abandonment of a bi-communal army, separate municipalities, the 70:30 ratio in civil service jobs, and the parliament’s authority to pass any tax

⁸² Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, p. 265.

⁸³ Denktaş, Rauf Raif, *Rauf Denktaş’ın Hatıraları*, 10th volume, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 2000), p. 166.

⁸⁴ Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 7.

⁸⁵ Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 7.

laws.”⁸⁶ Turkish authors favoring the official state line allude to these proposed amendments as a means employed by Greek Cypriots to reach their ultimate goal of Enosis⁸⁷. This they do by establishing a direct correlation between the refusal of the amendments by Turkish Cypriot community and the launch of Greek attacks to implement the Akritas Plan “aiming at abrogation of the Agreements, extermination of Turkish Cypriot community and the union of Cyprus with Greece.”⁸⁸

By the end of December 1963, just after the refusal came, the island began to witness a new spell of bi-communal fightings. While the Enosist Greek Cypriots’ attacks were transforming into a widespread military campaign, the Turkish leadership decided to leave all the official posts occupied by Turks in the state apparatus. “As the conflict continued, various security council resolutions seeking to stem the fighting were approved in 1964 and 1965.”⁸⁹ This time the UN, which adopted 7 Security Council resolutions during two years, was much more involved in the Cyprus dispute at the Security Council level. The most remarkable of these was the Resolution 186 passed on 4 March 1964 with which the Security Council called upon member states “to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace.”⁹⁰ The Resolution also recommended stationing of a UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) in the island and appointment of a UN mediator charged to submit a report to the Council on the conflict. Since then UNFICYP’s mandate has been extended every six months.

Along with the deepening of the bi-communal clashes, the Cyprus issue came to reoccupy the center of the political agenda in Turkey as a “national cause”. On 13

⁸⁶ Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, p. 511.

⁸⁷ Ertekün, Necati M., *The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, pp. 9-11.

⁸⁸ Soysal, Mümtaz and Necati M. Ertekün, “Federal Solution for Cyprus”, *Foreign Policy*, Vol. XIV No. 3-4, p. 18.

⁸⁹ Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, “The Cyprus Question and the United Nations 1950-1986”, p. 177.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 177.

March 1964 the İnönü government delivered “an ultimatum to Makarios threatening military intervention if the attacks did not stop.”⁹¹ That the intercommunal armed conflicts persisted despite Turkey’s continuous threat to intervene even after UNFICYP landed on the island rendered the bi-communal Cyprus state inoperational. The Turkish government was of the opinion that international community showed a lack of sensitivity toward the violence experienced by the Turkish Cypriots who “were in a very weak and depressed condition.”⁹² The Prime Minister İnönü in an interview on 15 April 1964 complained about the United States’ Cyprus policy as it adopted “a hands-off attitude”⁹³ on the issue particularly after the UNFICYP landed on the island. It is in this interview that İnönü conveyed his striking message targeting both the domestic and world public opinion through the following famous words: “If our allies do not change their attitude, the Western alliance will break up... a new king of world will then come into being on a new pattern, and in this new world Turkey will find herself a place.”⁹⁴ It would be fair to claim that this message was a manifestation of the Turkish state elite’s endeavors both to diversify Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy and also to control and manipulate the ever-increasing anti-Greek and anti-Western sentiments in the domestic politics.

On 1 June 1964 the Cyprus Parliament, in a meeting where its Turkish members did not participate, “enacted a conscription law authorizing the ‘government’”⁹⁵ to establish a new army. The İnönü government, who found this decision unacceptable convened on 2 June 1964 and “decided to land forces in Cyprus to establish ‘a political and military beachhead’”⁹⁶ The government was convinced that “UN forces were not

⁹¹ Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, p. 515.

⁹² Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 8.

⁹³ Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, p. 516.

⁹⁴ *The New York Times*, 17 April 1964, p. 12.

⁹⁵ Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, p. 516.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 516.

providing adequate protection for the Turkish community on the island”⁹⁷ When the government informed the United States about its intent to send troops to Cyprus and occupy one part of the island, the immediate response of the United States came on 5 June 1964 in the form of a letter signed by the American President Lyndon Johnson. The letter, which is claimed to have prompted frustration among the Turkish state elite particularly with its style, has long been debated and consistently criticized by analysts sympathetic to the Turkish thesis. “The letter, written in an almost patronizing style, categorically rejected İnönü’s argument that all peaceful means had been exhausted.”⁹⁸ “In 1964 Turkey was forcefully and brusquely dissuaded from intervening militarily by President Lyndon Johnson.”⁹⁹ According to Johnson administration, as Turkey’s ‘right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable’ under these circumstances, she should not accept her NATO allies to come to her aid in case of either the direct involvement of the Soviet Union to the dispute or the outbreak of an armed conflict between Turkey and Greece.¹⁰⁰ In the letter Johnson also manifestly expressed that “the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.”¹⁰¹ Not surprisingly, after the receipt of such a letter the Turkish government cancelled its decision of landing troops on the island and Premier İnönü required Johnson to be more actively involved in the dispute in order to achieve a settlement.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ Ahmad, Feroz, *The Turkish Experiment In Democracy (1950-1975)*, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977), p. 406.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 517.

⁹⁹ Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 8.

¹⁰⁰ ‘President Johnson’s Letter to Prime Minister İnönü’, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. XX, No. 3 (1966), p.386.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 387.

¹⁰² ‘Prime Minister İnönü’s Response to the President, 13 June 1964’, *Middle East Journal*, Vol XX, No. 3 (1966), p. 386.

However, it can be argued, as some authors do¹⁰³, that the Johnson's letter symbolizing the foreign hand that prevented Turkey from intervening in Cyprus was utilized by İnönü in reconfiguring the internal political balances in such a way as to consolidate the legitimacy of the government and its policies. To this line of thought, as Turkey was not militarily and politically prepared, İnönü created the incentives for such a letter by the American administration. An external impediment of this kind also facilitated for the Turkish state elite the reproduction of the strong state rhetoric vis-à-vis the society. İnönü in his response to Johnson had already wrote that he would "let [the] public know that [the] intervention had been put off on [the] urging of [the] USG [United States Government] and that the US would endeavor to solve the crisis."¹⁰⁴ Hence, the letter was partially "leaked to the Turkish press almost immediately upon its receipt."¹⁰⁵

If the failing initiative of Dean Acheson, who was the former Secretary of State of the US, is left aside, there occurred a relative stagnation on the diplomatic front until the end of 1967. The Acheson's plan roughly foresaw the unification of Cyprus with Greece in return for cessation of a territory on the Carpas Peninsula to Turkey "[o]ver which it would have sovereignty and which would be regarded as an indivisible part"¹⁰⁶ of it. This plan, which "sought to secure US interests by removing the Cyprus problem without the direct participation of the Cypriots themselves"¹⁰⁷, was rejected by Makarios claiming that it meant a disguised partition of the island.¹⁰⁸ On the military front inter-communal tension continuously escalated with the attacks of Greek Cypriots

¹⁰³ For a recent debate on this issue see Şahin, Haluk, *Johnson Mektubu: Türk-ABD İlişkilerini Değiştiren Olayın Perde Arkası*, (İstanbul: Gendaş A.Ş., 2002).

¹⁰⁴ Tel. No. 1616 from US Ambassador Hare to the State Department (6 June 1964), in NSCHF: Cyprus Crisis. The telegram is cited in Bölükbaşı, Süha, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", p. 517.

¹⁰⁵ Meyer, James H., "Policy Watershed: Turkey's Cyprus Policy and the Interventions of 1974", *WWS Case Study* 3/00, p. 12.

¹⁰⁶ For the details of Dean Acheson's plan see Salih, Halil İbrahim, *Cyprus The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on A State*, (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1978), pp. 47-48.

¹⁰⁷ Mandell, Brian, "The Cyprus Conflict: Explaining Resistance to Resolution", in *Cyprus A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution*, Norma Salem (ed.), p. 211.

¹⁰⁸ Fırat, Melek M., *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p. 155.

to the Turkish enclaves in Kokkina¹⁰⁹. This led to Turkish aerial bombardment and reconnaissance which continued “until the status quo ante bellum was restored in the area.”¹¹⁰ That in 1967 inter-communal strives flared up provoked Turkey to intervene militarily in the island, which in turn deteriorated Turco-Greek relations. Fortunately enough, through a settlement reached after a relatively fruitful negotiation process the aggravation of the crisis was deterred. The parties compromised in the return of nearly 10.000 Greek troops to Greece in tandem with General Grivas and lifting the embargo on Turkish Cypriot enclaves.¹¹¹

The inter-communal negotiations, which lasted on and off between 1968-74 were aiming at “exploring various possibilities for the solution of the constitutional problem on the basis of an independent, integral state.”¹¹² These talks came to a stalemate mainly owing to the uncompromising attitude of the negotiating parties, which was disguisedly endorsed by the ‘motherlands’ too. The problems on the state structure and the exercise of sovereignty were the issues subject to the most arduous and persistent debates at the negotiating table. The Greek Cypriot leadership advocated a unitary state where the central authority exercised its power over the whole territory of the island; whereas the Turkish Cypriot administration was sympathetic to a more federalistic resolution in which the Turkish community did not share its sovereignty rights and local autonomy with the central authority as far as possible. Months before the 1974 Greek and Turkish military interventions to the island “the newly elected Turkish Premier Bülent Ecevit” made it clear that “the only solution acceptable to

¹⁰⁹ Salih, Halil İbrahim, *Cyprus The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on A State*, p. 50.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 52.

¹¹¹ Dodd, Clement H., (ed.), “A Historical Overview”, p. 8.

¹¹² Mandell, Brian, “The Cyprus Conflict: Explaining Resistance to Resolution”, p. 212.

Turkey was “federation”, a slogan that caused Clerides to withdraw from the negotiating table.”¹¹³

5.2.6. Turkey’s Military Intervention of July-August 1974 in Cyprus

The relations between the pro-enosis military junta in Greece and Makarios, who had been defending an independent state of Cyprus since a couple of years, had further deteriorated when the year 1974 ushered in¹¹⁴. “From 1970 to 1974 there were numerous unsuccessful plots against Makarios, which most people assumed were being planned by the EOKA-B under the direction of Grivas,”¹¹⁵ supported by the fascist Greek junta. The Cyprus president, who was not abstaining from aligning himself with “the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and some of the Arab and nonaligned states”¹¹⁶ (namely non-Western powers), was perceived by both the American and Greek administrations as “a red priest and the Castro of the Mediterranean”¹¹⁷.

On 15 July 1974 the pro-enosis forces namely “the National Guard, which was widely known to be controlled by the Greek junta”¹¹⁸ in Athens engineered a coup with the purpose of overthrowing Makarios after which he fled to Britain. Nicos Sampson, who was the leading figure in orchestrating the pro-enosis coup, declared the unification of the island with Greece along with his presidency to the Cyprus Republic. However, the coup offered “a golden opportunity”¹¹⁹ for Turkey “having prepared itself

¹¹³ Markides, Kyriacos C., *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 154.

¹¹⁴ For the details of the relations between Greece and the Cyprus Republic before and after the Greek military junta, see, Attalides, Michael A., *Cyprus Nationalism and International Politics*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), pp. 122-140.

¹¹⁵ Salih, Halil Ibrahim, *Cyprus The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on A State*, pp. 88.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 73.

¹¹⁷ Melakopides, Constantine, “The Cyprus Problem In Greek Foreign Policy”, in *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution*, p. 78.

¹¹⁸ Attalides, Michael A., *Cyprus Nationalism and International Politics*, p. 162.

¹¹⁹ Salih, Halil Ibrahim, *Cyprus The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on A State*, p. 89.

for such a development”¹²⁰ for a long period of time. The Turkish Premier Bülent Ecevit, who avoided a unilateral action, attempted to convince the British government for a joint intervention as guarantors. Upon receiving the British refusal and the failure of the American diplomacy, Turkey decided to initiate a unilateral military intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974¹²¹. When Turkish troops began to land on Cyprus the Turkish Prime Minister was expressing the purpose of the operation as “not to wage war but to bring peace, not only to the Turks, but also to the Greeks on the island.”¹²² For Ecevit and other Turkish officials Turkey was implementing its commitments and responsibilities of “restoring peace, fraternity and liberty in Cyprus”¹²³ emanating from the guarantorship agreements of 1959. The first declarations by Turkish Prime Minister justifying the military operation were full of motives of a reactionist discourse blaming the Greek government in a vehement tone¹²⁴:

they [Turkish Armed Forces] are in Cyprus for Peace not War. They are there not to invade Cyprus but to put an end to invasion. This latest Greek action on the island is not simply a coup, it is intended to destroy the independence of the Cyprus state and to undermine the international agreements on which the Cyprus Republic was founded.¹²⁵

In the wake of the immediate call of the UN Security Council for a cease-fire, Turkey’s military action was suspended for a short spell of time. On 22 July both the junta government in Greece and the enosist Cyprus regime collapsed. With the breakdown of tripartite Geneva Conferences (convened between 25-30 July 1974 and resumed from August 8 to 14) Turkey began to stage the second phase of its military warfare. She was aiming at both strengthening its military position on the island and also gaining “the political concessions it had failed to achieve through negotiations

¹²⁰ Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 9.

¹²¹ Teziç, Erdoğan, Murat Sarica et. Al. (ed.), *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1975), pp. 185-192.

¹²² Birand, Mehmet Ali, *30 Hot Days*, (London: K. Rüstem & Brother, 1985), p. 66.

¹²³ İsmail, Sabahattin, *20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences*, p. 182.

¹²⁴ See Appendix A and B.

¹²⁵ İsmail, Sabahattin, *20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences*, p. 182.

since 1964.”¹²⁶ On 16 August 1974 the Turkish state announced a unilateral cease-fire by highlighting its readiness to return to the negotiating table, which was refused by both Great Britain and Greece. “After fighting ceased a Turkish Cypriot system of government was established in 1975 (...) calling itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.”¹²⁷

Between the years 1975 and 1983 there came various inter-communal negotiations and international missions including Vienna Talks of 1975-76, the Clifford Mission of 1977, the ABC Proposals of 1978 and the inter-communal talks of 1979-83,¹²⁸ none of which yielded fruitful results for a prospective settlement of the Cyprus dispute. During 1977 summit meetings between Denktaş and Kyprianou the parties had seemingly agreed on a federal solution to the problem. In the communiqué issued after these negotiations the parties stated that they were “seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.”¹²⁹ However owing to disagreements in other territorial, societal and economic issues the meetings ended without bringing any desirable outcome.

Similarly the intercommunal negotiations of 1983 under the auspices of the UN came to a deadlock with the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on 15 November although a substantial progress had seemed probable by the summer of this year. Within the conventional reactionist discourse this declaration was alleged as a response “to the persistent internationalizing of the Cyprus issue by Greece and the Greek Cypriots after local negotiations had stalled.”¹³⁰ The proclamation of the TRNC prompted fervent reactions within the international community; for instance the United Nations Security Council condemned the proclamation as ‘purported secession

¹²⁶ Salih, Halil İbrahim, *Cyprus The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on A State*, p. 96.

¹²⁷ Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 9.

¹²⁸ For a brief analysis of efforts towards a solution to the question during this period see Mandell, Brian, “The Cyprus Conflict: Explaining Resistance to Resolution”, pp. 213-15.

¹²⁹ Soysal, Mümtaz and Necati M. Ertekün, “Federal Solution for Cyprus”, p. 15.

¹³⁰ Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 11.

of part of the Republic of Cyprus' by underlining its illegal nature. The Council, which demanded the withdrawal of the proclamation also called on all the members of international community not to recognize 'any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus'¹³¹. For Greece the announcement of TRNC, contrary to the 1960 Accords, was manifestly threatening the "unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity" of the Cyprus Republic. However, Turkey advocated the legitimacy of such an announcement by asserting that it "amounted to a restoration of the bi-communal status of Cyprus, which had been destroyed by the Greek Cypriots, and was in accordance with the principle of self-determination."¹³² Even after the establishment of the TRNC international efforts, especially under the auspices of the United Nations such as Proximity talks of 1984-1986, the Davos Process of 1987-1988, and 'Set of Ideas' in 1992, persisted in the post-1983 period; yet did not suffice to revive the hopes for a peaceful settlement.

5.2.7. Involvement of the European Union in the Cyprus Question and Other Developments in the 1990s

Meanwhile in 1988 the President of the Cyprus Republic Vassiliou declared the intent of his government to apply to the European Community full membership, "to which the North immediately rejected" on the grounds that "the Greek Cypriot administration, representing only one community, did not have the authority to apply on behalf of the whole of Cyprus."¹³³ The Cyprus Republic had already signed "a customs union treaty with the European Community in 1987 that became effective on 1 January 1988."¹³⁴ The application of the Cyprus Republic for full membership came on 4 July 1990. On 30 June 1993 the European Commission reported that the Cyprus Republic

¹³¹ The United Nations Yearbook, 1983, p. 254.

¹³² Sönmezoglu, Faruk, "The Cyprus Question and the United Nations 1950-1986", p. 184.

¹³³ Dodd, Clement H., *The Cyprus Imbroglio*, (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1998), p. 62.

¹³⁴ Theophanous, Andreas, "The Cyprus Problem and Its Implications for Stability and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean", in *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2001), pp. 200-201.

was eligible for membership. In the European Council summit of 24-25 June 1994 in Corfu the Council made it public that “the next phase of the enlargement of the Union will involve Cyprus and Malta.”¹³⁵

In 1992 the stagnant inter-communal negotiations gained impetus with the ‘Set of Ideas’ submitted by the UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali. Even though the Turkish Cypriots asserted having accepted various provisions (91 out of 100)¹³⁶ of the UN plan, they voiced their objections on a number of crucial points. The central reason behind the Turkish rejection of the UN document was that it established a federal system in which the sovereignty and the right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot people were not recognized¹³⁷. Although in the Set of Ideas it was maintained that ‘sovereignty emanated equally from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities’¹³⁸, the Turkish Cypriot leadership took a firm stance on the recognition of the fact that “the sovereignty of each state in the proposed federation could only be limited in those areas given to the authority of the federal state”¹³⁹. In 1993 another initiative of the UN called confidence-building measures came into effect with the aim of reopening Nicosia (Lefkoşa) International Airport (closed since 1974) and reconsidering the status of the Varosha (Maraş), which did not yield any concrete result.

The Turkish political scene became very much occupied once more with the debates on the Cyprus question in the year 1995. The signing of the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU on 6 March and the general elections of 24 December were the two crucial events triggering the revival of those debates. During both the Parliamentary discussions on the ratification of the Customs Union treaty in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the political parties’ general election campaigns

¹³⁵ Dodd, Clement H., *The Cyprus Imbroglio*, p. 63.

¹³⁶ Uslu, Nasuh, “Kıbrıs Sorunu”, in *21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, İdris Bal (ed.), p.268.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 268.

¹³⁸ Dodd, Clement H., *The Cyprus Imbroglio*, p. 46.

¹³⁹ Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 12.

the issue has turned out to be the fundamental subject of the political debates and struggle between the coalition government and the opposition parties. The discourse of abandoning and ‘selling out’ Cyprus namely the “national cause, national interests” was once more utilized to undermine the legitimacy of the political rivals in Turkey. The opposition parties adamantly accused the coalition government of selling out the Turkish Cypriots in return for signing of the Customs Union treaty¹⁴⁰. The Turkish press, for the most part, contributed enthusiastically to the gaining dominance of the discourse of “selling out” in the political debates regarding the Cyprus dispute.¹⁴¹

On 28 December 1995 Turkey and the TRNC signed a joint declaration “providing a security guarantee to the TRNC in every respect”. The declaration came at the time when especially the opposition parties in Turkey expressed their concerns “on possible negative effects of the Customs Union on the TRNC’s economic and political situation.”¹⁴² It is safe to propose that the joint declaration the signing of which is claimed as a response to the Greek Cypriots’ confrontational rearmament policy was a message sent by the Turkish state elite and the TRNC administration to both the domestic and world public opinion. Among the main traits of the declaration illuminating also Turkey’s official approach to the EU membership of Cyprus were:

- a) Joining the EU without finding a solution in Cyprus cannot be considered
- b) Turkey’s role as guarantor on the island will continue
- c) The Turkish Cypriots will enjoy equal sovereignty with the Greek Cypriots
- d) Cyprus cannot join the EU while Turkey is outside of the Union¹⁴³.

¹⁴⁰ Bağcı, Hüseyin, “Cyprus: Accession to the European Union- A Turkish View”, in *Cyprus and the European Union New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict*, Heinz-Jürgen Axt and Hansjörg Brey, (München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1997), p. 159.

¹⁴¹ Hüseyin Bağcı illustrates this kind of approach by presenting some headlines used in the Turkish press. Turkey left TRNC out, Cumhuriyet 18 April 1995, Selling Cyprus and South East Anatolia, Cumhuriyet, 12 April 1995, We Did Not Sell Cyprus, Milliyet, 30 December 1995.

¹⁴² Bağcı, Hüseyin, “Cyprus: Accession to the European Union- A Turkish View”, p. 159.

¹⁴³ Manisalı, Erol, “What Happens if Cyprus Joins the EU Without Turkey?”, in *Avrupa Birliği Kısacasında Kıbrıs Meselesi: Bugünü ve Yarını*, İrfan Kaya Ülger and Ertan Efeğil (eds.), (Ankara: s.n., 2001), p. 60.

There came an American attempt to settle the longstanding Cyprus problem at the beginning of 1996. This effort initiated by “the bright diplomat” of Dayton Agreement the US assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke resulted in an absolute failure mainly owing to the outbreak of Kardak/Imia crisis between Turkey and Greece. This crisis that heavily increased the tension in the Aegean and escalated the military confrontation “over an uninhabited 10-acre outcrop” was utilized by the then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller “to enhance her popularity and strengthen her hand in the coalition-building negotiations.”¹⁴⁴ By the same token Tözün Bahçeli also argues that

indeed with an eye to garnering domestic electoral support, Çiller subsequently exploited both Cypriot and Aegean tensions and adopted a populist line. Taking advantage of tensions created by the violence along the green line that resulted in the death of one Turkish Cypriot and four Greek Cypriots she visited the TRNC in September 1996 to attend the funeral of the slain Turkish Cypriot.¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, it will be a reductionist and inadequate analysis to associate these kinds of attempts on the part of the leaders of political parties solely with their calculations on gaining power vis-à-vis their rivals, for there exist other and admittedly more significant root causes rendering the Cyprus issue integral to the power/domination relations in Turkish politics. At this juncture, suffice it to say that a number of politicians including Turgut Özal, Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz employed, in various occasions, the discursive totality overloaded with intensive nationalistic motives as regards the Cyprus question so as to legitimize and consolidate their position vis-à-vis the bureaucratic establishment in Turkey. It is possible to read such efforts of these political figures as their preference “to handle Cyprus policy primarily through the Prime Minister’s office rather than the Foreign Ministry” and the bureaucratic establishment “where Denktaş enjoyed greater support”¹⁴⁶ from the outset of the Cyprus problem.

¹⁴⁴ Bağcı, Hüseyin, “Cyprus: Accession to the European Union- A Turkish View”, pp. 160 and 161 respectively.

¹⁴⁵ Bahçeli Tözün, “Turkey’s Cyprus Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974”, p. 217.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 217.

At the very beginning of 1997 the security and military dimension of the Cyprus dispute utterly overshadowed all other aspects of the issue with the announcement of the government of the Republic of Cyprus to purchase “S-300 surface to air missiles from Russia.”¹⁴⁷ This initiation which “deeply concerned the military and the government” in Turkey was expressed by the Greek Cypriot government as a requirement of their defense vis-à-vis the strategic supremacy of the Turkish side. For them,

the S-300 missiles could only make sense as a defensive ground to air weapon not as an offensive system. Given Turkey’s reluctance to accept a no-fly zone over Cyprus the vulnerability of Cypriot airspace and its constant violation the S-300 would have constituted a minor correction in the Republic’s vast military disadvantage vis-à-vis Turkey or a bargaining chip to be exchanged for the demilitarization of the island.¹⁴⁸

In tandem with the S-300 crisis, further progress observed in Greek/Greek Cypriot Joint Defense Doctrine, which was concluded between these two in 1993, was also perceived by the Turkish bureaucratic and political elite as “a direct military threat to Turkey.”¹⁴⁹ Within this period that the discourse of threat and security was persistently employed by all the concerned parties bore the Cyprus issue in to the field of ‘the vital’ and ‘the existential’.

The year 1997 also earmarked the inception of a new era in which the European Union began to be more actively and deeply involved within the Cyprus question. At the Luxembourg Summit (12-13 December 1997) the European Council decided “to launch an accession process comprising the ten Central and East European applicants States and Cyprus”¹⁵⁰. In the wake of the Summit “where among other things Cyprus received a date for accession talks while Turkey was not promised accession even in the

¹⁴⁷ Dodd, Clement H., “Cyprus in Turkish Politics and Foreign Policy”, in, *Cyprus The Need for New Perspectives*, Clement H. Dodd (ed.), (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1999), p. 143.

¹⁴⁸ Veremis, Thanos, “The Protracted Crisis”, in *Greek-Turkish Relations In the Era of Globalization*, Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2001), p. 49.

¹⁴⁹ Elekdağ, Şükrü, “2 1/2 War Strategy“, *Perceptions Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 3 No 4, (March-May) 1999, which can be accessed at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/il/per1-3.htm>.

¹⁵⁰ EU’s Luxembourg Summit conclusions can be accessed at <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=56855&from=&LANG=1>.

long run”¹⁵¹ Turkey expressed her decision to cut off dialogue with the EU concerning political matters. The Turkish state elite was of the opinion that the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic cannot join the Union “without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots or before Turkey is itself admitted.”¹⁵² To illustrate the enormity of the disillusionment and frustration, which the Luxembourg decisions of the European Council induced on the part of the Turkish state, the statement below from the web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in order:

Turkey and the TRNC have, at every opportunity and at all levels, been emphasizing their views on and objections to the Greek Cypriot efforts to join the EU in the aftermath of its unilateral and illegal application, thus putting on record their legal and political objections in this regard. In this context, we have been stressing at every opportunity and at all levels that if the membership of the Greek Cypriot Administration to the EU is realized, it will have adverse ramifications on peace and tranquility both on the Island and in the Eastern Mediterranean region and that due to its historical and treaty-based rights and interests, Turkey would never accept this, would not compromise over Cyprus and Turkey’s response to such a development would have no limits.¹⁵³

What is more, another decision of the Turkish state announced by the Foreign Ministry on 16 December 1997 mounted the tension in Turkey’s relations with both Greece and the EU. In conformity with this announcement every step to be taken towards the integration of Cyprus into the Union would have been counterbalanced with the efforts that would proceed the TRNC’s integration with Turkey. However, this policy that was also recommended by the National Security Council on 20 January 1998¹⁵⁴ was never materialized and with the Justice and Development Party government, who ascended to power in late 2002, gave out its long-lasting primary position in the political agenda.

¹⁵¹ Theophanous, Andreas, “The Cyprus Problem and Its Implications for Stability and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean”, in *Greek-Turkish Relations In the Era of Globalization*, Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2001), p. 194.

¹⁵² Veremis, Thanos, “The Protracted Crisis”, p. 48.

¹⁵³ See <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/dev.cyprus.htm>.

¹⁵⁴ Veremis, Thanos, “The Protracted Crisis”, p. 49.

On 31 August 1998 Denktaş formally submitted a set of proposals for confederation “as a final effort to achieve a mutually acceptable lasting solution in Cyprus”¹⁵⁵. In effect, Denktaş had been favoring a confederal system of governance instead of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federalism since the onset of 1990s; this was, however, the first instance where he formally declared his intention of establishing a confederal structure in Cyprus. This Declaration of historic significance, which gave rise to fervent reactions and frustration in both Greeks and Greek Cypriots, foresaw establishment of a confederated structure “composed of two peoples and of two states of the island supported by symmetrical agreements with the two respective motherlands and guarantor states”¹⁵⁶ and maintenance of special relations of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with their ‘motherlands’. As regards the accession of Turkey and Cyprus to the European Union the proposal put forward that

the Cyprus Confederation may, if both parties jointly agree, pursue a policy of accession to the EU. Until Turkey’s full membership of the EU, a special arrangement will provide Turkey with the full rights and obligations of an EU member with regard to the Cyprus Confederation.¹⁵⁷

5.2.8. The New Millennium and Latest Developments in the Cyprus Issue

The United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan’s statement of 14 November 1999 intending to prepare the ground for negotiations to achieve a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus dispute gave a fresh impetus to the intercommunal dialogue and led to five rounds of proximity talks between 3 December 1999 and 10 November 2000¹⁵⁸. The talks commenced in a positive atmosphere by virtue of the Secretary General’s reaffirmation that the two peoples on the island were politically equal and that the

¹⁵⁵ Theophanous, Andreas, “The Cyprus Problem and Its Implications for Stability and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean”, p. 195.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 195.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 195.

¹⁵⁸ Ertuğ, Osman, “The Turkish Cypriot View in the Aftermath of Proximity Talks- Confederation or Two States”, in *Two Peoples and Two States in Cyprus At the Eleventh Hour*, Proceedings of a seminar held at the Turkish Embassy in London, (London: Turkish Embassy, 2001), pp. 10-11.

representatives of two communities were invited to conduct negotiations as equal parties not representing each other. However this atmosphere turned to negative with Denktaş's insistence that any settlement of the Cyprus conflict necessarily entailed the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus¹⁵⁹ and with the Oral Remarks presented to both parties on 8 November 2000 which were assessed as far from meeting the basic political needs of the Turkish side, leading finally to the breakdown of the proximity talks¹⁶⁰. The failure of these talks was intended to be compensated for in the five rounds of direct talks between 16 January 2002 and 14 January 2003¹⁶¹. These UN-led face-to-face negotiations covered a wide range of core issues including the territorial issue, the executive and legal authority of a central state still with a very dim prospect for a solution¹⁶².

Landmark in these negotiation processes was the 'Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement on the Cyprus Problem' conveyed to the two sides by the UN Secretary General on 11 November 2002 envisaging to "establish a common State along the lines of the Helvetic Confederation and two constituent States, one Greek the other Turk, each exercising all the powers that the Constitution does not delegate explicitly to a common State"¹⁶³. Asked by Kofi Annan to give an initial response to the plan in a week's time, Clerides replied on 18 November 2002 indicating his readiness to start peace talks on the basis of the proposed framework. Denktaş, on the other hand, submitted his response with a delay of nine days (that is on 27 November 2002)

¹⁵⁹ Turkish Daily News, electronic edition, 9 March 2000, http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/09_03_00/for.htm.

¹⁶⁰ Developments Regarding Cyprus accessible at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/dev.cyprus.htm>.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² No Sign Of Resolution To Cyprus Talks, EuropaWorld accessible at <http://www.europaworld.org/week89/nosignof5702.htm>.

¹⁶³ Deloy, Corinne, "Presidential Elections in Cyprus, A Round-Up 30 Days Before the Vote", The Robert Schumann Foundation accessible at <http://www.robert-schuman.org/anglais/oe/chypre/default.htm>.

accepting the document as a basis for negotiations¹⁶⁴. Considering the objections and further proposals from both parties Annan submitted a revised version of the framework on 10 December 2002 and demanded the two leaders to act swiftly and wisely to reach a conclusion “so that a reunited Cyprus could accede to the European Union”¹⁶⁵.

The UN plan, the Annan plan in popular parlance, prompted ongoing feverish debates in Turkish as well as Turkish Cypriot public opinion. During these debates the conventional state/security based understandings together with the Denktaş leadership began to be criticized ever extensively than before in the Turkish media. Massive demonstrations in favor of the Annan’s plan and accession to the EU and counter-demonstrations turned out to occupy the political agenda in North Cyprus. Meanwhile, Annan’s proposal to submit the plan to separate public referenda on 30 March 2003 was rejected by Denktaş and the newly elected Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos¹⁶⁶.

Another momentous event in the course of modern Cyprus history arrived on 16 April 2003 when the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Union¹⁶⁷. This historic development acquires even greater significance if seen in the light of the fact that the Turkish-controlled sector of the island has already been isolated from the accession process due to the failed efforts towards the unification of the island. Practically one week after the signing of the Treaty, the president of the TRNC Denktaş announced the opening of the Green Line on 23 April 2003 separating the two communities on the island for 29 years. This decision taken within the context of confidence building measures not only eased the tension between the peoples inhabiting the island but also sparked, to a certain extent, revitalization of the island in economic and political terms. The upcoming parliamentary elections in the Turkish

¹⁶⁴ Resumption of Intercommunal Talks, Annan Plan, The Republic of Cyprus, http://www.pio.gov.cy/cyissue/latest_development_001.htm.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Turkish Daily News, electronic edition, 1 March 2003.

¹⁶⁷ Application for Membership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, at <http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa.nsf/EUAppForMembership?OpenForm>.

Republic of Northern Cyprus on 14 December loom as a vital threshold in the fate of the island as well as the future course of the Cyprus problem. It is anticipated by analysts and scholars that the outcome of these elections will also have a fundamental role to play on the future of Turkey-EU relations as well as Turkey's integration process to the Union.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ The analyses establishing a strong linkage between the outcomes of the forthcoming elections in Cyprus and the future of Turkish-EU relations began to be repeatedly articulated by various journalists, academics, ex-ambassadors, politicians and other experts of the issue on various platforms in Turkey.

CHAPTER VI

CYPRUS AS AN UNFINISHED SECURITY PROJECT OF THE TURKISH STATE

6.1. Introduction

For any scholar searching for the role and functioning of ‘foreign’ policy discourses and representations in restructuring and/or ensuring the domestic order within a given socio-political context, examining how the Cyprus issue is approached and articulated by the Turkish state and academic “elite” constitutes a very pertinent model. It is a non-deniable fact that decoding the discursive and representative economy espoused by the state apparatus in foreign political matters yields substantial insights in bringing into daylight the specificities of the processes through which state identity and state society relations are continuously redefined within a given polity. In this sense, a thorough analysis of the conventional official Cyprus discourse in Turkey is similar to climbing up a tree laden with fruit for those aspiring to explore the relationality between the maintenance of domestic power relations and the modes in which ‘foreign’ political issues are represented. Having analyzed the process through which the Cyprus issue has turned out to be a ‘national cause’ and an indispensable strategic asset for Turkey, even the existence of which was denied at the outset by the political and state elite, one can explicitly theorize the share of ‘foreign’ policy in the reproduction of Turkish state identity as a ‘modern nation state’. As David Campbell correctly argued, ‘foreign’ political discourses and representations based on the constant articulation of danger, threat and security are both integral to state identity construction and functional in securing the standards of this identity¹. They are also operational in defining and

¹ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, (rev. ed.), (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1998), p. 13.

determining the criteria of being allowed into the political center or being marginalized and excluded from the socio-political domain.

These introductory remarks provoke us to recontemplate on ‘foreign’ policy functioning as boundary producing, disciplinary, and securitizing practices or as integral part of domestic power relations. Re-approaching foreign policy in this manner also reminds us the need for rethinking state society relations as a structure continually transforming and reproducing itself. The classical paradigms have generally assumed those relations as relations between a completed agent (the state) and its social/national formation, which are shaped through the interests of state elite, some interest groups or classes². They generally deemed those as one-layered relations occurring within a definitely bounded political space. This inadequate conceptualization misses the discursive and representative practices of the state apparatus through which the core assumptions and characteristics of state society relations are redefined and/or reconfigured in accordance with changing sociopolitical circumstances. Thus the social theory has to reconsider state society relations as a multi-layered discursive space embracing also foreign policy representations of the state and corresponding responses of domestic society.

In this sense this chapter maintains that the discursive economy constituted around the Cyprus question and premised on the constant assertion of such concepts as ‘the national cause’, ‘national defense and security’, ‘national unity and integrity’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘geo-strategic importance’, and ‘vital threats’ is very operational in inscribing the legitimate boundaries of ‘the political’ in Turkey. The main reason making the Cyprus issue so central to the power relations and state identity construction in Turkey stems from the security language intensely employed by the Turkish civilian and military bureaucratic establishment in such a way as to help consolidate their

² Alford, Robert R., “Paradigms of Relations Between State and Society”, in *The State Critical Concepts Volume I*, John A. Hall (ed.), (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 63-76.

hegemonic status within the system. Therefore the main burden of this chapter will be to unfold this security discourse constituted around the Cyprus issue.

To comprehend this discursive totality better fixing the Cyprus issue as an area of bureaucratic specialty and competence, the chapter will concentrate on Turkey's official Cyprus discourse bearing the issue directly to the field of 'security and vitality'. In this context I will reveal some ways of securitizing the issue at stake within its official representation through scanning of a wide range of official declarations and written and oral statements extracted from different historical epochs of the Cyprus dispute. As it was previously stated in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, some statements of Rauf Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) will also be included in the discursive analytical terrain of the study. For, his approach and discourse concerning the Cyprus question, which is in full conformity with those of the Turkish bureaucratic and foreign policy establishment, are constantly disseminated by Turkish media in a way as to deeply influence the public debate. Such issues as the representation of the island of Cyprus as a geopolitical asset and natural extension of Anatolian heartland, centrality assigned to its geopolitical significance from the viewpoint of Turkey's national survival, equation of Turkey's security with that of the TRNC and the discourse on the necessity of a sovereign Turkish Cypriot state in the island will constitute the sub-concerns of this section. To sum up, this chapter will focus on the discursive and representative performances of the Turkish state elite situating the Cyprus issue in a statist context where institutional needs and objectives of the state are prioritized vis-à-vis other agents, i.e. different societal groups, and their expectations.

6.2. Securitizing Official Discourse on the Cyprus Question

*Turkey has a multitude of soft and hard security concerns. Owing to historic, cultural, economic and strategic linkages, and the location of Turkey at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, as well as the Mediterranean and Black Sea Basins, these concerns are increasingly interconnected with security in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Caspian region, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The most pressing concern for Turkey, however, is the bundle of disagreements with Greece. The Cyprus question is the knot that binds the bundle.*³

Should the state project of security be successful in the terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exist. Security as the absence of movement would result in death via stasis. Ironically, then, the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state's continued success as an impelling identity.

*The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state's identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.*⁴

Whilst expatiating Turkey's security discourse on the issue at stake I have two pivotal aims to achieve within this section of the chapter. First, I will strive to explore and concentrate on the modes in which the Cyprus issue has been represented and articulated by the Turkish state elite primarily and particularly as an issue of geo-strategy and security. In this sense, I will exemplify the discourse of "geopolitics-threat and encirclement" recurrently applied through the Cyprus question throughout different historical stints in Turkish politics. Secondly, I will allege that the constant emphasis on the island's geopolitical and strategic vitality and indispensability for Turkey's national interests and security concerns have led to the heavily securitization of the issue in a way as to move it out of the sphere of *normal politics*. In this regard I will also contend that the heavily securitized representation of the Cyprus question in the domestic politics has unique and seminal impacts on the state society relations and the state identity construction in Turkey as a disciplinary practice conditioning and limiting the scope and content of 'the political'.

³ Olgun, Mustafa Ergün, "Turkey's Tough Neighbourhood Security Dimensions of the Cyprus Conflict", in *Cyprus The Need for New Perspectives*, Clement H. Dodd (ed.), (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1999), pp. 231-32.

⁴ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, pp. 12-13.

In the official state line, the heavily securitization of the Cyprus issue is realized through various modes of representation bearing the issue to the field of “the vital, the existential, the imminent”. The official discursive economy imposing certain patterns of understanding and explaining and thus inscribing and limiting the political imagination concerning the Cyprus issue is built upon the persistent repetition of some arguments taken for granted as pre-given facts. Some of the motives recurrently asserted in the official Cyprus discourse can be stated as: the identification of the security of Turkish Cypriots with that of the ‘mainland’ Turks through the metaphor of ‘motherland’ and ‘babyland’ and the inseparability of the security of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC); representation of the island of Cyprus as ‘natural extension and/or continuation of Anatolia’ from the geological/geographical, economic and cultural perspectives; the vitally important status of the island for Turkey’s national defense and security due to its centrality and pre-dominance within Eastern Mediterranean region; the overriding position of Cyprus on the crossing of the trade and water ways and oil routes; representation of the island as a geopolitical asset or a ‘floating military base’; the persistent articulation of the fear of encirclement and so forth. It should be noted that throughout different historical epochs some of these motives were picked up and highlighted within the official discourse depending on the changes in the global conjuncture and Turkish political landscape. In this part of the study my attempt is to discuss and exemplify the main tracks of the securitizing discursive strategy applied by the foreign policy establishment as regards the Cyprus question. However, before unearthing this discursive strategy and certain modes of representation embedded in it I would like to deal with the issue of geopolitics intermingled with securitization in our case of Cyprus.

6.2.1. Geopolitics As Part of Social Reality

Trailing the research avenue of historical sociology, geopolitics should be treated as another key term to comprehend and unfold fully the impact of the Cyprus policy adopted by the state elite on the system reproduction in Turkey. The constant articulation of geopolitical vitality of the island of Cyprus from the viewpoint of Turkey's security objectives and priorities within 'the military exigencies' of international politics is quite elucidating to understand the unique place allocated by Michael Mann and other historical sociologists to geopolitics in theorizing state action. For Mann, who insistently mentions the distinguished nature of geopolitical organization from other power organizations, geopolitics, in effect, "[i]s an essential part of social life and it is not reducible to the 'internal' power configurations of its component states"⁵. This analysis which deems geopolitical circumstances as an independent variable determining the international dimension of state's behaviors, in turn, paves the way to critically question how and to what extent the geopolitical representation of a 'foreign political issue' can condition the modes in which it is articulated within domestic politics. For instance, the representation of the island as an invaluable geopolitical asset vital to the maintenance of Turkish 'national security and interests' served to the articulation of the Cyprus issue as a question of 'existential threat'⁶ both to Turkey and to Turkishness itself.

In the same vein, other historical sociologists whose prominent aim is defined as "bringing the state back in" to the analytical scene as stated in the previous chapter attribute paramount importance to the international dimension of state's behaviors and geopolitical circumstances for the full comprehension of the unique nature of the modern nation state and its agential capacities. In this sense, the historical sociological

⁵ Mann, Michael, *The Sources Of Social Power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 2.

⁶ Wæver, Ole, "Securitization and Desecuritization", in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

attempt sets out its analysis by establishing a direct correlation between domestic and international agential capacities of the state. To this paradigmatic framework, international dimension of state action stemming from its territoriality, namely the territorially bounded context of its performances, ensures state autonomy and independence vis-à-vis the social formation to which it belongs. In other words, historical sociologists emphasize the necessity of considering state's international capacities, policy objectives and maneuvers (meaningly the external dimension of its sovereignty) while examining its relations with the domestic society. For them, that the state is a "Janus-faced entity"⁷ functioning in relation to both their own territory and the boundaries with other states renders it operational outside and above the civil society. Thus geopolitics among the factors molding external policy choices and actions of the state emerges as a seminal variable in the reproduction of state society relations within a given polity. Drawing on this approach to which I referred, to some extent, in formulating the problematique of this thesis work, international relations i.e. the 'foreign' political initiatives of the state are inherent "to the process of the very constitution of the modern state as a nation state".⁸

In the same direction, the constructivist IR theory also foregrounds the notion that foreign political performances and representations of statecraft are deeply involved in the normative processes through which the modern nation state is created as a territorially sovereign entity. By taking the analysis one step further, the poststructuralists claim that foreign political representations and discourses of the state functioning as a disciplinary practice are inherent to the constitution and maintenance of state identity and its privileged status as the only sovereign and autonomous subject within a given socio-political context. As various post-structuralist scholars indicated,

⁷ Skocpol, Theda, *States and Revolutions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 110.

⁸ Keyman, Fuat E. , *Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), p. 81.

the ideological and organizational function of geopolitics “as an essential part of social life”⁹ and the subjective articulation of geopolitical circumstances serves to the consolidation of state’s autonomy and power vis-à-vis domestic society. Building upon the post-positivist research avenue it is fair to suggest that any critical inquiry on the role of geopolitics in state identity-making should necessarily embrace “demonstration of the metaphysical or ideological character of the presuppositions relied on, and the determination of their place in a wider system of metaphysical or ideological values.”¹⁰ Such an analytical approach refutes, from the outset, to presumably accept geopolitical circumstances as given, objective, and unchanging realities and calls us to reconsider geopolitical representations as an integral part of state’s strategies toward increasing national cohesion and unity in support of its ‘foreign’ political choices and national security conception.

In line with these arguments I strongly propose that an adequate analysis of Turkey’s Cyprus policy preconditions the unfolding and problematization of centrality assigned to geopolitics in the official account and the relevant discursive economy built around it while handling the dispute. In this context, the strong relationality between the geopolitical representation of the island and the securitization of the Cyprus issue and thereby its moving out of the spheres of ‘normal politics’ will be extensively elaborated on in the ensuing sections of this thesis. At this point, I shall content myself with saying that the securitization of the Cyprus issue due to its geo-strategic vitality is achieved via “the discourse of threat and security internal to foreign policy”¹¹ and thus to state identity. Following Campellian analysis, in the next sections of this chapter my central purpose will be to problematize the discursive economy espoused by the Turkish state

⁹ Mann, Michael, *The Sources Of Social Power*, p. 2.

¹⁰ Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 20.

¹¹ The internality of the discourse of danger, threat and security to foreign political representations of the state is addressed by David Campbell in the introduction of his book *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, pp. 1-13.

elite as to the Cyprus question by considering its implications on the processes through which the state identity and the state society relations are reproduced in Turkey. However a few remarks on the salience of its geopolitical positioning in the history of the island are in order before setting out this examination.

It would not be an exaggeration to propose that as “an island confined merely within its geographical traits”¹² Cyprus’s geopolitical and strategic asset has turned out to be the most appealing incentive for the occupying forces throughout its political history. The island’s centrality and pre-dominance within Eastern Mediterranean region in close proximity to the Middle East, extending practically at the same distance from Europe, Asia and Africa and enjoying an overriding position on the crossing of the trade and water ways rendered it an indispensable asset from the viewpoint of geo-strategy in the eyes of countless occupiers from the Ottomans, from the Venetians and from the British. In modern times the geo-strategic value assigned to the island of Cyprus increased dramatically parallel to the subordination of international politics to nation state-centric interest perceptions, security concerns and threat calculations.

Particularly along the Cold War years the island, due to its geopolitical and geo-strategic positioning, was one of the hottest areas within the global East-West competition. Rather than concerned with the socio-political demands and expectations of the Cypriot people, the Western great powers approached the question, first and foremost, as an issue of military/security within the context of the maintenance of NATO’s control in the Eastern Mediterranean region vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. As a matter of fact, the foundation of 1960 independent Cyprus Republic was a concrete outcome of global competition within the bi-polar Cold War world. The Cyprus Republic, where Britain has insistently preserved its two sovereign military bases for

¹² Hasgüler, Mehmet, *Kıbrıs’ta Enosis ve Taksim Politikalarının Sonu*, (İstanbul, İletişim Yayıncılık, 2000), pp. 17-18.

strategic reasons¹³ and the sovereignty of which was restricted by the guarantership rights of three NATO powers (Greece, Turkey and Britain) was imposed by the United States and Great Britain in order not to jeopardize the stability of NATO's southeastern flank. To various authors, the geo-strategic location of the island attracted also the Soviet Union to be actively involved in the conflict with the aim of benefiting from the political tensions and disturbances inside the NATO. As it will be indicated in the ensuing part, various IR academics and strategists converge on the idea that with the end of bi-polarity the island's geo-strategic salience has gained new dimensions due to increase of regional politics.

6.2.2. Centrality of Geopolitics in Turkish Security Discourse on Cyprus

Atatürk, who had been following a military manouvre in Southern Turkey, asked the officers around him: 'Suppose Turkey has been invaded again and Turkish forces are fighting only in this region. What are our routes of supplies? The officers gave a great number of views and thoughts. Atatürk listened all of them with great patience and then he pointed out Cyprus on the map and said, 'Sirs, as long as Cyprus is in the possession of the enemies, the supply routes of this area are blocked. Pay attention to Cyprus, it is very important for us'.¹⁴

This famous anecdote told with pride in various 'academic' and non-academic texts where nationalistic motives and aspirations prevail implies, at first glance, two things. First, examining Turkey's Cyprus policy and its implications in the domestic politics impels scholars to be familiar with the burning issue of 'geopolitics and strategy.' And second, the island's geo-strategic vitality and indispensability to Turkey's 'national security and defence' has been assigned a unique salience by the Turkish state elite.

¹³ Dodd, Clement, "The Historical Background" in Clement Dodd (ed.), *The Need for New Perspectives*, p. 6.

¹⁴ Manizade, Derviş, *Kıbrıs: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, (İstanbul: Yaylacık Matbaası, 1975), p. 13 quoted and translated in Sabahattin İsmail, *20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences*, (İstanbul: Kastaş Ltd. Co. Publications, 1989), pp. 170-1.

However, the centrality of geopolitics does not only emanate from geo-strategic importance of the island of Cyprus, which is geographically located in close vicinity with Turkish southern coasts. Yet more importantly it is due to its instrumentalization in injecting some degree of legitimacy to the securitizing official discourse on Cyprus. Mainly owing to the centrality of geopolitics “the ‘strategic element’ has continued to be of the utmost importance in Turkish calculations”¹⁵ since the existence of the Cyprus problem was formally recognized in Turkey. In the ‘specific rhetorical structure’ adopted by the Turkish ‘foreign’ policy establishment the Cyprus issue involving “Turkey’s vital national and strategic interests”¹⁶ has Janus-faced implications in Turkey’s strategic calculations and threat perceptions: the geographical proximity of the island to the Anatolian heartland is utilized to represent the issue in domestic politics either as a source of imminent, fatal and persistent threat to Turkish nation and state or as an indispensable element and integral part of Turkish national security.

6.2.3. Cyprus As A Source of Existential Threat to Turkey and The Fear of

Encirclement

*...Turks are apt to remind foreigners that Cyprus is only 40 miles from the southern coast of Turkey. This fact alone goes a long way to explain Turkish interest in the island. Indeed, there is a consensus among writers of Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus that its primary interest in the island has been strategic*¹⁷.

While depicting how such an urgent and persistent threat Greeks and Greek Cypriots constitute to Turkey’s and “Turkish Cypriots’ rights and existence”¹⁸ the discourse of encirclement has been recurrently referred to by the official and

¹⁵ Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, in Thomas Diez (ed.), *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict Postmodern Union*, (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 58.

¹⁶ Republic of Turkey Turkish Embassy at Washington D.C. accessible at <http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/issuescyprus.htm>.

¹⁷ Bahçeli, Tözün, “Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey Since 1955”, in Norma Salem (ed.), *Cyprus A Regional Conflict and its Resolution*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 62.

¹⁸ Mustafa Ergün Olgun, “Turkey’s Tough Neighbourhood: Security Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict”, p. 232.

mainstream argumentation. From military documents, declarations and other official statements to editorials, newspaper columns, leaflets and brochures the imminent threat of encirclement was constantly asserted throughout all the phases of the Cyprus question. “Stuck in its southern underbelly, Cyprus is a major source of concern for Turkey”¹⁹ and “it is the final, southern element in the containment of Turkey, which is already encircled by the Greek islands in the Aegean.” The island which has a “strategic position to control the important Turkish harbours of Iskenderun and Mersin, as well as Syrian and Israeli harbours”²⁰ can easily be utilized by the hostile power as a “springboard for the conquest of Anatolia from the South”. Therefore, the island as a ‘naval fortress’ or “a natural aircraft carrier in the Eastern Mediterranean”²¹ is of vital importance for Turkey’s national defence and security. “It is an ‘unsinkable’ aircraft carrier, missile launching pad, and a ‘control tower’ on the air and maritime routes in the Eastern Mediterranean.”²²

It could be claimed with some degree of accuracy that the main reason underlying the discourse and fear of encirclement bearing the issue directly to the field of ‘vitality’ and ‘emergency’ is that the implied occupying force is regarded by Turkey as Greece itself. A lengthy quotation from the then Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu suffices to summarize the mainstream and official Turkish argument on the issue at stake:

from the military perspective the island of Cyprus has to be in the hands of a state, which is concerned in the fate of Turkey and the surrounding Middle Eastern states. ... The dominant power on the island would have a position of control over Turkey’s harbours. If this dominant power is also the same dominant power on the islands to the west [of Turkey], Turkey would be de facto encircled by this power. Turkey thinks that it is convenient to maintain the

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 232.

²⁰ Torumtay, Necip, *Değişen Stratejilerin Odağında Türkiye*, 2nd ed., (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1997), pp. 88-96; A. Cural, ‘S-300 Füze Krizi ve Düşündürdükleri’, *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, 356, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1998), pp. 64-65; C. Evcil, *Yavru Vatan Kıbrıs’ta Zaferin Hikayesi*, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1999), p. 1. Quoted and translated in Işıl Kazan, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 58.

²¹ Balancar, Ferda, *Last Tango In Cyprus*, http://www.turkishtime.org/aramak/40_1_en.htm.

²² Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 58.

current status quo of the island. If it is going to be changed, then it must be returned to Turkey... Turkish people cannot think differently about the future of an island which is existentially important to the defence of its country.²³

Almost all columnists writing in mainstream newspapers and various book publishers and authors converge, particularly in the course of 1950s and 1960s, on the idea that Greeks and Greek Cypriots fostering the desire of reviving the Byzantine Empire for the materialization of *Megali Idea*, in reality, wish to complete the encirclement of Turkey from both south and west by unifying Cyprus with Greece (see Figure 1).

By the same token, Pan-Turkist journals of those years (Orkun, Bozkurt and Toprak) foregrounded the idea that in case of this unification (*Enosis*) “what they describe as a “noose to strangle Turkey””²⁴ was to be created. The discourse and fear of encirclement may also be manifestly observed while listing the reasons underlying Turkey’s ‘intervention’ in Cyprus in July 1974:

Turkey’s Aegean coast is blockaded because of the possession of the Dodecanese Islands by Greece. As a matter of fact Turkey’s only free access to the sea is its southern shores. About 40 miles away from these shores is the island of Cyprus. Possession of Cyprus by Greece through *Enosis*, would have meant the encirclement of the southern shores of Turkey as well. Therefore Turkey had to destroy the de facto situation created by the coup of 15 July with the military intervention of 20 July²⁵.

Figure 1. The map illustrating the encirclement of Turkey by Greece.

²³ Bilge, A. Suat, “Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği Münasebetleri”, in Mehmet Gönübol (ed.), *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 9th ed., (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), p. 335-427. Translated in Işıl Kazan, ‘Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey’, p. 58.

²⁴ Christos P. Ioannides, *In Turkey’s Image The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas Publisher, 1991), p. 63-64.

²⁵ Sabahattin İsmail, *20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences*, p. 171.

Below this figure, which appeared in a book edited by Prof. Dr. Derviş Manizade, president of the İstanbul branch of the Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association reads²⁶:

Dark Circle: As a result of the granting of the Dodecanese Islands as a gift by Italy to Greece in the aftermath of the World War II, a Greek circle came to existence stretching from Kapıkule to Meis. In an attempt to materialize the Megali Idea, Greece harbors the strong desire of encircling Turkey from both south and west by further expanding this circle in a way as to include Cyprus therein.

Even though the end of bi-polar rivalry, emergence of new political/economic actors, and strengthening of supranational institutions and the appearance of new risks such as terrorism, micro-ethnic conflicts dramatically altered the parameters of security and being secure in the global scale, ascendancy of the discourse of encirclement remained intact in Turkey's official Cyprus policy. It was persistently imagined as "the cornerstone of Greece's policy of enveloping Turkey with a strategic belt of hostile states."²⁷ For instance the signing of military and technical cooperation agreements between Armenia and the Greek-controlled sector of Cyprus has been interpreted by both Turkish bureaucratic and foreign policy establishment and the ministries of foreign affairs and defense of the TRNC as a new stride towards this envelopment/encirclement policy. Soon after the conclusion of these agreements it was made public by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense of TRNC that

there is no doubt that this action is part of an attempt at the encirclement of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by the hostile forces within the framework of the "Joint Military Doctrine" formed between the Greek Cypriot side and Greece.²⁸

In the same vein, the remarks by the chief of General Staff General Hilmi Özkök in January 2003 regarding the recent developments in Cyprus in the light of the UN Secretary-General Annan's peace plan are stunningly revealing. According to the leader

²⁶ Manizade, Derviş, *Kıbrıs: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, p. 200. The translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.

²⁷ Olgun, Mustafa Ergün, "Turkey's Tough Neighbourhood: Security Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict", in *Cyprus The Need for New Perspectives*, Clement H. Dodd (ed.), (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1999), p. 243.

²⁸ Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of TRNC, 1 March 2002, accessible at www.trncinfo.com/ENGLISH/PRESSRELEASE/010302.htm.

of Turkish military in case of the acceptance of Annan's proposals "the entrapment of Turkey in Anatolia" would have been completed²⁹. This rather fervent rhetoric qualifying Annan's plan as a threat to Turkey's security stands out as a perfect illustration of the securitization of an issue political in nature.

As it can be deduced from all these quotations the centrality assigned to the geo-strategic salience of the island from the viewpoint of Turkey's encirclement was constantly asserted and overemphasized within official and popular discourses throughout all the phases of the dispute. Within this ossified and prosaic discursive economy its geographical proximity to Turkey refers to a mark indicating the magnitude and urgency of the threat with which Turkey is faced. The geographical vicinity of Cyprus to Turkey when compared with Greece is frequently alluded to so as to underscore the non-Greek character of the island. "Cyprus has never been part of the Greek state. It lies 40 miles from the coast of Turkey, and Turkish people have inhabited the island since the 12th century. Cyprus is 250 miles from the nearest Greek island (Rhodes), and Athens is 460 miles away."³⁰

During the long history of the Cyprus question in declarations of some politicians, newspaper articles and in booklets published by student unions such as Turkish National Student Federation (TNSF), and such associations as Cyprus is Turkish and Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association most of whom have organic and sound links with the officials of the state apparatus, the island of Cyprus is invoked "as the geopolitical right of Turkey."³¹ This notion was echoed very recently and strikingly by Rauf Denktaş, President of TRNC, within the context of debates on Annan's plan. The author of this dissertation is of the opinion that the below affirmation of Denktaş

²⁹ Güven, Erdal, "Kıbrıs'ta Yeni Politika Bekleyelim, Görelim", *Radikal*, (Turkish daily), 10 January 2003; Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Davutoğlu'nu Okumak", *Yeni Şafak* (Turkish Daily), 28 January 2003; "Turkish Cypriots Prepare Protest" *Kathimerini* English Edition (Greek Daily), 10 January 2003.

³⁰ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/briefing.htm>

³¹ President Denktash: "People trying to tie Cyprus to the EU cannot come to the power", *Kıbrıs'ta* (Turkish Cypriot daily), 13 June 2003 accessible at <http://www.cyprusmedianet.com/EN/article/6743>.

not only exemplifies the conventional state-centricist outlook to Cyprus question, which is also widely shared by Turkish foreign policy establishment, but also exhibits the disciplinary and exclusionary nature of the state's foreign policy discourses:

I cannot think any of Turkish Cypriots who would sign the Annan Plan in order to join the EU without Turkey and thus forfeit Turkey's geopolitical rights in Cyprus along with the end of the dispersal of the Turkish Cypriots. I don't think of any Turkish Cypriot who would cause this damage to Turkey.³²

To this argument, signing of Annan's plan and joining the EU without Turkey are unthinkable even if most sectors of society wish to do so. This is precisely because such a deed will inevitably damage Turkey's 'geopolitical rights' over Cyprus and thereby tears down its defense and security. This mode of designating the problem, bearing the issue to the field of 'state security' prevents it from being debated in public sphere with the active involvement of society. The words "I cannot think any of Turkish Cypriots" and similar phrases employed within Turkey's conjuncture totalizes the society as a homogenous and organic unity by inscribing the limits of political imagination as regards the issue at stake.

6.2.4. Cyprus As An Indispensable Element of Turkey's National Security

... The importance of Cyprus to Turkey does not arise from a single cause; it is a necessity which emanates from the exigencies of history, geography, economy and military strategy, from the right to existence and security, which is the most sacred of every state, in short, from the very nature of things³³.

These utterances quoted from the speech of the then Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu at the Tripartite Conference on Cyprus held in London at the end of August 1955 are quite elucidating to unveil the basic tenets of Turkey's official outlook to the Cyprus question. This line of argumentation, which proved its durability from the 1950s up to the present time, hinges upon the notion that Cyprus is an inexorable and

³² Kıbrıs (Turkish Cypriot daily), 13 June 2003 accessed at <http://www.cyprusmedianet.com/EN/article/6743>.

³³ Accessible at <http://www.hellas.org/cyprus/trexpand.htm>.

integral part of Turkey's national defense and security. This mode of representation coding the Cyprus question primarily as an issue of 'national security' has also been disseminated through printing press, books, brochures and other media in the course of the historical stint indicated above. The popular discourse produced and reproduced through these instruments incessantly reminds to the Turkish society the vitality of the Cyprus question for its 'rights, existence and security'. It also intends to alert the society to preserve its unity and national cohesion against thwarted and deviant ideas and desires. "Turkish people cannot think differently about the future of an island which is existentially important to the defense of its country"³⁴. It should be noted that the security language that the Turkish bureaucratic and political establishment have used proved its success until the recent years in preventing the occurrence of public debate as regards the Cyprus question. To illustrate this fact, if Turkish Worker's Party's (TİP) declaration in 1967 is left aside, Turkish politics has not witnessed any radical criticism of Turkey's official Cyprus policy.³⁵ It is worthy of note that TİP voiced its criticisms only in the second half of 1960s when indignation and aversion against the USA and the NATO were prevalent in Turkish public opinion.

However to better comprehend to what extent security considerations have been determining the episteme underlying the Turkish state's approach to the Cyprus issue, one should necessarily assess the lengthy quotation below. This statement of Turan Güneş, who was the Turkish foreign minister in the left-leaning Ecevit cabinet during Turkey's military intervention of July-August 1974 in Cyprus, also reveals how the Turkish state elite understands and expresses the nature of the Cyprus question.

Cyprus is as precious as the right arm of a country which cares for her defence or her expansionistic aims if she harbours any. If we don't keep this strategic importance of Cyprus we cannot understand the

³⁴ Bilge, A. Suat, "Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği Münasebetleri", pp. 335-427 quoted in Işıl Kazan, "Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey", p. 58.

³⁵ Fırat, Melek M., *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1997), pp. 159-60.

peace operation of 20 July or rather it is impossible to understand the entire Cyprus crisis... Many states, to a certain extent because it suits their interest, want to see the Cyprus problem merely as our desire to protect the Turkish community on the island. Whereas the actual problem is the security of 45 million Turks in the motherland together with the Turks in the island and the maintenance of the balance of the Middle East³⁶.

The foundation and survival of a separate Turkish Cypriot state through which Turkey's military control over the island could be guaranteed was deemed both as a requirement and necessity of Turkey's strategic calculations. The increased insistence of the Turkish side on a settlement based on the existence of two separate and sovereign states and the absolute separation of the two communities on the island can partly be explained by the dominance of geo-strategic calculations and security concerns in formulating Turkey's official Cyprus policy. In a joint declaration between Turkey and the TRNC on 20 July 1997 it was stated that

taking into account that the massive build-up of arms and the support given to terrorism in south Cyprus has reached a level which constitutes a threat directed against Turkey, both sides have emphasized the increasing importance of the TRNC for the security of Turkey, while Turkey continues to provide effective guarantee for the TRNC³⁷.

The rhetoric equating the security of the Turkish state with that of the TRNC intensified in the years 1997-98 when the S-300 missile crisis outbroke.

With its arms and armaments, air assault fields, Russian military experts and S-300s, the Greek Cypriot administration has attempted to threaten not only the TRNC but Turkey as well. The security of the TRNC is directly the same as the security of Turkey. Any threat, provocation or aggression against the existence of the TRNC will be treated as directly targeted against Turkey³⁸.

This line of thought was also echoed by the civilian and military top brass and the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit throughout this period: "we now believe that not only is

³⁶ *Hürriyet*, (Turkish daily), 20 July 1980.

³⁷ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement By The Republic Of Turkey And The Turkish Republic Of Northern Cyprus - 20 July 1997 accessible at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/doc4.htm>.

³⁸ Statement By Foreign Minister Ismail Cem At A Press Conference During His Visit To The TRNC - 30 March 1998, The Turkish Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/doc14.htm.

Turkey guarantor of the security of the TRNC, but at the same time we consider the existence of the TRNC to be a necessity for the security of Turkey.”³⁹

6.2.5. The ‘Motherland’-‘Babyland’ Metaphor and Representation of Cyprus As A Natural Extension of Anatolia

*The days that you will, once again, be tested against hardship and agony, are awaiting you. They are not only awaiting you but us as well. We, as your brothers in Motherland Turkey, are by your side. I want you to remember that whatever circumstances and difficulties you face, we will stand by your side. I want you to know that at every stage of your struggle, whatever your need, obligation or decision will be, we are by your side*⁴⁰.

The geographical proximity of Cyprus to Turkey as opposed to Greece is recurrently employed as a fundamental reference point by the authors favoring Turkey’s official thesis concerning the issue in order to inject a degree of legitimacy into their arguments. In those texts whether academic or non-academic as well as in official statements, the geographical location of the island, stretching out only 40 miles away from Turkish southern coasts, is made use of to indicate the historical, economic, strategic and cultural linkages between the Cyprus and ‘the mainland’ Turkey. As evident in the statement quoted above the unity of the mainland Turks’ and “our Turkish Cypriot consanguinities” fate and destiny is persistently articulated in the declarations by official and political figures.

One step forward in describing the maternal relationality between the island and Anatolia is the representation of the island as a natural extension of the Anatolian heartland. To prove the allegations about the existence of indissoluble and sacred linkages connecting the Baby to her Mother historical, geographic, geological and demographic findings are also benefited from. For many columnists, authors, academics, politicians and bureaucrats as Cyprus “is a natural extension of Anatolia”

³⁹ Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 61.

⁴⁰ Statement by the then Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem At A Press Conference During His Visit To The TRNC, 30 March 1998 accessible at www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/doc14.htm.

the existence of these historical bonds legitimizing Turkey's involvement in the Cyprus dispute turns out to be an undeniable truth⁴¹.

Cyprus is a natural continuation of Anatolia, indeed geologists always stress that it is an extension of the Taurus Mountains. It formed part of the Hatay province of Anatolia during the first part of geological history, but was later separated from the mainland due to the cracking and crumbling of the earth's crust⁴².

The thesis that "Cyprus is geographically part of Anatolia" and thereby is "an integral part of Turkish national defense and security" has been articulated by many Turkish politicians, bureaucrats and prime ministers throughout the long history of events and developments in Cyprus. To illustrate this point, a telling quotation from a message delivered in 1954 by the then main opposition leader İsmet İnönü can be made:

Cyprus has been ceded to Britain in return for undertaking to ensure Turkey's territorial security. Turkey's territorial security is, indeed, of primary concern in today's conditions as well. ... None of our equitable friends could expect us to overlook neither the fate of Turks in Cyprus nor the utmost strategic importance of the Island for the integrity of our country. Cyprus is admittedly vitally important for us as well.⁴³

This line of thought was echoed by Adnan Menderes, the then Prime Minister, on 24 August 1955: "Cyprus is but the continuation of Anatolia and constitutes one of the pivotal elements as regards its security."⁴⁴ To this argument throughout the long centuries of history of the region "nations who controlled Anatolia or the North African coast and wished to be dominant in the Mediterranean had all wanted to add Cyprus to their list of possessions."⁴⁵ This contention predicated upon the presumption that any state capturing the island will necessarily have a strong say on Turkey's fate has also been articulated in various international conferences by Turkish official delegations.

⁴¹ This understanding is strongly asserted in various newspaper columns quoted in Fahir Armaoğlu's book entitled *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959*, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1963)

⁴² İsmail, Sabahattin, *20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences*, p. 10.

⁴³ Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959*, p. 64. Translated by Esra Kaliber.

⁴⁴ *AYIN TARİHİ*, August 1955, (261), pp. 170-73 quoted in Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959*, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1973), p. 133.

⁴⁵ İsmail, Sabahattin, *20th July Peace Operation*, p. 12.

“Strategically located only 40 miles off the Turkish coastline, an unfriendly power lodged in Cyprus could easily strike the nation’s Anatolian heartland.”⁴⁶ To give another example, in the London Conference of August-September 1955 organized among Turkey, Greece and Britain persistently referred to this fact by affirming that “Cyprus is, from geographical point of view, but a continuation of Anatolian heartland. As a matter of fact, civilizations dominating Anatolia throughout history have naturally become dominant over Cyprus as well.”⁴⁷

Another commonality between the authors of the mainstream Turkish thesis is the direct relationality established between the maintenance of Turkey’s involvement in the island and the sustenance of NATO’s control in the East Mediterranean. In line with this thesis articulated particularly until the midst of 1960s, in which Turkey’s reliance on the Western Alliance was eroded, the island of Cyprus is vital not only to Turkey’s national defense but also to that of the “free world”. Those who allowed the unification of the island with Greece tolerating the communist and pro-communist forces in Greek Cypriots and also endorsed Makarios, who strove to remain out of NATO and to verge on the Soviet Union and the non-aligned states would unavoidably create deficits and cause destabilization in NATO’s southern flank. Therefore, secession of Cyprus, which is so geo-strategically indispensable an island for the defense of the “free world”, can render it ‘the Cuba of the Mediterranean’. In accordance with this argument, which will be addressed more comprehensively in sections to come, *Enosis* (unification with Greece) must have definitely been prevented for the sake of “peace loving” and “free nations”.

The centrality assigned to the geo-strategic salience of the island and the discursive economy constituted around it by the Turkish state elite have continued to

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 137.

⁴⁷ *AYIN TARİHİ*, September 1955, (262), pp. 166-67 quoted in Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959*, p. 146.

manifest itself throughout all the phases of the Cyprus dispute. Rather than diminishing, the dominance of geopolitics in which Cyprus was perceived primarily as a geopolitical asset or a “floating military base” boosted in the post-bipolar international system.

6.2.6. Increase of Regional Level Politics

According to a widespread analysis within the discipline of IR, with the end of the Cold War era, namely the end of global competition between the Eastern and Western blocs, regionalist concerns and calculations have come to dominate the international politics⁴⁸ precisely because states have begun to focus “increasingly on regional conflicts and co-operation.”⁴⁹ In this sense, by using the “regional security complex theory”⁵⁰ introduced into the literature by Barry Buzan, Işıl Kazan argues that “... the geo-strategic importance of Cyprus to Turkey has increased in parallel with the changing of the ‘geography’ of Turkish threat perceptions, which has shifted from the ‘north’ to the ‘south-east’ of Turkey, and from the global to the regional and domestic levels.”⁵¹ In the same vein, Ahmet Davutoğlu, one of the prominent political advisers of the current Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, exemplifies the increase of regional level politics by stressing the intensifying interrelatedness between the Balkan and the Middle Eastern regions.⁵² To him, unlike the bipolar Cold War landscape in which these two regions seemed isolated from one another, in the contemporary

⁴⁸ Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security A New Framework For Analysis*, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 9.

⁴⁹ Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 55.

⁵⁰ Buzan, Barry, People, *States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Hemel Hempstead; Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

⁵¹ Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 54.

⁵² Davutoğlu, Ahmet, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), p. 177.

circumstances of global politics the fates of those are ever bound to each other.⁵³ Therefore, there may not exist, for Turkey, a policy of the Balkans and of the Middle East segregated from each other. Nonetheless, she needs a new policy for the regions at the center of which the inner balances of the Eastern Mediterranean have been struck.⁵⁴

In this formula, Cyprus, due to its geo-strategic location, indubitably plays the key role as one of the “basic instruments of this new policy.”⁵⁵ For him, any regional or global power nurturing strategic calculations and interests in “the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and in the Gulf” cannot fail to pay heed to the island of Cyprus, enjoying the capacity of directly influencing all those regions⁵⁶. Thereby Turkey should consider it as the key element of a general naval strategy concerning the adjacent sea belt surrounding her⁵⁷. By the same token, a news analysis which appeared on 5 March 2003 in a Turkish daily Turkish Daily News, reputed to be close with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was quite interesting. According to the paper, ‘some military analysts’ were maintaining that

whatever the strategy the AK Party headquarters could produce, as was laid down clearly at the latest Feb. 28 National Security Council (MGK) meeting, Turkey must be ready for new possible tensions in the entire southern front from Cyprus to Iraq, and must act with the awareness that every stone in that front is linked with each other. “We must know that the loss of one playing piece may bring about a total defeat,” a leading source commented, stressing that a “retreat” from the Cyprus position could land Turkey in a position to “retreat” in all fronts, including the EU.⁵⁸

Another notion intensely highlighted within the discourse of geopolitics particularly with the midst of 1990s is the close proximity of the island to the oil-riched Middle East and also its critical position within the new routes of oil transportation stretching out from Caucasus to Europe. Thus, if Turkey desires to have a strong saying

⁵³ Ibid., p. 177.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 177.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 177.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 180.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 180.

⁵⁸ Turkish Daily News, electronic edition, ‘Denktaş arrives for crucial Cyprus summit’, 5 March 2003.

both on the sharing of this huge and seductive oil cake and the political future of the region vis-à-vis its “immediate neighbors” (namely Russia and Greece), it has to adamantly cling on to its involvement within the island. As a matter of fact, as stated by Mustafa Ergün Olgun, Undersecretary of TRNC presidential office, this region “will become even more important once the pipelines from the Caspian Basin to Ceyhan materialize.”⁵⁹ By the same token, many recent analyses were published evaluating the S-300 missile crisis of 1997 in the context of Turkish-Soviet rivalry as regards the transportation of the Caucasus oil to the West. To this analysis what mostly motivated Russia to sell these missiles to the Cyprus Republic was to weaken Turkey’s hand in the rivalry by destabilizing and disturbing the strategic balances in the Mediterranean region⁶⁰.

All these statements quoted above unequivocally reveal the fact that in the mainstream Turkish view and/or in the official conceptualization Cyprus issue is perceived first and foremost as a question of geopolitics and security. As addressed in Kazan’s cited article, this line of thought was manifestly demonstrated in 1970s in “A. Váli’s seminal work on Turkish foreign policy: ‘Ankara, it was said, would have opposed *Enosis* for strategic reasons even if there had been no Turks on Cyprus’.”⁶¹ To this argument, which is echoed by Davutoğlu, practically 30 years later, the island has a vital geo-strategic importance to Turkey independent from the national belongings of the peoples inhabiting it. Therefore,

the second axis of the Cyprus issue rotates around the geo-strategic salience of the island by virtue of its geographical location. Independent from the residents of the island, this axis is vitally important *per se*. There has to exist for Turkey a problem of Cyprus as such even if not a single Muslim Turk lives there. No country can remain indifferent toward such an island located at the very heart of

⁵⁹ Olgun, Mustafa Ergün, “Turkey’s Tough Neighbourhood: Security Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict”, p. 243.

⁶⁰ Davutoğlu, Ahmet, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu*, p. 177-78.

⁶¹ Váli, F. A., *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), quoted in Işıl Kazan, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 58.

that country's life space. Hence apart from its human dimension Turkey has to pay heed to Cyprus in strategic terms in the same way as the significance of Dodecanese Islands, on which live only an inconsiderable number of Turks, does not expire in the eyes of Turkey and in the same way as the United States is directly involved and interested in Cuba and other Caribbean islands although it does not enjoy any commonalities in terms of population with those islands.⁶²

6.2.7. Turkish Cypriot Population As A Strategic Asset

The allegation that there is massive immigration of Turkish nationals from Turkey to Cyprus with the purpose of changing the demographic character of the island within a pre-planned partition project is not only completely contrary to the truth but also a distortion of the actual facts. All that is taking place is that skilled technicians and workers are being imported from Turkey on a temporary basis as "guest workers" to meet the immediate needs of the economy⁶³.

The debates with regard to the ethno-demographic structure of such a little Eastern Mediterranean island, the total population of which has never transcended 1 million⁶⁴ even at present, have persistently taken place at the core of the 'discursive battle' among the parties to the Cyprus dispute. In this respect, such issues as Population Exchange Agreements, immigrations to and emigrations from the island, status of Anatolian settlers and returning of displaced Cypriots have ranked high on the political agenda of intercommunal negotiations particularly since 1975. The fact that all the concerning parties approach the population inhabiting the island as a strategic element legitimizing and strengthening their positions has impeded reaching reliable data on the ethno-demographic structure of Cyprus in the long history of the dispute.

Population may be qualified as another discursive area where the state-centricism of the official and popular Cyprus discourses in Turkey can manifestly be observed. As Işıl Kazan explicitly pointed out "Turkey's twin security concerns in

⁶² Davutoğlu, Ahmet, *Stratejik Derinlik*, p. 179. Translated by Esra Kaliber.

⁶³ It is quoted from the letter sent by TFSC Representative to the UN Vedat Çelik to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, 24 October 1975. The letter is cited in Christos P. Ioannides, *In Turkey's Image The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 3.

⁶⁴ According to the statistical data provided by the government of the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic the total population of the island was 573.000 in 1960, 714.000 in 1992 and 759.000 in 2000. Data are accessible at <http://www.pio.gov.cy/cyprus/people.htm>.

regard to Cyprus” (namely its own security and that of the Turkish Cypriot community) have remained intact during all the phases of the Cyprus problem and “have not changed even after the Turkish-Greek rapprochement born out of the earthquakes in the summer of 1999, and the official acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy for membership by the Union after the Helsinki summit of December 1999.”⁶⁵ In Turkey’s security discourse on Cyprus the Turkish Cypriot population is envisioned as a strategic asset both necessitating and legitimizing Turkey’s existence and control on the island and involvement in the dispute.

Cyprus is an island which pierces the middle of Turkey like a dagger. It is extremely vital from the viewpoint of our security. This island should not be in enemy hands. The existence of the Turks in northern Cyprus is a guarantee in this direction⁶⁶.

Particularly in the popular discourse Cyprus is geographically and historically an extension of Anatolia as much as the Turkish Cypriot community an extension and/or part of the entire Turkish nation. Thereby there is nothing as natural as imagining that the security of Turkish Cypriots and of Turkey are intimately associated with each other: "Naturally Turkey has strategic interests in Cyprus. It is fortunate for Turkey that the Turkish Cypriot community exists here."⁶⁷

Besides its existence, the size of the Turkish Cypriot community is also of greatest importance, in strategic terms, for the maintenance of “Turkey’s twin security concerns” in the island. Therefore, to many analysts “Ankara has secured the immigration of tens of thousands of settlers from Turkey since 1974” with the aim of changing “the island-wide demographic balance in favor of Turkish Cypriots.”⁶⁸ As a consequence of this policy while Turkish Cypriots were generally constituting one fifth

⁶⁵ Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 61.

⁶⁶ “The Long Term Turkish Policy on Cyprus”, Human Rights Action, accessible at <http://www.hr-action.org/chr/tpolicy.html>.

⁶⁷ Quoted from the statement of Rauf Denktaş in Turkish daily *Milliyet*, 23 July 1985.

⁶⁸ Bahçeli, Tözün, “Turkey’s Cyprus Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974”, in *Greek-Turkish Relations In the Era of Globalization*, Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2001), p. 214.

of the island's overall population, as is the case in 1960⁶⁹, currently this ratio has risen to 30% of the total population⁷⁰. To many authors, on the other hand, settlement of large numbers of mainland Turks soon after Turkey's military intervention of July-August 1974 cannot only be explained with the motivation of boosting the population of TRNC vis-à-vis the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic. To them, another strategic reason behind this movement of migration is to be able to support the Denktaş leadership and the right wing and nationalist parties within the TRNC, the policy objectives, and interest perceptions of which are not contradictory with Turkey's security understanding. "Both Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership have been pleased that the Anatolian settlers have tended to vote for the nationalist parties in TRNC elections. However, this has upset" the center-left opposition which has been "critical of Turkey's influence in the TRNC" and has been "more amenable to reaching a political settlement with Greek Cypriots based on a bizonal federation."⁷¹ As a matter of fact, the debates as regards the Turkish settlers have recently flared up both in the island and Turkey. During those debates the Turkish Cypriot government was blamed for by-passing the Immigration Law and granting citizenship to thousands of mainland Turks by decree of the Council of Ministers with the intend of winning the forthcoming elections on 14 December 2003.

6.3. Discourse of Sovereignty

In conformity with the aimed contributions of the sixth chapter, this section focuses on the discourse of sovereignty increasingly occupying Turkish political agenda with regard to the Cyprus question. While analyzing the sources of utmost state-

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 214.

⁷⁰ According to the statistical data provided by The State Planning Organization of Turkey the figure of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus amounted to 215.000 in 2002. Source: <http://www.devplan.org/MEVZUAT/YATIRIM/TUR/REH1.html#COGRAFI>. The overall population of Cyprus was estimated at 650.000.

⁷¹ Bahçeli, Tözün, "Turkey's Cyprus Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974", p. 215.

centricism of Turkey's conventional and mainstream outlook to the Cyprus issue, one should never overlook the concept of sovereignty predominating the official discourse particularly soon after Turkey's military intervention of July-August 1974. In this context, this part of the study suggests that the concept of sovereignty and the desire of having a separate and sovereign Turkish state in Cyprus as a guarantee for "the existence and survival of Turkish Cypriots" and of "Turkey's own security" can be cited amongst the factors reproducing state/security centricist essence of the official and mainstream approaches to the issue in Turkey. To put forward that the main underlying reason for this mind-set is the identification of sovereignty with the nation state itself would be a simplificationist analysis. What is more, it does not suffice to examine and explain all the complex connotations of the concept as for the Cyprus issue. The focal task of this little section can also be described as striving to decipher these connotations rendering sovereignty so central a concept in the securitization and statification of the question at stake both in Turkish and Northern Cyprus's domestic politics. In this part of the dissertation it is finally proposed that the discursive economy on the necessity of a sovereign Turkish Cypriot state has a bearing on the reconstruction of the issue of Cyprus as the "cause" of the entire Turkish nation. Nationalist narrative in which the TRNC referred to the 17th Turkish state presumes sovereignty as the *sine qua non* of any viable solution to the dispute through which the absolute equality and survival of Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis the 'Greek side' can be guaranteed.

6.3.1. Sovereignty As the Defining Characteristic of the Nation State

Sovereignty as the "defining characteristic"⁷² and/or "property"⁷³ of the modern state simultaneously constitutes the basic vantage point of modern analytical discourses in explaining contemporary international system. Thus in modern world sovereignty is

⁷² Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 3.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 23.

the essence not only of the nation state as the “historically incontestable as the original fact”⁷⁴ but also of the very “basis of interstate order and intrastate order.”⁷⁵ As Bartelson drew upon, to many modernist theoreticians of International Relations such as Hedley Bull “the presence of international relations is conditioned- logically as well as historically- by sovereignty.”⁷⁶ It is presumed that the existence and conduct of foreign policy as a phenomenon unique to modern politics is possible only with the existence of the state “or independent political communities, each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population”⁷⁷ The “historical incontestability” and thereby naturalness and inevitability attributed to sovereignty as the operational code of interstate system renders it the very foundation of identity of the modern state, which paradoxically has to reproduce itself continually.

The modern nation state “as an introvert and extravert existence”⁷⁸ is presumed sovereign mainly in two domains of political activity: internal and external.

On the one hand, states assert, in relation to this territory and population, what may be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within that territory and population. On the other hand, they assert what may be called external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy but independence of outside authorities.⁷⁹

These two major dimensions of state’s sovereignty help the state to reproduce itself as a territorially bounded entity normatively independent from and equal to other states enjoying the same sovereignty rights.

6.3.2. Sovereignty As A Guarantee to National Survival

⁷⁴ Aron, Raymond, *Peace and War*, p. 738.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 738.

⁷⁶ Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 23.

⁷⁷ Bull, Hedley, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 8 quoted in Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 23.

⁷⁸ Karatekelioğlu, Petek, *The Impact of the European Union on the Modern Nation-State*, (Ankara: Bilkent University Master’s Thesis, 2000), p. 10.

⁷⁹ Bull, Hedley, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, quoted in Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 23.

“We are fighting for our dignity, for our rights, for our political equality, for our right in the sovereignty of Cyprus, which we did not allow Greek Cypriots to sweep away and to make it theirs!”⁸⁰ As implied in this quotation from Rauf Denktaş, the President of the TRNC, the concept of sovereignty has eventually situated itself at the core of conventional discourses on the Cyprus question. Any researcher can observe the fact that the desire of having a separate and sovereign state began to be increasingly pronounced especially with the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) on 13 February 1975. When Denktaş began to stand for a confederal system of governance instead of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federalism with the onset of 1990s, the discourse on the necessity of having a sovereign state culminated within the official argumentation.

The difference between “federation” and “confederation” may be blurred, but it has been clear for some years that the Turkish Cypriots have been moving away from the original agreement in favor of two sovereign states with equal rights to self-determination. This was confirmed in March 1990 by Rauf Denktash in discussion with the then UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar⁸¹.

As a matter of fact, on 30 August 1998 Denktaş formally submitted a proposal on the creation of a “confederal structure composed of two peoples and two states of the island”⁸² respecting for the special relations of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with their ‘motherlands’. After the EU Helsinki Summit of December 1999 “Ankara reaffirmed its support”⁸³ for this new settlement foreseeing a looser partnership between the two communities of the island and the existence of two sovereign states. To the official discourse, a viable solution not contradicting with “the realities of Cyprus” can only be reached in accordance with the principle of confederalism:

The bizonality that was finalized through the Population Exchange Agreement in 1975 has since evolved into a two-State situation. The reality of the separate

⁸⁰ Denktaş, Rauf, Opening Remarks in the Inaugural Session for the Conference on “New Horizons of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000 and Beyond”, *Foreign Policy*, Vol. XXIV 2000, No: 1-2, p. 12.

⁸¹ Crawshaw, Nancy, “Cyprus: A Crisis of Confidence”, *World Today* (April 1994): p. 72.

⁸² See Appendix E for Denktaş’s proposals for confederation on 31 August 1998.

⁸³ Bahçeli, Tözün, “Turkey’s Cyprus Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974”, p. 220.

geographical and political existence of the two peoples and their respective States has to be acknowledged and respected. You may ask why confederation? A confederation enables the politically sovereign states to accommodate themselves to today's realities, such as the growing interdependence among various states or the desire of distinct peoples to cooperate in a new structure, allowing them to preserve their separate national identities and existence.⁸⁴

Another crucially important point which should necessarily be highlighted within this lengthy quotation is the linkage established between the confederal system and the preservation of "separate national identities and existence". This analysis takes for granted the absence of any common Cypriot identity and the existence of two ethnically differentiated peoples as extension of the Turkish and Greek nations. The analysis also presumes that the "distinct peoples" of the island cannot preserve their national identities unless they have their own sovereign states. The discourse directly associating the survival of the Turkish national identity in the island of Cyprus with sovereignty not only reproduces state-centricist episteme of the official and mainstream approaches but also imposes a certain understanding of national identity denying Cypriotness in favor of Turkishness.

The official argument vigorously advocated by Turkish bureaucratic and foreign policy establishment also foregrounds the notion that a separate and independent Turkish Cypriot state will serve as the guarantor of the Turkish Cypriots' rights and full equality. To this thesis, a confederal system "envisaging the separate sovereignty of the two sides according to which both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would respect each other's rights of sovereignty"⁸⁵ is a precondition of any just solution to the dispute. In other words, to the official rhetoric the only way of securing the "absolute equality between the separate states and the two sides"⁸⁶ is the acknowledgement of TRNC as a

⁸⁴ Ertuğ, Osman, "The Turkish Cypriot View in the Aftermath of Proximity Talks- Confederation or Two States", in *Two Peoples and Two States in Cyprus At the Eleventh Hour*, Proceedings of a seminar held at the Turkish Embassy in London, (London: Turkish Embassy, 2001), pp. 16-17.

⁸⁵ Manisalı, Erol, "What Happens if Cyprus Joins the EU Without Turkey?", in *Avrupa Birliği Kışkacında Kıbrıs Meselesi: Bugünü ve Yarını*, İrfan Kaya Ülger and Ertan Efegil (eds.), (Ankara: s.n., 2001), p. 74.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 75.

sovereign entity within a confederal solution to the dispute. The factor rendering the discourse of sovereignty integral to the reproduction of state-centricism of the official rhetoric on Cyprus is the ever-increasing identification of the security and existence of the Turkish Cypriots with the recognition of the TRNC as a sovereign state.

Now I call on the whole world, particularly on those who, even if with good intentions, would like to rush the Turkish Cypriots into a federation and; to those who see but could not observe and hear but could not understand: The real intention of Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration, as stated by Mr.Pangalos, is to reduce the status of the Turkish Cypriots to that of a defenceless minority. What is tailored for purpose, in the name of a "federation", for the Turkish Cypriots is reducing them to a defenceless minority in a hostile environment⁸⁷.

As expressed in this statement delivered by the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem, the establishment of a federal regime in Cyprus poses a direct threat for Turkish community since it will downgrade their status to a “defenceless minority” vis-à-vis Greeks. To this line of thought, the only solution to “bring permanent peace to the island” is the confederal one precisely because “statehood of the North will suffice to put an end to Greek Cypriot aspirations of making Cyprus a Greek Cypriot Republic again.”⁸⁸

6.3.3. The UN Plan and Debates on Sovereignty

*The document fails to meet in full neither the "separate sovereignty" and "equal partnership" status of the Turkish Cypriot side and, with constant references to the 1960 regime, gives the impression that it is more in line with the Greek Cypriot thesis that the new state ought to be a continuation of the Cyprus Republic. Whereas the new state ought to succeed both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot states.*⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Statement By Foreign Minister İsmail Cem At A Press Conference During His Visit To The TRNC - 30 March 1998, The Turkish Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs accessible at www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/doc14.htm.

⁸⁸ Denktaş, Rauf, Opening Remarks in the Inaugural Session for the Conference on “New Horizons of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000 and Beyond”, pp. 13-14.

⁸⁹ Kanlı, Yusuf, “The Glass is Half Full”, *Turkish Daily News*, electronic edition, 21 November 2002.

Soon after the UN Secretary General conveyed his proposals entitled ‘Basis for Agreement On A Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’, the debates on the sovereignty rights of Turkish Cypriots once more flared up and occupied the center of the political discourse. The UN plan at the basis of which lay “the principle of land in exchange for sovereignty”⁹⁰ foresees the creation of a new state of Cyprus “in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a common state government and two equal component states, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot.”⁹¹ In the eyes of Turkey’s foreign policy establishment and bureaucratic elite “the vague ‘component states’ terminology”⁹² making implicit references to the sovereignty of these ‘component states’ is far from meeting the expectations of the ‘Turkish side’ as regards sovereignty. To this view, the plan stating that “within the limits of the Constitution” component states “sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the ‘common state’ government”⁹³ diluted the meaning of the concept. This was precisely because there is a difference between ‘being sovereign’ and ‘exercise powers sovereignly’⁹⁴. Nonetheless, in the proposed framework there were references to the separate sovereignty of the ‘component states’ “without using the word "sovereignty" because of the semantics problem between the two sides on Cyprus.”⁹⁵ However, to the line of thought articulated in Turkey particularly by nationalist circles and bureaucratic elite, the UN plan destroys “the existence of the state [of the TRNC], its sovereignty, and inseparable unity of the country”⁹⁶, and dilutes Turkey’s guarantorship rights.

⁹⁰ Balancar, Ferda, “Last Tango in Cyprus”, Turkish Time. The article is accessible at http://www.turkishtime.org/aralik/40_1_en.htm.

⁹¹ Kanlı, Yusuf, “The Glass is Half Full”, *Turkish Daily News*, electronic edition, 21 November 2002.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ ‘Basis for Agreement On A Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’ accessible at www.abhaber.com/nt_hbr_2002/annankibrisplani.doc.

⁹⁴ Kanlı, Yusuf, “The Glass is Half Full”, *Turkish Daily News*, electronic edition, 21 November 2002.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ “Constitutional Crime”, *Volkan*, (Turkish Cypriot Daily), 4 March 2003.

Therefore, to them the UN proposal forces the Turkish Cypriot side to surrender their state established “after an honorable struggle.”⁹⁷

In line with this analysis approaching sovereignty primarily as an issue of security and/or ‘life or death’, an independent and sovereign Turkish Cypriot state is the guarantee of the equal status and security of the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus any order that can prevent the repetition of violent attacks to which Turkish Cypriots were exposed between the years 1963-1974 may only be established “with a strong state”⁹⁸ ensuring its equal status vis-à-vis the Greek community.

If we give up our state we become the minority of Greek Cypriots and everybody knows what that eventuality would be. If we give up our state we give up our spirit and honor, too. Our martyrs will never forgive us. Neither the history, too. Thanks god we would live under our flag, guarantorship of Turkey and Turkish military. You could look at the future hopefully.⁹⁹

As implied in this quotation, in the conventional rhetoric the existence of a sovereign and independent Turkish state in the island is justified through a conception of national history imbued with atrocities, grievances, tortures, mass killings and other forms of aggression. In this historiography Greeks refer to the historical ‘other’ threatening the national identity and survival of the Turkish Cypriot community in the past, today and in the future. “In the event of an agreement made on paper, which was not based on sovereignty, the Greek Cypriots would find the opportunity to repeat what they did in 1963”¹⁰⁰.

As an indicative of this Weltanschauung, a demonstration was “organized by the Committee of National Solidarity” and backed by the Denktaş leadership and the two parties of the TRNC government with the name of “Sovereignty and Peace”¹⁰¹. The

⁹⁷ Denktash: “If we give up our state we shall become minority under Greek Cypriots sovereignty”, *Volkan*, 26 June 2003.

⁹⁸ *Yeni Düzen* 27 August 2003.

⁹⁹ Denktash: “If we give up our state we shall become minority under Greek Cypriots sovereignty”, *Volkan*, 26 June 2003.

¹⁰⁰ Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot News 20 May 2002 accessible at http://www.trncwashdc.org/News/02_05_20.html.

¹⁰¹ *Halkın Sesi*, 7 March 2003.

meeting also supported by the military top brass and the foreign policy establishment in Turkey was inviting only the people “who want an honorable and viable peace with sovereignty, do not want Greeks among them, and do not want to migrate.”¹⁰² This double exclusionary rhetoric not only identifies “the outside” with threat and danger yet simultaneously marginalizes those who, for instance, wanted Greeks among themselves. The message is clear: The ones whose conception of sovereignty and understanding of settlement to the Cyprus problem does not overlap with that of Denktaş leadership are in the service of foreigners who want to eradicate Turkish national identity in the island. As a matter of fact, for the Denktaş administration and its supporters in Turkey the forthcoming elections of 14 December 2003 “would mean a choice between Enosis and the continued struggle with the help of Turkey, for an independent TRNC.”¹⁰³ The natural consequence of this rhetoric widely used in Turkey as well is the declaration of some sectors of society as ‘deviant’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘non-national’ both in the ‘Babyland’ Cyprus and ‘Motherland’ Turkey.

6.4 Conclusion

At the heart of this statist and state-centered, monist approach lie the ignorance and even the exclusion of other societal, cultural and economic dimensions of the Cyprus issue. Prioritizing state-based national security understanding, this approach serves to reproduce the state’s *de facto* primacy to the detriment of other institutions and particularly the society itself. In this analysis, other socio-political, economic or cultural aspects of the issue are treated as worth analyzing if and only when they are in compliance with the priorities and expectations ascertained by the state apparatus. The official discourse on “extremely vital” importance of Cyprus “from the viewpoint of our

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ *Yeni Düzen* “Enosist Test” 27 August 2003.

security” portrays it as an island “that pierces the middle of Turkey like a dagger.”¹⁰⁴ Mainly owing to its geo-strategic position, geographical proximity to Anatolian costs, the island is both a source of persistent and existential threat and also an invaluable naval base that should be taken hold of at all costs by Turkey. That the island is inhabited by 200.000 Turkish Cypriots in tandem with practically 650.000 Greek Cypriots harboring intimate relations with the imminent neighbor of Greece also increases considerably the vitality and indispensability of Cyprus for Turkey’s “national defence and interests”.

This securitizing discourse of the state elite locates military considerations, strategic calculations and threat perceptions into the center of the analysis and hence fixes the Cyprus issue as a perpetual security project of the state. Continuance of this project of security by virtue of new risks and/or failures in satisfactorily meeting the needs and priorities articulated in the state’s new security agenda turned out to be the guarantors of the continued success of the state “as an impelling identity.”¹⁰⁵ The security language and the statist geopolitical discourse that the Turkish state elite has employed on the Cyprus question has a two-fold function. First, it has helped the state to consolidate its privileged status as an agent and/or subject within the domestic politics vis-à-vis the Turkish society. This security discourse secondly facilitated the moving out of the issue at stake from the spheres of normal politics and public debate. As such the domestic society may not actively be involved in the processes of discussion, assessment and decision-making as a real political subject. De-politicization through securitization consolidates the state’s autonomy and independence from the domestic society and thus secures the reproduction of the relations between these two in its conventional and hierarchical structure.

¹⁰⁴ “The Long Term Turkish Policy on Cyprus”, Human Rights Action, accessible at <http://www.hr-action.org/chr/Tpolicy.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, p. 12.

In line with all the theoretical clarifications and statements recited above, it is fair to propose for our issue of Cyprus that the securitizing practices of the Turkish state elite in unison with Rauf Denktaş bearing the issue directly to the field of existential and perpetual threat made the interrogation of state/security based policies impossible in the public space during the long history of the dispute. The specific and securitizing rhetoric employed by the political and bureaucratic foreign policy establishment has enabled the state to reinscribe the boundaries of the political imagination and thinking on the issue at stake in Turkish politics.

“Cyprus is an issue involving Turkey's vital national and strategic interests. A great amount of commitment and sensitivity is attached to it both on the public and official level.”¹⁰⁶ As implied in this expression extracted from the web page of Turkish Embassy at Washington D.C., the Turkish state elite has successfully securitized the Cyprus issue through the recurrent application of the discourse of geopolitics, intermingled with and feeding on the fear of encirclement and the existence of a persistent threat both to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. As I tried to indicate, a thorough analysis of the securitizing practices and discourses of the state elite is of profound importance so as to discuss and problematize the implications and reflections of the Cyprus issue on the Turkish domestic politics. In this respect, it can correctly be argued that the security discourse and representations of the Turkish state elite as regards the Cyprus dispute by restricting, to a considerable extent, the public debate on the issue became the integral part of the practices securing the sustenance of state society relations in its conventional, hierarchical terms. Furthermore, the official discursive totality locating the state's strategic interests or threat perceptions into the center of the analysis imagines them as objective and intransigent realities. In this mode of representation the Turkish state as a coherent self and unitary actor struggles for the

¹⁰⁶ Republic of Turkey, Turkish Embassy at Washington D.C., Cyprus Information Note accessible at <http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/issuescyprus.htm>.

maintenance of the given national interests and the security of the Turkish society. Consequently, the Cyprus problem as a 'vital' foreign policy and security issue serves to consolidate the autonomy of the state from the society in Turkish political landscape.

CHAPTER VII

CYPRUS AS THE CAUSE OF TURKISH NATION

REPRODUCING ‘THE SELF’ AND ‘THE OTHER’ THROUGH THE CYPRUS QUESTION

7.1. Introduction

*Our souls are one and united when it comes to the national issues. The government’s policy is our national policy; our national policy is the government’s policy as regards the national issues*¹.

What are the roles and functions of state’s foreign policy discourses and representations in the symbiotic and ideological reproduction of nationhood and national consciousness within a given sociopolitical context?

“Is there a connection between the daily activities of a domestic government agency” and the political practices “we traditionally associate with foreign policy”²?

What is the dialectical relationship between imagining ‘them’, ‘the foreign’, ‘the alien’ and imagining ‘us’ and ‘our unique nation’?

How and to what extent foreign political discourse and performances of the state apparatus are instrumental in persistently reminding ‘us’ the fact that we live in a nation with its own peculiarities and unique culture amongst other nations?

What is the significance of state-based foreign policy in creating and recreating the national unity and cohesion in such away as to ensure both the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis the domestic society and reproduction of the relations between these two as the relations of subjugation and dominance?

¹ Yücel, Hasan Ali, Kıbrıs Dolayısıyla, *Cumhuriyet* (Turkish daily), 23 Aralık 1956 quoted in Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959*, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1963), p. 283.

² Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, (rev. ed.), (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1998), p. 36.

How and in what ways foreign policy issues are operationalized by the nation state in specifying and declaring internal others and in drawing boundaries demarcating ‘the national’ and ‘non-national’, ‘the legitimate’ and ‘the illegitimate’ within the domestic politics?

What is the role and significance of securitization of foreign political matters by the state elite in securing the domestic political community and national identity and also in reconstructing the state as the only legitimate power that can protect its nation against all internal and external enemies?

It is a well-known and unfortunate fact that neither the conventional theories of international relations nor most of the analytical enterprises on nationalism and nation state do satisfactorily deal with the questions raised above and the like. Save for a few academic works, the relationality between foreign policy and reproduction of domestic/national identity has not caught as much attention of most scholars as it deserved. Thus there rises an emergent need for brand new literature which will critically and adequately assess the share and significance of foreign policy in the consolidation of subjective interpretation of history privileging the nation state vis-à-vis other political subjects and privileging the nation and nationalism vis-à-vis other forms of political community. This undertaking necessitates an increase in the number of studies “not being constrained by the boundaries of specific academic disciplines and adopting an eclectic approach”³ in studying foreign policy and nationalism.

As to the Turkish foreign policy and Turkish nationalism the lack of this interdisciplinary scholarship marks one of the main limitations and weaknesses of the literature dedicated to the issue. To illustrate, the contemporary scholarship on Turkish foreign policy displays, for the most part, the proclivity to view foreign policy just as a state-centric phenomenon and/or diplomatic procedures and bureaucratic activities that

³ Özkırımlı, Umut, *Theories of Nationalism A Critical Introduction*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 197.

are and should be formulated only by the state elite to pursue Turkey's national interests and security. As was stated in the previous chapters within the state-centricist epistemology of the literature, foreign policy refers to an area of bureaucratic competence and external actions of the state toward others in the name of the whole Turkish society. Thus the mainstream international relations scholarship in Turkey does not need to discuss and problematize neither the precise nature of state and its reproduced identity nor the implications and impacts of the state's foreign policy discourses and representations in the maintenance of domestic power relations.

The literature on Turkish nationalism, on the other hand, even if more receptive of other social disciplines such as sociology, cultural studies and comparative politics, still suffers from some impasses particularly in analyzing the salience and impacts of "external dynamics" on Turkish nationalism. While intensely concentrating on the inner dynamics behind the emergence and development of Turkish nationalism and the idea of Turkish nationhood, adequate academic works and due emphasis are not dedicated to the analysis of the outer sources and incentives. Furthermore, it does not comprehensively address and theorize the role and significance of the official foreign policy discourses in reproducing the nationalist meta-narrative in Turkey. This is all the more true for the studies examining the Cyprus question which are afflicted with similar limitations and inadequacies. For instance, the official and mainstream academic rhetorics on the Cyprus question where the phrases beginning by the adjective 'national' were recurrently asserted were not hitherto subjugated to any inclusive inquiry: an inquiry associating the Cyprus issue with the construction of the standards and boundaries of Turkish national identity. What is more, the literature on Cyprus does not take issue with the ethnicist and state-centricist modes of understanding and explaining and replicates the idea that there exists no Cypriot identity and that Turkish Cypriots are

integral part and branch of the greater Turkish world⁴. I am convinced that any attempt to comprehend diverse and complex connotations of the Cyprus question with respect to Turkish national identity will also make substantial contribution to the development of a more comprehensive analytical framework on Turkish nationalism.

At this point I should immediately state that the burden of this part of the thesis work is neither to reveal all the limitations of the literature on Turkish foreign policy and Turkish nationalism nor to develop a brand new approach satisfactorily encompassing the answers to the questions raised above. However I am convinced that this attempt will be a further stride towards this end. Within the scope of this section my objective is to strive to reveal how and in which ways the Cyprus dispute is utilized in securing and maintaining the Turkish national identity. With the help of some theoretical clarifications, this chapter seeks to ask the critical question whether the Cyprus issue has become instrumentalized in reinscribing the boundaries and standards of Turkish nationalism and national identity; if so in which ways and to what extent it has assumed particular roles in and exerted influence on the socialization of nationalist and even Pan-Turkist discourses within Turkish public sphere. This chapter answering the first question with an undoubted ‘yes’ maintains that, though with varying levels of intensity, the official and mainstream rhetoric on the Cyprus issue has always become inherent to the reproduction of domestic/national political identity. Hence this part of the dissertation is dedicated to the exploration of different ways within which the Cyprus question has had a role to play in the consolidation of a national identity securing the unity, cohesion and homogenization of Turkish nation.

In line with this goal, the chapter will first delineate the process through which the Cyprus issue has turned out to be ‘the cause of the nation’ around which maintenance of the national unity is necessarily required. At this juncture, the study

⁴ Bora, Tanıl, “Milli Dava Kıbrıs Bir Velayet Davası Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Kıbrıs”, *Birikim* No: 77, September 1995, pp. 18-26.

establishes a parallel between the centralization of nationalism in Turkish politics and the articulation of the issue at stake as ‘the national cause’ in the public sphere. In this respect, it will be highly interesting to look into a less-known report prepared by RPP on minorities in Turkey from which valuable evidences can be derived as to the exclusionary nationalist tendencies of the period. The active involvement of the Pan-Turkist and other nationalist associations and student organizations in the process through which the issue has been declared as the ‘cause of the nation’ will also be put under scrutiny in this part.

The seventh chapter aiming at discussing and exploring the role and significance of the Cyprus question in the reproduction of Turkish national identity shall secondly deal with the problematic of the ‘other’. In this sense, the modes in which the Cyprus issue has been articulated and represented by the Turkish state elite will be rendered the object of critical inquiry with regard to their role and impacts on the definition of the ‘self’ (Turkish national identity) in relation to the ‘other’. In this respect the study intends to search for how and in what ways the Cyprus question was functionalized by Turkish bureaucratic and political establishment in specifying and declaring communism, communists, Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey as the ‘other’ of the Turkish nation. The anti-Greek riots of 6-7 September 1955, the expulsion of the Greek minority from Turkey in 1964-65, the intense anti-communist discourse of 1950s and 1960s will be the points of reference while expatiating the issue at stake. Against this background, the chapter arrives at the conclusion that Turkey’s official and mainstream rhetoric on the Cyprus dispute has a bearing on the consolidation of Turkish national identity the boundaries and content of which have been defined in relation to the ‘other’. Thus the national foreign policy rhetoric on Cyprus operating through ‘othering’ strategies and repressive practices has substantially contributed to the reproduction of

the relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ in Turkey as the relations of subjugation and dominance.

7.1.1. Foreign Policy and Nationalism

The notion of identity as a never finished, nor pre-ordained and unstable phenomenon or as an artificial construct has been one of the pillars and sources of inspiration for such a thesis work. To this argument largely acknowledged by critical scholars

[i]dentity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of thinking identity as an accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation.⁵

Thus if it is to persist, any identity, whether individual or collective, has to be reconfigured within a relatively coherent narrative imposed by an agent or a range of agents. In addition, each and every identity needs a self-evident discursive formation as an “epistemological framework in which statements are possible.”⁶ As Jonathan Bach reminds us any discursive totality desiring to achieve narrative coherence

necessitates an actor which is capable of imposition. Discourses do not impose themselves: a community uses social pressure, institutions create frameworks for the legitimated use of power, groups of persons can use violence or control information- the methods are manifold.⁷

Without overlooking other possible actors and/or mechanisms the modern nation state can be cited as the very agent having the capacity of imposing the domestic/national identity. Of course there exist numerous mechanisms through which the national ‘we’ is constituted and maintained as a unique identity. “Nevertheless, while a polity must meet a set of preconditions to form a nation, it is interaction with the

⁵ Hall, Stuart, Cultural Identity and Diaspora, in J. Rutherford (ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture and Difference*, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), p. 222.

⁶ Bach, Jonathan, P.G. *Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and National Identity After 1989*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 49.

⁷ Ibid., p. 50.

outside world, namely the acceptance or rejection of “the other”, that allows polities to develop a sense of national uniqueness.”⁸ As Michael Billig and various other scholars imply the national ‘we’ and its uniqueness cannot be imagined only with reference to the characteristics attributed to that identity.

If ‘our’ nation is to be imagined in all its particularity, it must be imagined as a nation amongst other nations. The consciousness of national identity normally assumes an international context, which itself needs to be imagined every bit as much as does the national community: or at least the imagination has to become frozen in a habit of thought. Thus, foreigners are not simply ‘others’, symbolizing the obverse of ‘us’: ‘they’ are also like ‘us’, part of the imagined universal code of nationhood⁹.

Rising of the nation as a “superior code of inclusion”¹⁰ within 17th and 18th century Europe has become possible with the simultaneous constitution of ‘the international’. Within the dialectical relationship between these two, international relations have appeared “as an arena of practice in which some subjects emerged with the status of actors, who are sustained by a variety of practices that establish the boundaries of legitimate meaning and naturalize a particular order.”¹¹ The construction of an international politics the content and scope of which are claimed to be constituted and determined by interactions among the nation states naturalized and normalized a particular political order. An order the existence and sustenance of which is grounded on the survival of nation state as a sovereign presence and on strengthening the national ‘we’ as a new type of collectivity. Imagining international politics as a precisely anarchic structure in which “the struggle for power is universal in time and space”¹² has served to the reproduction of state’s legitimacy and nationalism as its founding paradigm in two ways: first, through the discourse of national foreign policy certain actors and events are declared as foreign, dangerous and threat to the so-called national

⁸ Prizel, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 16.

⁹ Billig, Michael, *Banal Nationalism*, (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 83.

¹⁰ Bach, Jonathan, P.G. *Between Sovereignty and Integration*, p. 57.

¹¹ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity*, p. 39.

¹² Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics Among Nations*, (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp. 328-29.

unity and survival. As David Campbell correctly discussed what is at stake is the “attempt to screen the strange, the unfamiliar, and the threatening associated with the outside from the familiar and safe, which are linked to the inside.”¹³ Second, consciousness about national identity and nationhood has to assume an international context in which the nation can imagine itself as part of a whole composed of nations as like-units. “Nationalists live in an international world, and their ideology is itself an international ideology. Without constant observation of the world of other nations, nationalists would be unable to claim that their nations meet the universal codes of nationhood.”¹⁴ Imagining an international world of nations helps to consolidate the separation between the national and the non-national as categories having their own particularities. Therefore “in the age of nation states and nationalism”¹⁵ ‘the foreigner’ does not only refer to ‘the other’ threatening ‘us’ but also defines the characteristics of the one who is not belonging to ‘our’ nation. The quotation from Julia Kristeva cited in Michael Billig’s *Banal Nationalism* perfectly puts the point. To Kristeva with the establishment of nation states “we come to the only modern, acceptable and clear definition of foreignness: the foreigner is the one who does not belong to the state in which we are, the one who does not have the same nationality.”¹⁶

Nations also need to be recognized by other established nations as a community meeting fully the criteria of being a nation. The nation “has to resemble other nations to gain their recognition. It must adopt conventional symbols of particularity, which, because of their conventionality, are simultaneously symbols of the universality of nationhood.”¹⁷ Hence having a national flag, national anthem, national currency and so forth is for both to declare its uniqueness and to prove its capacity of being a nation vis-

¹³ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity*, p. 36.

¹⁴ Billig, Michael, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 80.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 79.

¹⁶ Kristeva, Julia, *Strangers to Ourselves*, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 96.

¹⁷ Billig, Michael, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 85.

à-vis other nations. Thus it can be claimed with some degree of accuracy that there exists a dialectical relationship between nationalism and internationalism as the nationalist discursive totality embraces both “the universalization of particularism, and the particularization of universalism.”¹⁸ This notion articulated by various scholars also refuses the existence of a pre-given international system predating the outbreak of the modern nation state. On the contrary the nation state and the interstate system as co-emergent entities¹⁹ are simultaneously integral to the creation and recreation of the modern nationalist discourse.

The very modern concept of citizen has, in turn, appeared as a relatively new category through which the dialectical relationship between the domestic and the external, the national and the international is maintained. For instance Campbell establishes a direct linkage between the transformation of the “organizations bearing the appellation “foreign” and “external”” to the form of “large-scale bureaucracies with global scope”²⁰ by the early 20th century and the concentration of power in the hands of the nation state. To him both the emergence of large-scale foreign policy bureaucracies and other developments which led to the increase of state power and autonomy within the domestic order “produced the category of “citizen”, and established nationalism as the primary form of social identity by the time of World War I”²¹. As a new type of collectivity or belonging citizenship has also created “a new category of outsider: the foreigner as member of another state and also those designated “non-citizen” within the state.”²² The strengthening of the category of citizenship as a salient identity has resulted in defining ‘self’ and ‘other’ more closely in relation to the nation. All these

¹⁸ Robertson, R., *Social Theory, Cultural Relativity and the Problem of Globality*, in A.D. King (ed.), *Culture, Globalization and the World System*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 73.

¹⁹ Der Derian, James, *The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations*, in J. Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations*, (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1989).

²⁰ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity*, p. 68.

²¹ Ibid., p. 68.

²² Bach, Jonathan P.G., *Between Sovereignty and Integration*, pp. 59-60.

indubitably paved the way for the centralization of the nationalist discourse within modern politics as a narrative “as constitutive of collective identity and as constitutive of the context in which politics is played out.”²³

These theoretical deductions aiming to decipher the relations among the state-based foreign policy discourse and nationalism as an ideology and “construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy”²⁴ need to be developed further. Leaving this undertaking to more experienced scholars at least for the time being, let me try to address and reveal this linkage within the context of our issue of Cyprus. The author of this dissertation is of the opinion that the official and popular discourses on the question has always been very functional in the reproduction of discourse of national unity and integrity and also of nationalism as a type of collectivity vis-à-vis other types of belongings and meta-narratives.

7.2. Cyprus As A ‘National Cause’

The term ‘national cause’ has been widely used in Turkish political discourse as to emphasize the vitally important nature of a particular issue i.e. Turkey’s full membership to the European Union and the two subsequent economic crises of February and November 2001. Yet in the collective memory of Turkish society it is the Cyprus issue with which the term ‘national cause’ has more often than not been associated. In this part of the dissertation I shall try to concisely delineate the process through which the Cyprus issue has begun to be articulated as the national cause of each and every Turk.

The Pan-Turkist and Turanist political movements, which became quite vocal during the beginning of 1940s were liquidated by the state elite within a process proceeding in parallel to the defeat of Germany in the World War II. Nevertheless, this

²³ Ibid., p. 44.

²⁴ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity*, p. 11.

did not suffice to decrease very strong nationalist and anti-communist tones in 1940s Turkey²⁵. These years can be evaluated as a kind of transitional period in which nationalism began to be popularized²⁶ as the hegemonic discourse in the public space, which had remained as the ideology of a relatively narrow state elite in the course of the first two decades of the Republican era. In such a political atmosphere, despite its all losses Pan-Turkism “remained a latent force in Turkish politics during the 1950s”²⁷ mainly owing to its vigorous activism in the Cyprus question. This activism reached its peak in the late 1940s and early 1950s when the Cyprus dispute had been “one of the pet issues of Pan-Turkists in Turkey.”²⁸

The plebiscite organized by the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church at the very beginning of 1950 came out as a rare opportunity for the Pan-Turkist and nationalist circles to consolidate their legitimacy²⁹ within the system, which was previously impaired along with the defeat of Germany. Furthermore, the potent support conferred upon AKEL by Greek Cypriots enabled an anti-communist agitation on the part of these circles. As it will be revealed in the ensuing pages in a more detailed manner, soon after the World War II and in tandem with the Cyprus issue, anti-communism became part and parcel of Turkish nationalism.

Based on strong nationalist sentiment and anti-Soviet feeling in the years immediately after the end of the Second World War, several nationalist associations sprang up of a marked Pan-Turk character. Perhaps the most noteworthy ones were the *Türk Kültür Çalışmaları Derneği* (“Association for Studies on Turkish Culture”) and the *Türk Gençlik Teşkilatı* (“Group of Turkish Youth”), both set up and led by university students in 1956³⁰. These and several others were established with the goal of promoting historically-hallowed Turkish

²⁵ Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 206.

²⁶ Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, pp. 205-6.

²⁷ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publisher, 1991), p. 62.

²⁸ Landau, Jacob M., *Pan-Turkism From Irredentism to Cooperation*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis : Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 135.

²⁹ Kızılyürek, Niyazi, *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*, p. 207.

³⁰ Here there should be publication error since later in the book the author states that these organizations fused in May 1951.

ideals, encouraging and assisting Outer Turks, and resisting the spread of communism in Turkey.³¹

All nationalist groups fusing under the name of *Türk Milliyetçiler Derneği* (Association of Turkish Nationalists) in May 1951 established intricate ties “with various groups and organizations defending the cause of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. Indeed, the identification of many Turks on the mainland with their brethren in Cyprus injected a more palpable element of Pan-Turkism into the activist *milliyetçi* groups.”³² Throughout the period from 1950 to 1955 the Cyprus problem proved to remain the first and foremost item of nationalists’ political agenda³³. Those years have also witnessed the foundation of various associations, concerned with the Cyprus issue, the core staff of which was composed of the Pan-Turkists of 1940s. Among these associations were Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association (CTCA) (*Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği*)³⁴, Society for the Protection of Cyprus (*Kıbrıs’ı Koruma Cemiyeti*)³⁵, Cyprus is Turkish Society (*Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti*) and Cyprus Turkish Culture and Aid Association (*Kıbrıs Türk Kültür ve Yardım Cemiyeti*)³⁶.

In order to acquaint the [Turkish] people with the Cyprus cause and get them to adopt it wholeheartedly, our Cypriot brothers together with patriotic citizens having espoused the Cyprus issue as a national cause have established associations with regard to Cyprus.³⁷

The activities of these associations were generally conducted and organized either by Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey maintaining close ties with nationalist circles such as

³¹ Landau, Jacob M., *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1974), pp. 200-201.

³² Ibid., p. 201.

³³ Bora, Tanıl, “Milli Dava Kıbrıs Bir Velayet Davası Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Kıbrıs”, p. 21.

³⁴ Landau, Jacob M., *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism*, (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981), p. 150.

³⁵ For detailed information on the association see Darendelioğlu, İlhan E., *Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri: Toplantılar, Mitingler, Nümayişler*, (Toker y.y., 1968), p. 216 ff. He names this association as the most active one among others.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 215.

³⁷ Darendelioğlu, İlhan E., *Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri: Toplantılar, Mitingler, Nümayişler*, p. 215.

Halil Fikret Alasya, Hasan Nevzat Karagil³⁸, Derviş Manizade³⁹ or by student union leaders and particularly by renowned journalists i.e. Sedat Simavi, Ahmet Emin Yalman, Hikmet Bil⁴⁰. Like these associations such student unions as Turkish National Student Federation (TNSF) and National Turkish Student Union (NTSU) were also under the strict control and manipulation of the political authority. To illustrate, throughout 1950s in the same direction with the Democrat Party government's policies, the three major issues with which these unions were mostly preoccupied were fight with communism, loyalty to Atatürk and Cyprus.⁴¹

“The ideology that Cyprus is Turkish has been the driving force behind the actions of Pan-Turkish groups” and other nationalist associations and student unions “in Turkey since the early 1950s.”⁴² They published numerous brochures and booklets, issued declarations and organized meetings and demonstrations contending that “Cyprus is Turkish soil”. In the booklets published by these organizations the historical, geographical, economic, cultural and other reasons why the island ‘belonged to Turkey’ and thus why it should be returned to Turkey were spelt out⁴³. All these groups by and large maintained organic ties with the Democrat Party government and some of them also enjoyed close relations with the opposing Republican People's Party (RPP). In these booklets and demonstrations it was defended that “as can never be denied” Cyprus was “a Turkish island having no connection and affinity with Greece from historical,

³⁸ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 75. These figures were two founders of the CTCA.

³⁹ He was the Istanbul district director of CTCA. See Derviş Manizade, *Kıbrıs: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, (Istanbul: Yaylacık Matbaası, 1975).

⁴⁰ Hikmet Bil became president of the Executive Committee of Cyprus is Turkish Society where Ahmet Emin Yalman was selected as member on 27 April 1955. See Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 83.

⁴¹ Kabacalı, Alpay, *Türkiye'de Gençlik Hareketleri*, (Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1992), pp. 123-24.

⁴² Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 68.

⁴³ See Appendix D for the Declaration on Cyprus issued by Turkish National Youth Committee on 12 July 1952, cited in Manizade, Derviş, *Kıbrıs: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, (Istanbul: Yaylacık Matbaası, 1975), p. 259-264. For the Declaration by the Society for the Protection of Cyprus see Darendelioğlu, İlhan E., *Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri: Toplantılar, Mitingler, Nümayişler*, p. 218.

geographical, economic, and geological viewpoint.”⁴⁴ It was further contended that “Greeks are but a minority vis-à-vis 30 millions of Turks.”⁴⁵ In other words, as Turkish Cypriots were an integral part of the Turkish nation and also the island was but the external extension of the ‘homeland’ territory, then Cyprus was a cause, which should forcibly be of interest to each and every Turk.

By the beginning of 1954, in the meetings organized by student unions and numerous Cyprus associations the heroic/nationalistic dose of speeches and declarations extensively increased. In those meetings, which generally received great publicity from mass-circulated newspapers, Greeks were called upon to remember the outcomes of the Turkish war of independence.⁴⁶ Meanwhile the daily *Hürriyet* began to publish series of articles about the ill-treatment to which the Turks of Dodecanese Islands and Western Thrace were exposed by the Greek administration.⁴⁷ Towards the midst of 1950s the Cyprus campaigns orchestrated and led by those organizations and extensively supported by the Turkish press increasingly gained impetus throughout Turkey.

The Cyprus campaigns correspond to a vantage point in the [Turkish] state’s fascistic practices directed at encouraging and organizing the civil mobility for the national causes and at making the public opinion unite around that very national cause. In a country taking giant strides in her way towards capitalist modernization these campaigns made substantial contributions to the popularization and modellization of mobility mechanisms towards creating a national public opinion.⁴⁸

Those campaigns were hinged upon three major motives: 1) The slogan “Cyprus is Turkish and Turkish it shall remain” 2) A strongly anti-Greek discourse, and 3) a vehement anti-communism. During those campaigns it was insistently required that the society should espouse the Cyprus question as its ‘national cause’ around which it

⁴⁴ Darendelioğlu, İlhan E., *Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri: Toplantılar, Mitingler, Nümayişler*, p. 218.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 218.

⁴⁶ For a few articles in Turkish press degrading the Greek nation and reminding them the outcomes of the War of Independence see Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, pp. 49, 235, 305-306.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

⁴⁸ Bora, Tanıl, « Milli Dava Kıbrıs Bir Velayet Davası, Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Kıbrıs », *Birikim*, September 1995 No. 77, p. 22. Translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.

should unify. “Each and every pure-blooded Turk should be interested in Cyprus.”⁴⁹ Mainly owing to these campaigns “Turkish public opinion was aroused and kept in state of nationalist agitation for months.”⁵⁰

In the midst of 1950s the official rhetoric on Cyprus coalesced with the popular discourse of these campaigns and Turkish dailies portraying Cyprus as the ‘national cause’. As such the process in which the Cyprus issue was imprinted as a national cause in the collective conscious of the Turkish society was completed. From 1950s on, the term has been persistently and extensively used by almost all political figures, intelligentsia, printed and visual media and more importantly by the ‘ordinary man’ in some cases even interchangeably with the Cyprus question itself. The Cyprus issue, which figured for the first time in the fourth Menderes government’s program, established on 9 December 1955⁵¹ was articulated as ‘the national cause’ under the foreign policy rubric of the programs prepared by almost all Turkish governments⁵². In the joint declarations issued by the Turkish Republic and the TRNC, in the resolutions declared by Turkish Grand National assembly, in the official statements and informal speeches delivered by the Turkish civilian and military top brass and Rauf Denktaş it has been consistently emphasized that the Cyprus cause is “the national cause of Turkey and the TRNC”. “It has been implemented, from the outset, by joint decisions and actions. This is the way it should continue and shall continue...”⁵³ Thereby, to the ninth president of Turkish Republic Süleyman Demirel, “as the hero of the national cause”

⁴⁹ Manizade Derviş, *Kıbrıs: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, p. 7.

⁵⁰ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 88.

⁵¹ Alpkaya, Gökçen T., “”Türk Dış Politikası”nda Milliyetçilik”, in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 163.

⁵² Ibid., p. 164 ff.

⁵³ Denktaş, Rauf R., “Türkiye’nin Hakları Önde”, *Radikal* 8 November 2003.

“the struggle of Denktas in Cyprus has been one of defending Turkish identity, the Turkish flag and Turkish national awareness.”⁵⁴

The rhetoric of ‘national cause’ that eventually evolved into a meta-narrative in Turkish political discourse as a boundary producing practice has had a two-fold function: one disciplinary and the other exclusionary. It is disciplinary in the sense that it imposes one and subjective way of perceiving the issue on Turkish society as an indubitable, undebatable and objective reality. This objectification is predicated on the exclusion of both other subjective ways of interpreting and of those who do not deem the Cyprus issue as a national cause. This disciplinary attitude has served to the homogenization, fixation and stabilization of Turkish society and its political identity. This, in turn, led to the confinement of the domestic political community within strictly constructed boundaries as an organic totality.

It is also exclusionary on the grounds that the term ‘national cause’ embraces an *a priori* division from the outset between ‘the national’ and ‘the non-national’, ‘the domestic’ and ‘the foreign’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. As the post-structuralist IR theory reminds us this *a priori* division created by the nation state’s elite is geared towards constructing a world of others: a world of others appearing as threatening the security of both the state and its domestic society. As such, a foreign policy discourse functioning through ‘othering’ strategies facilitates the securitization of issues political in nature in such a way as to secure the mobilization of the masses around the official policies. The division between the national and the non-national also entails identification of one or several sectors of the domestic society such as ethnic minority groups and individuals opposed to the official understanding with non-national (*gayri milli*) elements. The long history of the Cyprus dispute is laden with examples of inventing internal ‘others’ identified with the threats originating from the ‘external enemies of Turkish nation’.

⁵⁴ Turkish Daily News, “Ankara reiterates support for Denktas ahead of KKTC elections” electronic edition, 21 March 2000.

For instance, though with varying levels of intensity, the Greek minority in Turkey and the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul were perceived and represented by the Turkish state elite as the “fifth column” (*beşinci kol*) threatening the security of Turkish state and society. Especially in the period between late 1940s to 1980s in tandem with communists, they were blamed for cooperating with ‘Turkey’s enemies in Cyprus’. This reminds the notion stressed by Campbell that state identity “can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the “inside” are linked through a discourse of “danger” with threats identified and located on the “outside””⁵⁵. Through the existence of internal and external others the state “is able to confer the appearance of unity upon the ‘self’ – i.e. a domestic population.”⁵⁶

The ensuing pages of this chapter are dedicated to expatiate the role and impact of the official and mainstream Cyprus discourses in specifying and declaring ‘the internal enemies of Turkish state and society’. In this respect, it is fair to propose that the Cyprus question was instrumentalized by Turkish civilian and military establishment to constantly warn the society against the inimical others such as communism, Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey. However, prior to the critical assessment of the official and mainstream discourses on the issue from this perspective, I would like to deal with a less-known report prepared by the Republican People’s Party in 1940s. Even though it is not directly related to our issue of Cyprus, the report is a seminal resource from which sound evidences can be gleamed as to how the minorities were perceived by the Turkish state elite as a danger that should necessarily be eliminated.

⁵⁵ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, p. 68.

⁵⁶ Hobson, John M., *The State and International Relations*, p. 159.

7.3. RPP's Report on Minorities

A less-known yet very interesting report prepared by the Ninth Bureau of the Republican People's Party responsible for the minorities and the distribution of income in Turkey ostensibly exemplifies the intense nationalistic and xenophobic *Weltanschauung* of the then Turkish state elite. The report estimated to have been written in 1944⁵⁷ stresses the urgency of developing a systematic official policy regarding different nationalities in the country⁵⁸. According to the report, the target of the RPP should be “the creation of a political and societal formation composed of citizens coalesced around their culture and ideal and speaking a single language” and “the creation of a unified nation with a single mother tongue and a single ideal within the boundaries of the homeland.”⁵⁹ The only way of materializing this goal was the imprint in the consciousness of the masses that “each and every honor and benefaction in this country is for the unique use and benefit of those who speak Turkish, who feel themselves Turk and who are only loyal to”⁶⁰ the Turkish nationhood. In the report assimilation is explicitly articulated among the measures that should be taken for the creation of a ‘unified nation’ (*birlik bir millet*). In the same vein, the report did not avoid listing certain techniques of assimilation such as displacement and dispersing of different minority groups to different regions of the country and their subordination in economic terms⁶¹.

The document classifies minorities mainly into two groups: 1) non-Muslims the mother tongue of whom is other than Turkish (Greeks, Armenians and Jews)⁶²; and 2)

⁵⁷ Akar, Rıdvan, ““Bir Resmi Metinden” Planlı Türkleştirme Dönemi”, *Birikim* No: 110, June 1998, p. 69.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 69.

⁵⁹ Bulut, Faik, *Kürt Sorununa Çözüm Arayışları*, (Istanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık, 1998), p. 174. The full text of this report can be found in this book between the pages 166 and 192.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 174.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 175-76. For instance in the report it is suggested that the Armenian minority as a whole be cleansed from Anatolia and be transferred to Istanbul see p. 178.

⁶² For a concise account of the population movements of these groups between 1935-50 see Akar, Rıdvan, ““Bir Resmi Metinden” Planlı Türkleştirme Dönemi”, pp. 171-72.

Muslim groups that are not ethnically Turk (Circassians, Lazes, Georgians, Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks, Arabs and Kurds). For the author, which remains anonymous, the existence of non-Muslim minority groups, the total population of which was estimated at 250.000, was an obstacle before and threat to⁶³ the realization of the RPP's target regarding the unity of language, culture and ideals (*dil, kültür, ülkü birliği*). Owing to its highly securitizing and chauvinistic discourse, the report seemed to herald the anti-Greek riots of 6-7 September 1955 and the extradition of Istanbul Greeks in 1964-65. As a matter of fact, the report set Istanbul Greeks as the very target for the Turkish public. As Anatolia was purged of Greeks as a potential danger, from then on attention should have been summoned only to Istanbul. The objective was crystal clear: "not a single Greek should exist in Istanbul at the 500th anniversary of the conquest of the city"⁶⁴ by the Ottoman. As Rıdvan Akar argued in his article, "the prophecy of the bureaucrat, who prepared the report for the RPP, was to be materialized in 1955 though with a two-year delay."⁶⁵

7.4. 6-7 September 1955 Riots

Time and again during my stay in Turkey, I was confronted by angry Turks heatedly trying to convince me that "Cyprus is Turkish". Their main argument was hardly ever of a strategic or military nature. If such considerations figured at all, they were invariably combined with, and usually overshadowed by, anti-Greek sentiment. I would hear countless stories of Greek atrocities against Turkish villagers in the bitter war of 1919-1923, followed with the assurance that the Turkish minority in Cyprus might expect similar treatment. My informants sometimes went so far as to assert that the Greeks still harbored ambitions for the re-establishment of the Eastern Roman Empire with its capital at Constantinople.

The outbreak of the riots of 6-7 September 1955 in Istanbul and Izmir, called by many as anti-Greek riots, can be evaluated as a vantage point with regard to the development

⁶³ Bulut, Faik, *Kürt Sorununa Çözüm Arayışları*, p. 177.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 178.

⁶⁵ Akar, Rıdvan, "'Bir Resmi Metinden' Planlı Türkleştirme Dönemi", p. 72.

of the Cyprus question. As will be evident in the course of the chapter, these riots were the culmination of a set of events beginning by the British call for a Tripartite Conference on Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean to be held in London on 29 June 1955.

The provocative and anti-Greek editorials and the nationalist tone in *Hürriyet*'s (an Istanbul daily) news as regards Cyprus in June and July 1955 served to create a sense of Greek hostility and an increase of interest in the fate of Turkish Cypriots in Turkish public opinion. The mass-circulated daily's campaign against the Patriarchate in July 1955 injected a religious fervor into the already inflamed public opinion and aggravated anti-Greek sentiments in Turkey⁶⁶. On 18 July *Hürriyet* published a declaration directed at Patriarch Athenagoras, questioning "how he could remain so indifferent to the atrocities and calamities in Cyprus" and called him to condemn "blood-shedder EOKA terrorists."⁶⁷ In reply to this provocative challenge, The Patriarch expressed the goodwill and friendly attitude recently displayed towards him by the Istanbul governor and the Menderes government. *Hürriyet*, in reply, called him not to seek refuge in government authorities and not to disregard the Turkish public opinion "which was indeed far more superior than the government itself."⁶⁸ To Fahir Armaoğlu, by undertaking this *Hürriyet*'s objective was twofold: on the one hand, an indirect, intimidating message was sent to the government. On the other, the Turkish public opinion was flattered by placing it above the government authorities.⁶⁹ "While both the government and the opposition press in general kept up the anti-Greek campaign, *Hürriyet* and *Vatan* played a leading role in it as they raised the specter of Greek armies marching to reconquer Constantinople and Anatolia. The Turkish press

⁶⁶ Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, p. 124.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 124.

⁶⁸ *Hürriyet*, 21 July 1955.

⁶⁹ Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, p. 125.

reported that the *Megali Idea* was imminent.”⁷⁰ Within this atmosphere of heightened tension, a rumor came out on 28 August 1955 and was disseminated through the printing press in Turkey.

Greek terrorists in Cyprus are planning to attack on and massacre the unarmed Turkish Cypriots. This will take place on 28 August. On that day Greek Cypriots will organize a massive meeting to protest against the Tripartite conference in London. This massacre will be carried out on 28 August.⁷¹

This rumor became the top priority in the Turkish press and public opinion so much so that it proved impossible to investigate its source and reliability. According to well-documented verdicts of the Martial Law Courts in Istanbul the epicenter of the rumor was Fazıl Küçük⁷², the leader of Turkish Cypriots, who wrote a letter to Hikmet Bil (editor of *Hürriyet* and president of Cyprus is Turkish Society) on 13 August 1955, which read:

My request to you of this is that, as soon as possible, you inform all branches [of Kıbrıs Türktür] of this situation and that we get them to take action. It seems to me that meetings in the mother country would be very useful. Because these Cyprus Greeks will hold a general meeting on August 28. Either on that day or after the conclusion of the Tripartite Conference they will want to attack us. As is known, they are armed and we have nothing.⁷³

Upon the receipt of the letter Bil sent a circular to all branches of Cyprus is Turkish Society and instructed them to take whatever action they saw appropriate against the massacre and to intimidate London and Athens “by the manly voice arising in the mother country.”⁷⁴ At that point, it will be very useful to briefly touch upon the Cyprus is Turkish Society (Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti) by opening a wide parenthesis.

⁷⁰ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 101.

⁷¹ American Consul General in İstanbul Dispatch 306, American Embassy in Ankara Dispatch 153, American Embassy in Ankara Dispatch 228 cited in An, Ahmet, *Kıbrıs Nereye Gidiyor?*, (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2002), p. 52.

⁷² Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, pp. 129-30.

⁷³ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 104.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

The Cyprus is Turkish Society that “played a more important role than any other organization in Turkey with regard to the Cyprus issue”⁷⁵ became very successful in the manipulation and conditioning of Turkish society and its political imagination. To comprehend the reasons of this success, it suffices to glance over the members of its executive council comprised of prominent journalists and editors of very influential dailies of the time together with the leaders of the student unions.⁷⁶ In the charter of the organization its objectives were stipulated as “to acquaint world public opinion with the fact that Cyprus is Turkish, to defend the rights and privileges of Turks with regard to Cyprus and [do it] from every point of view, and to condition Turkish public opinion.”⁷⁷ Cyprus is Turkish Society, founded on 2 October 1954, was welcomed with great enthusiasm by the whole Turkish press and official circles.

However, the weight and power of the society did not solely originate from the strong approval and blessing it received from the government; more importantly it was reflecting a consensus reached at the top of the state among the Turkish political elite. For instance, two members of the executive council Orhan Birgit and Hikmet Bil were known to have maintained intricate ties with the RPP leadership. The following words of Adnan Menderes quoted by Orhan Birgit explicitly reveals this consensus on such a ‘national cause’: “The Greeks should see how the opposition and the ruling party are united on the Cyprus issue.”⁷⁸ In the aftermath of its foundation the organization spread quickly throughout Turkey and established 50 branches in 12 provinces including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.⁷⁹ The fact that the Society did not experience any difficulty in printing large quantities of placards, handbills and in organizing and coordinating

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 76.

⁷⁶ The executive council included Hikmet Bil from Hürriyet, Kamil Önal from Zafer, A. Emin Yalman from Vatan and Hüsamettin Canöztürk (the leader of the Turkish National Student Federation TNSF).

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 77.

⁷⁸ Birgit, Orhan, *Akis* (a weekly magazine) 11 February 1956.

⁷⁹ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 83.

different activities led to the speculations that it enjoyed financial and other assistance from the state itself. Nevertheless, it goes without doubt that Cyprus is Turkish Society as a 'semi-official',⁸⁰ organization made strategic contributions to the socialization of the discourse of the 'national cause' with regard to Cyprus in Turkish public sphere.

Turning again to the the period preceding the 6-7 September riots, in view of the forthcoming Tripartite Conference what the Ankara government strove to demonstrate to the international public opinion was that the Turkish society was increasingly preoccupied with the Cyprus issue and the imminent threat of massacre of Turkish Cypriots and that the government was not in a position to yield concessions during the Conference in such a national issue.⁸¹ National vigilance and frustration culminated in the wake of the speech delivered by the acting Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in a farewell dinner for the Turkish delegation to the London Conference. Menderes gave credence to the massacre rumor by stating that

the attitude and statements of provocators as regards the Cyprus issue understandably lead us to nurture concerns... They, in a terrorist fashion, declare continually that 28 August will be a day of massacre for our friends in Cyprus... We are therefore obliged to take seriously into account the possibility of an attack by them [Greek terrorists], which might be so sudden as to take the [British] administration unaware.⁸²

Menderes' speech received wide coverage in the Turkish press the next day and arose nationalist emotions of the public to its utmost degree. That very day the statement made by the RPP leader İnönü gave the hints on the convergence of the two political parties vis-à-vis 'the imminent threat of massacre in Cyprus'. İnönü, in full support of the government stressed that "during the time that the government is busy with the Cyprus issue, our domestic politics shall be impregnated with this issue as well."⁸³

⁸⁰ The definition belongs to the author of the dissertation.

⁸¹ See Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 99, and An, Ahmet, *Kıbrıs Nereye Gidiyor?*, p. 55.

⁸² For the full text of Menderes' speech in Liman Lokantasi see Demirer, Mehmet Akif, *6 Eylül 1955 Yassıada 6/7 Eylül Davası*, (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995), pp. 395-400.

⁸³ *Ulus*, 26 August 1955 cited in An, Ahmet, *Kıbrıs Nereye Gidiyor?*, p. 61.

These utterances of the outstanding political figures foregrounding a discourse of ‘national unity’ was accompanied by a provocative campaign of Turkish press against Patriarch Athenagoras and the Greek minority. For instance on 28 August 1955, when the massacre was thought to be launched, stirring news appeared in Cumhuriyet. The daily claimed that the Patriarch was hiding “secret anti-Turkish agents” and that in an attempt to send financial assistance to EOKA activities, Greeks of Istanbul and Greek Orthodox priests had saved “millions of liras”. To make the atmosphere worse, Hürriyet gave a bitter message to Turkish as well as world public opinion by stating that “if Greeks dare attack our brothers in Cyprus, there are plenty of Greeks in Istanbul to retaliate upon.”⁸⁴ Turkish press was portraying the Greek minority both as an immense source of threat for Turkish nation and as a ‘trump’ to be employed, when necessary, against Greece looming as the ‘historical enemy’ of Turks. This rhetoric, which was going to be loudly echoed by the Turkish state elite practically ten years later, was based on the total externalization of Greeks of Istanbul. Hence they were asserted as ‘different’, ‘alien’, ‘pernicious’ and ‘marginal’ elements to Turkish society. In this line of thought, the Turkish governments grappling with and neutralizing the Greek minority came to be seen as defending the ‘national interests’ and the ‘security of the Turkish nation’.

Although on 28 August there occurred no attacks against Turkish Cypriots, “what happened in Cyprus and Turkey in July and August of that summer set the stage for the anti-Greek riots of 6 September 1955 in Turkey. It was during this period that the activities of *Kıbrıs Türktür* reached their peak.”⁸⁵ “With some encouragement from the government and provocation from abroad” and from the press,

public discussion of the Cyprus issue in the summer of 1955 became permeated with sentiments of anger and frustration. By the time Turkish interests in the

⁸⁴ Hürriyet, 28 August 1955 cited in An, Ahmet, *Kıbrıs Nereye Gidiyor?*, p. 63.

⁸⁵ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 98.

dispute were formally recognized with the calling of the Tripartite Conference in London late in August, feeling within the country had reached fever pitch. It was in this atmosphere that serious rioting broke out in the cities of Istanbul and Izmir on September 6, 1955. This explosion of feeling was highly indicative not only of the nature of the Cyprus dispute, but of the character of the nationalist sentiments involved in it.⁸⁶

The spark that started these rallies was the news of a bomb explosion at Atatürk's birthplace in Salonica on 6 September 1955. 'This unexpected incident' caused extreme indignation in Turkish society when the bombing appeared on the headline of pro-government newspaper *Istanbul Ekspres*. The daily announced the event in an extra edition with the largest headline of its history which read: "Atatürk's House Damaged by Bomb"⁸⁷. In the wake of the statement of Cyprus is Turkish on the newspaper, the Society became the motor-force of upcoming events and demonstrations. The statement by the Secretary General of the Society read: "Those who dared lay their hands on our sacred Atatürk shall pay very dearly."⁸⁸ Both Cyprus is Turkish and TNSF issued declarations putting the blame of bombings on Greeks and regarding the event "as the drop which made the cup overflow". They stated that it was no longer possible to control their patience, called Turkish citizens to be aware of the doings of those who did not belong to them and to "repeat the national oath: Cyprus is Turkish and shall remain Turkish."⁸⁹ This declaration was soon circulated among thousands of people and culminated the anti-Greek emotions of the Turkish public.

It was no later than the preparations carried out by Cyprus is Turkish Society in the evening of 6 September had thousands of people rallied in Taksim square in Istanbul. Other groups of demonstrators soon appeared with Atatürk pictures, Turkish flags and iron bars at their hands chanting this slogan: "Demolish and break the

⁸⁶ Tachau, Frank, "The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected in the Cyprus Dispute", in *Middle East Journal*, summer 1959, p. 269.

⁸⁷ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 111.

⁸⁸ Demirer, Mehmet Akif, *6 Eylül 1955 Yassıada 6/7 Eylül Davası*, p. 74.

⁸⁹ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 113.

property of the infidels; they are the enemies of Muslims; no killing”⁹⁰. This mass riot continued in several districts in Istanbul and Izmir with looting, demolishing the Greek shops, schools, restaurants, churches, homes and so forth⁹¹. (See Figure 2)

Figure 2. The 6-7 September 1955 riots in İstanbul⁹²

“What seemed to have begun as a noisy demonstration of Turkish opinion on Cyprus turned into a destructive free-for-all. The leading element became the *lumpenproletariat*, the bootblacks, porters, *kapicis*, and mendicants.”⁹³ Each of the groupings justified their actions in the name of nationalism; thus nationalism became the common denominator of demonstrators.

On 7 September when the army finally intervened in the demonstrations a serious blow had been dealt to the Greek minority in Istanbul. As for the instigators and organizers of these anti-Greek riots, Hikmet Bil, the editor of *Hürriyet*, wrote in his book *Kıbrıs Olayı ve İç Yüzü*⁹⁴ that in the evening of 5 September 1955 a meeting was held in Menderes’s residence. While Menderes was talking about the Tripartite

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 116.

⁹¹ When the riots were over, 73 churches, 26 schools, 1,004 homes, 4212 shops and stores, 21 factories, 12 hotels, 97 restaurants were in ruins and 16 Greeks had died. For a detailed account of 6-7 September 1955 riots see Demirel, Mehmet Akif, *6 Eylül 1955 Yassıada 6/7 Eylül Davası*.

⁹² The figure is taken from *Tarih ve Toplum* (117), September 2003, p. 88.

⁹³ Tachau, Frank, “The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected in the Cyprus Dispute”, pp. 269-70.

⁹⁴ Bil, Hikmet, *Kıbrıs Olayı ve İç Yüzü*, (Istanbul: İtimat Kitabevi, 1976).

Conference in London, “he told me that he received a crypto from [Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü] Zorlu. Zorlu states that he should be able to tell the delegates that we can no longer subdue Turkish public opinion in the Cyprus issue. He wants us to be more active ... The Conference will either acknowledge our cause or will be torpedoed by Zorlu.”⁹⁵ Bil alleges in his book that 6-7 September riots were organized by Menderes government and the Istanbul Police Chief that very night after he left the residence. To expand the circle of instigators further, a retired full general Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu confessed in an interview to Fatih Güllapoğlu that “6-7 September riots were organized by the Special Warfare Department (*Özel Harp Dairesi*). This was a good organization indeed. They hit the very target.”⁹⁶

Nevertheless, soon after a Martial Law was declared in Istanbul on 7 September 1955 (which was to be prolonged several times until 6-7 June 1957), Menderes, in his speech on the state’s radio, accused “the secret communist organization and leftist elements” of instigating the 6-7 September riots. Not surprisingly, leftist writers, intellectuals and laborers previously registered by the police were arrested and kept prisoner for ungrounded reasons. On 10 September 1955 the Commander of Martial Law Lieutenant General Nurettin Aknos held a press conference and announced the following prohibitions:⁹⁷

- 1) It is prohibited to report news that could cause agitation and provocation in the public. Parliamentary meetings shall not be reported should they have potential to cause agitation.
- 2) It is prohibited to criticize the government.
- 3) It is prohibited to make any coverage that could badly affect the government’s functioning.
- 4) It is prohibited to report news as to the Martial Law.
- 5) It is prohibited to report news as to the NATO states.
- 6) It is prohibited to report news as to shortages and scarcities in the country.

⁹⁵ An, Ahmet, *Kıbrıs Nereye Gidiyor?*, p. 68.

⁹⁶ Güllapoğlu, Fatih, *Tanksız Topsuz Harekat*, (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1991), p. 104.

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 195-96.

- 7) It is prohibited to report news and write comments claiming that the events of 6-7 September were organized by groups other than communists.
- 8) News and comments as regards the events of 6-7 September are not allowed.
- 9) News and pictures in the magazine sections of newspapers that could cause agitation and provocation in the public are not allowed.
- 10) Second editions of newspapers are prohibited.

In the wake of these prohibitions, every day new ones were announced by phone to newspaper editors. For instance, on 12 September 1955 it was prohibited to report any news and give pictures on the developments in Cyprus. It was not allowed to report news on investigations carried out with regard to student unions and other associations (13 September). News regarding the courts of the Martial Law were prohibited (17 September). The publication of various newspapers such as *Ulus*, *Tercüman* and *Hürriyet*, each charged with contravening different prohibitions were disallowed for a period of 15 days or for an indefinite period of time.

Although no evidence proved culpability of “communists” in the riots, various Turkish authors and newspapers seemed unreservedly convinced that 6-7 September riots were communist-provoked. Fahir Armaoğlu unquestioningly asserts in his book that the events of 6-7 September originally began as righteous, innocent and well-intentioned demonstrations incited by “national excitement” but later turned out to go beyond its objectives due to “a premeditated communist organization and provocation.”⁹⁸ All major newspapers were in harmony blaming and degrading “communists”. To illustrate, Ömer Sami Coşar in *Cumhuriyet* wrote that “these provocative groups [communists] abusing people’s feelings behaved in such a way as to do a great harm to the Turkish nation and its causes and thus distorted the demonstrations.”⁹⁹ Like *Akşam*, *Ulus* wrote that an “evil plan” (*iblisane tertip*) was concocted by foreign powers aiming at impairing Turco-Greek friendship and at

⁹⁸ Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, p. 165.

⁹⁹ Coşar, Ömer Sami, “Kıbrıs İçin”, *Cumhuriyet* 8 September 1955.

dismembering the Balkan Pact¹⁰⁰. *Milliyet* went as far as to impute the responsibility of not only 6-7 September events but also the breakdown of Turco-Greek relations, provocations in the Cyprus issue and the bombing of Atatürk's house in Selonica on "communists".¹⁰¹ While student unions issued declarations reproaching and protesting the events of 6-7 September, TNSF regarded these unlawful movements as "organized by secret hands."¹⁰²

Despite the two-day attacks and looting against the Greek minority in Istanbul, the number of Greeks leaving Turkey after 7 September 1955 was quite small. According to statistical data compiled by Mehmet Demirer the total number of Greeks residing in Turkey was 80.000 before 6 September 1955. This figured decreased to 75.000 in 1960 and to 48.000 in 1965. Contrary to the general opinion, the events that marked the end of Greek presence in Istanbul were the systemic expulsion of the Rum minority by the Turkish government in the years 1964 and 1965. The burden of the subsequent section will be to expand upon this extradition policy as a consequence of which the number of Greeks in Istanbul declined vastly to 3000 in 1995.

7.5. Extradition of the Greek Minority in 1964-65

While historicizing the treatment and oppression experienced by the Greek minority in Turkey, it is common practice to refer to the anti-Greek riots of 6-7 September 1955 and the imposition of the Tax on Wealth (*Varlık Vergisi*) in 1942 on Greek as well as Jewish and Armenian minority groups in the country. As has been widely elaborated in the previous part, the riots of 6-7 September were a manifest attack organized with the involvement of the Turkish state itself¹⁰³ and had intricate connotations with the Cyprus issue. Quite interestingly, the deportation of Istanbul

¹⁰⁰ Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahit, "Son Olaylar", *Ulus* 12 September 1955.

¹⁰¹ "Bugün Değilse Hiçbir Gün", *Milliyet* 11 September 1955.

¹⁰² *Hürriyet* 8 and 9 September 1955 respectively.

¹⁰³ Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), p. 11.

Greeks in 1964 with a government decree, which had as much crucial implications on Turkish domestic politics as did the events of 6-7 September, has not attracted the academic interest it deserves. This government-led deportation movement remains as an under-studied area partly due to the fact that the official documents, registers and information on Greeks in Turkey are meticulously classified by the government apparatus. Perhaps a less important factor can be said to lie in the amnesia, wittingly or unwittingly, of scholars overlooking this enigmatic period of Turkish history.

Against this background, the mass exiles of Greeks in 1964 acquires even greater significance if evaluated as the last stage of the governments' deliberate moves since 1914 toward annihilating the Greek minority in Turkey within a four-step process. This rather jingoistic move, which went hand in hand with the 'Turkification' policies, originated in 1914 under the rule of the Committee of the Union and Progress and aimed at eliminating the impact exerted by the minority bourgeoisie on the Ottoman economic and commercial life. Turkification policies were, in Aktar's terms

an effort toward consolidating the hegemony of Turkish ethnic identity and its bearers over every field of societal life from the every day language and the official account of history to be taught at schools, from the course of commercial transactions to the recruitment policies for official posts¹⁰⁴.

As striking statistical data, whilst prior to the World War I the minorities constituted approximately 18% of the population, in 1924 nearly just one out of every 40 persons was minority belonging in Turkey¹⁰⁵.

The second stage occurred in the Population Exchange Agreement concluded between Turkey and Greece in the aftermath of the Treaty of Lausanne. A tax law adopted in 1942 set the ground for the third step of the Turkification process under the guise of Tax on Wealth. In his comprehensive book on Tax on Wealth Ayhan Aktar reclaims this tax not as a mere implementation of a newly-adopted law but more

¹⁰⁴ Aktar, Ayhan, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), pp. 101-135.

¹⁰⁵ Keyder, Çağlar, *State and Class in Turkey*, (London: Verso, 1987), p. 79.

importantly as an inherent part of the ‘Turkification’ policies of the government in the early years of the Republican era. In this context, the Tax on Wealth, which imposed a much more severe burden on Greek, Jew and Armenian minority belongings when compared with Turkish nationals, can also be read as a continuation of the ‘anti-minority’ policies in Turkey¹⁰⁶.

Turning again to the expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul in 1964 and 1965, it is fair to suggest that this policy of extradition can be evaluated as the final stage of Turkifying the economic, societal, and cultural life in the country. This part of the dissertation aims to elaborate on the process through which the decision of expulsion was taken and implemented by the governments of the time. Owing to the scarce literature on the issue at stake, I will mostly draw on Hülya Demir and Rıdvan Akar’s book and on the daily press of the time. As the corollary of the policy of expulsion it is estimated that an approximate total of 30.000-40.000¹⁰⁷ Greeks of Turkish and Greek nationalities left Turkey. As it will be more evident in the pages to come, this policy had, from the beginning, been championed by the press in full harmony with the Turkish government. Not unlike the state elite, the press and the student unions maintaining organic ties with the government devised a xenophobic, chauvinist, exclusionary and degrading discourse against the Greek minority mostly living in İstanbul.

Given the undeniable linkage between the trajectory of the Cyprus dispute and the domestic political maneuvers of the İnönü government¹⁰⁸, it is worthwhile to point briefly to the political atmosphere in the island and its repercussions on the Turkish society. In November 1963 Archbishop Makarios proposed 13 amendments in the

¹⁰⁶ Aktar, Ayhan, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, p. 136.

¹⁰⁷ In fact this figure is thought to be much higher owing to the number of Greeks leaving Turkey voluntarily and the family members of the expelled Greeks. However adequate and reliable statistical data are not available. Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 12.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 17-18.

Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. To the official argument it was no later than Turkish Cypriots opposed to the amendments had the Greek Cypriot attacks been launched to destroy houses and properties in 103 Turkish Cypriot villages¹⁰⁹. It then became a daily practice to read in newspapers violently murdered, missing and captured Turkish Cypriots. Such was the frustration of Turkish public opinion against Greek Cypriots exercising economic embargo, legal restrictions and conducting onslaughts that the fate of Cypriot ‘brethren’ became the hottest issue¹¹⁰. At the very beginning of 1964 Turkey had exhausted all political means at her disposal for a solution in Cyprus at the international level. This desperation found expression in Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun C. Erkin’s statement that “the key for the resolution of the Cyprus problem was in the hands of Greece.”¹¹¹ At this juncture when Turkey was in urgent need of gaining new trumps vis-à-vis Greece, the Greek minority resident in Turkey came to be seen as a means for ‘retaliation’¹¹² in the Cyprus conflict. Hence a project concocted by the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü envisaged employing the Rums in Turkey as ‘hostages’ for the acceptance and materialization of Turkish thesis as regards the Cyprus dispute¹¹³.

Turkish press turned out to be a willing instrument for legitimizing the government’s policy in the eyes of Turkish citizens. News and articles in the daily press after reminding the common ethnic, religious and cultural origins of the Greek minority in Turkey and the Greek Cypriots contended that direct financial and other assistance were provided by the Rums in Turkey to Archbishop Makarios and ‘EOKA terrorists’¹¹⁴. A large number of columnists in dailies set out to create an anti-Greek discourse portraying Greeks as the “fifth column” encircling Turkey since the Ottoman

¹⁰⁹ Soysal, Mümtaz & Ertekün, N. Münir, “Federal Solution for Cyprus”, *Foreign Policy* Vol. XIV No: 3-4, p. 18.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 19.

¹¹¹ Toker, Metin, *Demokrasinin İsmet Paşalı Yılları, İnönü’nün Son Başbakanlığı (1961-1965)*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992), p. 195. Quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 26.

¹¹² Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 27.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 27.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

period. In the newspaper columns the Greeks were also referred as genetically flawed and ruthless bloodshedders¹¹⁵, and as the evil, historical enemy of Turks¹¹⁶.

A significant point should be highlighted with regard to the government's operation of eliminating the Greek minority. The Turkish Assembly was used as a stepping stone by the then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü to pre-empt the allegations that an illegal and undemocratic operation was underway¹¹⁷. In effect, the second stepping stone was the formation of a responsive and harmonious public opinion by the activities of student unions and Turkish press. This double-edged strategy had once more been used in 1942 to implement Tax on Wealth by the same political cadres as in 1964. On 14 February 1964 a parliamentary question was submitted by a deputy from RPP to the Prime Minister. The content of the question was as follows:

- 1) What is the total population of the Greeks of Turkish nationality residing and working in Turkey?
- 2) What is the proportion of those liable for income tax?
- 3) What is the total amount of income tax levied from the Greeks of Turkish nationality?
- 4) What is the amount of income tax per Greek in Turkey?
- 5) Has any measure been taken against those avoiding income tax?
- 6) Has the government been closely monitoring the economic and social activities of the Greeks of Turkish nationality?
- 7) Will the residence permits of the Greeks of Turkish nationality be revised and the necessary measures be taken?¹¹⁸

After this set of questions two seminal statements preceded the adoption of an expulsion decision for the Greek minority. As covered in daily *Milliyet*, İnönü complained about the activities of those detrimental to the society, evading somehow punishment and pointed to the urgency of taking governmental action against them to safeguard the

¹¹⁵ Kaflı, Kadircan, "Rum", *Tercüman* 28 January 1964, quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 30.

¹¹⁶ Kabaklı, Ahmet, *Tercüman* 20 January 1964, quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 31.

¹¹⁷ Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 33.

¹¹⁸ *Yeni Sabah* 14 February 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 33-34. Translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.

society¹¹⁹. The implied unpunished “malignants” were later clarified by Ahmet Kabaklı as follows:

The deportation of Greeks in Turkey to Greece can easily be negotiated. If there are people among those who wish to emigrate in their own will, our government and even Turkish people are ready and willing to pay ample compensation to them ... Should our patience reach its limits not only Cyprus but also all Turkish island in the Aegean, Western Thrace and even Marmara islands shall be returned to their original owner [Turkey].¹²⁰

According to Akar, there exist two underlying references in this conservative columnist’s article. By proposing to pay compensation to Greeks to be expelled from the country he was making allusion to the compensation which had been paid to the Greek minority in the wake of anti-Greek riots of 6-7 September 1955. Nevertheless, this proposition should not be read as a legal entitlement but rather as a covert threat against the Rums of Istanbul. Equally important was his expression that Marmara islands (e.g. Büyükada, Kınalıada) the population of which was mostly composed of non-Muslims, could be regained by Turkey. This had long been the dream cherished by certain chauvinist circles in the country yearning for the return of ‘lost lands’¹²¹.

On 16 March 1964 the İnönü government annulled the Agreement on Residence, Commerce and Navigation signed between Greece and Turkey on 30 October 1930 and thus announced the extradition of Greeks of Turkish nationality residing in Turkey in six months’ time. The unilateral annulment of the agreement was cheered in the Turkish public opinion as it amounted to “the second War of Independence vis-à-vis the Greek.”¹²² As further announced by Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs these forcefully banished Greeks could return to Turkey on the condition that Greece yielded concessions in the Cyprus issue.¹²³ Nevertheless, Article 16 of the agreement stipulated

¹¹⁹ *Milliyet* 9 March 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 35.

¹²⁰ Kabaklı, Ahmet, “Kutsal Tugay”, *Tercüman* 6 February 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 36. The translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.

¹²¹ Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 36.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

that the minority groups be swiftly expelled from their resident country should the security of the parties to the Agreement be at stake. This presented a legitimate ground for Turkish government to implement the decision of expelling the Greek minority without delay. In view of the fact that the course of events in Cyprus had further aggravated it was evaluated as unwise to wait six months to purge the Greeks in Turkey and to cleanse the society from “the evil-doings of Greeks”¹²⁴.

The daily press made its own contribution to the anti-Greek atmosphere in Turkey by giving wide coverage to the crimes and offences of the Greek minority and accentuating the ethnic origins of those arrested: “A Greek murderer and smuggler was arrested”, “Two Greek tradesmen defrauded the market”¹²⁵. Not surprisingly the first set of Greek businessmen were to be expelled by reasons of “security concerns” and were claimed to have been conducting detrimental activities against Turkey¹²⁶. This allegation pointed to the enemies from inside looming as “an insidious threat” both above the Turkish economy and Turkish society as a whole¹²⁷. “The first set of Greeks of Turkish nationality involved in such misdeeds as establishing illegal associations, gathering money with the purpose of providing arms to Greek Cypriots, making anti-Turkish propaganda and using fake invoices will be expelled today.”¹²⁸

In the ensuing days the government accelerated the extradition policy to purge the Greeks of Greek nationality “seeking to deal a blow to Turkey from within and conducting detrimental activities as the fifth column.”¹²⁹ As a matter of fact the basis of the government’s extradition policy was hinged upon the existence of a clandestine organization through which Turkey was to be weakened and financial aid was

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 66.

¹²⁵ *Son Havadis* 13 January 1964 and *Akşam* 15 May 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 65.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 68.

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp. 68-69.

¹²⁸ *Vatan* 30 March 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 69.

¹²⁹ Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 73.

transferred to Greek Cypriots¹³⁰. Minister of Internal Affairs İlhan Öztrak announced to the public that the 95% of expelled Greek businessmen were members of an illegal association ‘Eleniki Enosis’ and were “imperiling the internal as well as external security of Turkey”.¹³¹ These allegations which remained unsubstantiated were enumerated in a document which was to be forcefully signed by Greeks subject to extradition. Anyone signing the document necessarily acknowledged that he/she:

- a) violated laws,
- b) held membership in the Eleniki Enosis, which is convicted of organizing political activities against Turkey,
- c) transferred money to Greek terrorists in Cyprus,
- d) consented to leave Turkey in his/her own will.¹³²

During the accelerated process of expulsion, student organizations after having stated their appreciation arising from “the government’s latest felicitous decision”, expressed their demands from the government as follows¹³³:

- 1) The urgent expulsion of the Greek nationals engaged in commercial activities by virtue of the annulment of the agreement depriving them from the right to do business in Turkey,
- 2) The abolishment of the educational privileges of minority schools opposing the unity of language and thought in Turkey,
- 3) The reform of religious institutions¹³⁴.

Quite interestingly, all these demands welcomed at the government level were to be fulfilled in a certain spell of time. Meanwhile student unions had already initiated on 15 April 1964 a campaign to end business activities with Greeks in Turkey and another campaign named as “Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş”.

Of the principal motives of anti-Greek propaganda and rhetoric in early 1964 was the comparison of Istanbul Greeks and their living conditions with the Turks of Western Thrace. In this sense, newspapers published series of articles depicting the ‘extreme poverty’ and ‘misery’ of ‘oppressed’ Turks in Western Thrace while stressing

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 75.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 75.

¹³² Ibid., p. 76.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 84.

¹³⁴ Here with the term ‘religious institutions’ it is referred to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchy in Istanbul.

the economic and social welfare and privileges of Rums in Turkey¹³⁵. The political authority was certainly in favor of these campaigns articulating Greeks as the inimical other deserving to be expelled from the country. It ventured to gain support for its policies through an inflammatory propaganda in Turkish press and anti-Greek activities of various organizations. In consequence, the government's operation of expelling the Greek minority and expropriating their securities and real properties throughout 1964 proved to be a systemic elimination of Rums in Istanbul and their weight in the national economy.

7.5.1. Economy As A Sphere To Be Turkified

The Rhetoric of National Economy

Among the major objectives of the newly born Turkish Republic was the dissemination of the 'consciousness of Turkishhood' among Turkish citizens in order to forge a nation state composed purely of Turks. This required at the second stage the elimination of non-Muslim minorities and their weight and influence in economic sphere. In this sense, the İnönü government established an analogy between the material wealth and well-being of the minorities and their ethnic identity through a specific rhetoric setting them as a manifest 'danger' to Turkish national economy. As such the exclusionary and securitizing official approach has been born to the sphere of economy as well. The rhetoric on national economy championed also by Turkish press, labor unions particularly TÜRKİŞ and the youth organizations was geared toward mobilizing the domestic society around the official policies in such a way as to secure the national unity and cohesion.

What we call national economy corresponds to a system where capital is accumulated in the hands of virtuous and patriotic Turks. If the state reclaims a national economy it should not grant loans to those transferring their earnings

¹³⁵ *Hürriyet* 6 May 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 93.

secretly to the enemies of Turks and helping to provide arms to kill our brethren ... People with national consciousness do business only with honest and honorable Turkish merchants.¹³⁶

In this atmosphere, the annulment of the Agreement on Residence, Commerce and Navigation by the İnönü government on 16 March 1964 was claimed to be cheered by Turkish people even though they had hardly any information about its content.¹³⁷

These fully-fledged creatures [Greeks] have established their hegemony in Istanbul market and have been sucking our blood by making use of the advantages of 1930 Agreement, our tolerance and the absent-mindedness of the authorities so much so that they have been nourishing our enemies and their hostility ... We, on the other hand, cannot supply employment to our own Turkish citizens in the country. It is high time we became extremely vigilant and stop feeding those malign, ungrateful people.¹³⁸

As a matter of fact, in this period “which turned out to be a hysteria for national independence, all agreements, whether major or minor, concluded with Greece began to be questioned”¹³⁹ and articulated as a threat to Turkey’s national interests.

On 15 April 1964 three government-led student organizations Turkish National Youth Organization (TNYO), Turkish National Student Federation (TNSF), National Turkish Student Union (NTSU) launched an anti-Greek campaign to stop all business activities with Greek merchants. Their joint declaration as regards the campaign read: “GREAT TURKISH NATION keeping in mind that each lira” they earn by exploiting you will turn out to be arms directed at “your brethren in Cyprus, the best thing you can do in the service of Turkishhood is to cut off all business with those exploiting us economically” (...) “At this period of economic warfare if you do not wish to be the slaves of world nations” become a volunteer in this campaign¹⁴⁰. (See Figure 3) The campaign that could not gain the backing of Turkish society as much as desired was

¹³⁶ Kabaklı, Ahmet, “Milli İktisat”, *Tercüman* 9 January 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 35. The translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹³⁸ Fenik, Mümtaz Faik, “Koynumuzda Yılan Beslemişiz”, *Son Havadis* 30 March 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 55. The translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 83.

stopped immediately after the message of the then Minister of Interior Affairs. This constitutes another proof that these youth organizations were strictly controlled and manipulated by the government itself.

Figure 3. A leaflet published by the Turkish National Student Federation (TNSF) and the National Turkish Student Union (NTSU) in 1964. Its publication details and translation is provided above¹⁴¹.

To the printing press in Turkey what had been imposed on the Greek minority through these campaigns and economic boycotts were normal and tolerable.

The financial and moral pressure exerted on our Rum citizens and Greek nationals by way of the recent events in Cyprus is normal. This pressure has not yet exceeded its normal limits. Nevertheless, as long as the wound of Cyprus bleeds, this situation might be expected to grow worse.¹⁴²

In consequence, it was a common inclination of the government-controlled press to establish direct linkages between the situation of the Greek minority in Turkey and the developments in the island of Cyprus. This ready-made correlation constitutes a very pertinent model of the exclusionary practices in which one sector of the society is marginalized and identified with the threats “located on the “outside””. As a matter of fact, the society was called upon to behave unilaterally vis-à-vis the Greeks of Turkey presented as existential and imminent threat to the survival of Turkish national economy. Thus apart from the degrading and exclusionary nature of the ‘civil’ campaigns and official policies directed against those, the government’s policy of expulsion can also be read as an attempt toward the Turkification of the economy. In

¹⁴¹ The leaflet is taken from *Tarih ve Toplum* (117) September 2003, p. 81.

¹⁴² *Barış Dünyası* (magazine), “Türkiye’deki Rumlar”, 1964, pp. 44-46 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 85.

materializing this goal, the first exiled group was consisting of wealthy and influential Greek businessmen whose properties were immediately confiscated by the state. Thereby it can easily be argued that the Cyprus issue was instrumentalized by the bureaucratic and political establishment in Turkey as a means in their long-lasting policy of Turkifying the national economy.

7.5.2. Campaigns Against the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate

It is fair to propose that at times when Turkish domestic politics was preoccupied with the Cyprus question and Turkish Cypriots, Turkish press and political figures such as members of the cabinet and deputies from both the ruling party and opposing parties kept a vigilant eye on the status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul and Patriarch Athenagoras. To illustrate, immediately before the anti-Greek riots of 6-7 September 1955 subsequent agitative articles appeared in dailies particularly in *Hürriyet* and *Vatan*. In April 1957 and later in 1958 various columnists suggested the transfer of the Patriarchate from Turkey to Greece. The daily *Yeni İstanbul* initiated a survey among the members of Turkish ‘intelligentsia’ and announced that the overwhelming majority of participants enthusiastically approved this transfer¹⁴³. In 1958 the campaign in favor of moving out of the Patriarchate from Turkey was revived by youth organizations and backed by various columnists such as A. Şükrü Esmer in daily *Ulus*. It was contended that the Orthodox Church in Turkey had moved far from its Ecumenical status and been Greekified¹⁴⁴.

As was indicated in the previous section as well, throughout 1950s in various occasions Turkish dailies had exerted pressures on Patriarch Athenagoras to condemn Makarios by virtue of his religious authority. In the same vein, at the very beginning of

¹⁴³ Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, pp. 344-45.

¹⁴⁴ Esmer, Ahmet Şükrü, “Patrikhanenin Durumu”, *Ulus* 11 July 1958 quoted in Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, p. 471.

1964 parallel to the government's decision of extradition, Turkish press resumed its pressures on the Patriarch to deliver statements favoring Turkey's official policy in the Cyprus conflict¹⁴⁵. However, this time the demands for the condemnation of Makarios was accompanied by the accusations imputed on the Patriarchate. Athenagoras and the Greeks of Istanbul were claimed to maintain good relations with Makarios and the Greek Cypriots and to donate 10 million dollars per year to 'the mainland' Greece¹⁴⁶. (See Figure 4)

Meanwhile, the government's usual strategy of addressing parliamentary questions was once more materialized on 4 April 1964 to take a firm stance against the institutional personality of the Patriarchate. An RPP deputy submitted a parliamentary question to the Turkish Grand National Assembly raising the following questions: whether the government was aware of the fact that the Patriarchate was engaged in politics since the Treaty of Lausanne, what was the stance of the Patriarchate concerning the Cyprus issue, did Athenagoras display an attitude favoring the Greek thesis during his negotiations with the Pope. Soon after this parliamentary question giving way to severe measures against the Orthodox Church¹⁴⁷, the printing house of the Patriarchate was closed down on the grounds that its operation was an infringement of the Treaty of Lausanne¹⁴⁸. The legal basis for the closure of the printing house was announced to the Patriarchate as the violation of the Act 5681 entitling only legal and physical persons to own printing houses.¹⁴⁹ This amounted to the declaration of the printing house and its periodicals as illegal.

¹⁴⁵ Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 32.

¹⁴⁶ Macar, Elçin, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), p. 201.

¹⁴⁷ Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 124.

¹⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet* 11 April 1964 quoted in Macar, Elçin, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, p. 202.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

Figure 4. Two nationalist brochures from 1967 and 1955. They are intended for “revealing the secret and pernicious activities of the Greek Patriarchate working in collaboration with protagonists of Megali Idea and internal enemies of Turks”- namely the Greeks of Istanbul.”¹⁵⁰

In parallel to the government’s ‘measures’ and the exclusionary language it used, some agitative articles appeared in the press implying that there existed no difference between the secret agents and the personnel of the Patriarchate working in a way as to damage “the political security in Turkey.”¹⁵¹ Though limited, this view gathered further support from the media and some political figures. The Greco-Turkish tension, which persisted in 1965, was by no means alleviated by the new S. H. Ürgüplü government as well. He decided to expulse all Greeks of Greek nationality in Turkey without delay and to audit the accounts of the Patriarchate by the government.¹⁵² Accordingly, an audit commission was formed to prepare a report on the financial situation and transactions of the Patriarchate. Although the conclusions of the report was not announced to the public, the speculative news were manifold in the press: “The investigation reached the conclusion that the Patriarchate had been engaged in politics and had been conducting activities as regards the Cyprus issue since the onset of the problem.”¹⁵³ In effect, this accusatory rhetoric had already been employed by the President of the Republic Cemal Gürsel on 8 April 1965: “Since its very inception the

¹⁵⁰ The figure is taken from *Tarih ve Toplum* (117), September 2003, p. 85.

¹⁵¹ Fenik, Mümtaz Faik, “Fener Patriği Hesap Vermelidir”, *Son Havadis* 13 April 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 126.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

¹⁵³ *Milliyet* 25 April 1965 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 139.

Patriarchate has been following an illegal path and has never been solely engaged in its religious duties ... The fate of the Greek minority is closely associated with the Cyprus issue and Turco-Greeks relations.”¹⁵⁴

In the following months due to the onset of bilateral negotiations between Turkey and Greece the pressures on the Patriarchate and Greek minority seemed to be alleviating although the public opinion and the press were not keen enough to renounce its firm stance against the Rum minority in the country¹⁵⁵. The common feature of these anti-Greek and anti-Patriarchate campaigns conducted in different stints is the perception of the Orthodox Patriarchate as a threat to Turkey and representation of Archbishop Makarios, as a religious figure, as the sole responsible of the onslaught of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus.

7.6. Cyprus As A Base In the Defence of the “Free World”

*Our membership in NATO is, first of all, an important stride in our westernization movement. We have obtained a place and a say within the Atlantic community. The frontiers of Europe now begin from Eastern Turkey. In the context of our historical development, this constitutes an important achievement and a milestone. In this world of ours that has been made smaller due to advances in ... technology, nations are compelled to come together and form solidarity groups ... The countries which have similar political systems, and close values and views of life and common interests generally come together. The cooperation ... grows in time and creates an atmosphere of community. This has been the case in NATO.*¹⁵⁶

As implied in this lengthy quotation from former Turkish foreign minister Kamran İnan, throughout the Cold War years Turkey’s membership in NATO has been directly associated with its will and efforts to be a member of the Western society by Turkish state elite.

NATO membership symbolizes Turkey’s Westernness, its dedication to modernity, democracy and human rights. It became a means for drawing boundaries between internal (the West) that manifested enlightened civilization

¹⁵⁴ *Milliyet* 8 April 1965 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*, p. 138.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-42.

¹⁵⁶ İnan, Kamran, “Turkey and NATO”, *Foreign Policy* 4:1 (1974), p. 71.

and development and the external (the East) that represented autocracy, underdevelopment and corruption.¹⁵⁷

The Turkish state elite perceiving and representing NATO membership as a new step in Turkey's westernization and modernization process elevated it to the status of a civilization project for Turkey as has been the very case in the United States¹⁵⁸. According to the prevailing idea among the state elite and intelligentsia, Turkey, by partaking in NATO, contributed not only to the defence of the Western world in military terms but also to the defence of Western values against the communist bloc.

In the decade following the World War II, anti-communism became the integral part of the nationalist and modernizing discourse of Turkish bureaucratic and political establishment. Hence it was incorporated in the processes through which the Turkish state identity had been redefined as a modern Western state. The existence of a communist threat emanating from the imminent neighbor USSR was also instrumentalized to fix and stabilize the domestic political community and to confine its political imagination within a sphere the boundaries of which were inscribed only by the state elite itself. As such the discursive economy devised on the struggle with communism has always been deeply embedded in and inherent to the state society relations in Turkey especially during the Cold War years.

7.6.1. Communism: A Threat Coming from the Eastern Mediterranean

For such a dissertation intended for analyzing the Cyprus question from the perspective of internal power relations and particularly the relations between 'the ruling' and 'the ruled' in Turkey, the vehemently anti-communist nature of the Cyprus campaigns figures as a very fertile and interesting area of study. I am convinced that

¹⁵⁷ Yılmaz, Eylem, *The Role of Foreign Policy Discourse in the Construction of Turkey's Western Identity During the Cold War*, Unpublished Master's thesis, (Ankara: Bilkent University The Department of International Relations, 2002), p. 68.

¹⁵⁸ Campbell, David, *Writing Security The United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Chapter 2.

any analytical attempt addressing and searching for the implications and reflections of the Cyprus question on the inner political dynamics in Turkey should necessarily take into account the prevalent discourse of anti-communism reproduced with respect to the Cyprus issue. It is a non-deniable fact that the anti-communist Cyprus campaigns the first implications of which can be traced back to late 1940s drastically conditioned the political approach and imagination of Turkish society regarding the issue at stake. In this context, this section of the seventh chapter suggests that the articulation of Cyprus as a “communist base” threatening both Turkey and the rest of “peace-loving nations” of the “free world” cannot solely be associated with Turkey’s self-location among the members of the Western society. Yet more importantly the rhetoric of anti-communism, as has been in the Cyprus case, has been inherent to the maintenance of state society relations in Turkey as the relations of subjugation and dominance.

In May 1951 a number of associations displaying nationalist and Pan-Turkist proclivities such as Hearths of Turkish Culture, Association for Turkish Culture and Turkish Youth Organization convened to form the Association of the Nationalists of Turkey.¹⁵⁹ The two common purposes amalgamating all these associations were to struggle with communism and to defend the cause of Turkish minority in Cyprus¹⁶⁰. “Such was the predominance of anti-communism in the discourse adopted by these associations that it outweighed the hostility against Greeks.”¹⁶¹ Various booklets published by different student organizations and nationalist associations drew attention to the ‘communist danger’ and called upon Turkey and Greece to jointly fight against this imminent threat. This vociferous call fully coincided with the anti-communist discourse of the Democrat Party government. According to Fahir Armaoğlu, “Turkish youth has been evaluating the Cyprus issue directly from the perspective of the danger

¹⁵⁹ Landau, Jacob M., *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, (Leiden: Brill, 1974), p. 197.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 197.

¹⁶¹ Bora, Tanıl, “Milli Dava Kıbrıs Bir Velayet Davası Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Kıbrıs”, p. 21.

of communism.”¹⁶² In the rallies organized especially by Pan-Turkist student and youth organizations the leaders of these unions were delivering fervent speeches on the “red imperialism” (*kızıl emparyalizm*) threatening the whole world and particularly the entire Turkish nation¹⁶³. Today millions of Turks “who fell under the clutches of the reds [Azeris, Kirgizes etc. under the hegemony of USSR] had been bemoaning and lamenting desperately. Now the red disaster is seeking to plague Cyprus.”¹⁶⁴ “It is a certain and regretful fact that the great majority of Greek citizens are communist.” The communists “in their cause for Enosis” united with Greek nationalists, “under the directives of Moscow”, in order for Russia to capture Cyprus. The conviction that Greeks and communists were collaborating against Turkey was broadly articulated in the rallies as well as in books and brochures published and disseminated in 1950s and 1960s. (See Figure 5)




Figure 5. The cover of an anti-communist book by Fethi Tevetoğlu written in 1966 under the name Cyprus and Communism.

¹⁶² Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, p. 11.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 11.

7.6.2. The State's Struggle with Communism

The struggle against communism and other 'extreme leftist movements' had at all times figured high on the political agenda of the bureaucratic establishment and political elite in Turkey throughout the Cold War years. In 1950s, when Turkey was in an enthusiastic search of finding herself a place in the 'Western family', the accent on anti-communism in government programs and official statements was enormously high. For instance, in the government program of the first Democrat Party cabinet which was announced on 29 May 1950, only two weeks after the general elections were held, the necessity of fighting with communism and extreme leftist political movements "for the preservation of our reforms unreservedly embraced by our people"¹⁶⁵ was allocated a seminal place. As such the government speaking on behalf of the whole Turkish nation was declaring communism and communists as a threat for the society presumed to be an absolutely unified and homogenous totality. By this program the government publicly announced that "the necessary legal measures would be taken" "to thoroughly eradicate" the extreme leftist movements devastating the country from inside.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes did not avoid in the course of parliamentary debates criticizing former RPP governments for having failed to conduct a judicious and satisfactory struggle against communism.

7.6.3. The Anti-communist Rhetoric of Turkish Press

Among the main parameters conditioning the outlook of Turkish press to the Cyprus question figured the interests of the Western alliance¹⁶⁷ particularly in the first two decades of the Cold War years. To illustrate this, during 1950s when the Turkish state had been seeking herself a place within the Western bloc Turkish press had an

¹⁶⁵ Darendelioğlu, İlhan E., *Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri: Toplantılar, Mitingler, Nümayişle*, p. 235.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 235.

¹⁶⁷ Gürel, Şükrü Sina, *Kıbrıs Tarihi 2*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1985), p. 73.

inclination of assessing almost all developments in Cyprus such as the organization of a plebiscite for Enosis by the Greek Orthodox Church with the backing of AKEL¹⁶⁸, the demand for self-determination asserted by Makarios and supported by Greece, the commencement of EOKA activism in the island from the perspective of maintaining and advocating the interests of the Western alliance and the “free world” vis-à-vis the communist bloc. This attitude overlapping with the mindset of the Turkish bureaucratic and political establishment resulted in persistent and systematic publications about the ‘danger of communism’. The press identifying Turkey’s national interests with those of the West did not avoid adopting an inflammatory language as to the threats posed by communists directed towards the survival of “Turkish nation and other free nations.” The Turkish press maintained this extremely Westernist posture until the midst of 1960s when the political elite began to express loudly its disillusionment due to the lack of support it had expected from the West as regards its thesis on the Cyprus question. To the press a Greekified Cyprus would inexorably fall under the domain of influence of the communist dictatorship and this would, in turn, constitute a threat to the neighboring Middle Eastern countries¹⁶⁹. In this way, Turkish press took its part in the processes in which communist ideology and communists were demonized and declared as ‘other’, ‘alien’ and ‘deviant’ inside and outside the country. There is no doubt that the dramatization of the Cyprus issue as an imminent and existential threat through an intense and vehement anti-communist rhetoric was substantially instrumental in the mobilization of the masses around such a national cause.

In both the official and mainstream discourses on Cyprus the existence of a vital threat of communism was another factor justifying the return of the island to Turkey in case of a change in the status quo. To this view articulated by various columnists,

¹⁶⁸ See Yalman, Ahmet, Emin, “Neden Bir Kıbrıs Meselesi Var?”, *Vatan* 18 January 1950.

¹⁶⁹ Gürel, Şükrü Sina, *Kıbrıs Tarihi* 2, p. 76.

politicians and other state authorities Greece had neither the capacity nor the will to avert such a looming danger. For instance, for Sedat Simavi

the determination and resolution Turkey displayed in the Korean War is indicative of how she is able to safeguard the Mediterranean region. The United States has come to understand who has the real capacity of defending such a base as Cyprus. Once each acre of these lands belongs to Turkey, it will not fall on the red priest [Archbishop Makarios] to discuss the issue in the presence of the US.¹⁷⁰

Not unlike Turkish press, other forms of published materials i.e. brochures, leaflets and books were stressing the necessity as to defending the interests of the Western alliance on Cyprus¹⁷¹. The maintenance of British sovereignty over the island and/or its return to Turkey were expressed as the two most appropriate ways of guaranteeing the strategic interests of Turkey and the “free world” against the “communist calamity”.

In a probable war Turkey could receive the aid to be extended to her within the framework of NATO via Mersin and İskenderun harbors. Should Cyprus be in the hands of Greece not willing to hamper communist activities, Turkey is bound to be faced with serious dangers and risks in view of the fact that 60 % of the Greeks on Cyprus are communist.¹⁷²

Parallel to the fierce anti-communism of the Democrat Party government, Turkish press with its most part “devoted a great deal of editorial space to apocalyptic articles highlighting the grave danger to Turkey that a “Greek and communist” Cyprus would pose.”¹⁷³ It is a well-known fact that throughout the Cold War period at no time did Turkish press spare its backing from Turkish governments and bureaucratic establishment in foreign policy issues especially if such ‘national causes’ as Cyprus was at stake. A brief glance at the overall attitude of the press toward Cyprus question along 1950s suffices to reveal and exemplify this ascertainment. Turkey’s official policy as regards Cyprus had been of maintaining the status quo between 1950-1956, of

¹⁷⁰ Quoted in Özejder, İbrahim, *Türkiye’nin Kıbrıs Sorununa Girişinde Basın ve Diğer Etkenlerin Rolü*, (unpublished PhD dissertation), (Istanbul: Istanbul University The Institute of Social Sciences, 1996), p. 84. The translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 96.

¹⁷² Metin, Hüseyin, *Kıbrıs Tarihine Toplu Bir Bakış*, (Lefkoşe: Halkın Sesi Matbaası, 1959), quoted in Özejder, İbrahim, *Türkiye’nin Kıbrıs Sorununa Girişinde Basın ve Diğer Etkenlerin Rolü*, p. 196.

¹⁷³ Ioannides, Christos P., *In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, p. 78.

advocating the partition of the island (*taksim*) between 1956-1958 and the existence of an independent Cyprus Republic from the end of 1958 onward. During the decade when Turkey defended three different official thesis on Cyprus the press was utilized as a kind of discursive space to make the Turkish society espouse the current thesis. The threat and danger of communism always operated as the common denominator and the major theme of articles and editorials occasionally defending contradictory solutions to the Cyprus problem such as the partition of the island and the foundation of an independent Cyprus Republic. For instance, in the first half of 1950s in full conformity with the government, Turkish dailies were publishing articles calling Turkey and Greece to collaborate and jointly struggle vis-à-vis the danger of a “communist Cyprus”¹⁷⁴. In these articles Greece was also warned “not to cut the branch it sat on”¹⁷⁵. By the same token, the daily *Zafer* known as the mouthpiece of the Menderes government having imputed the generation of the problem on communists drew attention to the danger of Cyprus being a “communist post under the command of the Cominform.”¹⁷⁶ As stated before in the years between 1956 and 1958 Turkey formally advocated the partition of the island “as the final sacrifice” that it could make for the sake of a resolution to the problem. This time the mass-circulated dailies allocated large editorial space in an attempt to legitimize this policy switch of the Turkish elite and the government by foregrounding the necessity of the partition as regards the national security of Turkey and the “free world”. According to the editor of daily *Vatan*, A. E. Yalman, Cyprus was “our defence front against Greek imperialism and Moscow’s aspirations.”

In view of the solidarity in the free world, the utmost sacrifice that we could make is the partition of the island to the effect that Turkey’s security on the

¹⁷⁴ Among many others see Yalman, Ahmet Emin, “Neden Bir Kıbrıs Meselesi Var?”, *Vatan* 18 January 1950.

¹⁷⁵ See Yalman, Ahmet, Emin, “Yunanistanın Ağır Mesuliyeti”, *Vatan* 19 June 1956.

¹⁷⁶ Fenik, Mümtaz Faik, “Kıbrısta Kızıklar”, *Zafer* 24 August 1954.

island is guaranteed and that our 120.000 brothers there shall continue to live in peace and tranquility on Turkish soils in Cyprus as Turkish citizens.¹⁷⁷

On 19 June 1958 Britain announced its resolution plan for Cyprus after having evaluated the Turkish and Greek sides' views. However before the announcement of the plan, its details had already been leaking to Turkish press from the beginning of June 1958. In view of these preliminary assessments in the press which did not seem to satisfy the priorities and expectations of the Turkish government, it strove to increase the level of national support and enthusiasm built around its official thesis of *taksim*. To this end the Menderes government, for the first time since 1955, allowed the organization of pro-taksim demonstrations throughout the country. Along this period student unions and nationalist Cyprus associations, working diligently for the Cyprus cause and expansively utilized by government authorities for the socialization of the policy of partition, organized and coordinated massive demonstrations where the slogan of "partition or death (*ya taksim ya ölüm*)" was relentlessly articulated. They also issued pro-partition declarations and published and disseminated brochures and booklets. The main purpose underlying these demonstrations waging in numerous provinces and districts of the country was to influence the British proposals and to make them coincide with the policy of partition as far as possible. The Turkish government, on the other hand, was concerned with manipulating and employing the domestic public opinion through official declarations:

1. Our government is resolved to materialize the partition as the sole formula for solution reflecting the national will of our consanguinities in Cyprus and assuring the security of the homeland.
2. (...) Our cooperation with the British government which is underway for quite a long time will hopefully last in the coming days. We strongly wish that our citizens will cherish the same hope as ours. It is an undoubted fact that the realization of our cause in Cyprus depends first and foremost on our national will¹⁷⁸.

¹⁷⁷ Yalman, Ahmet Emin, "Yeni Bir Oyun", *Vatan* 13 Ocak 1957. The translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.

¹⁷⁸ *Zafer* 8 June 1958 quoted in Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, p. 431.

As can be inferred from the above declaration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 8 June 1958 the government desired Turkish society to behave as a unified totality by revealing its strong support to the official policies. By affirming partition as the “sole formula” around which the national will and unity should be secured, the government sought to avert and de-legitimize the outbreak of any opposition from the outset. These demonstrations were covered on the headlines of newspapers which read i.e. “300.000 citizens in Istanbul took the oath for the partition of the island on behalf of 26 million Turks”¹⁷⁹ and were accompanied by intimidating articles directed at Britain and the US.

Cyprus is our national cause of top priority from the viewpoint of Turkey’s defence and of the well-being and survival of our Cypriot consanguinities. At this fragile and fundamental corner of the free world a solution should be and could be reached by taking into consideration Turkey’s natural and legal rights and by avoiding any harm to the collaboration between free nations.¹⁸⁰

7.6.4. Cyprus As “The Cuba of the Mediterranean”

Since the end of the Second World War, Soviet Russia has maintained close interest in the developments on Cyprus. The active role played by the Cyprus Communist Front Organization AKEL in the enosis campaign initiated soon after the war by Cypriot Greeks must therefore, be evaluated within the framework of the over-all Soviet policy aiming at having access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. During those years the British presence in Suez and Cyprus was an important obstacle for the Soviet entry into the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Considering the civil war in Greece during 1946-1949 and the substantial communist strength in Greece, placing Cyprus in the hands of a weak Greece rather than a strong Britain would secure significant benefits for Soviet designs¹⁸¹.

During the hottest years of the Cold War a metaphor was in vogue among almost all columnists in both left and right-leaning Turkish dailies¹⁸². This metaphor espoused also by the political¹⁸³ and academic elite¹⁸⁴ was devised to define the magnitude and

¹⁷⁹ Zafer 8 June 1958.

¹⁸⁰ Gülek, Kasım, *Hürriyet* 21 April 1957 quoted in Armaoğlu, Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, p. 357.

¹⁸¹ Armaoğlu, Fahir, “1974 Cyprus Crisis and the Soviets”, *Foreign Policy*, 4: 2-3 1974, p. 178.

¹⁸² In 1960s numerous journalists widely employed this metaphor in their news and columns. A few are Ö. Sami Çoşar, Kayhan Sağlamer (*Cumhuriyet*).

¹⁸³ Leaders of various political parties and members of the parliament used this metaphor in parliamentary negotiations and in their official statements. A few examples are Fethi Tevetoğlu, Cihad Baban.

urgency of the communist threat with which Turkey and the “free world” were faced. To the argument articulated through this metaphor, Cyprus was running the risk of being “the Cuba of the Mediterranean.”¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, a Cyprus with the majority of its Greek population who were communist or sympathetic to communist movements posed an immense threat both to the security of the countries in the region¹⁸⁶ and also of the Western alliance. “Northern, northwestern and northeastern Turkey has been encircled by communists.” Thereby, Cyprus is of vital importance “for us” to maintain Turkey’s security from the south¹⁸⁷. Consequently, “not only Turkey and the free world but also the whole NATO community are faced with the policy and view seeking to transform Cyprus into another Cuba.”¹⁸⁸

This threat analysis of Cihat Baban (Istanbul deputy of RPP and a prominent journalist) was extensively acknowledged by academics and foreign policy writers. According to Fahir Armaoğlu writing on 4 March 1964 in the daily *Cumhuriyet*, “Soviets cherished two main concerns in their Cyprus policy”: First, the survival of the independent Cyprus Republic as a non-aligned state and a rather weak administration that could easily fall under the Soviet influence. As such it may continue to operate as a “valuable base” through which the USSR could conduct its “communist activities in both Greece and the Middle East.”¹⁸⁹ Second, “as long as the Cyprus problem prolonged, the gulf between” Greek and Turkish nations “would be further expanded. This would, in turn, impair the effectiveness of NATO’s right flank and even weaken

¹⁸⁴ For example Prof. Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “Kıbrıs ve Küba”, *Ulus* 15 September 1963; Prof. Fahir Armaoğlu and Prof. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, “Kıbrıs Bir Devlet midir?”, in *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, Nevzat Karagil (ed.), (Istanbul: Anıl Matbaası, 1964), pp. 14-18.

¹⁸⁵ Tevetoğlu, Fethi, *Kıbrıs ve Komünizm*, (Ankara: Komünizmle Mücadele Yayınları, 1966), p.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁸⁷ Sağlamer, Kayhan, “Rusya, Kıbrıs ve İngiltere’nin Hatası”, *Cumhuriyet* 9 November 1964 quoted in Tevetoğlu, Fethi, *Kıbrıs ve Komünizm*, p. 39.

¹⁸⁸ Baban, Cihad, “NATO, Kıbrıs Küba Yapmak İsteyen Görüşle Karşı Karşıyadır”, in *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, Nevzat Karagil (ed.), p. 33.

¹⁸⁹ Armaoğlu, Fahir, “Kıbrıs ve Sovyetler”, in *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, Nevzat Karagil (ed.), p. 57.

it.”¹⁹⁰ In the same vein, for Tevetoğlu, who was another vehement anti-communist political figure, there existed four targets of communist Russia:

1. to ensure the continuation of the crisis and exploit it toward the dismemberment of Western defence force in Eastern Mediterranean, 2. to hamper the annexation of Cyprus to Greece, 3. To hamper the resolution of the Greek problem by way of reaching an agreement with Greece, Turkey and the representatives of the people of the island, and 4. to create a totally independent and impartial Cyprus state having no affiliation with Greece and Turkey and particularly with NATO and the Western world.

Henceforth, to the prevailing idea in Turkey Cyprus was no longer an internal affair of the Cyprus Republic but rather was an inter-bloc problem within the East-West competition¹⁹¹.

7.7. Conclusion

It would not be an exaggeration to claim that throughout the long history of the Cyprus dispute the official rhetoric offers countless examples of inventing and declaring internal ‘others’ who are in the service of ‘external enemies’ of Turkey ‘seeking to devastate the country from the inside’. The official discourse coding and fixating Cyprus primarily as an issue of security and ‘national cause’ has figured among the factors impeding the emergence of a real public debate concerning the issue in Turkey until the last few years. This totalitarian approach imposing one conception of the question on Turkish society has presumed different ways of understanding and explaining other than the official state line as dangerous and illegitimate. As I tried to indicate in this chapter, this resulted in the exclusionary and disciplinary policies through which some sectors of the domestic society have been marginalized due to their opposing views and beliefs and/or different ethnic origins. In this sense the objective of the seventh chapter was formulated as the exploration of different ways within which

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁹¹ Tunaya, Tarık Zafer, “Kıbrıs Bir Devlet midir?”, in *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, Nevzat Karagil (ed.), p. 17.

the Cyprus dispute was instrumentalized for the consolidation of a national identity securing the unity, cohesion and homogenization of Turkish nation.

Throughout the Cold War era Turkey adopted a security regime in full conformity with the US-based threat perceptions and strategies. In this regime, where the domestic politics was subjugated to “the national defence considerations”, anti-communism “had a key role to play”¹⁹². In the securitizing practices and the nationalist discourse of the state elite, communism proved to be the first and foremost ‘enemy’ threatening Turkey’s both internal and external security. In the official rhetoric, the communists who were easily associated with the Soviet threat were blamed for carrying out subversive and disruptive activities at the expense of Turkey. Besides, the Greek communists working under the directives of Moscow were serving for the objectives of the Soviet Russia, who aimed at ‘having access to the hot waters of the Mediterranean’ by capturing Cyprus.

In the doctrine known as Atatürkist nationalism, communism has been labeled as an “alien ideology” to Turkish society¹⁹³. “The fundamental characteristic of Atatürkism, on the contrary, is that it has been the only national”¹⁹⁴ and hence the only legitimate ideology in Turkey. It is worthwhile to remember the fact that the then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü had accused Pan-Turkism also of being “an imported ideology” under the service of the foreigners but not of the Turkish nation in his famous speech of 19 May 1944¹⁹⁵. In the eyes of the Turkish state elite all political postures remaining outside the well-defined and standardized boundaries of Atatürkist nationalism corresponded to the ‘non-national’ and ‘the dangerous’. The fiercely anti-communist rhetoric employed in Turkish public sphere within the context of the Cyprus question

¹⁹² Bora, Tanıl, “Ordu ve Milliyetçilik”, *Birikim* No. 160/161 August-September 2002, p. 64.

¹⁹³ The brochure prepared by the Martial Law Commandership (1973) quoted in Bora, Tanıl, “Ordu ve Milliyetçilik”, p. 64.

¹⁹⁴ Bora, Tanıl, “Ordu ve Milliyetçilik”, p. 64.

¹⁹⁵ Koçak, Cemil, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Volume I, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), p. 205.

offers an elucidating example of the direct relationality established between ‘the non-national’ and ‘the dangerous’. Thus the duality constructed between the national and non-national entails identification of one or several sectors of the domestic society with non-national elements and external threats.

In this context, the Greek minority in Turkey along with communists became another sector of the society identified with the non-national and the menacing. As indicated in this chapter of the dissertation, in the official and mainstream discourse the Greek minority and the Greek Patriarchate were referred to as the “fifth column” seeking to deal a blow to Turkey from within. Owing to their common ethnic, religious and cultural origins with Greek Cypriots, the Greek minority was marginalized as the inimical other against which the society should be safeguarded and be kept alert. They were also acknowledged as hegemons in the Istanbul market sucking the blood of impoverished Turkish people and transferring its economic resources to external enemies.

As such what could easily be associated with the imminent/existential threats to Turkey became the inimical and historical ‘other’ against which the core assumptions of Turkish national identity were defined. The natural corollary of this has been the marginalization of communists and the Greek minority within Turkish society declared as ‘deviant’, ‘alien’, and ‘enemy’ of both the society and its state. Particularly in the period extending from late 1940s to 1980s the Cyprus question was intensely utilized by Turkish civilian and military establishment to constantly warn the society against the communist and Greek threat. In consequence, the paramount importance attached to the unity and cohesion of Turkish nation vis-à-vis these threats has always constituted one of the fundamental elements of the nationalist rhetoric reproduced through foreign policy. The securitizing and nationalist narrative created and recreated with respect to the Cyprus issue presented the state the legitimacy and power it needed to reinscribe the

boundaries and the core assumptions of the identity of domestic political community. As such the Cyprus question has become one of the fundamental spheres allowing the reproduction of state society relations in Turkey as the relations of subjugation and dominance from ideological to practically every level of public life.

As argued thoroughly in the third chapter of this dissertation, the post-structuralist IR theory conceives foreign policy as a double exclusionary and disciplinary practice of the state through which the internal and external others are specified and declared to the domestic society. Thus the national foreign policy rhetoric of the state apparatus operates through ‘othering’ strategies in which the ‘self’ is negatively defined against the threatening ‘other’. The construction of ‘self’ and ‘other’ as antonymous categories justifies for the power holders to marginalize and exclude the internal and external ‘other’ from the socio-political context. In consequence, ‘the different’ is denied and negated through a specific rhetoric of threat and danger for the insurance of a ‘coherent’ and ‘unified’ national identity- namely the self. As such the practices homogenizing the domestic community are achieved through establishment of strict boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’, ‘national’ and ‘non-national’ and mainly owing to these boundaries within the domestic society the internal ‘others’ are silenced, punished and marginalized.

Subjugation of the society to the state apparatus is secured via the encouragement of “the people to form “a more perfect Union” and “insure domestic Tranquility””¹⁹⁶. The constitution and maintenance of the domestic political community as a unified collectivity enables the state to speak as the one and only representative and signifier of this “imagined” unity in both internal and international context. Thereby forming “a more perfect Union” through the consolidation of the national ‘we’ is a necessity for the state to implement its national agential capacity on behalf of the social

¹⁹⁶ Campbell, David, *Writing Security The United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, p. 35.

formation in which it is embedded. At this stage, the state apparatus needs to build an image of international politics through which danger, threat and anarchy are externalized and presumably imagined as the characteristics of the 'outside'. In this imagining, the state itself and/or its territorially bounded sovereignty operates as if an invisible boundary demarcating 'outside' (the realm of violence, hostility and insecurity) from the 'inside' (the realm of harmony, unity, and security). The modern state apparatus desiring to secure the maintenance of internal power relations disciplines the domestic society via dangers and threats originating from the so-called chaotic nature of inter-state system.

To sum up, as a double exclusionary practice the function of national foreign policy rhetoric of the state is two-fold: first, strengthening the national 'we' and national cohesion at the expense of social groups and individuals that cannot be included within the well-defined boundaries of the national identity. Second, creating an illusion to naturalize and normalize the absolute division between 'inside' and 'outside', 'internal' and 'international', 'domestic' and 'foreign'. In the rhetoric of national foreign policy the state corresponds to the only power having capacity to challenge possible dangers and threats both in internal and international political realms and hence assuring the security of its society. As regards our issue of Cyprus, the official discourse devised and socialized by the Turkish bureaucratic and political establishment perfectly illustrates the double exclusionary rhetoric of foreign policy functioning through 'othering' strategies.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Among the most paramount outcomes of the process beginning by the 1980 military coup and the subsequent legal and constitutional amendments was the abstraction of ‘the societal’ from ‘the political’ as a technique of de-politicization of politics in Turkey. Throughout this process, the profound impacts of which are noticeable even at present, the legitimate boundaries of the political sphere were reinscribed and narrowed unprecedentedly. In this political order defined by Ahmet Insel as the “September 12 regime”, “an authoritarian and conservative statist conception of politics”¹ was imposed on the Turkish society. The regime did not avoid immensely restricting all political rights and liberties, which it deemed conflicting with its understanding of security. The “September 12 regime” where the political center was totally occupied and even reconstructed by the state perceived the society “as a threat besieging the center” and regarded all kinds of “authoritarian methods legitimate in defending itself against that threat.”² Hence especially the military establishment deemed it as a matter of state security to distance the society from the political center by eradicating the organic ties of the political parties with the most part and sectors of the society such as the youth, the women and the laborer.

Within the statist conception of politics ‘the political’ was reduced to the institutional survival and security of the state. The maintenance of political stability and social stagnation was considered by the military and civilian establishment as the only insurance for the security of the regime and the state itself. As political polarizations, in effect the politics itself, were perceived as an ‘existential threat’ to such stability, the

¹ Insel, Ahmet “The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102:2/3, p. 293.

² Ibid., p. 295.

political and public sphere were totally restructured through the securitizing policies of the civilian and military bureaucracy. In the course of 1980s and 1990s the bureaucratic establishment, with İlkay Sunar's terms, "has been the political anchor of Turkish political life."³ Particularly the role and weight of the military establishment dramatically increased as "a strategic group involved in the formulation and implementation of development policies, the mobilization and allocation of resources", designation and conduct of the national security and 'foreign' policy "as well as the regulation of many other aspects of national life"⁴. Throughout this period Turkish politics witnessed the swift pervasiveness of the discourse and practices of the Turkish state elite bearing almost all 'domestic' and 'foreign' issues into the field of security and vitality. As Ümit Cizre correctly pointed out "since the second half of the 1990s, a new security discourse in Turkey sanctifies security over democratic and developmental objectives."⁵

This not only posed a major obstacle in the insertion of a wide range of socio-political issues into the political space but also set the proper ground for the 'National Security Council' (MGK) to increase its power and authority in such a way as to intervene in the whole aspects of socio-political and cultural life. Thus the governmental rationality prevailing throughout this period served to reemphasize the monolithic structure and state-centeredness of Turkish political modernity the sustenance of which was fundamentally predicated on the reproduction of state society relations as the relations of subjugation and dominance. As such within the "September 12 regime" security began to substitute politics and was

conceived of as synonymous with public policy, thus granting the military a free entry into policy making. This is made possible by letting the national security

³ Sunar, İlkay, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974), p. 122.

⁴ Ibid., p. 122.

⁵ Cizre, Ümit, "Demythologizing The National security Concept: The Case of Turkey", *Middle East Journal*, Volume 57, No. 2, p. 213.

concept influence codification of laws pertaining to internal security, anti-terrorism, and maintenance of public order, criminalizing certain political activities, constraining public debate and expanding military jurisdiction over civilians. It is the translation of national security into laws, decrees, and regulations that, in fact, gives the Turkish military a wide latitude in policy-making and law enforcement⁶.

As it was previously argued in the concluding section of the fourth chapter, the sphere of foreign policy, which is quite open to the securitizing policies, has always had a distinctive role to play in the maintenance of state society relations in its conventional and hierarchical structure in Turkey. As the Turkish bureaucratic and foreign policy establishment have conceived foreign policy as a vital space to ward off external threats directed against national unity and integrity, in the Republicanist tradition the sphere of foreign policy has been heavily securitized. This led to the exclusion of the domestic society and its elected representatives from the decision-making processes on ‘foreign’ political issues in such a way as to narrow the political sphere in Turkey. However the narrowing effect of ‘foreign’ policy on Turkish politics may not be limited with the exclusion of the society and even the political parties from the decision and policy-making.

It is a gainsaying that criticizing the substance and/or fundamentals of official ‘foreign’ policies remained as problematic in the history of modern Turkish state until the recent years. In ‘foreign’ political matters the governments generally had no alternative other than to pursue the already formulated policies by the Turkish bureaucratic elite beyond the political authority especially if they are labeled as ‘state policies’.

If an aggressive move directed against us through our community turns into a dispute, we shall not hesitate for a moment to implement the predetermined elements of our policy on the subject. I am certainly not saying these in the sense of a threat. This is the basis of our established policy fixed for years as a Nation

⁶ Ibid., p. 219.

and State. Governments have changed, and may change but policy of Turkey on Cyprus does not change.⁷

These utterances of H. Bayülken, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, embrace two crucially important points from the viewpoint of this dissertation. First, it presumes the existence of a pre-given and unproblematic relationship of representivity and identicalness between the Turkish state and society. Second, it posits the limitations before the political authorities to implement and/or change foreign policy in Turkey. The Minister is speaking of “pre-established” policies as regards the Cyprus dispute “fixed for years as a Nation and State”. These words take for granted an absolute unity and unproblematic identicalness between the state and society and also imagines the latter as an organic, unified and homogenous totality. They deny, from the outset, the existence of possible differentiations both between the state and society and within the society itself. Bayülken by implying a unity between ‘the ruled’ and ‘the ruling’ in Turkey also delegitimizes any opposition as regards the substance of the predetermined policies just as did another Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs F.R. Zorlu stating that “Turkish people cannot think differently about the future of an island which is existentially important to the defence of its country.”⁸ By affirming that “Governments may change but policy of Turkey on Cyprus does not change” Bayülken not solely imagines Turkey as a homogenized and unified totality with its state and nation but also provokes questions about the effectiveness and capacity of the governments as the political authority in the formulation and conduct of foreign policies. If the governments do not have the capacity of changing the “predetermined” policies by for instance the

⁷ Quoted from an interview given by Ümit Haluk Bayülken, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs to the editor of *Milliyet* published in *Foreign Policy of Turkey At The United Nations Between the Years 1966-1972* vol. 1, Yüksel Söylemez (ed.), (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973), p. 297.

⁸ Bilge, A. Suat, “Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği Münasebetleri”, in Mehmet Gönlübol (ed.), *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 9th ed., (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), pp. 335-427. Translated in Işıl Kazan, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 58.

bureaucratic establishment, this leads one to the inference that foreign policy decisions are taken by ‘non-political’ institutions.

This, on the one hand, limited the ruling parties’ capacities to govern and on the other it gave the governments a proper ground on which they could easily delegitimize the opposition since criticizing ‘governments’ policies’ amounted to criticizing the regime and the state itself. More or less radical criticisms directed to the official state line tend to be evaluated as an opposition to “the state’s indivisible identity with the country and the nation”⁹ especially if these are related to the issues either cited among the fundamental priorities of the state or directly associated with the national security (one being the Cyprus dispute). Thereby the securitizing official discourse on ‘foreign’ policy where the phrases beginning by the adjective ‘national’ are recurrently applied serves to define also the prerequisites of being loyal to the Turkish state and the Turkishness itself as is the case in the Cyprus question. As to the questions labeled as ‘national cause’, our problematic of reconsidering the role and significance of foreign policy in securing the domestic order gains a profound importance. The term ‘national cause’ as a self-referential term is predicated on a fundamental demarcation between ‘the national’ and the ‘non-national’ and thereby ‘the legitimate’ and the ‘illegitimate.’ As such ‘foreign’ policy has turned out to be the area where ‘the national’ and ‘the secure’ are simultaneously sanctified and the demands and priorities differing from and conflicting with those of the state are marginalized and declared as distractive to the domestic order. Such analysis provokes us to contemplate the central function of ‘foreign’ policy in Turkey as a “boundary producing and disciplinary practice”¹⁰ demarcating ‘the national’ and ‘the non-national’, ‘the legitimate’ and ‘the illegitimate.’

The term national cause, which was widely and frequently used within the context of the Cyprus question in Turkey, takes as read the existence of a cause around

⁹ Bora, Tanıl “National Discourses in Turkey”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102:2/3, p. 438.

¹⁰ Campbell, David, *Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity*, p. 62.

which the unity and cohesion of a homogenized society should be secured. This provides a proper ground for the state on which it can delegitimize the views and opinions conflicting with its policy objectives and practices. Labeling and fixation of an issue as a national cause serves to its isolation from political processes through which the discourses and policies of the state elite could be interrogated by different sectors of the society. As such it narrows the political space at the expense of the society and confines its active involvement in the political processes within strictly constructed boundaries by the state. In consequence, both the securitization of an issue political in nature and its declaration as a national cause contribute substantially to the reproduction of state's autonomy and independence from and supremacy over its domestic society.

This dissertation mainly ventured to re-examine and problematize the modes in which the Cyprus issue is articulated and represented within the official and mainstream narratives in Turkey. The study assuming a dialogical interplay between the internal and external political processes aimed at critically questioning the role and impact of these narratives both in the reproduction of state identity and the state society relations in Turkey. Thus, if it is to be reminded, the dissertation approaches foreign policy as part of governmental structure and incorporates the state's foreign policy initiatives and discourses into the dynamics forming the domestic political regime in Turkey. Thereby, by drawing on the post-structuralist theory and its research agenda the study strove to analyze to what extent and in what ways the Cyprus question was instrumentalized by the bureaucratic and political establishment in Turkey in the consolidation and maintenance of the core characteristics assigned to the state, society and the relations between these two- namely the domestic political regime. Doing this, the dissertation intends to introduce a brand new approach to the literature on the Cyprus question in Turkey analyzing the issue from the perspective of internal power relations.

In materializing its goals expressed below the dissertation primarily illuminated the historical background within which the Cyprus issue has turned out to be a multi-partite international question. How specific events and phenomena as regards the Cyprus issue were historicized and narrativized by the official and political figures and also the academic and non-academic analysts were put under scrutiny to trace the main tracks of this discursive positioning. The study secondly indicated how and in what ways the Cyprus question has been securitized within the Turkish official discourse mainly owing to the vitality assigned to the island's geo-political location. In this context, it reached the conclusion that the securitizing rhetoric of the Turkish state elite locates military considerations, strategic calculations and threat perceptions into the center of the analysis and hence fixes the Cyprus issue as a perpetual security project of the state. The security language and the geopolitical discourse that the Turkish civilian and military bureaucracy have used on the Cyprus question has a two-fold function. First, it has helped the state to consolidate its privileged status as an agent and/or subject within the domestic politics vis-à-vis the Turkish society. This security discourse secondly facilitated the moving out of the issue at stake from the spheres of normal politics and public debate. This has prevented Turkish society from being actively involved in the processes of discussion, assessment and decision-making as a real political subject. As such de-politicization through securitization has consolidated the state's autonomy and independence from the domestic society and thus secured reproduction of relations between these two as the relations of subjugation and dominance.

The dissertation finally dedicated itself to delineate and reveal the role and impact of the official and mainstream Cyprus narratives in inscribing and reinscribing the standards and boundaries of the Turkish national identity. In this context, the dissertation arrived at the conclusion that the disciplinary and exclusionary discursive

economy devised with respect to the Cyprus question functioning through ‘othering’ strategies has substantially contributed to the construction of boundaries demarcating ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’, ‘national’ and ‘non-national’, ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ in Turkey. Throughout the Cold War years what could easily be associated with the imminent/existential threats to Turkey became the inimical and historical ‘other’ against which the core assumptions of Turkish national identity were defined and redefined. In this respect, the Cyprus question was utilized by Turkish civilian and military establishment to constantly warn the society against the inimical others such as communism, Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey. Thereby the securitizing and nationalistic narrative created and recreated with respect to the Cyprus issue presented the state the legitimacy and power it needed to inscribe the boundaries and the core assumptions of the identity assigned to the domestic political community.

As another crucially important point I should state that the Turkish mainstream scholarship on Cyprus has not only replicated the basic tenets of the official discourse but also has substantially contributed to its reproduction as the hegemonic Cyprus discourse in Turkish public sphere. The conventional literature has more often than not adopted the official state line on the question at stake rather than problematizing it. I am of the opinion that a thorough analysis of the Turkish academic discourse on Cyprus will be quite interesting since it will enable to unfold the parallelisms and common denominators between the official and the conventional literature on the issue. This undertaking of rendering the mainstream academic discourses on Cyprus the object of critical inquiry transcends the scope and limits of this thesis work. However, such examination and problematization of the Turkish conventional literature on Cyprus in this sense will constitute a crucial part of my future studies.

A Few Words For A Hopeful Future

Nevertheless, to limit the role and function of foreign policy in general and the Cyprus issue in particular only with the act of boundary producing in contemporary Turkish politics is a reductionist stance in which the society is presumed as a passive bearer vis-à-vis the state apparatus. For, it is possible also to speak about the inclusive function of the Cyprus issue, which, I hope, will be more influential in the restructuring of Turkish politics by the beginning of the new millennium. In Turkey the beginning of the new millennium symbolizes a gradual change of the rationale on which state society relations are grounded in the country. 'Foreign' policy, which was intensely instrumentalized to restrict political rights and liberties, this time became the area where the boundaries demarcating the political from the societal began to dissolve. Publicization and socialization of 'foreign' political matters created an unignorable chance for political mobilization. Here by socialization of 'foreign' policy I refer to the fact that Turkish 'foreign' political relations and matters have turned out to be part and parcel of the debates in the public sphere in stark contrast with the experiences of the past. Hence the new millennium came with various signs of the dawn of a new era for Turkish politics characterized by the rapid intensification of the interactions between the internal and international political processes. The reviving Turkish-EU relations in the post-Helsinki era, the offspring democratization reforms in domestic politics, the resurgence of efforts to find a viable solution to the Cyprus problem due to the Annan's plan, the economic stability program conducted with IMF and the political liquidation occurred with the November 3 general elections heralded the inception of this new era.

The reviving Cyprus negotiations and Turkey's integration process into the EU have become the two fundamental subjects of those debates socializing 'foreign' policy in Turkey in such a way as to shatter and erode the conventional approaches conceiving 'foreign' policy just as heavily securitized bureaucratic activities. Those debates have

also facilitated the articulation of differentiated social expectations and priorities by civil societal organizations some of which have criticized the homogenizing effect of Turkey's "strong state tradition"¹¹, fixing the society as an organic and unified totality. For instance Turkey's official Cyprus policy has been borne into the public fora and begun to be criticized ever extensively than before. The active involvement of different sectors of Turkish society in those debates has flared up the democratization of the relations between the ruling and the ruled in Turkey as it enabled the critique of official policies as comprehensively as has never been in the past. These critiques have the potential to force the Turkish government and the foreign policy establishment to review and modify, to some extent, the official understanding where strategic and security concerns of the state were prioritized at the expense of other dimensions of the issue. This is the point where desecuritization, namely repolitisization of 'foreign' political issues by rendering them part and parcel of public debates gains paramount importance for the democratic transformation of state society relations in Turkey. The author of this article is of the opinion that every attempt to desecuritize in other words 'to move issues out from the threat-defense sequence into the ordinary public sphere'¹² will substantially contribute to such democratization and erosion of the state-centered structure of Turkish political modernity. The active involvement of Turkish society in the debates on 'foreign' political matters presents it a chance to relocate itself within the system as a real political subject vis-à-vis the state. Yet this is only possible should a radical paradigmatic change and epistemological break occur in the state society relations in Turkey. Who knows this little island of Cyprus may be the place from where such a change and break can be translated into life.

¹¹ See Heper, Metin, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (North Humberstone: The Eothen Press, 1985).

¹² Buzan, B., O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, *Security A New Framework For Analysis*, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 29.

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APPENDIX A

TURKISH GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUÉ

20 July 1974

A coup d'état has been carried out in Cyprus by both the Greek contingent stationed in the Island and the unconstitutional Greek National Guard which is under the complete command and control of officers from the mainland Greece. Since the forces involved in the coup are the military units under the direct command of a foreign state, the independence and the territorial integrity of Cyprus have been seriously impaired as a result of this action. The present situation on the Island, as has emerged from the coup, has completely darkened the future of the independent State of Cyprus. In these circumstances it is hoped that all States which are favoring the independence and the territorial integrity of Cyprus will support Turkey in her action aimed at restoring the legitimate order in the Island, undertaken in her capacity as a state which guaranteed the independence of Cyprus under international treaties.

After having fully evaluated the recent events which took place in the Island and in view of the failure of the consultations and efforts it undertook in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 as one of the guarantor powers, the Government of the Republic of Turkey has decided to carry out its obligations under Article 4/2 of the said Treaty, with a view to enable Cyprus to survive as an independent State and to safeguard its territorial integrity and the security of life and property of the Turkish Community and even that of many Greek Cypriots who are faced with all sorts dangers and pressures under the new Administration.

The purpose of our peaceful action is to eliminate the danger directed against the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus and the rights of all Cypriots as a whole and to restore the independence, territorial integrity and security and the order established by the basic articles of the Constitution. Turkey, in the action she undertook as the Guarantor Power shall act with the sincere desire of cooperation with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in the Island in the restoration of conditions of security. On the other hand, because of the above-mentioned aim of the action, those Greek Cypriots who are wholeheartedly attached to the independence of Cyprus and to the rule of democracy in the Island, need not be concerned. Turkey's aim is to restore security and human rights without any discrimination whatsoever among the Communities.

Our purpose in Cyprus, a bicommunal state, is to get the intercommunal talks to start as rapidly as possible in order to restore the situation prior to the coup and the legitimate order. But it is natural that we cannot consider as interlocutor the present de facto Administration which seized power by the use of brutal force and which is not representative of the Greek Cypriot community.

Following the restoration of constitutional order, Turkey will strictly abide by what is required from a guarantor power which fulfilled its treaty obligations.

APPENDIX B

MESSAGE BY BÜLENT ECEVİT PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY

20 July 1974

The Turkish Armed Forces have started a peace operation in Cyprus this morning to end decades of strife provoked by extremist and irredentist elements. At the last stage of the Cyprus tragedy, these extremist elements has started massacring even their own people- the Greeks.

It is acknowledged in the entire world that the coup which recently took place was manufactured by the dictatorial regime of Athens. In fact it was much more than a coup. It was the forceful and flagrant violation of the independence of Cyprus Republic and of the international agreements on which this Republic was based.

Turkey is a co-guarantor of the independence and constitutional order of Cyprus. Turkey is fulfilling her legal responsibility by taking this action. The Turkish Government did not resort to armed action before all the other means were tried, but to no avail.

This is not an invasion, but an act against invasion.

This is not aggression, but an act to end aggression.

The Turkish Armed Forces are not going to open fire unless they are fired at. The Turkish planes are throwing not bombs but messages of goodwill to all the people of Cyprus.

The operations of peace that started with the breaking of the day, this morning, will bring an end to the darkest period in the history of Cyprus.

The victory of the Turkish Armed Forces will be a victory for justice, for peace, for freedom.

I appeal to all Greeks in Cyprus who have suffered the atrocities of terrorism and dictatorship. Bury with the past dark days the intercommunal enmities and strives that were the making of those same terrorists. Join hand in hand with your Turkish brothers to speed up this victory and together build a new, free and happy Cyprus.

We are there to help you, not to hurt.

We are there with love, not with hate.

We are there not to fight you but to end your plight.

APPENDIX C

THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND THE VIEWS OF THE TURKISH UNIVERSITIES

Dear colleague,

The Turkish Universities desire to appeal to universities throughout the world to consider the following points so that a full understanding of the facts concerning the Cyprus Question is ensured.

1-It is common knowledge that the series of events which finally led to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus by the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959 originated in the year 1954 while the sole purpose of Greece and the Greek Cypriot community during the intervening period had been the total annexation of Cyprus to Greece: the so-called policy of "Enosis". Fully supported and, indeed, directed by the Greek governments of the time, the Greek Cypriots behaved most unscrupulously, resorted to all kinds of bloody and ruthless means in their power and chose terrorization as their principal weapon for the achievement of their purpose. The murderous attacks of the Greeks were not directed at the representatives of the protectorate alone, but also against the Island's Turkish community, which had no aim other than that of living in peace and freedom.

2- The Turkish Cypriot community welcomed the foundation of the independent Republic of Cyprus, established in accordance with the provisions of the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959, as the opening of a new phase in the island's history, but the Greek community was never satisfied with the new state. Whereas some of the Greek Cypriots were opposed to the new state because they saw it as blocking the path which led to Enosis, others who were less impatient, saw the new Republic of Cyprus as a first step on the path which must ultimately lead to Enosis. Among the latter was Archbishop Makarios, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, and in speeches and statements made on a variety of occasions in the years from 1960 to 1963 the Archbishop stated this view in the clearest of terms pointing to the fact that Enosis had not been forgotten as ultimate objective, for the island would, sooner or later, unite with Greece. Such declarations of the Archbishop are frequent in the documents of that period.

3- The Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64 was the outcome of a ruthless plot prepared in collusion by Archbishop Makarios and the government in Athens. Its aim was to annihilate the Turkish community by widespread massacres and thus facilitate the annexation of the island by Greece. It was in order to achieve this aim that so many members of the Turkish community, men, young and old, women and even children were slaughtered with indiscriminate brutality on New Year's Day, 1963. Such atrocities continued throughout 1964 and will be remembered as among the most savage acts of genocide in history. The terrible events of the years 1963 and 1964 were a source of deep anxiety in Turkey, concerned as she has always been for the survival and freedom of the Turkish Cypriot community.

4- Realizing that she would never be able to achieve her aim of Enosis through the Greek Cypriot community under the Makarios administration, Greece sought the fulfillment of her objective by military means and from the summer of 1964 onwards sent as many as 12,000 troops to Cyprus in contravention of the terms of the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements which had allowed Turkey to maintain 650 soldiers on the island while Greece was allowed 950 of her own. It is difficult to interpret the silence of those who now advocate the independence and national sovereignty of Cyprus, in the face of that flagrant violation of the principles of international legal agreements.

5- Having come to power by a coup d'état in April 1967, the Greek Military Junta also visualized a policy of genocide as the only means of securing the objective of Enosis and after a series of massacres, the second Cyprus crisis occurred in that same year. Even the Greek publications revealed that the acts of aggression against the Turkish Cypriots were the product of a joint plan drawn up by Archbishop Makarios and the military regime in Athens.

Although the crisis of 1967 subsided through Turkey's firm attitude, by the withdrawal of Greek forces from Cyprus and the removal of General Grivas from the island, Greece sent Grivas back to Cyprus in August 1971, and used both the 2,000 troops and officers which she had left in Cyprus and the Greek National Guard under the command of Greek officers for the realization of Enosis, a cause which she has never given up.

6- It became apparent during the intercommunal negotiations conducted between 1968 and 1973, which had as their object the establishment of a new constitutional status Cyprus, that the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus which recognized the existence of distinct Turkish community on the island, were sources of dissatisfaction to the Greek community. This was owing to the fact that the recognition of the Turks on the island as a distinct community constituted an important barrier to the realization of plans for Enosis. What Greece and with her the Greek Cypriots wanted was that the Turkish community should be treated as a minority group, thus ensuring that they would remain under the hegemony of Greek Cypriots to facilitate the subsequent annexation of the island as a whole to Greece. For Greece and the Greek Cypriots' territorial ambitions were of greater importance than the rights of the Turkish people on the island or their desire to lead decent, honorable lives.

7- Recent events have disclosed that while international talks were in progress, Greece, together with the Makarios government, violating both the Agreements and the Constitution, organized an army of 40,000 men, provided with officers all of whom were sent from Greece. What explanation can those who today uphold the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus offer for their indifference to such open intervention on the part of Greece? How could anyone ignore the role of Makarios in this intervention?

8- It was this 40,000 strong Greek military force in Cyprus that set in motion the events of July 1974. the overthrow of President Makarios with the aid of Greek intervention and the accession to power of Nikos Sampson by force were

evident preliminaries to a further attempt at Enosis the means to which would once again be massacres which, if resisted, would result in the annihilation of the Turkish community. So many proofs of this have been forthcoming that their repetition is, we feel, unnecessary when we address ourselves to any independent judge. The very fact that the man who was then made President of Cyprus, was a cold-blooded killer and former terrorist leader, who had gloried in his crimes, is sufficient to indicate the more than probable fate of the Turkish community under any regime led by him.

9- The course which the events in Cyprus have followed during the last twenty years has revealed certain incontrovertible facts. First, the annexation of Cyprus, i.e. Enosis, is the supreme national ideal of Greece and the Greek Cypriot community. Neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriot community has ever had any faith in independent and sovereign Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, they consider such a republic to be an obstacle to Enosis. As a further obstacle, indeed the greatest obstacle of all, there is the Turkish Cypriot community and in view of their consideration to this end, both Greece and the Greek Cypriot community have consistently striven to remove that community by terrorization and massacre as the methods most likely to answer their evil purposes. While Greece and Greek Cypriots have acted in contravention to the Zurich and London Agreements, ignored Human Rights and the provisions of international law, the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey herself have been most careful to abide by those same agreements and the rule of law, limiting themselves to the rights accorded to them by such rules and always seeking for the peaceful solution to the crises brought about by the acts of violence resorted to by the other side.

10- The peace-keeping operation undertaken in Cyprus on Turkey's part between 20th July and 14th August 1974 should be judged in the light of the above facts alone. It was upon the Greek intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus on July 15th that Turkey exposed yet another Greek attempt at Enosis and in order to prevent the imminent collapse of the independent and sovereign state of Cyprus, and to protect the Turkish community on the island against possible acts of aggression and subsequent massacre or even genocide, invited the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to act jointly with her in accordance with Article Four of the 1960 Guarantee Agreement to which Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United Kingdom were all signatories.

As the government of the United Kingdom evaded the issue and refused to assume its responsibility, Turkey using the right given to her under Article Four of the Guarantee Agreement began her peace operation on the island to prevent the annexation of Cyprus by Greece and genocide of the Turks on the island.

Turkey's peace operation has revealed all too clearly Greece's readiness to realize her dual aim of Enosis and genocide. Monasteries, churches, and hospitals had been used for military purposes and equipped by the Greeks with heavy guns thus constituting military positions while churches and hospitals were turned into centers for the training of terrorists whose sole purpose was slaughter.

11- The preamble to the United Nations Charter states that one of the principal aims of the Organization is "to establish conditions under which ... respect for

the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.” Regardless of this statement, one of the distinctive features of Greek foreign policy has been to evade the terms of treaties which she has signed. The latest example of such behavior is connected with the agreement signed in Geneva on July 30th, 1974, Greece completely ignored the obligations which she had undertaken in fulfillment of this agreement: hundreds of Turkish villages and tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots were surrounded by the EOKA-B Organization and the Greek Cypriot forces, under the command of Greek officers, and threatened with annihilation. Turkey was once again forced to a realization that the Turkish community in Cyprus was in grave danger and this was one of the main reasons for the second peace operation, which was initiated on August 15th, 1974.

12- The operation undertaken in Cyprus on the part of Turkey is fully in keeping with agreements which have also been registered by the United Nations Organization and it has one object and one object only- the protection of the Turkish community in Cyprus from attack by Greek Cypriots and Greece, from aggression amounting to massacres and even genocide. It aims at the establishment of order, of safety and the security of dignity. The developments of the twenty years have shown that the most effective way of ensuring such a regime of security will be the establishment of a geographical federation, based on the principle of the recognition of the separate existence of the two communities. In view of the fact that the federal solution has proved effective in such multi-national states as the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the Republic of Switzerland and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, opposition to the application of this solution to the Cyprus problem would appear to be due to insufficient goodwill.

13- Greece has complained that forty percent of the island is under the control of the Turkish peace-keeping force. However, the fact is that some thirty five percent is actually concerned, while it should not be forgotten that when the Cyprus problem became an international issue in 1954, Turkish Cypriots earning their living by agriculture possessed some thirty three percent tillable land. Since then the acts of aggression, terrorization and massacres which have occurred steadily over the years have forced many Turkish Cypriots to the dire necessity of abandoning their lands and the homes in which they have lived for so many years. It is indeed a regrettable fact that those who appear so concerned about the problem of Greek refugees now, have not shown an equal concern for the fate of those large numbers of Turkish Cypriots who, for many years past, have been driven from their lands and homes and deprived of their livelihood.

The purpose of Turkish intervention in the Cyprus issue is not the acquisition of land or the extension of her territories, as is the case with Greece. Her aim is to provide the 120,000 Turks living on the island with safety of life and security of livelihood consistent with human dignity. In Cyprus, as in all international relations, peace can neither be established nor made durable in the absence of security. A civil order which will bring this security and therefore lasting peace to both communities will be achieved only if Turkey and Greece, the two countries directly involved, meet at the conference table and negotiate a settlement. Greece has so far eschewed all talks. It is customary, is it not, for

well-intentioned people who are seeking solution to a problem to come together and talk their positions over?

My dear colleague, although the Cyprus problem is primarily the problem of my country, it is also an international problem and I have therefore attempted to submit for your consideration the facts of the inhuman treatment to which Turkish Cypriots have for long been subjected by Greece and their Greek Cypriot neighbors, with the serious objectivity which is alone worthy of a scholar, regardless of his nationality.

Yours sincerely,
Prof. Tahsin Özgüç
Rector of the University of Ankara

APPENDIX D

TÜRKİYE MİLLÎ GENÇLİK KOMİTESİNİN 12 TEMMUZ 1952'DE GENEL KURUL KARARI İLE YAYINLADIĞI KIBRIS BEYANNAMESİ

(The Cyprus Declaration Issued By the Turkish National Youth Committee
on 12 July 1952)

12 Temmuz 1952'de toplanan Türkiye Milli Gençlik Komitesi Genel Kurulu, Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonunun teklifi ile gündemindeki bir çok önemli işleri geri bırakarak günün mevzuu olan Kıbrıs meselesi üzerindeki görüşlerini aşağıdaki beyanname ile dünyaya ilan ederken ayrıca Kıbrıs'lı Türk kardeşlerimize kongrenin sıcak sevgilerini sunmağa ve kaderleri ile Türk milletinin öz kaderi imiş gibi candan ilgilendirdiğini bildirmeye karar vermiştir.

Başkanlık divanı, beyannamenin müzakeresi sırasında, kongrede şahlanan çoğunluk ve emsalsiz tezahüratı, kardeşin kardeşi, Anayurdun yavru yurdu sinayeti şeklinde tespit ve hülasa ettiğini Kıbrıs Türk'lüğüne sevgi ile bildirdikten sonra şu beyannameyi yayınlamıştır:

KIBRIS BEYANNAMESİ

Kıbrıs adasının mukadderatı ile ilgili olarak, Türkiye Milli Gençlik Komitesi ve bu komiteye dahil teşekküllerle diğer gençlik teşekkülleri, aşağıdaki hususları Türkiye ve dünya umumi efkârına arz etmeyi uygun görmüşlerdir:

19 uncu yüzyıl sonlarına doğru, Anavatani şimalden gelen tehlikelere karşı korumak endişesiyle, muvakkat İngiliz işgaline terk etmek zorunda kaldığımız, güney sahillerimizin bekçisi, dört asırlık Türk toprağı, Yeşil Kıbrıs Adası, son zamanlarda Balkan tipi bir küçük emperyalizmin hedefi olmaya başlamıştır. Bilindiği gibi adada yaşayan yerli Rumlar, ilim ve mantık haysiyetini haiz her türlü mesnetten mahrum, hissi birtakım iddialarla Adanın Yunanistan'a ilhakını istemektedirler. Bu maksatla teşekkül etmiş olan cemiyetler ve bilhassa Kıbrıs Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi bu tahrikâtı idare etmektedir. Yüz bine balığ olan Kıbrıs Türk Topluluğu, müstemlekeci İngilizlerin lâkayt gözleri önünde, müteassıp, Türk düşmanı Rum çoğunluğu tarafından daimi bir tedhiş havası içinde bulundurulmakta ve her türlü baskı ve işkence tehdidine maruz bırakılmaktadır. Bu faaliyet, Yunanistan'da resmi ve gayri resmi bütün teşekküller tarafından desteklenmekte ve bizzat Yunan hükümetince tahrik ve teşvik edilmektedir.

İkinci Dünya Harbi sonlarına doğru, İtalyan ve Alman işgalinden kurtarılan 12 adanın Yunanistan'a devri sırasında, Türkiye'nin tamamen pasif bir politika takip etmiş olmasının, "Kıbrıs'ı ilhak" kampanyasında Yunanlılara bir hayli cesaret verdiği ve Yeşilada üzerindeki mesnetsiz Yunan iddialarının gittikçe artan bir taşkınlıkla ileri sürülmesine yol açtığı inkâr edilemez bir hakikattir. O zamandan beri Yunan politikacıları, Kıbrıs'ın bir Yunan adası olduğunu pervasızca iddia etmişlerdir ve ihtiyatsız hareket ve beyanatlarıyla Kıbrıs meselesini Yunan umumi efkârının en çok meşgul olduğu mevzulardan biri haline getirmişlerdir. Geçenlerde Türk milletinin misafiri olarak Başkentimize gelmiş olan Elen Kralı Majeste Paul'un, Atina'da kurulan

“Kıbrıs’ı İlhak Cemiyeti”nin fahri başkanlığına deruhte etmesi, Yunanistan’da Kıbrıs davasına yeni bir “Megali İdea” hüviyeti vermiş bulunuyor. Bu gün, Kıbrıs meselesi, müfrit sağdan müfrit sola kadar bütün Yunan basını ve siyasi partileri için bir istismar mevzuu olmuş ve Yunan iç politikasına müessir bir hale gelmiştir. Yunan halkı bir “Enosis-ilhak” isterisine tutulmuş bir vaziyettedir.

Komşumuz ve dostumuz Yunanistan’daki bu falsolu hareketleri Yunan hükümetinin zaman zaman gizlemeye gayret etmesine rağmen Atina Parlamentosunda Kıbrıs için her vesileden istifade edilerek yapılan tezahürat, Yunan hükümeti adına bizzat Ekselans Venizelos tarafından verilen demeçler ve meselenin Birleşmiş Milletler İnsan Hakları ve Vesayet Komisyonlarında müzakeresini temin maksadiyle Yunan delegeleri tarafından sarf edilen gayretle, Türk Gençlik Teşekküllerinin gözünden kaçmamış; 8 Mayıs ve 4 Temmuz 1952 tarihlerinde Atina’da tertiplenen sokak mitingleri ile bunları takip eden Parlamento nümayişlerini ve Dışişleri Bakanı Ekselans Venizelos ile yardımcısı Ekselans Averoff’un son faaliyet ve beyanatını Türk gençliği dikkatle takip etmiştir.

Bütün bu hadiseler, ve nihayet Yunan Dışişleri Bakanlığının bir tebliğ yayınlarak Kıbrıs davasının resmen ele alındığını ilan etmesi, bugüne kadar Kıbrıs için yapılan tahrikatta dost Yunan hükümetinin doğrudan doğruya methaldar ve hatta müşevvik rolünde olduğunu, ve bu faaliyetlerin Türk-Yunan münasebetlerini ihlâl etmek isteyen komünist tahrikçi unsurların eseri olduğu yolundaki kanaat ve iddianın hakikatle hiçbir ilgisi bulunmadığını tevil götürmez bir şekilde ortaya koymuştur.

Hakikat şudur ki Doğu Akdeniz’de huzursuzluk yaratmak ve bir taraftan İngiliz-Yunan, diğer taraftan Türk-Yunan münasebetlerini bulandırmak maksadiyle hareket edenlerin, Kıbrıs mevzuundan faydalanarak yaptıkları tahrikler muvacehesinde, Türk Millet ve Hükümetinin takip etmeği ihtiyar ettiği basiretkar hareket hattını Yunanlı dostlarımız istismar etmeğe yeltenmekte ve sükutumuzdan istifade ederek, Kıbrıs’ın Yunanistan’a ilhakını bir emrivaki haline getirmeğe çalışmaktadır. Bu gün, Kıbrıs mevzuu ile meşgul olmadığı bir iç politika zarureti olarak ileri süren Yunan Hükümetinin samimiyetine inanmak güçtür; çünkü, halihazır durumu meydana getiren bu hükümetin bizzat kendisidir.

Bu hakikatları böylece tesbit ettikten sonra, Kıbrıs mevzuundaki görüşümüzü bir defa daha açıklayalım: Bütün Dünyaya en gür sesimizle bir defa haykırıyoruz ki bugün müttefikimiz Britanya’nın işgalinde bulunan Kıbrıs Adası herşeyden evvel bir Türk toprağıdır. Yunanlı dostlarımızın şu realiteleri iyi bilmeleri ve daima gözönünde bulundurmaları, hakiki Türk-Yunan dostluğunun temel zaruretlerinden biridir. Kıbrıs Adası, her şeyden evvel bir Türk toprağıdır. Çünkü:

- 1- Kıbrıs coğrafya itibariyle küçük Asya’ya bağlıdır. 9.283 kilometrekareden ibaret küçük bir adanın bağlanacağı ana ülkenin tayininde itibar nazarına alınması lazım gelen en esaslı faktör, coğrafya faktörüdür. (Kıbrıs Adası küçük Asya’ya 44, Yunanistan’a ise 1,100 mil mesafededir). Ege denizinde kara sularımız içinde bulunan adaların, Milli Mücadele şartları ve zaruretleri altında Milli Misak hudutlarımız dışında bırakılmış olması ve İkinci Cihan Harbinin sonlarına doğru yine kara sularımız içinde bulunan On İki Adanın Türkiye’ye iade edilecek yerde Yunanistan’a verilmiş bulunması bu argümanı asla zayıflatamaz. Hiçbir zaman değişmeyen

- coğrafya faktörüne aykırı olarak Yunan hakimiyetine terk edilmiş olan bu adaların mukadderatının yeniden bahis mevzuu olup olmaması, Türk-Yunan dostluğunun istikbaline bağlıdır.
- 2- Kıbrıs, fetih hakkı itibariyle Türk'tür. 1571'de har karış toprağını Türk kanıyla sulayarak fethettiğimiz ve 307 sene hukuken ve fiilen hükümlan olduktan sonra, 1878'de siyasi ve askeri zaruretlerle emaneten İngiltere'ye terkettiğimiz Kıbrıs, tarih ve medeniyetimizin ebedi damgasını taşımaktadır. Kıbrıs'ta her adım başında bir şehit mezarına rastlanır. Mabetlerimiz, tarihi abide ve eserlerimiz, beş milyon sterlin değerindeki evkaf tesislerimiz, adanın Türk karakterinin şahididir. 1923 Lozan Sulh Anlaşmasıyla ve o zamanın zaruret ve icaplarına uyarak, Ada üzerindeki hükümlanlık haklarımızı İngiltere'ye devretmiş olmamıza rağmen, Türk milleti, değişmez coğrafi yakınlığımız ve tarihi haklarımız dolayısıyla Kıbrıs'a karşı daima en kuvvetli alakayı duymuştur. Yunanistan'ın ise, Kıbrıs'la tarihi hiçbir ilgisi yoktur. Çünkü Kıbrıs tarihte hiçbir zaman Yunanistan'a ait olmamıştır.
- 3- Kıbrıs Adası, iktisaden Anadolu'ya bağlıdır. Tabii kaynakları zayıf olan ve kendi kendine yeten bir ekonomiye sahip olmayan Kıbrıs, tarih boyunca iktisaden daima Anadolu'ya tabi kalmıştır. İkinci Cihan Harbi sırasında İngiltere'nin müstemleke ve dominyon İmparatorluklarıyla Ada arasındaki ticari münakalenin inkıtaa uğradığı zamanlar, Kıbrıs'ın bilhassa gıda maddeleri ve bazı sınai mamüller itibariyle Türkiye'ye dayanmış olması, bu iddianın en kuvvetli delilidir. Kıbrıs'ın Yunanistan'a ilhakı, iktisaden mahvı demek olur. Nitelim, On İki Adanın Yunanistan'a bağlanması, ora halkı için ekonomik bakımdan feci neticeler vermiştir. Dostumuz Yunanistan, maalesef, fakir bir memlekettir ve tabii kaynakları o kadar mahduttur ki daima fakir kalmaya mahkumdur. Bunun içindir ki, Kıbrıs gibi Yunanistan'da her zaman nüfus ihraç eden bir memleket olmuştur. Türkiye ise bu bakımdan son derece müsait bir durumdadır. Zengin kaynakları, süratle inkişaf eden sanayii ve nüfus kabul etme kabiliyetiyle ancak Türkiye Kıbrıs için bir anavatan olabilir.
- 4- Kıbrıs, askeri ve stratejik bakımdan Türkiye için büyük bir önemi haizdir. Doğu Akdeniz'de kilit mevkiini işgal eden ve Türkiye'nin güney kanadını himaye eden Kıbrıs Adasının zayıf bir devletin eline geçmesine Türkiye asla müsaade etmez. Çünkü, Kıbrıs'ın düşman tarafından istilası, Türk emniyet sisteminin kökünden sarsılması demek olur. Yunanlı dostlarımız unutmasınlar ki, İkinci Dünya Harbinde Ege denizindeki Yunan adalarının düşman hakimiyetine geçmesiyle, Türkiye Batıdan, tamamiyle tecrit edilmiş ve ancak Kıbrıs'ın dost ve kuvvetli bir elde bulunması sayesinde Güneyden nefes almak imkanını bulabilmiştir. Yunanlı dostlarımız şunu da unutmasınlar ki Türkiye, NATO çerçevesi içinde, Kıbrıs'taki İngiliz-Amerikan üslerinin muhafazası şartıyla dahi, Adanın Yunanistan'a devrine razı olamaz. Çünkü, Türk milleti, askeri ve stratejik ehemmiyeti bakımından Kıbrıs meselesini yalnız bugünün şartları

içinde değil, uzun bir geleceğin değişik şartları içinde mütalâa etmektedir.

- 5- Kıbrıs'ın Yunanistan'a ilhakını isteyenlerin ileri sürebildikleri yegâne argüman, Adadaki nüfus çokluğunun Yunanistan'ı istediği iddiasıdır. Bu argüman, halkların kendi mukadderatlarının kendilerinin tayin etmeleri (Auto-détérmination) prensibine istinat ettirilmeğe çalışılmakta ise de, bunun bir demagojiden başka bir şey olmadığı ve ilmi ciddiyet ve değerden tamamen mahrum bulunduğu aşikârdır. Kıbrıs, başlı başına bir (Entité) sayılamaz. Coğrafi, tarihi, ekonomik, askeri ve stratejik sebeplerle Küçük Asya'ya bağlı olan ve Anadolu ile bir bütün teşkil eden Kıbrıs Adası, nüfus bakımından Küçük Asya'dan ayrı olarak mütalâa edilemez. Bu böyle olunca, Kıbrıs Rumlarının, Küçük Asya ve Orta Doğu'daki Türk-İslam âlemi içinde küçük bir ekalliyetten başka bir şey olmadıkları kolayca anlaşılır.

Bundan başka, unutulmamalıdır ki, Küçük Asya'daki bu küçük Rum ekalliyetinin yarısı komünisttir ve Kıbrıs komünistleri Yunanistan'ı istemekte samimi değillerdir. Bunların hakiki maksatlarının Doğu Akdeniz bölgesinde huzursuzluk yaratmaktan başka bir şey olmadığı malumdur. Kıbrıs komünistinin reyini Kıbrıs'ın mukadderatını tâyin etmesine Türkiye asla razı olmayacaktır. Yunanlı dostlarımızın iddia ettikleri gibi, Adanın mukadderatının tayininde plebisite müracaat edilmesine hiçbir suretle müsaade edemeyiz. Kıbrıs'ın mukadderatı, coğrafi, tarihi, ekonomik, askeri ve stratejik faktörlere ve Türkiye'nin emniyeti mülahazalarına göre hal edilecektir. Yunanlı dostlarımızın da, Kıbrıs'ın Rum sekenesiyle mahalli ilhakçı tahrikâtı idare eden papazların da bunu böyle bilmeleri gerekir.

Beyanatımıza son vermeden evvel şu noktayı bilhassa belirtmek isteriz ki, Türk gençliği, Türk-Yunan dostluğunun ehemmiyetini müdriktir ve bugünkü dünya şartları içinde bu dostluğun bir zaruret olduğuna kanidir. Ancak, dostluğun icaplarına riayetini, bir taraflı olarak yalnız bize düşen bir vazife olmadığını da Yunanlı dostlarımızın takdir etmeleri icap eder.

Türk Milleti, Türk-Yunan dostluğuna önem verdiği içindir ki, düpedüz haksızlık olduğuna kani bulunmasına rağmen, Oniki Ada'nın Yunan hakimiyetine terkedilmesine itiraz etmemiştir. Fakat hiçbir mesul Türk Hükümeti, Yunan dostluğunun hatırı için, Anadolu'nun ayrılmaz birer parçası olan bu özbeöz Türk topraklarının birbiri peşinden Yunanistan'a ihsan edilmesine müsaade edemez. Hiçbir mesul Türk Hükümeti, yüz bin kişilik Kıbrıs Türk kütlesini dört asırlık Türk düşmanlığının insafına terkedemez. Türk Gençliğinin, gerekirse Türk-Yunan dostluğunu dahi feda ederek Kıbrıs için çarpışmak kararında olduğunu, mesul Türk Hükümeti hesaba katmak zorundadır. Yunanistan'ı idare edenlerin Türkiye realitelerini iyi bilmeleri ve tehlikeli Kıbrıs mevzuu ile oynamaktan biran evvel vazgeçmeleri, Türk-Yunan dostluğunun istikbali nâmına temenniye şâyandır.

Türk Gençlik teşekkülleri, bu beyannameleri ile Türkiye umumi efkârına tercüman olduklarına emindirler; ve Yunanlı dostlarımız pekâlâ bilirler ki, Türk umumi efkârının temayülleri demokrat Türk Hükümetinin üzerinde kuvvetle müessirdir.

Türkiye Milli Gençlik Komitesi Genel Kurul Başkanı İlhan Yetkin; Türkiye Milli Gençlik Komitesi Genel Sekreteri Vedat Özsan; Türkiye Milli Talebe

Federasyonu Genel Başkanı Ali İhsan Çelikkan; Ankara Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği Başkanı Öznur Taylan; Ankara Yüksek Tahsil Talebe Birliği Başkanı Ahmet Çakıroğlu; İstanbul Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği Başkanı Turgut Şedele; İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği Başkanı Hulusi Çetinoğlu; İstanbul Yüksek Okullar Talebe Birliği Başkanı Demirtaş Celal Bayar; İzmir Yüksek Ekonomi ve Ticaret Okulu Talebe Cemiyeti Başkanı Ergun Göksan, Zonguldak Teknik Okulu Talebe Cemiyeti Başkanı Necdet Baş; Lozan Türk Talebe Cemiyeti Başkanı Orhan Aldıkaçtı; Türk Devrim Ocakları İstanbul İl Başkanı Rıza Serhatoğlu; Türk Kadınlar Birliği İstanbul Başkanı İffet Halim Oruz; Yeşilay Gençlik Kolu Başkanı Aytekin Ozan; Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Birliği Başkanı Y. Mehmet Ali Pamir; Kıbrıs Türk Kültür ve Yardım Cemiyeti Başkanı Dr. Derviş Manizade.

APPENDIX E

DENKTAŞ'S PROPOSALS FOR CONFEDERATION

31 August 1998

As a final effort to achieve a mutually acceptable lasting solution in Cyprus I propose the establishment of a Cyprus Confederation based on the following arrangement:

- 1) A special relationship between Turkey and the TRNC on the basis of agreements to be concluded.
- 2) A similar special relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration on the basis of symmetrical agreements to be concluded.
- 3) Establishment of a Cyprus Confederation between the TRNC and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
- 4) The 1960 Guarantee System shall continue.
- 5) The Cyprus Confederation may, if both parties jointly agree, pursue a policy of accession to the EU. Until Turkey's full membership of the EU, a special arrangement will provide Turkey with the full rights and obligations of an EU member with regard to the Cyprus Confederation. The ultimate aim of the negotiations will thus be a partnership settlement which will be a confederated structure composed of two peoples and of two states of the island supported by symmetrical agreements with the two respective motherlands and guarantor states. All rights and powers which are not referred to the confederal state/entity will reside with the two confederated states. The agreement to be reached as a result of the negotiations will be submitted for approval in separate referenda. By participating in these negotiations the parties will acknowledge that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides are two sovereign and equal states, each with its own functioning democratic institutions and jurisdiction, reflecting the political equality and the will of their respective peoples. They will also acknowledge that the authorities of one party do not represent the other. We believe that only this structure will provide for the security of both sides, will safeguard their identity and well-being. If the Greek Cypriots agree to this final basis, we are ready to begin negotiations to establish the Cyprus Confederation.